Neo-Ottomanist Hegemonic Order and its Implications on Ankara’s Foreign Policy in the Balkans by Egeresi, Zoltán
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ZOLTÁN EGERESI 
 
Neo-Ottomanist Hegemonic Order and its 
Implications on Ankara’s Foreign Policy in the 
Balkans 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Budapest, 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corvinus University of Budapest 
 
International Relations 
Multidisciplinary 
Doctoral School 
International and Security 
Studies Subprogram 
 
PHD THESIS 
 
Zoltán EGERESI 
 
Neo-Ottomanist Hegemonic Order and its 
Implications on Ankara’s Foreign Policy in the 
Balkans 
 
 
 
Supervisors: 
 
László Csicsmann, Dr. Habil 
Erzsébet N. Rózsa, Dr. Habil. 
 
 
 
Budapest, 2018 
© Zoltán Egeresi 
3 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 5 
List of Figures, Tables and Maps ................................................................................................... 6 
List of Abbreviations ..................................................................................................................... 8 
Introduction 10 
Hypotheses, methodology and literature review ....................................................................... 21 
1. Hypotheses ........................................................................................................................ 21 
1.1. Conceptualizing Turkish foreign policy ...................................................................... 21 
1.2. Hypothesis 1 – Neo-Ottomanism in Turkish foreign policy ....................................... 28 
1.3. Hypothesis 2 – The AKP’s neoliberal foreign policy ................................................... 38 
2. Theoretical Foundations .................................................................................................... 42 
2.1. Gramscianism ............................................................................................................ 42 
2.2. Neo-Gramscianism..................................................................................................... 47 
3. Methodology ............................................................................................................... 55 
4. Literature review on the AKP’s foreign policy ............................................................ 57 
4.1. Leaving the friends or justified claims for an autonomous foreign policy? .............. 59 
4.2. Qualitative change in foreign policy making? ............................................................ 64 
4.3. Continuation of the previous governments’ foreign policy? ..................................... 73 
4.4. Academic literature on the Turkish foreign policy and the Balkans .......................... 77 
Constructing hegemony: the AKP’s rule in Turkey ..................................................................... 86 
1. Emergence of the Islamist counter-hegemonic project ............................................. 86 
1.1. New hegemonic bloc and the establishment of the Republic ............................... 86 
1.2. Naissance of the Islamist Middle Classes and the rise of Islamist parties ............. 89 
2. The AKP’s hegemony ................................................................................................... 96 
2.1. Electoral success: making electoral hegemony ...................................................... 96 
2.2. War of position ..................................................................................................... 102 
   2.2.1.Neoliberalism and economic success ..................................................... 102 
   2.2.2.The role of the EU in hegemony building ............................................... 107 
2.2.3.Changing identity discourse ................................................................... 111 
2.2.4.Promise of democratization ................................................................... 113 
2.2.5.Conflicts with veto powers ..................................................................... 115 
2.3. Moment of hegemony .......................................................................................... 120 
2.3.1.Cementing the AKP’s power................................................................... 120 
2.3.2.Ottomanalgia.......................................................................................... 123 
2.3.3.Making Neo-Ottomanist cultural policy ................................................. 127 
2.4. Moment of crisis ....................................................................................................... 132 
4 
 
2.4.1.Challenges of the hegemonic order ........................................................ 132 
2.4.2.Successful crisis management and growing authoritarianism ............... 136 
2.4.3.Towards Caesarism? ............................................................................... 141 
2.5. Limits of AKP’s hegemony ............................................................................................. 144 
   2.5.1.Societal features and electoral geography ............................................. 144 
Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans ......................................................................................... 149 
1. Decomposing the Balkans ......................................................................................... 149 
1.1. Ottoman heritage and kin in the Balkans ................................................................. 149 
1.2 The Balkans ‘in’ Turkey .............................................................................................. 164 
1.3. Portraying the Balkans – the region in the AKP’s rethoric ....................................... 170 
2. Co-opting the Kin: Neo-Ottomanist features of the foreign policy .................................. 180 
2.1. Main patterns in Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans until 2002 ........................... 180 
2.2. Foreign policy of co-option ...................................................................................... 187 
2.3. Institutions of co-option ........................................................................................... 192 
2.4. Societal actors and hegemony: relations with TFP .................................................. 212 
2.5. Local allies: the co-option in practice ....................................................................... 237 
3. Turkey`s economic relations with the Balkans .......................................................... 243 
3.1. The role of economy in Turkish foreign policy ...................................................... 243 
3.2. Evaluation of Turkish-Balkans economic relations ............................................... 249 
Conclusion 264 
List of References ...................................................................................................................... 274 
Primary Sources .................................................................................................................... 274 
Secondary sources ................................................................................................................ 276 
News and reports ................................................................................................................. 301 
Statistical data and other ..................................................................................................... 306 
List of the Author’s related publications ................................................................................... 307 
Author’s conference participations ........................................................................................... 310 
 
5 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
First of all, I would like to thank to my supervisor Dr. habil. Erzsébet Rózsa N. 
and Dr. habil László Csicsmann for their continuous support, their patience and 
motivation. I am grateful for the encouragement, academic and mental support to 
Alexandra Nádor, Ágnes Bocskay, Dr. Ateș Uslu, Prof. Dr. Atila Eralp, Dr. Balázs Vizi, 
Berat Kılıç, Ceyda Özden, Diána Szőke, Dr. Emre Saral, Éva Ködmön, Mehran 
Ghasabeh, Miloš Marković, Dr. Mustafa Türkeș, Dr. Muzaffer Senel, Dr. Nándor Bárdi, 
Noémi Ritter, Özge Memișoǧlu, Dr. Özlem Kader, Róbert Venyige, Szandra Pátyodi, 
Dr. Srđan Mićić. 
I would like to express my gratitude to my former and current bosses, including 
Prof. Dr. József Padányi, Dr. Sándor Gallai and Dr. Péter Tálas for supporting me 
during the years of research and for their constructive attitude concerning my frequent 
visits to Turkey and the Balkans. Furthermore, I am also thankful to my colleagues at 
Center for Strategic and Defence Studies for their methodological, structural and 
stylistic advices. 
Last but not the least, I would like to thank my family: my parents for supporting 
me wholeheartedly throughout writing this thesis and never forgetting to ask when the 
work would be finished.  
Last but not least, I would like to thank my family: my parents for supporting me 
wholeheartedly throughout writing this thesis and keep asking me when the work would 
be finished. 
6 
 
List of Figures, Tables and Maps 
 
Chart 1.   AKP's electoral performance (p. 96.) 
Chart 2.  Media Freedom in Turkey (p. 139.) 
Chart 3.  AKP's electoral performance and its share of parliamentary mandates (p. 145.) 
Chart 4.  CHP's electoral performance and its share of parliamentary mandates (p. 145.)  
Chart 5.  MHP's electoral performance and its share of parliamentary mandates (p.147.) 
Chart 6.  Kurdish parties' elecotral performance and their share of parliamentary 
mandates (p. 147.) 
Chart 7.  Turkey’s ODA towards the Balkans and its share in the total Turkish ODA 
without Syria (p. 195.) 
Chart 7.  The evoltuion of Turkey’s export and import during the AKP era (p. 247.) 
Chart 8.  Turkey’s trade of balance with SEE countries (p. 254.) 
Chart 9.  Share of Balkan countries’ exort and import in Turkey’s trade (p. 255.) 
Chart 10.  SEE countries’ share in Turkey’s export (%) (p. 257.) 
Chart 11.  SEE countries’ share in Turkey’s import (%) (p.258.) 
 
Table 1.  Changes in the status of EU accesion negotiation chapters (2006-2016)(p. 108) 
Table 2.  Turkish Political party membership and their proportion of votes (p. 122.) 
Table 3.  Approximate size of Muslim minorities in southeast Europe, by country  
 (p. 157.) 
Table 4.  Approximate number of Muslim minorities in southeast Europe, by linguistic 
group (p. 158.) 
Table 5.  Number of ethnic Turks in southeast Europe (p. 162.) 
Table 6.  Status of Turkish minority groups in southeast Europe (p. 163.) 
Table 7.  Turkey-Bosnia and Herzegovina-Serbia trilateral consultation 
mechanism’s summits (2009-2018) (p. 188.) 
7 
 
Table 8.   The TİKA’s projects by country in southeast Europe (p. 196.) 
Table 9.   Number of foreign students studying at Turkish universities (p. 199.) 
Table 10.   MRF’s electoral performance (p. 216.) 
Table 11.   Gülenist organisations and educational institutions in southeast Europe 
(p. 231-233.) 
Table 12.   Turkish minority’s political parties in southeast Europe (p. 238.) 
Table 13.   Ranking of Competitiveness of SEE countries (p. 251.) 
Table 14.   Biletarel inverstment agreements between Turkey and SEE countries  
   (p. 253.) 
Table 15.   Free Trade agreements between Turkey and SEE countries (p. 253.) 
Table 16.   Double Taxation Agreements between Turkey and SEE countries   
   (p. 253.) 
Table 17.   Turkey’s onward FDI (p. 261.) 
Table 18.   Main Turkish companies in SEE (p.262.) 
 
Map 1.   Ottoman conquest of the Balkans (p. 150) 
Map 2.   Territorial losses of the Ottoman Empire (p. 153.) 
Map 3.   Muslim population in the Balkans (p. 155.) 
Map 4.   Muslim communities in the Balkans (p. 160.) 
 
Figure 1.   The institutions and actors of Turkish foreign policy making (p. 193.) 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
List of Abbreviations 
 
AFAD  Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (Afet ve Acil 
Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı) 
AKP   Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) 
BSEC  Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
CHP   Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) 
CSCE   Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 
DEİK   Foreign Ecnomic Relations Board (Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu) 
DHKP-C  Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front Devrimci (Halk 
Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi) 
DIYANET   Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) 
DTP   Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi) 
EU   European Union 
GDF  General Directorate of Foundations (Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü) 
HDP   People’s Demorcatic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi) 
HSYK  Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (Hâkimler ve Savcılar 
Kurulu) 
İHH  Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian  
Relief İnsan (Hak ve Hürriyetleri İnsanı Yardım Vakfı) 
IR   International Relations 
ISPAT  Investment Support and Promotion Agency of Turkey (Yatırım 
Destek ve Tanıtım Ajansı) 
KDK  Coordinatorship of Public Diplomacy (Kamu Diplomasisi 
Koordinatörlüǧü) 
KDTP  Turkish Democratic Party of Kosovo (Kosova Demokratik Türk 
Partisi) 
MHP   Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi)  
MRF   Movement for Rights and Freedom (Hak ve Özgürlükler Hareketi) 
MÜSIAD  Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association (Müstakil 
Sanayici ve İş Adamları Derneği) 
OHAL   State of Emergency (Olağanüstü hal) 
9 
 
OSCE    Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
OYAK Armed Forces Mutual Assistance Fund (Ordu Yardımlaşma 
Kurumu) 
PKK   Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan) 
RCC   Regional Cooperation Council  
RS   Serb Republic (Republika Srbska) 
SDA   Party of Democratic Action (Stranka Demokratske Akcije) 
SEE   South-eastern Europe 
SEECP  South East European Countries Cooperation Process 
TBMM  Grand National Assembly of Turkey (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi) 
TDBB  Union of Turkish World Municipalities (Türk Dünyası Belediyeler 
Birliği) 
TDV   Turkey Diyanet Foundation (Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı) 
TFP   Turkish Foreign Policy 
TİKA Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (Türk İşbirliği ve 
Kalkınma İdaresi Başkanlığı) 
TİM   Turkish Exporters’ Assembly (Türkiye İhracatçılar Meclisi) 
TMV   Turkey Maarif Vakfı (Türkiye Maarif Vakfı) 
TOBB  Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (Türkiye 
Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği) 
TOKI  Public Housing Development Administration (Toplu Konut İdaresi      
Başkanlığı) 
TSK   Turkish Armed Forces (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri) 
TÜSIAD  Turkish Industry and Business Association (Türk Sanayicileri ve 
İşadamları Derneği) 
TUSKON  Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists in Turkey (Türkiye 
İșadamları ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu) 
UETD   Union of European Turkish Democrats 
YAŞ   Supreme Military Council (Yüksek Askeri Șura) 
YDK   Investment Adviasory Council (Yatırım Danıșma Konseyleri)  
YÖK   High Education Board (Yüksek Öğetim Kurumu) 
YTB Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (Yurt Dışı 
Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Bașkanlığı) 
10 
 
Introduction 
 
Probably the first questions that arise when one starts to depict Turkish foreign 
policy (TFP) towards the Balkans are ‘what does Turkey really do in the region and 
what does it really want to achieve?’ which practically means that research may focus 
on the tools and the object of Ankara’s external ambitions. Nevertheless, for the author, 
to reveal the cause seemed to be more relevant because it may provide a deeper 
understanding of Turkish foreign policy’s nature, motives and makes its prediction 
easier.  
Re-emergence as a powerful regional actor was a sign of a turn in TFP under the 
Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) rule. The AKP being in the power since 2002 
has produced probably one of the most debated and discussed contemporary foreign 
policies during the last more than a decade. This debate, or these debates – presented in 
a given chapter – preliminary rather focused on Ankara’s EU accession, later its stance 
towards its Western partners and its search for new allies. It is safe to say that the 
majority of scholars have chosen the Middle East as a case study to test and analyse 
Turkey’s foreign relations and their changing dynamics. The Arab Spring, and its 
tremendous effects in 2011 put Turkey, again in the centre of analysis and promoted it, 
again, to became a model for democratizing Arab countries. The ‘Turkish model,’ later 
Ankara’s growing difficulties in the Middle Eastern neighbours, especially the Syrian 
war has kept Turkey an important focal point of IR and FPA literature. However, 
Turkey’s growing leverage on its neighbours during the last 10-15 years also affected its 
relations with south-eastern European countries. 
News, articles, policy papers focusing on Turkey’s activism in the Balkans 
began to be frequently published / issued after the recently-nominated, new Foreign 
Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu’s visit in Sarajevo in fall 2009. At a conference organized 
in the Bosnian capital, he elaborated his ideas about Turkey’s historical mission in the 
Balkans and the need to reinstate good intraregional relations. His speech brought back 
Turkey to the spotlight (at least in the Balkans’ context) and gave an impetus to political 
analysts, researchers and journalists to work on Turkish foreign policy in South-Eastern 
Europe. Ankara’s successes in the region – as a facilitator of the rapprochement 
between Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, trade agreements, almost immediate 
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recognition and support of Kosovo, spectacular expansion of Turkish organizations etc. 
– provided enough ground for speculations and researches about the features of 
Ankara’s ambitions in the region. The public interest increased even in Hungary, as the 
issue was presented in various articles and lectures.1  
Lectures at international and domestic conferences or at simple university 
courses where the author had opportunity to present his ideas about Turkish foreign 
policy towards the region, questions have aroused usually focusing on Ankara’s 
political interests and its aims at achieving something, in the Balkans. This something 
was generally associated with hegemony. This narrative to explain Turkey’s activism in 
South-Eastern Europe, especially after 2009 when Ankara’s commitment for a much 
more tangible international presence has become obvious, has shaped the author’s focus 
point to begin to deal with Turkey’s leverage in the region. Without paying too much 
attention about the emerging discourse about Turkey’s (possible) rupture with its 
(former) Western allies and Western orientation the author wanted to go beyond 
‘traditional’ IR and FPA approaches and narratives concerning Turkey and understand 
the very nature of Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans. 
‘Go beyond’ during the PhD studies resulted in frequent research trips to the 
region.  Between 2011 and 2018, the Author has spent several months in the region; 
nearly two months in various Balkans countries, making researches and doing 
interviews with scholars, politicians and journalists about the topic. These journeys 
were taking place in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Kosovo, 
Macedonia (FYROM) and in Bulgaria. Probably the most influential field experiences 
were acquired during his staying in Turkey, especially in Ankara, at the Middle East 
Technical University where he had the opportunity to get familiar with the Turkish (and 
even English) academic literature about the issue. His point of view was also shaped by 
trips within Turkey. By visiting various towns and cities in the country from south-
eastern Anatolia’s Syrian border to Edirne, as well as the most Westernized cities, such 
as Izmir or conservative strongholds, like Konya put the picture in a different aspect.  
Interviews with experts and politicians alongside what he has seen in the Balkans and in 
Turkey convinced him to use a different approach to explain Turkish foreign policy. 
These characteristics of the period have produced a rather Area Studies than 
International Relations epistemology. This has changed the problematique’s starting 
                                                          
1 It is enough to think Erhan Türbedar’s presentation about Turkish foreign policy in the region, in 2012 
at the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs. 
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point. Without going into details about the difference of the two disciplines – it is 
enough to mention that the end of Cold War rather favoured the IR theories and 
approaches as they were able to provide a globally used explanatory framework based 
on rational choice theory that contributed to the decline in AS’s popularity –, the main 
result was that the author has become more susceptible for the region and especially for 
its internal dynamics. Based on these experiences and knowledge, he got convinced by 
the end of his research about three findings. 
 
1) Describing the TFP and the in the region as Ankara’s endeavour 
to create hegemony or – in a more realistic approach – dominance over various 
Balkans countries leads to a cul-de-sac. Portraying Turkey’s growing diplomatic 
activities as simple power projection of an emerging, ambitious middle power 
does not give adequate explanations to understand what is behind of this 
phenomenon. Albeit the literature about regional hegemony is growing and it 
could provide some useful explanations and valuable findings, as an analytical 
approach it remains too questionable and consequently too discussible. First of 
all, there is no consensus about the precise conditions for the notion of ‘being 
dominant over a region.’ Economic leverage does not lead to direct political 
leverage automatically and it is also arbitrary to set a level of (inter)dependence 
based on a given percentage of trade or investment. Concerning the political 
leverage, it is even more complex issue, and it is even more difficult to provide 
tangible conditions or given numbers about the measurability of hegemony or 
dominance. Furthermore, many scholars also express their doubts about 
Turkey’s hegemony in the Balkans. For instance, Buzan sees that although 
Turkey plays an important role in the region, according to him Ankara cannot 
compete with the EU or US in shaping the region’s future and it will remain an 
insulator state despite its leadership’s willingness to break out from this status 
(Buzan – Wǽver, 2003, 394-395).  
 
2) The above-mentioned first-hand experiences were convincing to 
pay more attention on domestic political changes and dynamics in Turkey itself. 
The Justice and Development Party took the power in November 2002 by a 
surprising electoral victory that granted the party a two-third majority in the 
parliament and prevented the previous government’s coalition parties to pass the 
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10 percent threshold. This victory was surprising (or historical) for another 
reason as well: the party has managed to form a single-party government which 
put an end to an eleven-year-long period of almost permanent government 
coalition crisis. The upcoming years brought nearly constant electoral success 
for the AKP that has started to create its own regime. This topic will be 
elaborated later in details; here it is enough to note that the party’s position, its 
clienteles has become more and more apparent. The AKP-era – which is still far 
from its end – has been featured by steady economic growth and prosperity – 
except in 2009 when huge downturn of GDP affected the country – providing 
adequate support from the society. Alongside with the political stability 
produced by the single-party government, this ensured the AKP enough 
opportunity to face its internal adversaries, especially the Turkish Armed Forces 
(TSK), the establishment, left-wing social groups and the Gülen movement, a 
former ally. By handling these opponents, the party has created its own leverage 
over the society – let’s say its own political hegemony in Turkey. A hegemony 
that influences almost every part of the daily life. 
 
3)  Current Turkish society is a product of its own cultural and 
historical past. As it is highly propagated in Turkey, the country has multiple 
identities in line with its rich cultural heritage. This narrative appears related to 
the Balkans as well; when one visits especially Muslim inhabited regions of the 
peninsula the similarities with Turkey could be easily identified. According even 
to Turks, they feel themselves ‘at home’ in the Balkans. This ‘feeling’ is 
embedded into the Turkish society by various waves of immigration and influx 
of hundreds of thousands people – Turks, Pomaks, Bosniaks, Albanians – that 
have taken place during the last more than one and half century. Descendants in 
many cases preserve the history of their family, ancestry sometimes in more 
palpable way or sometimes at least with a positive stance on the region. This 
feature, – affecting the society in Turkey – was a particular argument for not to 
neglect the historical background of the current situation and also pay attention 
to societal actors during the research. 
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It has become obvious that although the relations between Turkey and the 
Balkans2 provide an excellent ground for a thesis presenting and discussing the history 
of Turkish foreign policy with a historian’s tools and point of view, it, however, could 
not be enough to explain the current relations adequately. History and the developments 
of bi- and multilateral relations, the notion of Balkans and Ottoman heritage occupy an 
important part of this dissertation. Nevertheless, simply revealing the various conflicts 
of the last century, immigration waves, wars and Turkey’s current activities in a linear 
manner would have narrowed the scope of the thesis and hide important social and 
political changes in the country’s recent history. Nonetheless, the author admits that 
more extended researches and prospective publications about the history of relations 
between the Balkans and Turkey would strengthen the Hungarian Balkanologie.  
These findings also pointed out the importance of two notions: power and 
dynamism. The preliminary assumption of the research – Turkey’s hegemony or 
dominance over various countries directly put power into the heart of this research 
project. Nevertheless, further fieldworks convinced the Author, that scope from 
predominantly inter-state relations should be switched to domestic level. Power that 
runs and shapes politics within a country shapes its foreign policy as well. In a country 
like Turkey, where power struggle was so apparent during the 20th century (relatively 
frequent coup d’états, regimes changes) and successive hegemonic and counter-
hegemonic project dominated the political landscape from the Young Turks to Recep 
Tayyip Erdoǧan’s AKP. That is why the Author decided to highlight the changes of 
Turkish domestic political structure which influences the country’s foreign activism. 
This focal point – the nature of power in the domestic Turkish context – made it 
indispensable to turn towards a theory that has adequate explanatory force to understand 
                                                          
2 The Author has to address the problem of definition of the ’Balkans.’ A number of approaches exist that 
defines the region geographically, politically and consequently gives different country groupings for it. 
According to some perceptions, even Turkey shall be considered as a Balkan country which also 
underlines the country’s relevance for the region (some five percent of Turkey, including the half of 
Istanbul and its metropolitan area is also located in the geographical Balkan area). Without presenting the 
literature about the possible definition of the region the Author defines the Balkans as a political-
geographical area consisting of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo, 
Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria and Romania. The Author does not consider Greece to be part of this 
analytical country grouping. Its reason is twofold. Firstly, it is linked to the fact that during the Cold War, 
Greece’s history and development started to diverge from Socialist Balkan states (that now, after a long 
period of transition, intend to catch up to Athens). Secondly, Greek-Turkish relations are more intensive 
due to the permanent problems such as the dispute about the exact delimitation of the Aegean Sea border 
and more importantly, because of the Cyprus issue. The involvement of this issue would extend the limits 
of present thesis. Slovenia is not considered as a Balkan country, either. Due to its different history – it 
was a core part of Austria for centuries – and the lack of Ottoman conquest, it shall be put to other 
country group such as Central Europe.  
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the dynamics of internal factors and features of Turkish foreign policy. The dynamics 
also suggested orienting towards a theoretical framework that can explain the causes of 
changes in Turkish foreign policy. 
Robert W. Cox states ‘Theory is always for someone and for some purpose’ 
(Cox, 1981, 128). These considerations set the focus on Gramscianism and Neo-
Gramscianism that has been proven to be useful and fruitful theoretical approaches for 
this thesis. After the emergence of AKP as a governmental party in 2002, the scholars 
did not predict a long future based on the party Islamic roots and the fate of its 
predecessors – banned regularly by the Constitutional Court. Although the AKP got a 
remarkably strong presence at the parliament only with one opposition party 
(Republican People’s Party, CHP), the secular elite and especially the Army were 
observing with deep suspicions the party’s rhetoric, domestic and foreign policy 
endeavours. The experience about the closure of former Islamist parties oriented the 
AKP leadership to use a more Pro-European rhetoric and follow an EU-conform policy-
making. Accompanied with a remarkable economic growth, this policy ensured 
electoral victory for the following elections.  
After tackling the threat imposed by the Kemalist establishment – namely the e-
memorandum in April 2007 and the so-called ‘constitutional coup’ attempt by the Chief 
Prosecutor and Constitutional Court in 2008 – the AKP continued to increase its 
influence. This process was – at least indirectly – helped by various investigations and 
probes, like the Ergenekon and Balyoz. These contributed to weaken the opposition 
forces, as (retired) generals, university rectors, Leftist politicians, intellectuals and 
journalists were detained and later condemned for prison. These affaires have decreased 
the criticism against the government. Moreover, they also influenced the relations 
between the AKP and the Army by easing the transformation of the latter’s leadership. 
The next wave of internal fights started at the end of 2013: probes were launched by the 
judiciary, however this time they aimed at pro-government circles and led to 
government crisis. This attempt refrained as a coup attempt by the “parallel state” 
(paralel devlet) – the Gülen movement (later referred as FETÖ, a terrorist organisation) 
– was handled by the mass dismissal and an open war against the movement. This 
internat struggle culminated in the 15 July coup attempt which failed and paved the way 
towards even harsher retaliation and almost the annihilation of the movement.  
The 2010 constitutional referendum also paved the way towards the growth of 
AKP’s power as it made more difficult to ban political parties and changed the 
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Constitutional Court’s stature. The general elections in June 2011 granted the highest 
share of votes in the party’s history: near 50 percent. Although the third Erdoğan 
government’s term second half resulted in unprecedented social unrest and corruption 
scandals, AKP manage to overcame these challenges and even win the local elections in 
March 2014. This era has been finished by Erdoğan victory at the presidential elections 
in August 2014. He could save its position after the 2015 June elections when the AKP 
could not seize the simple majority. The snap elections in November secured the party a 
comfortable majority in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) but the 
Turkish ‘War on Terror’ launched in July 2015 led to the gradual destabilization of the 
country, growing insecurity, perpetual attacks by PKK/TAK and ISIS. Although the 
coup attempt in 2016 did not achieve its goal the increasing authoritarian tendencies, 
spreading violence and the gradual crackdown of Kurdish political movement with the 
constitutional change open a new chapter of the modern history of Turkey. 
These domestic changes affected the country’s foreign policy in a great manner. 
One of the main theoretical questions of the thesis is that how domestic political 
(power) transformation shapes a country’s foreign policy goals, tools and 
characteristics. The other one is related to how international world order influences the 
nature of the domestic power, and consequently the foreign policy.  
In this context this thesis intends to provide adequate answers to the question of 
1) whether Gramscian and Neo-Gramscian theory can be as a theoretical framework in 
the analysing the Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans. This piece would make an 
attempt to elaborate 2) why and how Turkish foreign policy has changed during the 
AKP-era, especially after the nomination of Davutoğlu. The thesis 3) reflects to the 
current debate about Turkish foreign policy conflicts with its traditional Western allies 
and its reorientation towards its ‘newly found’ neighbourhood. In this respect, this work 
4) evaluates Ankara’s foreign policy as well. 
To answer these questions and achieve these goals, this dissertation is divided 
into three main parts. The first one portrays the methodology and hypotheses, elaborates 
the theoretical foundations and gives an overview about the debates on TFP. In the 
second main chapter, the Author presents the AKP’s political emergence and the 
internal power transformation that features the period between 2002 and 2018. 
Although the dissertation outlines the historical background of the political trajectory of 
Islamist parties, it rather focuses on this 16-year-long period which starts 3 November 
2002 by the electoral victory of the AKP and lasts until the 24 June 2018 parliamentary 
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and presidential elections which cemented the AKP’s power and introduced the 
presidential system in Turkey creating a cornerstone in the process of hegemony 
building. This chapter elaborates the features of the AKP’s hegemony in Turkey and its 
neo-Ottoman political cultural characteristics. This section also shows how neoliberal 
world order affected Turkey. The third part establishes the links between the party’s 
hegemony and its foreign policy towards the Balkans. This chapter explains why 
usually Muslim communities play a central role in Turkey’s ambitions and how Turkish 
decision-makers portray the Balkans. It analyses the activities of Turkish foreign policy 
institutions and the non-governmental actors’ role in representing Ankara’s interests. 
Furthermore, this chapter also address the economic relations between Balkan countries 
and Turkey. 
By the end of the introduction, the Author has to confess why he has chosen this 
topic for research beyond his willingness to contribute to the development of Social 
Sciences and to enlarge the available knowledge about Turkey and the Balkans.  
 
1) Testing theory 
This thesis’s theoretical framework offers a unique case and approach to explain 
current political dynamics within Turkey and its foreign policy making, 
especially towards the Balkans. Gramsci’s political materialist theory about 
hegemony and the construction of hegemonic bloc is not unknown in the 
Hungarian and international literature, however, in Hungary its ‘application’ is 
very limited. There is no Hungarian translation of his famous Prisons notebooks; 
only some chapters or parts were published that is far inadequate to make 
extended research in Hungarian about his theory that explains why his idea had 
very limited effects on Hungarian researches. Nonetheless, his ideas have a 
valuable explanatory capability to reveal and understand AKP’s domestic 
politics in Turkey, and some dimensions of its foreign policy. Nevertheless, it is 
just one side of the coin. 
The ‘re-invention of Gramsci’ by American IR theorists helped to redefine its 
preliminary, rather society-oriented theory. Robert W. Cox has changed the 
previous scope by broadening to the global level. He and his followers offered a 
system-level analytical framework based on permanent change and movement 
refusing a static approach and admitting the relevance of dynamism. This theory 
explaining the world order by the US neoliberal hegemony that other states 
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intend to adapt and realize their own (neoliberal) hegemonic projects creates a 
valuable opportunity to analyse Turkish foreign policy at system-level. By 
combining these two theories, it provides a case for expanding ‘usual’ 
theoretical frameworks. Finally, the poor representation of Neo-Gramscian 
theory in Hungarian literature also legitimizes the Author’s choice that could 
contribute to broaden the tools for conceptualizing and understanding a given 
country’s foreign policy. 
 
2) Importance of Turkey 
Turkey as a middle-power has a particular role in current international relations. 
Possessing with a strategic location, it occupies the interception of three conflict 
zones that shapes contemporary international relations.  Nowadays, one of these 
regions seems to be rather peaceful – the Balkans where two bloody wars were 
taking place in the 1990’s. Other two regions, the Caucasus and the Middle East 
constitute a troublesome neighbourhood for Turkey. Ankara’s involvement in 
the Syrian war also strengthened its leverage in the international field. As a host 
of more than 3 million refugees, it was a key actor in handling the 2015 refugee 
crisis that also affected Hungary. Turkey could give a fresh impetus to the EU 
accession negotiations benefitting from the crisis. 
Furthermore, Ankara conducts a rather proactive foreign policy in order to 
influence of the outcome of current political processes at adjacent territories. Its 
position, its ambitions also increase the country’s importance within the 
international community: the AKP’s government growing activities passed the 
border of the neighbouring regions, and even its ‘traditional’ partners like the 
US, EU or Central Asia. Now, Ankara targets Africa, Latin-America and Far-
East. During recent years, Turkish foreign policy tools were diversified; e. g. the 
Turkish Development Agency’s (TİKA) performance was rocketing. The 
foreign policy is just one field that makes Turkey an excellent field of research. 
The social and political transformation that occurs in the country throughout the 
Justice and Development Party rule is a particular phenomenon in the Muslim 
World. Probably Turkey is the Muslim state that made the most steps towards 
democracy even if this process does not avoid ambiguities and nowadays one 
can see more authoritarian tendencies in the country that advances to the 
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presidential system. Despite the difficulties this feature offers a unique case to 
analyse this transformation effects on foreign policy pursuit.  
 
3) Balkans’ relevance for Hungary 
Choosing Turkey’s relations with the Balkans as a central problematique of the 
research was highly linked to Hungary. As a Hungarian researcher, the author 
wanted to focus on an issue which is not just geographically located close to 
Hungary but may concern his country’s public opinion, academic community 
and even decision-makers. Turkey’s current activities influence a region with 
which Hungary shares common history. Due to the geographical proximity, 
Hungary’s foreign policy based on its own strategic interests, meets the Turkish 
one and it may lead to cooperation or even competition. In order to understand 
Turkey’s growing ambitions in the region, it cannot be analysed without 
extensive research and understanding the internal processes and their effects on 
foreign policy making. Various centres focusing on the region, such as the 
valuable work of the Geographical Department of University of Pécs contributed 
to understand the internal demographic, economic and socio-political 
development in the Balkans. The Author believes that putting the scope on 
Ankara in the regional context may also help to understand the internal 
tendencies. 
 
4) Following Orientalist tradition 
The other, Hungary-related aspect was the willingness to follow the Orientalist 
line in the country’s scientific history. Although the author considers himself as 
a political scientist, he intends to channel its research focus to the East. Started 
with ÁrminVámbéry, Ottoman Empire – as Turkey can be considered as its 
hereditary – was a key element for Hungarian orientalists in order to understand 
our history and culture. Furthermore, during communist era Hungarian 
Turkologists such as György Németh conducted their researches in Bulgaria’s 
Turkish inhabited regions. The political scientist approach used in the 
dissertation intends to broaden and in the same time to follow this Orientalist 
tradition. 
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5) Author’s personal stance 
Closely linked to the above mentioned reasoning, the author personal interest 
also influenced why he has chosen this topic. A number of years ago, as simple 
university student he started to deal with Turkish minority living in the Balkans, 
and later he turned towards Turkey. Meanwhile, he preserved his interest 
towards Turkish minority groups and the Balkans as a whole which convinced 
him to bring together these topics in a dissertation. Due to his researches which 
were realized – alongside with long hours spent in various libraries and archives 
– as extended field researches in Balkans countries and in Turkey itself, the 
author hopes that information and sources gathered by previous years may 
contribute to his deeper understanding of the region and Turkey’s domestic and 
foreign policy. 
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Hypotheses, methodology and literature review 
 
1. Hypotheses 
1.1. Conceptualizing Turkish foreign policy 
 
Before the Author would show the contemporary discourses and ongoing 
debates about Turkish foreign policy, he has to address the need of a theoretical 
framework. Although one will see a wide range of interpretations, it is important to 
point out that the vast majority of scholars agree that something has changed during the 
AKP governments. The features of this change embrace a wide spectrum: from 
arguments about the personalisation of external relations (Türkeş, 2008) to the 
interpretation of a structural change in foreign policy orientation, and not (just) in the 
process and the tools of policy making. According to the ‘drift-literature’ Ankara has 
made a major correction in its foreign policy orientation, especially after 2007 or 2009. 
The most palpable sign of this reorientation was an opening towards the Middle East 
and Arab countries, which roughly overlapped with the decline of EU accession 
discourse in Turkish domestic politics and the simultaneous troubles with the EU 
negotiation process. 
The main features of the ‘new’ foreign policy are: 
1) A new discourse of a more autonomous foreign policy, 
2) A growing involvement of think-tanks and media in shaping the public 
opinion about the foreign policy making,  
3)  A growing commitment towards the neighbouring regions, especially the 
Middle East, the Balkans and the Caucasus, 
4) A growing activity in Africa, the Far-East and Latin America, 
5) A declining commitment and increasingly hostile discourse towards 
Western partners, 
6) EU accession fatigue and decreasing harmonization/ negotiation efforts, 
7) A growing importance of soft power and soft power tools, 
8) An increase in number of foreign policy related institutions 
9) Growing activism in international organisations. 
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To conceptualise this change a number of paradigms have emerged. One of 
them, Eurasianism, or its predecessor, pan-Turanism3 was rather a common 
interpretation of Turkish foreign policy orientation in the 1990s (Türk, 2013). After the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, Turgut Özal turned towards the Central Asian Turkic 
republics aiming at creating new leverage over the newly independent countries. Özal 
was the first Turkish leader facing the radical geopolitical challenges that came with the 
collapse of the Eastern Bloc, the Soviet Union, the Yugoslav wars and the second Gulf 
war that pushed Turkey to reconsider its Cold War position and redefine its identity in 
line with its ‘national interests.’ The ideological tool for this expansion was pan-
Turanism or pan-Turkism that intended to build on the Turkic identity. During the 
1990’s, the efforts did not achieve the desired results,4 and the very end of the nineties 
brought a new impetus into Ankara’s endeavours to become a member of the European 
Union. Nevertheless, the commitment towards Central Asia and the Turkic cause has 
not vanished from Ankara’s diplomatic landscape completely. Interestingly, this concept 
reappeared as Eurasianism (Tüysüzoğlu, 2014) that was a left wing idea, but it gained 
support in nationalist and even Islamist circles.5 Although various nationalist groups 
have been disseminating the idea of a Turkic centric world, Turkish Eurasianism gained 
after the early 2000’s a new momentum. After translating Alexander Dugin Russian 
Geopolitics the Turkish public could become familiar with Russian Eurasianism and 
Dugin’s anti-US stance that found some supporters (İmanbeyli, 2015). While Ankara 
started to establish closer relation with Moscow and Erdoǧan raised the idea of joining 
the Sanghai Cooperation Organisation several journalists and pundits have thought that 
Turkey had a real ambition to create a strategic partnership with Asian countries. 
                                                          
3Pan-Turanism appeared at the beginning of the 20th century and played a major role in the Ottoman 
Empire’s entering the World War I. It aimed at unifying the Turkic people of Central Asia within the 
Empire that could not achieve its realisation. However, the idea was influential for the contemporary 
intellectuals, and could survive the Atatürk era and the following decades when pan-Turkist ideology was 
banned from the state apparatus and foreign policy making. During this time the ideology of pan-
Turanism has transformed to pan-Turkism and it started to focus mainly on Turkic people.  It re-emerged 
as an accepted but not promoted ideology (by the state) during the 1970’s when Alparslan Türkeș became 
the leader of the extreme right in Turkey. The collapse of the Soviet Union created considerably better 
conditions for the ideology as Ankara has become able to shape effectively its relations with Central Asia 
and the Caucasus (Azerbaijan). 
4One of the main projects was to create a common alphabet that failed due to the resistance of the Central 
Asian republics. Turkish language could not become a lingua franca in the region, either. Even the 
preliminary impetus creating new international organisations with the participation of Turkic republics 
had limited results. The expected Turkic alliance also failed due to the deteriorated relations with 
Uzbekistan. 
5The Gülen movement has rapidly become an influential actor in Central Asia. As usual, the movement 
focused on the education sector. It established a number of high schools and universities in Central Asia 
that emerged as the best educational centres in the region. 
23 
 
Nevertheless, the distance and diverging interest with Russia concerning Ukraine, Syria 
or the Caucasus, the Russian sanctions and diplomatic row after downing the SU-24 in 
November 2015 have shown the conflicts. 
The beginning of the 2000s, when the anchor of the Turkish foreign policy was 
EU-membership, a number of scholars explained the changes by referring to the 
Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy. In case of Turkey as an aspirant or candidate-
state, the process of Europeanisation6 was defined in terms of the domestic changes 
which occurred due to the adaptation to European legislation, norms and the 
implementation of the harmonisation process (Ulusoy, 2009; Kaliber, 2012). The EU 
played a substantial role in stimulating internal change (Mültüfer-Bac, 2005, 17). In this 
regard, one perceives the changes in Turkish foreign policy as a result of a top-down 
process between the EU and the candidate country (Ovalı, 2012). As Ovalı states: 
 
‘When foreign policy is considered, the EU lacks its supranational power but still capable of imposing 
pressures on Turkey to furthering the structural and ideational transformations in the foreign policy 
domain. Therefore, the effects of Europeanization in Turkish foreign policy through conditionality were 
not only limited to administrative and institutional changes but in the meantime transformed Turkey’s 
traditional security-dominated foreign policy approach as well (Ovalı, 2012, 4).’ 
 
According to this interpretation, Ankara could re-evaluate its relations with its 
neighbourhood and also transform the rigid foreign policy making process to a more 
European one that involves the vox populi in the decision making process. The foreign 
policy has become a part of public debate and civil society also appeared as an 
important factor in shaping the country’s relations. For instance, the government’s effort 
to solve the Cyprus issue is a clear sign of the Europeanisation of the foreign policy 
(Tersi, 2005). 
However, the loss of momentum in the EU accession talks, especially after the 
end of 2006 also resulted in a slowdown in the Europeanisation. The transformation of 
agenda setting in Ankara’s foreign relations, like opening towards the Middle East and 
growing difficulties with Brussels and other EU member countries, like Germany and 
France needed to be admitted by a new paradigm. Ovalı argues that the unsuccessful 
Annan Plan referendum and the deteriorating relations with Cyprus and it’s blocking the 
openening of new negotiation chapters significantly contributed to this turn. This 
                                                          
6 The notion of Europeanisation has various approaches. Usually the scientific literature labels the 
bottom-up process of the EU member states to build, strengthen the institutions of the European Union 
(e.g. European Parliament). Another interpretation of Europeanisation refers to the candidate countries’ 
internal processes aiming at adapting to the Union norms and legislation.  
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change can be evaluated as the ‘Re-nationalization’ of Turkish foreign policy (Ovalı, 
2012, 11). The paradigm of Europeanization as an explanation of Ankara’s diplomacy 
has become more and more marginalized due to the increasing ‘self-confidence’ of 
Turkish governments. The 2009 economic crisis in Europe and the subsequent euro 
crisis that affected the Eurozone, especially Greece, a country that Turkey shares a 
common border with, also contributed to the decrease of the EU institutions’ influence. 
The EU’s difficulties in handling the refugee crisis in 2015-2016 was also perceived in 
Turkey as a clear sign of its transformative power’s decline (Öniș-Kutlay, 2017). Some 
highlight that these crises led to the de-Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy 
(Ovalı, 2013, Demirtaș 2015) through impelling decision makers in Ankara to find new 
alternatives for investment and trade. Simultaneously, the decline of the EU also 
contributed to a more ambitious and self-conscious Turkey and the worldwide economic 
crisis was one of the main factors behind the country's current drift away from 
Europeanization (Ovalı, 2013, 21). 
Ziya Öniş and Şuhnaz Yılmaz also reflect to a drift that changed the focal point 
in Turkish foreign policy from Europeanization to “soft Euro-Asianism” (Öniş – 
Yılmaz, 2009). They argue that this new shift means that ‘foreign policy activism is 
pursued with respect to all neighbouring regions but does not form an EU axis’ which is 
very distinct from the “hard Euro-Asianism” what would result a more palpable loss of 
the EU and Western orientation (Öniş – Yılmaz, 13, 2009). According to them, a great 
number of elements of continuity can be identified within the AKP’s foreign policy 
when compared with the previous governments. Throughout its first term, the AKP 
executed a set of economic and democratic reforms initiated by the Ecevit government 
(1999-2002). This period lasted until 2005 and it was the Golden Age of 
Europeanisation in Turkey. After 2006, the decline in EU commitment paved the way 
for a “soft Euro-Asianism” that also showed many similarities with the previous 
government, for example with that of Özal, which practically means that elements of 
Europeanisation and euro-asianism ‘have coexisted during both period ‘(Öniş – Yılmaz, 
16, 2009). 
Others state that the Turkish foreign policy has gone through a Middle-
Easternisation that has changed Ankara’s point of gravity and pushed towards a rather 
Middle-East oriented policy. This literature has intended to prove the reality of this turn 
by a number of already mentioned examples (downturn in Turkish-Israeli relations, 
rapprochement with Syria, deeper involvement in regional conflicts etc.). Scholars 
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explain this process with the emergence of the AKP as an Islamist (or at least pro-
Islamist) party that embraced Turkey’s cultural and religious identity and tried to find a 
foreign policy that fits better to the country. As a Muslim country having an Islamist 
party at power, one can accept that Turkey has become more interested in the Muslim 
Middle Eastern neighbourhood. Furthermore, until 2012, Ankara’s activism was 
regarded as a positive phenomenon in the region as well, as Meliha Altunıșık’s 
researches have shown.7 
Probably the most famous paradigm for Turkish foreign policy is Neo-
Ottomanism. As it will be a pivotal notion for the dissertation, the Author here just 
summarises the main tenets and features of this approach. Primarily, it is important to 
note that Neo-Ottomanism has emerged much before the rise of the AKP. It was often 
used to describe Özal’s foreign policy, at the beginning of the nineties. Later, the 
expression reappeared during the AKP’s rule to portray Ankara’s growing involvement 
in its neighbourhood, especially in the Balkans and the Middle East. Stemming from the 
word Ottoman, the scholars and journalists intended to describe Turkey’s activism in the 
former Ottoman territories, and its efforts to become a hegemon – or at least a dominant 
player in the adjacent areas. This endeavours were legitimized by historical and cultural 
arguments and the survival of a vast Ottoman heritage (See among others: Anastasakis, 
2012; Gangloff, 2001, 2005; Tanasković, 2010, Tașpınar, 2008). 
The explanations of the above-mentioned change are also numerous. The 
literature of the so-called paradigms – Asianism, Euro-Asianism, Middle-Easternization, 
Europeanization, Neo-Ottomanism – gives usually two kind of explanations: a) the 
foreign policy change is linked to the AKP, b) the international system/structure 
compelled the AKP to pursuit such a pro-active, outward-looking foreign policy. 
  A number of authors portrayed the change as the outcome of the Justice and 
Development Party's ascend to power (Robins, 2006; Alessandri, 2010; Balcı, 2010). 
Some analysts assign this drift to the new elite, with a ‘distinctly new worldview’ 
(Reynolds, 2012, iii). For instance, Aras and Görener offer an identity-based 
explanation for Turkey’s foreign policy activism in the Middle East. They apply in their 
                                                          
7The opinion polls about the image of Turkey conducted during the last five years have demonstrated, 
especially in 2009 and 2010 that the country’s perception has changed drastically in a positive way 
compared to the beginning of the 2000s. Various factors shaped the new image: the launching of the EU 
accession process, the prospering economy and increasing cultural presence in the region (see the success 
of Turkish soap operas). Finally, the political emergence of the Justice and Development Party carried a 
positive message for the Islamists (parties) of the region. The Moroccan Justice and Development Party 
has declared many times that it was inspired by AKP. 
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analytical framework the notion of national role which is the ‘policy-makers’ 
understanding of what their nation stands for in the international arena’ (Aras-Görener, 
2010, 76) and consequently they focus on Erdoğan and Davutoğlu’s discourse. Although 
they see some similarities between Özal and the AKP’s foreign policy-makers they 
rather emphasize the novelty. While Özal’s regional activism was driven by economic 
necessity, the AKP’s regional initiatives are motivated by a normative moral framework 
(Aras – Görener, 2010, 83). As other features of AKP-led foreign policy, they 
distinguish the collaborative stance on regional and global level as well, the ‘bridge 
discourse that was more frequent at the beginning of AKP’s era than later. 
Marc Pierini admits that various factors influence Ankara's foreign policy-
making that make it less and less predictable. Among these factors, like energy 
dependency or the geostrategic positioning of the country at the interconnection of 
frozen or particularly vivid crises and conflicts, he underlines the influence of the 
AKP’s vote maximization attempts. For ballot box success, the party needs to rely on its 
core electorate’s religious and nationalist feelings (Pierini, 2013). Some even go as far 
to suggest that simply political gains at domestic level influenced the foreign-policy 
making of the AKP. Many think that the anti-Israel rhetoric employed by Prime Minister 
Erdoǧan in the run-up of local elections in March 2009, was at least partially motivated 
by domestic political purposes (Sengupta, 2014, 12). Göktürk points out that the AKP’s 
commitment towards the EU membership – shaping Ankara’s external efforts – has been 
a tool for legitimating its power. After 2006, the government continued to use 
diplomacy as a means for social and political legitimacy (Göktürk, 2014, 91).  Some 
scholars argue that Turkish foreign policy is rather a populist one by underlining that the 
AKP seeks to attract the attention of domestic constituency and international public 
opinion (Demirtaş, 215). Even if economy or other issues draw more attention, 
diplomacy appears in the domestic political field (Yanık, 2012). These authors interpret 
the government’s foreign policy as an extension of domestic politics to the international 
sphere. Other interpretations setting the level of analysis on domestic social 
transformation (having a historical materialist approach) are limited in the literature. 
They argue that the rise of AKP (and preliminarily, Islamist parties) resulted in a more 
proactive foreign policy and the extensive use of soft power compared to the more 
inward-looking and security-oriented Kemalist elites (Yalvaç, 2012, 2014). 
Others emphasize the importance of the international system and argue that 
contemporary Turkish foreign policy is a response to the current challenges. Şaban 
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Kardaş proposes to position the Turkish diplomacy in the changing international system 
(Kardaş, 2013). Özhan underlines that Turkey seeks to find its position and adapt to the 
fundamental change in the world order, however, according to him, claims about the 
‘axis shift’ are unfounded (Özhan, 2010). Göktürk argues that the new Turkish foreign 
policy stems from a pragmatism that considers the religion as a ‘frame of reference’ 
having the capability to encompass the multiculturalism already realized during the 
Ottoman times. Furthermore, Davutoğlu’s Strategic Depth doctrine intends to place 
Turkey in the centre of Afro-Asia, at the middle of regional interconnections. By doing 
this, Ankara’s policy can be perceived as a ‘civilization-based geopolitical initiative’ 
(Göktürk, 2014, 103). 
Keyman and Gümüscü state that the profound and severe crisis of globalisation - 
economic crisis, increasing security risks, lack of global leadership, poverty, exclusion, 
food security, climate change etc. - produced the feeling of uncertainty and insecurity. In 
order to tackle these threats and the 'global turmoil', Turkey has created a proactive 
foreign policy that was termed as 'active globalisation' (Keyman - Gümüscü, 2014, 71-
73).  By engaging in global problems and in global debates, Turkey's position has been 
strengthened vis-á-vis the global turmoil (Keyman – Gümüscü, 2014, Larrabee, 2010b) 
Obviously, a country's foreign policy cannot be negligent to the global 
challenges; nevertheless, it is usually shaped by strong domestic actors and interests. 
Even the answers to the above-mentioned global problems are given by a domestic 
regime that could be different. 
 The AKP's pro-activism is not independent of the features of its own conduct of 
domestic policy and the interests of the social classes represented by the party. The 
majority of these global challenges were present for Turkey during decades (turmoil in 
the Middle East, Caucasus, Balkans, terrorism, poverty etc.), however, not every 
Turkish government was as proactive as the AKP’s ones. The Author intends to prove 
that transformation of foreign-policy making (involvement of think-tanks and the public 
etc.) was in line with the emergence of the party as a strong internal actor that needed a 
new style (and allies) in weakening the influence of the state-centric and powerful 
Kemalist elites. In line with this change, foreign policy activism also had become an 
important tool to legitimize the AKP at the domestic and the international level, too. 
Despite the already showed criticism of American and Western-European scholars and 
journalists, the country's efforts to bring peace and stability to the surrounding regions 
usually met the support of US and EU politicians.  
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The change of global structure could not leave the Turkish foreign policy 
unaffected; however, the Author believes that very severe domestic incentives shaped its 
pursuit as well. A number of explanations pointed out the role of this domestic 
transformation, nevertheless the research of the relation between the influence of the 
global and local structure on Ankara's foreign policy behaviour got limited limelight. 
The Author aims at analysing the relation of global and local structure and explaining 
the Turkish foreign policy pursuits by the interrelation of the two levels.  
Consequently, two levels of analysis shall be distinguished. Concerning the local 
level, the Author aims to show the AKP-created system in work. He will describe the 
regime built by the AKP after the successive electoral victories, and how it affects the 
pursuit of foreign policy. The already mentioned debates showed that Turkish foreign 
policy has been described as drifting, (De-)Europeanized, Middle-Easternised, Eurasian 
and Neo-Ottoman. The Author argues that characteristics of the system shall be 
portrayed as Neo-Ottoman. 
 
1.2. Hypothesis 1 – Neo-Ottomanism in Turkish foreign 
policy 
 
After becoming familiar with the main paradigms that aim at describing Turkish 
foreign policy, it is important to settle the hypotheses of the dissertation. Due to the 
already mentioned two-level analysis, the Author will focus on the AKP’s rise and the 
transformation of power at the domestic level that led to a significant change of Turkish 
foreign policy. This development paved the way for a new vision in cultural and identity 
policy and the change of traditional orientation and tools in foreign policy making. 
Thus, the central argumentation concerning the internal effects on Turkish foreign 
policy is based on the following hypothesis:  
 
H1: The emergence of AKP as an internal hegemon creates a Neo-Ottoman 
regime what shapes its foreign policy.  
 
After establishing H1 it is essential to define and specify the expressions used. 
“emergence of the AKP”: this expression describes the ascendency of the party 
to the power due to its successive electoral victories. It also reflects to the process that 
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resulted in the monopolisation of power and the increasing authoritarian tendencies. 
This emergence also refers to the weakening of the Kemalist elites, especially the Army 
and the Constitutional Court and the changes in state administration. 
“internal hegemon”: the expression refers to the notion of hegemonic bloc in a 
Gramscian term. It means that a party managing to acquire power was successful to 
establish its own hegemony by coercion or co-optation of various elements of the 
society.  
“Neo-Ottoman regime”: Neo-Ottomanism refers to the cultural and ideological 
features of the hegemonic bloc created by the AKP. 
“to shape its foreign policy”: this expression refers to the effects of the Neo-
Ottoman turn in domestic policy on the foreign policy features. By having a 'new 
foreign policy vision' compared to the previous governments the AKP has brought a 
number of novelties in form of orientation and tools into the conventional Turkish 
diplomacy. Even if it follows the main patterns of the ‘Kemalist cabinets’, the cultural 
and identity aspects or at least their emphasis have changed according to the domestic 
hegemonic orders’ cultural and identity politics. Therefore, the Neo-Ottoman regime 
influences the diplomacy; however, the Author does not label Turkey’s foreign policy 
as Neo-Ottoman. 
So what is Neo-Ottomanism? Certainly there are several problems that arise. 
Preliminary the prefix ‘Neo’ raises concerns as it supposes that an Ottomanism that has 
ended at some point of the past is (re)emerging right now. Actually the problem stems 
from the definition of Ottomanism. Historically, Ottomanism (Osmanlılık) was an 
ideology created by a movement to save the Ottoman Empire during the last decades of 
the Sultanate.8 This ideology, usually advocated by the establishment and the central 
elite in Istanbul until the very end of the Empire was one of the competing ideologies of 
that time - like Islamism (supported especially by Sultan Abdülhamid) and (Pan-
Turkism) -, and was clearly disseminating the idea that the Empire can be saved by only 
the use of nationalism and the creation of a Turkish nation.9 So this historical 
background shows, Ottomanism practically has nothing to do with Republican Turkey, 
what is more the nationalist project of Young Turks, and the formation of a nation-state 
based on the principles of Turkish nationalism by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The latter 
                                                          
8 Yeni Osmanlılar (New-Osmanists) was a group of intellectuals like İbrahim Șinası, Namık Kemal, Ziya 
Pașa and Ali Suavi, aiming to save the Empire from the decline culminating in territorial losses and 
subsequent defeats from Western powers and Russia. They also propagated a reform program. 
9 This division was stated firstly by a Tatar immigrant, Yusuf Akçura. 
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symbolises rather a clear break with the imperial project aiming at postponing the chute 
de l’Empire and giving an Ottoman identity to its inhabitants divided along ethnic and 
religious lines. 
During the Republican era, Ottomanism could be associated with three groups: 
1) a group that defended the Ottoman dynasty and tried to bring it back to the power, 2) 
a group of conservative-nationalist people who have given great importance to the 
Ottoman past and heritage, 3) certain groups in the Post-Cold war era supporting the 
idea of Pax Ottomana (Neo-Ottomanism) in order to tackle the domestic and foreign 
problems in Turkey and its neighbourhood (Çetinsaya, 2003, 361). 
Mainly two approaches depict our notion. The most common use of Neo-
Ottomanism is to be found in foreign policy, so as the Author has already mentioned, it 
appears as a paradigm for foreign policy. The core of this interpretation lies in the 
assumption that Turkey intends to become more active in the adjacent (former Ottoman 
territories) regions based on its historical and cultural heritage that serves as a 
legitimising tool for Ankara. Although this thinking appears in every interpretation of 
Neo-Ottomanism, the perceptions of these foreign policy endeavours are diverging.  
The emergence of Neo-Ottomanism occurred in line of the rehabilitation of the 
Ottoman Empire in public and more importantly, in diplomatic discourse. This change 
was influenced by Turkey’s turn to the Arab states in the 1970s due to the economic 
problems following the petrol crisis (Ankara wanted to bargain lower prices) and the 
deteriorating relations with its Western partners over Cyprus. The references to the 
common Ottoman past have appeared in the speeches of Minister of Foreign Affairs 
İhsan Sabri Çaǧlayangil in 1969 (Yanık, 2016, 474).  
The first appearance of the expression of Neo-Ottomanism may also highlight 
the very core problem that engulfs the perceptions of the notion. Kemal Karpat 
mentions that the first use of Neo-Ottomanism is linked to Greece (Karpat, 2002, 524). 
After the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, Athens has begun to label the Turkish foreign 
policy as Neo-Ottoman aiming at its expansionist characteristics. This interpretation 
perceives Ankara as a threat to its neighbourhood and titles it as a revisionist power. 
This narrative does not refer to the historical Ottomanist movement or imperial ideology 
to create a common identity for Ottoman subjects and gaining their loyalty but the 
empire-building process of Ottoman dynasty resulting in on the one hand one of the 
greatest Empires in World history but on the other the conquest of independent states in 
the Balkans and the Middle East that brought these territories – especially according to 
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the Balkan perceptions – under Ottoman Yoke with bloodshed. Due to the fact that in 
the Balkans the nation-building processes and independence movements of Christian 
peoples were conducted against Ottomans, the ‘Turks’ have become an eternal enemy 
who has brought backwardness into the region and prevented it from a Western 
European-style internal development. According to the general perception in the region 
this fall-back explains the historical root of current underdevelopment and the internal 
conflicts of the region. School books and national media are also strengthening this 
image, especially in Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia. Through education, this anti-Turk and 
anti-Muslim perceptions and cultural codes were passed down from generations to 
generations. In a given situation they could be reinstated and use as a mobilisation tool 
like it happened during the Bosnian war (1992-1995). After many decades of the Balkan 
Wars which marginalised Turkish state presence on the peninsula, the threatening image 
of Turks still persisted in the 2000s (Gangloff, 2005).10 In this context, Turkish activism 
labelled ‘Neo-Ottomanism’ that re-emerged in the 1990s and 2000s usually was 
welcomed at least by caution if not by hostility.  Others believe that probably David 
Barchard has used the term in a scientific work David Barchard “Turkey and the West” 
booklet published in 1985. He argued that the imperial consciousness in the Turkish 
society is a more politically potent force than Islam and when the country gains 
economic strength it would assert itself as a leader in the Middle East (Yanık, 2016, 
475-476).  
All in all, the references to the Ottoman Empire and Islamic heritage have 
become more frequent by policy makers in the 1980s. In case of Middle-Eastern 
countries, they preferred referring to the common past, culture and religion than to the 
Ottoman Empire. They intended to omit the Empire and they presented a common 
historical and cultural anchor neutrally in order not to offend their partners’ historical 
sensitivity. Nevertheless, the image of Ottoman Empire could appear in the relations 
with the West. Minister of Foreign Affairs and Turgut Özal usually mentioned the 
Empire as a former Empire that linked Turkey to Europe. An entity has played a great 
role in European history. (Yanık, 2016).  
                                                          
10 Meliha Altunışık points out that ‘The idea of Ottoman geography is dangerous. There is an antipathy 
against the Ottoman geography. It expresses well-known relations, cultural closeness, but at the same 
time it makes remember negative things as well. In Turkey’s neighbourhood, most countries gained their 
independence against the Ottoman Empire. That is why I know that for Arabs Neo-Ottomanism is 
inacceptable. There is no one who needs a boss or leader like this.’ (Altunışık, 2010, 16-17) 
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The end of Cold War has created a drastically new geopolitical situation for 
Turkey that had to be addressed by Turkish political elite. Neo-Ottomanism got more 
limelight and for some, it even appeared as a tool devoted to entitle Turgut Özal’s 
foreign policy. According to Yavuz, after the end of Cold War, Turkish state had to 
uncover its oppressed (sub)identities such as Anatolian, Islamic, Balkan, Central Asian 
and so on (Yavuz,1998, 33.). He considered a key element in the emergence of Neo-
Ottomanism: the rejection of Turkey’s accession to the EU (the then European 
Economic Community). Turgut Özal made a bid for full membership in 1987, in the 
same decade when other major, Mediterranean states such as Portugal, Spain and 
Greece (having a long dictatorship period in their recent history) were allowed to join 
the organisation. However, the EEC rejected Turkey’s bid after a thirty-month study, 
pleading the country’s poor economy, demographic boom, shortcomings in civil and 
democratic rights and finally the cultural differences. 
The second major development strengthening Neo-Ottomanism was the war in 
Bosnia. According to Yavuz, it was a key to the rise of the notion, that various authors, 
such as Cengiz Çandar and Nur Vergin started to promote the idea that Turkishness was 
rather a construct for and by Anatolian, Balkan and Caucasian Muslim populations on 
the basis of their Ottoman past (Yavuz, 1998, 37). Turkish decision-makers also started 
to make some efforts to secure Bosniaks due to the popular request of ‘Neo-Ottoman 
intellectuals’ and Balkan immigrants groups/associations’ request to cope with the 
ethnic-cleansing (Yavuz, 1998, 38).  In this interpretation Neo-Ottomanism was a 
dialectical outcome of various internal and domestic factors shaping the identity seeking 
of Turkey (Yavuz, 1998).  
Albeit Özal did promote a foreign policy focusing rather on Turkic people in the 
Caucasus and Central Asia, he opened a debate about Turkish identity including ex-
Ottoman Muslims (Yavuz, 1998, 24.). This was linked to some advisors, like the 
influential Turkish intellectual, journalist and political advisor of Turgut Özal, Cengiz 
Çandar. At the beginning of the Post-Cold War period, when Turkey met the problem of 
repositioning itself in the new world order, and a relative decline in its previously 
appreciated role as a bastion against the Soviet Union, Çandar proposed to reconsider 
the country’s foreign policy on the basis of Neo-Ottomanism. His ‘invention’ has 
become well-known as well as much criticised in Turkey and abroad, too. In his 
interpretation the notion was a reflection to the new geopolitical circumstance of the 
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country after the collapse of the huge neighbour and dramatic changes in the Middle 
East and the Balkans (Çandar, 2008). 
Accordingly, Neo-Ottomanism as a foreign policy paradigm has a rather 
peaceful approach that aimed at helping the decision makers to reposition Turkey and 
find a new role in the global turmoil. It intended to use the cultural and historical 
heritage of the country as a base for creating bridges towards the neighbours, something 
that can be seen as a common without redrawing the current political borders and 
boosting Turkish dominance. As Abdullah Gül summarised in 1995: 
 
‘Neo-Ottomanism does not aim to eliminate state boundaries nor seek a resurrection of an 
unified Ottoman super-state but rather to create a new sense of a macro-identity among populations that 
share the Ottoman Islamic heritage (Yavuz, 1998, 40). ‘ 
 
Nevertheless, political leaders have thought to avoid the Neo-Ottoman label.11 Turgut 
Özal has never mentioned the expression. The first article considered as the 
proclamation of Neo-Ottomanism was published in Türkiye Günlüǧü (Kanık, 2011, 5). 
It was an interview with Turgut Özal, titled “Türkiye’nin Önünde Hacet Kapıları 
Açıldı”12 where the then President of Republic shared his ideas about the Ottoman 
heritage (geography and governing practices) that may be used to solve Turkey’s 
current problems and he points out that: 
 
‘We need to identify and properly analyse several points regarding the geopolitical region that 
extends from Central Asia to the Balkans, which forms the target area of our leadership role. To a large 
degree, this region contains Turkish communities [sic] and with this aspect, at the same time, it also 
harbors the cultural belt that we call Turkish World [sic]. Yet, this region, again to a large extent, contains 
communities and states that are Muslim but not Turkish, which lived as Ottoman subjects. So, in this 
region that extends from the Adriatic to Central Asia, we can talk about several different nestled rings that 
have features in common but are located separate from each other. We should see these rings as areas 
with large intersection points (translated by Kanık, 2011, 6).’ 
 
The above-rmentioned rings could be identified as sphere of interests, and the notion of 
various basins has reappeared at Davugoǧlu. Due to the war against the PKK, the 
interpretation of Ottoman Empire as a country of peaceful coexistence of various ethnic 
and religious groups, so a romanticised image of the former Empire has been 
disseminated and propagated by politicians and at some extent, by several scholars as 
well. By recalling the Kurdish constituencies to a common, peaceful past Ankara 
tempted to weaken the nationalist Kurdish group in South-eastern Turkey. This 
                                                          
11 In 1995 Gül was an ordinary deputy in the TBMM, a member of opposition party RP. 
12 It may be translated as ‘The door of great opportunities opened to Turkey.’ 
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interpretation of history also influenced the social construction of the Ottoman era and 
helped to redefine the contemporary society’s stance towards its Pre-Republican history. 
The international scientific community could not neglect the notion either. It has 
already been familiar with this sense of the notion due to Graham Fuller’s work on 
Turkey. He stated in 1992 that: 
 
‘This reexamination and reevaluation of Ottoman history in no way implies the emergence of a 
new Turkish irredentism or expansionism. It does suggest, however, a renewed interest in the former 
territories and people of the Empire, which includes Muslims who were part of that Empire. It suggests 
that certain organic geopolitical, cultural and economic relations may reemerge in the new “normal” 
regional environment that had been absent during the “abnormal” period of Cold War polarization.  It 
suggests that the Turks may now come to see themselves once again at the center of a world reemerging 
around them on all sides rather than at the tail-end of a European world that is increasingly uncertain 
about whether or not is sees Turkey as part of itself (Fuller, 1992, 13.).’ 
 
Although the notion was extensively used in the nineties, it has lost its 
‘popularity’. It reappeared after 2005 to describe the reorientation of Turkish foreign 
policy towards its neighbourhood. Davutoǧlu’s and Erdoǧan’s speeches on Ottoman 
legacy, shared history and culture gave inspirations to views claiming that Neo-
Ottomanism has gained momentum. Independently from the negative or positive 
understanding, the expression has got much attention in analyses. Ömer Taşpınar, a 
well-known Turkish expert living in Washington, argues: 
 
‘Neo-Ottomanism embraces a grand, geostrategic vision of Turkey as an effective and engaged 
regional actor, trying to solve regional and global problems. Since the concept of Neo-Ottomanism may 
evoke an imperial agenda, one important point needs clarification: Turkey, in this neo-Ottoman paradigm, 
does not pursue a neo-imperialist policy aimed at resurrecting the Ottoman Empire. Instead of imperial 
nostalgia, Neo-Ottomanism is essentially about projecting Turkey’s “soft power”— a bridge between East 
and West, a Muslim nation, a secular state, a democratic political system, and a capitalistic economic 
force (Taşpınar, 2008, 3).’ 
 
Neo-Ottomanism in his interpretation reconciles the Ottoman and imperial 
legacy with the contemporary Turkish identity and it offers a more democratic solution 
for the Kurdish question. Furthermore, this vision provides Turkey with more self-
confidence and a sense of grandeur as it puts the country in the ‘centre’. 
Sengupta also thinks that Neo-Ottomanism is rather a soft power tool that 
enables Turkey to pursue an active foreign policy. She states: 
 
‘Internationally, neo-Ottomanism had pan-Turkic and pan-Islamist undertones and was used to 
stake an economic, cultural, and diplomatic role for Turkey in the newly independent states of the 
Balkans, Caucasus, and Central Asia as well as the Middle East. Neo-Ottomanism is reflected in Ankara’s 
new activism in the Middle East and is essentially less obsessed with domestic issues like the Kurdish 
question and more focused on Turkey’s “soft power.” It seeks to rise beyond this Kemalist paradigm and 
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embrace a grand, geostrategic vision of Turkey as an effective and engaged regional actor trying to solve 
regional and global problems. (Sengupta, 2014, 89)’ 
 
 In later works, Taşpınar distinguishes three visions of Turkish foreign policy, as 
neo-Ottomanism, Kemalism and Turkish Gaullism (Taşpınar 2011). In this case the 
third vision deserves more explication. While Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism are 
common in their nationalism and state-centric focus, Turkish Gaullism refers to a more 
nationalist, independent and self-confident stance which could culminate in questioning 
the military alliance with the West and even the need for EU membership. According to 
him, this vision may harm Turkey’s Western alliance and reduce its willingness to 
cooperate with its current allies.  
 By stating that the current Turkish foreign policy is Neo-Ottomanist Öztürk 
argues that: 
 
‘Due to the commonalities between the foreign policy approaches of both Özal governments and 
AKP government, AKP was argued to be a subrogee of Özal and a follower of his so-called Neo-
Ottomanist policy. While Kemalist foreign policy orders bearing with the West on every accounts, which 
has arguably been an alienating factor for Turkey in its region, ‘Neo-Ottomanist’ foreign policy suggests 
rooting Turkey in its neighbourhood, without neglecting the global picture. To some, AKP’s foreign 
policy is motivated by Neo-Ottomanism through trying to use its ‘soft power’ in the region (Öztürk, 
2013).’ 
 
Despite of the great number of attempts to apply Neo-Ottomanism to Turkish 
foreign policy, it has limited explanatory value. Firstly, academic literature fails to give 
a precise definition of the expression. It is presented as a tool of soft power to build 
bridges between Turkey and its neighbours (Tașpınar, 2008; McDonald, 2012, 
Sengupta, 2014); a tool for legitimacy (Anastasakis, 2012; Gangloff, 2005; Wiegen, 
2009) or it is described as a threatening, hegemony-building policy (Trifković, 2011). 
Others label the whole Davutoǧlu-led Turkish foreign policy due to the change of its 
orientation as Neo-Ottomanist, because of its massive use of references to the Ottoman 
Empire, and a multiple identity of contemporary Turkey based on its culture, history 
and geography (Oner, 2009, Balogh at al., 2013). These diverging views and problems 
around the measurability (especially when the approach is defined as soft power) do not 
ease the concept's applicability for the analysis. 
Secondly, beyond the shortcomings of the conceptualisation, there are other 
problems that emerge. Since Neo-Ottomanism is referred to as a tool in foreign policy it 
cannot provide a whole explanatory framework to describe it. Even if it is defined as 
some worldview, its applicability is questionable for Turkish ambitions beyond the 
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former Ottoman geography. Ankara can hardly use it to explain its motives in Central 
Asia or the EU accession process also lacks the references to the former Ottoman 
Empire. Furthermore the references to the Ottoman past are not specific features of the 
Özal or the AKP-era. As Kanık argues: 
 
‘Davutoglu, the AKP and former Prime Minister Turgut Özal are not the only actors who 
portrayed Turkey liminal and banked on hybrid representations of geography and history and thus, 
deliberately or not, created an exceptionalist identity for Turkey. If neo-Ottomanism is defined as a 
discourse that highlights Turkey’s Ottoman past and mixes it with geographical uniqueness to justify an 
active foreign policy in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood, it can easily be demonstrated that there were 
shades of unspoken neo-Ottomanism helping to construct an exceptionalist Turkish identity even during 
the periods in which there was no neo-Ottomanism debate (Kanık, 2011, 2).’ 
 
Thirdly, some even disagree with the use of Neo-Ottomanism. Caǧaptay argues 
that the AKP cannot be perceived as Neo-Ottomanist as it focuses more on Arab and 
Middle Eastern countries thus it should be defined rather Islamist than Neo-Ottoman in 
a "secular" sense (Caǧpatay, 2009). Bechev talks about Neo-Ottoman hype by 
highlighting the exaggerated importance of the notion (Bechev, 2012).  
Finally, subsequent AKP-led governments have never recognised themselves as 
Neo-Ottomanist, even Davutoǧlu refused to use the expression. This reluctance towards 
the word is obvious if one thinks of the resistance against Turkey in Serbia and 
Bulgaria. The wording would only have added fuel to the fire. 
The problems around the conceptualisation of Neo-Ottomanism in foreign policy 
suggest using a broader concept. Although the academic literature is limited on this 
interpretation, the Author also has to address it. This approach does not restrict the Neo-
Ottomanism to the level of foreign policy but defines it as an ideology or as an 
organising force in society.   
Murinson argues that `Neo-Ottomanism is the ideology of the new Turkish elite, 
which began to form in Central Anatolia at the end of the 1980s` (Murinson, 2012), 
which means that in his interpretation Neo-Ottomanism is not just a describing frame 
for Turkish foreign policy but an ideological product of the new, domestic elites. These 
elites are composed mainly from the Central Anatolian, religious bourgeoisie 
(`Anatolian Tigers`) who as entrepreneurs managed to gain more influence over Turkish 
internal and external politics, particularly during Özal, Erbakan and Erdoğan`s era 
(Murinson, 7, 2012).  
Hartmann argues that Kemalism is amorphous enough and adaptable to keep 
remaining the main ideological tenet of the Turkish Republic, constraining the 
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transformative power of the Neo-Ottomanism (Hartmann, 2013, 9). Nevertheless, 
despite the existing debate on the notion, there is no consensus about it. Others also 
argue that Neo-Ottomanism has gained momentum in internal politics in Turkey, as it 
started to become more apparent in the daily symbolic politics. The AKP has moved 
towards monopolising and redefining the Ottoman past (Danforth, 2014; Czajka-
Wastnidge, 2015). The legitimacy and usefulness of the above-mentioned, broader 
understanding of Neo-Ottomanism is supported by the existence of the debate on it 
within the Turkish society itself. Kınıklıoǧlu argues that ‘Osman is making such a 
forceful return’ in the daily life. He explains this change by stating that ’The most 
significant reason is that fundamentally the doctrines of the republic have been unable 
to respond to the moral and ethical needs of Turkish society’ (Kınıklıoǧlu, 2007). 
Referring to the ‘forceful return’ stems from the daily, tangible appearance of an 
Ottoman past – supported or not by the government. The emerging nostalgia over the 
Ottoman past has become a palpable part of the life in the Turkish Republic, as symbols 
of Ottoman past are coming back day after day. This transformation can be easily 
perceived through the huge wave of renovation of old Ottoman buildings and historical 
monuments (not just) all over Turkey. This ‘Neo-Ottoman’ renaissance affects even the 
restoration and renovation of old houses in historical city centres, like Ankara, Eskișehir 
– one shall find examples in almost every Turkish city and town – where at least some 
part of a district got back their old, Ottoman splendour.  
The governmental policy to support this renovation activity that may be called 
Neo-Ottomanist cultural policy creates new – in Pierre Nora’s term – ‘lieu de memoires’ 
where this nostalgia of a splendid, Ottoman past can be felt. Probably the most famous 
example of it is the Safranbolu UNESCO site. Obviously not just material objects but 
reinvented traditions and narratives also contribute to this project.  
It was already mentioned the notion but particularly as a tool for summarising, 
naming Turkish foreign policy or foreign ambitions. He emphasizes that not just foreign 
policy scholars (see Gangloff, Tanasković, Tașpınar etc.) have used the expression but 
the international and domestic media as well, and not just in Turkey but also in the 
Balkans for describing Ankara’s diplomacy. Nevertheless, this thesis proposes a broader 
understanding of Neo-Ottomanism. To accept the legitimacy to use this notion as a tool 
for conceptualising Ankara’s motives does not mean that it shall be restricted only for 
foreign policy. On the contrary, the Author suggests using Neo-Ottomanism as an 
expression for the AKP’s own hegemonic project, based on the characteristics of 
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cultural policies and internal political discourse taken by successive AKP governments. 
Furthermore, these features like governmental narratives of Turkish identity, cultural 
and political interpretation and presentation of the Ottoman past and its use for current 
daily life – that will be examined in details in next chapters – shall not be separated 
from foreign policy. According to the Author’s view, Turkey’s foreign policy shall be 
understood and analysed as an external projection of the Neo-Ottomanist domestic 
hegemonic project. This thesis accepts that foreign policy making is a more complex 
issue than a simple ‘continuation’ of internal politics, however, as it will be proves, they 
are highly interrelated, especially in the given Turkish case.  
 
1.3. Hypothesis 2 – The AKP’s neoliberal foreign policy 
 
Neo-Ottomanism may be placed in the centre of contemporary Turkish cultural 
policies; however, it is just one side of the coin. The effects of internal changes on 
foreign policy are not independent from the changes in the international system. As the 
Author presented, a number of works argues that the adjustment in the global structure 
or regional sub-structure shaped Ankara’s international relations. He also argues that 
these developments also affected the Turkish society and domestic politics as well. The 
Author states that the main effects are linked to the neoliberal turn in economy, 
beginning by the Özal era in the mid-1980s and lasting nowadays. 
This neoliberal turn has transformed the society and strengthened the Central-
Anatolian business elites during the 1980s and 1990s as well as it contributed to the 
changes in the political landscape. The emergence of the Anatolian Tigers was a prelude 
of political adjustment; however, every Turkish government’s aim was to establish 
investment-friendly conditions in the country. Despite the gradual opening to 
international markets and accepting a rather export oriented trade policy, these years 
were troublesome for Turkish economy. Ankara had to face several crises in 1994, 
1999, 2000 and 2001. The last one particularly damaged the reputation of the 
government parties and contributed in a great manner to the electoral victory of the 
AKP in 2002.  
Since this electoral victory, the Justice and Development Party has managed to 
keep the power and follow a neoliberal policy by opening its markets, affiliating with 
the EU, benefiting from FDI and the positive effects of growing trade. Various business 
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associations also could take advantage from this neoliberal turn that the government 
also supported. Not surprisingly, the economy or economic interests also have appeared 
as important features of the AKP. 
The Author argues that the global structure’s most important effects on Turkey 
was the ‘victory’ of Neoliberalism that linked more the country to the international 
economy and contributed to the last decades’ political changes as well. Having a 
neoliberal party at power, representation of neoliberal economic values in foreign policy 
also gain momentum. The interconnection of the social changes as the effects of the 
global structure influences the contemporary Turkish foreign policy. Consequently, the 
Author formulates the second hypothesis of the dissertation as: 
 
H2: The AKP's hegemony is a derivate of the neoliberal global structure that 
affects its foreign policy by the growing role of the economy. 
 
Here the Author has to reveal and define the notions used in H2. 
‘neoliberal structure’: the notion refers to the concept that the current world 
order is establish on a neoliberal hegemony in which the US plays a central role. 
 'neoliberalism': According to Encyclopeadia Britannica, it is an ‘ideology and 
model that emphasizes the value of free market competition’, and ‘it is commonly 
associated with laissez-faire economics (Smith, 2014).’ Accordingly, neoliberalism is 
often coupled with globalisation. Nevertheless, it also has no an accepted definition and 
scholars are also divided over its concept. This volume due to its scope cannot describe 
the various interpretation of neoliberalism.13 The Author defines the notion as a set of 
ideas advocating to need of free trade, the support of private sector in the economy and 
economic liberalisation as well as the representation of economic interest in the foreign 
policy. He emphasizes that neoliberalism in this dissertation is defined as policy 
affecting various (especially economic and foreign) political fields thus it is not 
perceived as an ideology.  
'affected the AKP's hegemony': The Author refers to the process of the 
neoliberal world and its implication on Turkey. This phenomenon does not affect only 
Ankara's foreign policy but the local structure e.g. the emergence of neoliberal classes. 
 
                                                          
13 In order to highligh the main features of neoliberalism see more: Steger – Roy, 2010; Thorsen– Lie 
2006. 
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The Author argues that although the need to tackle the growing global and 
regional challenges affects Turkish foreign policy, however, its embedment to the 
international system, and the international neoliberal system compelled the country to 
be active in its international relations. The emergence of pro-neoliberal classes in 
Turkey also affected its foreign policy as the economy has become more and more 
important in diplomatic relations. Consequently, the neoliberal world order pushed 
Ankara towards a more opened and active, trade- and investment-oriented foreign 
policy. 
The compelling role of economy in Turkish foreign policy making can be 
conceptualized by the emergence of neoliberalism and the emergence of certain classes 
that favour neoliberal economic policy. The growing literature on this issue highlighted 
that neoliberal turn in domestic economic policy under Özal that also paved the way 
towards the growing representation of economic interest in the diplomacy. After the 
2001 crisis, the country has managed to overcome its economic difficulties, especially 
due to former Vice-President of World Bank Kemal Derviş who has determined the 
neoliberal economic policy in the first half of the 2000’s. The AKP has followed the 
way that he began and it was proved to be fruitful. Furthermore, neoliberal policy also 
led to an economic opening, overlapping with the interests of Turkish business groups. 
During the first years of the AKP at power, the Turkish economic growth was 
spectacular. 
A number of authors also mainly analyse the nature of Turkish economic 
expansion in the Middle East. This approach also appears particularly often in works on 
Turkish-African relations where economic considerations are perceived as major driven 
forces in foreign policy (Marsai, 2016). According to Pintér, although one can see 
obvious parallels between the previous Özal era’s foreign policy and the AKP’s one, the 
new period is rather different because of the influence of economic consideration in 
foreign-policy making. By promoting peace and stability in neighbouring countries, 
Turkish government ensures the viable economic relations as well as creates 
opportunities for investment and trade (Pintér, 2013). Kirişçi characterized Turkey as a 
‘trading state’ (Kirișçi, 2009). Other sees that the economy serves as ‘practical hand’ 
and also contributes a very important soft power tool by opening new dialogue channels 
(Kutlay, 2011).  
In their interpretation, Turkish foreign policy is realized with close cooperation 
of various economic actors, e. g. a number of Turkish business associations (which may 
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appear as autonomous players in shaping bilateral economic relations, see Tür, 2013) 
and wealthy businessmen (several hundred businessmen participate in Turkish 
presidential or prime ministerial visits) in order to boost foreign trade and pave the way 
towards Turkish investments. The charts and tables cited by these authors also show the 
spectacular change in the country economic relations. Turkey’s foreign trade has 
multiplied. Due to economic expansion in developing markets, the foreign trade’s 
structure has also changed. Tür points out that the decline of EU’s share in exports and 
imports was huge while the MENA region’s share in trade was rocketing (Tür, 2011). 
This development also suggested for some authors to conclude that Turkey is leaving 
the Western bloc. In these approaches changing economic relations could be the cause 
or just a sign for the ‘new’ Turkish foreign policy that also highlights the clash of 
various interpretations about foreign activism. This aspect of foreign relations is an 
under-studies are in literature about the ongoing Turkish foreign policy (Kutlay, 2011, 
77), nevertheless the Author believes that it plays a very important role that will be 
portrayed in relations with the Balkan states.  
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2. Theoretical Foundations 
2.1. Gramscianism  
 
Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937), as revolutionary strategist and former leader of 
Italian Communist Party, who was arrested and imprisoned by the Mussolini regime 
(1926) could see by personal experience the nature of leadership and championed a 
political and ideological struggle for hegemony (Lipsitz, 1988, 146). Whilst he was 
jailed, he has produced 2 848 pages handwritten notes that have never been published in 
Hungarian or in English in its complexity (see more: Hoare – Smith, 1999). 
Nevertheless, it is possible to apply his theoretical achievements for the current research 
due to the valuable translations and the literature aiming to evaluate his work.  Probably 
the most significant contribution of Gramsci’s theoretical works is the focus on social 
forces, classes and parties’ role within a state – or, in a larger context, inter-state 
relations. Due to his momentous life when he had to face the collapse of Communist 
Party’s activities in Italy and the establishment of Mussolini’s dictatorship, he produced 
an excellent overview about the relation and interactions of domestic political and social 
changes. 
In his approach, hegemony is placed in the centre. Hegemony, for Gramsci, is a 
condition in which the governed accepted or acquiesced in authority without the need 
for the application of force. Although force is always latent in the background, 
hegemony means leadership rather than domination in Gramscian terms. Gramsci traces 
the genesis of hegemony to civil society, in the spread throughout society of common 
conceptions of how things work and ought to work. (Cox, 2004, 311, Karatzogianni –
 Robinson, 2009, 83). 
Thus, the ‘moment of hegemony’ is never stabile but constantly challenged by 
subaltern groups and perpetually recreated by the ruling class. The given hegemonic 
social group always makes efforts to boost consent among the whole population by co-
opting or applying force. Due to this constant pressure from the above, hegemonizing is 
hard work and requires sufficient legitimacy in the daily life, concessions to the 
displeased groups and keeping alliances between antagonistic groups and nourishing an 
ideology. Hunt argues that the hegemonic project shall address and incorporate at least 
partially the ideology and aspirations of subaltern groups, assure the basic of social life 
and articulate norms which may have considerable trans-class appeal. These tools 
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altogether result in the ‘incorporative hegemony’ (Hunt, 1990, 311). Subsequently 
hegemonic process can be used to neutralize dangerous ideas and groups by 
assimilating them into the dominant classes. Nevertheless, the weakness of hegemony 
gives the system a rather volatile and instable feature and risks new challenges when life 
experiences greatly differ from the legitimasing ideology (Lipsitz, 1988, 147) 
To grab the production and society’s relations Gramsci has borrowed Georges 
Sorel’s notion of historical bloc (Blocco Storico), nonetheless he uses in a new sense. 
Historical bloc is a result of the unity of structures and superstructures, in other words it 
‘is the refection of the ensemble of the social relations of production’ which highlights 
his view about the role of production within the society. While Marxism emphasizes the 
priority of the production Gramsci gives a more complex approach by revealing the 
importance of the interaction of the economy, cultural and political sphere. (Hoare – 
Smith, 1999, 366). In other words, ‘material forces are the content and ideologies are 
the form, though this distinction between form and content has purely didactic value, 
since the material forces would be inconceivable historically without form and the 
ideologies would be individual fancies without the material forces’ (Hoare – Smith, 
1999, 377).  
This historic bloc has to have a hegemonic class that rules the system and 
maintain its stability by unifying the production, political and social sphere and counter 
alternative class’s attempt to challenge. For Gramsci, the emergence of the workers’ 
class is only feasible if it creates its own apparatus, culture based on the political 
leadership of the party. However, ruling class propagates a common culture and 
worldview based on his unique position to control and direct the society’s 
superstructure in order to maintain its dominant position, the cohesion and the identity 
of the bloc. Gramsci outlined two major superstructural levels. One was called ‘civil 
society, that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called private’, like the schools, 
universities, political parties, associations and so on, while the other was termed as 
"political society" or "the State". He pointed out that ‘these two levels correspond on the 
one hand to the function of "hegemony" which the dominant group exercises throughout 
society and on the other hand to that of "direct domination" or command exercised 
through the State and ''juridical'' government’ (Hoare – Smith, 1999, 12). By having this 
favourable position, it could create ‘spontaneous consent given by the great masses of 
the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant 
fundamental group’ (Hoare – Smith, 1999, 12). 
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Social consent can be forced by the state apparatus/political society. The state 
coercive power disciplines the society’s renitent members. Thus he distinguishes two 
ways to rule or at least two tools in the hand of the ruling class: social hegemony and 
state domination which function as rewards and punishments for the subaltern social 
groups. He gives a broader understanding of the State in his Prison Notebooks that is 
outlined in the above mentioned duality. He defines the modern state as ‘State = 
political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the armour of 
coercion’ (Hoare-Smith, 1999, 263). By defining the state as a synthesis of civil society 
and the political apparatus he admits that these are inseparable and the two – consent 
and coercion – exist in the same time and shape the subordinated groups’ world view to 
accept the current economic-political situation. Like Machiavelli’s metaphor about the 
Centaur (‘half-animal and half-human’) which incarnates a duality like ‘levels of force 
and of consent, authority and hegemony, violence and civilisation, of the individual 
moment and of the universal moment ("Church" and "State"), of agitation and of 
propaganda, of tactics and of strategy etc.’ (Hoare-Smith, 1999, 170). 
This results that government can gain support from the media because various 
elites share similar life-styles and values and because it controls directly or indirectly 
the civil society as these organisations operate within the framework of rules and faces 
punishment if they pass the room for manoeuvre granted by the legal structure. (Femia, 
1987). These considerations put his definition of civil society, political society and state 
relations contradicts the contemporary approaches which tend to separate the civil and 
political society (Dikici-Bilgin, 2009, 108-111). 
According to Gramsci, hegemony is realized via ‘intellectuals’ who translate the 
ruling class’s hegemony to the society and act as functionaries of the dominant. This 
pattern exists in the state’s administration but in the civil society as well. He makes 
difference between two groups of intellectuals: the urban and the rural-type 
intellectuals. For him, the first group represents those who are loyal to the dominant 
class and take part actively in building the hegemony while the other type lives in small 
towns and have regular contacts with the masses, namely the peasantry (Hoare – Smith, 
1999, 12-15). 
By delineating the main tenets of how the ruling elites intend to preserve their 
power (the Italian bourgeoisie in his time) he also outlines the successful strategy to 
challenge the current hegemony. One of the main themes in Gramsci’s approach is the 
difference between the success of Bolshevik revolution and the seemingly limited effect 
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of Labour movement in Western Europe. According to him, the relation between civil 
society and state differed greatly in Russia and Western Europe. In Russia, civil society 
was rather underdeveloped while state apparatus was strong but vulnerable. With the 
successful revolution (war of movement) it was easy for the Bolsheviks to impose the 
new order over the whole population (Hoare – Smith, 1999). 
On the contrary, in Western European states the civil society under bourgeois 
control was much more developed, and had strong control over the state bureaucracy. 
This circumstance made the realisation of the Bolshevik way impossible. Having the 
hegemony in the bourgeoisie’s hand, its resilience would make a war of movement 
futile. That is why Gramsci proposes another tactic for working classes to seize the 
power: the war of position. According to him, this will lead to a longer process in which 
a new, working class-related civil society would emerge acquiring the adequate strength 
to slowly occupy important state positions. This timely process would coexist with the 
current, given social-political order and it would be realized de facto by the emergence 
of a counter-hegemonic bloc despite of the possible obstacles erected by the prevailing 
bourgeoisie.  
The process of the emergence of the new hegemonic bloc via war of position (or 
passive revolution which is also used by Gramsci) is a gradual change (Hoare – Smith, 
1999, 109).  This means that subaltern social groups slowly emerge and occupy 
gradually the social superstructure without using force. This process last when the new 
ruling class accumulates enough legitimacy to establish a new hegemony from the 
inside out (Hendrik, 2009). 
To put it into context, Gramsci distinguishes two kinds of society in Western 
Europe. The first group, like France and England, had almost fully developed society 
undergone social revolution. Other states, such as Germany could not finish this process 
entirely. This proves of social revolution did not finish and the new industrial 
bourgeoisie could not accede to hegemony while the old order has managed to keep at 
least some part its power.  This stalemate resulted in the notion of ‘passive revolution’ 
(Hoare – Smith, 1999, 289-301) that has three fundamental moments (‘situation’) or 
equilibrium of forces (equilibrium of social political, equilibrium of political forces and 
politico-military equilibrium) (Hoare – Smith, 1999, 404-411). 
Gramsci states that one feature of the passive revolution is Caesarism which is 
basically occurs when a strong man (like Caesar or Napoleon Bonaparte) seizes the 
power and overwrite the stalemate between equal and opposed social groups.  The 
46 
 
Caesarism could be two forms depending which social force was supported by the 
strong man. It could be progressive when he favours the new order and reactionary 
when he stabilizes the older one. Nevertheless, he distinguishes an other type of 
Caesarism which stems from the moment when the “political deficiency of the 
traditional dominant force” is taking place. He sees Napoleon III political trajectory as a 
result of the internal struggle between rival forces of the same dominant class, like 
legitimists, Orleanists, Bonapartists, Jacobin-republicans (Hoare – Smith, 1999, 463-
471).  
To create a counter-hegemonic project one group may address a number of 
problems. It has to create an alternative discourse that can challenge the dominant one 
whilst it still preserves some elements of it. It means that new discourse build on the 
useful part of the current main discourse however, it adds new elements to it thus 
transforming the ‘common sense’ in a ‘new sense.’ (Hunt, 1990, 314). Like in the 19th 
century the idea serfdom which was a normal legal status and reality in daily life for 
millions in Central-Europe was challenged and after the adequate reforms it has become 
obsolete.  
 Furthermore, a crisis when current dominant groups’ position can be challenged 
may also open the way to the success of counter-hegemonic project. Hegemonic crises 
may occur when external or internal problems weaken the integrity of the hegemonic 
group or the counter-hegemonic project gains convincing force rapidly (Hunt, 1990, 
315). Hunt points out that Gramsci places the law in the intersection of civil and 
political society which on the one hand gives legitimacy for norms and rules while 
serves as a legal framework for civil society and make public accountability and 
surveillance on the other. Thus counter-hegemony project may emphasize the 
importance of law and fight for rights by keeping mind that the only option for success 
to switch from ‘corporate’ to ‘universal’ level. In other terms, it should represent not 
just the given group’s interest (at least at the discursive level) but make inter-class 
alliances by representing universal rights for broader groups. Subsequently single-issue 
movement has fewer prospects to win that a group articulating a more comprehensive 
agenda. (Hunt, 1990, 315-322).  
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2.2. Neo-Gramscianism 
 
Historically its stems from the 70s and especially the 80s when Anglo-Saxon IR 
scholars had to ‘rediscover’ the notion of hegemony and apply for explaining the world 
order after the relative decline of US power following the fiasco in Vietnam. Hitherto, 
traditional concept of hegemony – dominance over other states based on military and 
economic power – was rather banished to the periphery of the discipline.14 A number of 
theorists and historians (for instance Robert Gilpin, Robert O. Keohane, Pauly 
Kennedy) depicted the image of classical hegemonic power – the US and its 
predecessors (Romsics, 2010). This rising popularity of the notion of hegemony resulted 
in that IR scholars had to trace the contour the new world order that even made the 
thinking about hegemony more accepted. Various IR schools, Liberals and Realists also 
engineered their own hegemony approach. Later this process even converged to a realist 
and liberal synthesis of hegemony, namely the hegemonic stability theory. It proposed 
an approach argued that a hegemon emerging from the anarchic world order would be 
able to establish a security and create better prospects for trade and produces goods that 
benefits every country from. In this approach hegemony was described as something 
based on material resources (Keohane, 1984).  
 Despite the growing importance of hegemony in IR, and the fact that Antonio 
Gramsci wrote his famous Prison Notebooks some decades ago, the scientific 
community did not manage to create a consensual reading of his ouvrage and more 
importantly it was sidelined for decades. Albeit Gramsci stated in his book that his 
theory may be applied for international relations because 
 
 ‘international relations react both passively and actively on political relations (of hegemony 
among the parties). The more the immediate economic life of a nation is subordinated to international 
relations, the more a particular party will come to represent this situation and to exploit it, with the aim of 
preventing rival parties gaining the upper hand’ (Hoare – Smith, 1999, 398) 
 
 this suggestion did not raise much attention for a long while. The anti-Marxist 
stance in the US – as leading centre in IR – also boosted this long-lasting negligence. 
However, in the 1980’s, several authors, like Robert W. Cox and Stephen Gill 
                                                          
14 Certainly, hegemony has a long history in international relation thinking, Thukydides was probably the 
first one in describing the notion. 
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announced his theory’s applicability in International Political Economy and 
International Relations as well. Especially Cox’s writings were crucial from that aspect 
(Cox, 1981, 1983). While admitting the concept’s strength at society and state level, he 
elaborated in various articles that Gramsci’s hegemony theory could be a valuable tool 
in understanding contemporary international system and the role of international 
organizations within this order. Antonio Gramsci’s theory was applied to the 
international system in his famous work entitled Gramsci, Hegemony and International 
Relations: an Essay in Method (Cox, 1983). It is important to note that Cox did not 
intended in his paper to make omnipotent critics about Gramsci’s Prison Notebook, 
nevertheless he derived some ideas from the Italian thinker’s book that he perceived as 
useful for the revision of international relations theory. He stated that hegemony shall 
be distinguished from the ‘dominance’ which is a notion to describe a state’s leverage 
over other state or group of states and not over a system (Cox, 1983, 60). 
He divided the roughly last one and half hundred years into four periods (1845-
1875, 1875-1945, 1945-1965 and 1965 to the 1980’s) when a world hegemony was 
established (hegemonic) and when ‘a dominance of a non-hegemonic kind prevails’ 
(non-hegemonic). According to him, the first one, between 1845 and 1875 was the era 
of British hegemony, while the following one was rather a non-hegemonic period 
because the British supremacy was successfully challenged and the world order 
determined by London in the previous period has been vanished. In the third period, 
between 1945 and 965, the United States has managed to recreate a new world order 
similar to the British one which led to a new hegemonic order. After 1965, ‘it became 
evident that this US-led world order was no longer working well’ (Cox, 1983, 60).  
As the very core element of his theoretical framework, he defines the notion of 
hegemony as not dominance over states but the capability to create a global world order 
that other states could adopt: 
 
’to become hegemonic, a state would have to found and protect a world order which was 
universal in conception, i.e., not an order in which one state directly exploits others but an order which 
most other states (or at least those within reach of the hegemony) could find compatible with their 
interests.’ (Cox, 61.) 
 
According to Cox, this kind of hegemonies is founded by strong and powerful 
states that have undergone a social and economic revolution. The world hegemony is 
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derived from the dominant social class in the given state. The social and political 
structure, economy and culture has become as an ideal structure to follow by other 
states.  This order implies a passive revolution on peripheral states that had not 
undergone through the same social and economic process. Consequently they attempt to 
incorporate the institutional, cultural and other elements of this hegemony which would 
be imparfait, especially the application of political model as the ‘old regime’ would 
keep in various manners its power. According to him, world hegemony is based on the 
unity of social, economic and political structure and it cannot be simply one of these 
things (Cox, 1983, 62).  The tools to express globally the world hegemony are 
international organisations (Cox, 1983, 62). He argues: 
 
‘Among the features of international organisation which express its hegemonic role are the 
following: (1) they embody the rules which facilitate the expansion of hegemonic world orders; (2) they 
are themselves the product of the hegemonic world order; (3) they ideologically legitimate the norms of 
the world order; (4) they co-opt the elites from peripheral countries and (5) they absorb counter--
hegemonic ideas. (Cox, 1983, 62)’ 
 
In his opinion, international organizations are effective tools to facilitate ‘the 
expansion of the dominant economic and social forces.’ Moreover they perform an 
ideological role as well (Cox, 1983, 63) as they help to define and legitimise given 
policy guidelines for states. International organization also uses Transforismo as they 
absorb people coming from the periphery who have to work in line with the interest of 
hegemonic state. Cox also agrees that ‘Transformismo also absorbs potentially counter-
hegemonic ideas and makes these ideas consistent with hegemonic doctrine’ (Cox, 
1983, 63).  
The collapse of Communist bloc and the Soviet-Union discredited the Stalinist-
Leninist understanding of historical materialism and it has given the opportunity 
towards more extensive researches of Gramsci’s work. This change also gave a fresh 
impetus to new wave of scholarly works dealing with the possibility to extend 
Gramscian theory towards IPE and IR. Reflecting to Gramsci’s expression, the 
neoliberal hegemony deriving from the United States has already created its 
‘international historical bloc’ (Gill – Law, 1993, 96). Rupert gives an excellent 
overview about this process arguing that production of goods made the leader of global 
division of labour. This gave the opportunity to reconstruct a new world order under 
American leadership stemming from the historic bloc of American social groups 
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(capitalists, businessmen) who fostered liberal capitalism in the US and later all around 
the world (Rupert, 1995). 
German and Kenny admit that Gramscian theory offers ‘an ontological and 
epistemological foundation upon which to construct a non-deterministic yet structurally 
grounded explanation of change.’  Furthermore, Gramscian approach accepting the 
human subjectivity provides researchers with a tool to avoid ‘deterministic and ahistoric 
structuralism’ (German – Kenny, 1998, 5.). According to them, other attractiveness of 
the theory ‘lies in the employment of his methodology.’  
To analyse the relation between the global and local structure and reveal the 
dynamics of Turkish domestic policy, the Author argues that Gramscian and Neo-
Gramscian approach may provide the adequate explanatory framework. Cox and 
subsequently Gramsci’s main contribution was a new, systemic level critical theory that 
moved away from the orthodoxy of state-centric interpretations. 
The Author believes that the application of the chosen theories does not lead to 
misunderstanding. Firstly, the two theory’s ontological assumptions stem from the same 
problematique, and they observe the same phenomenon with similar tools. The main 
difference between the two approaches is the scope. While Gramsci rather concentrates 
to changes within one state (although he admits the applicability of his theory for 
international relations), Neo-Gramscianism offers rather a world-level analysis.  
The fusion of these levels means the main theoretical approach of this work. The 
Neoliberal word order and its hegemony helped the emergence of Neoliberal state 
policies that strengthened certain groups. Gramsci argues that the social groups that 
manage to adopt the fastest the new economic world order will be able to rule the state 
sooner or later.  
To conclude, Gramsci offers a useful analytical tool in order to conceptualize the 
social-political transformation taking place in Turkey under the AKP. Nevertheless, the 
social change in close cooperation with the changes in form of production started before 
the emergence of the Justice and Development Party. This political turn started with the 
Özal era that led to the growing influence of the periphery – the Anatolian conservative, 
Islamist groups which emerged as a counter-hegemonic project. 
It is worth emphasizing that Gramsci’s approach is not a novelty for Turkey, 
both Turkish and foreign researchers have demonstrated its applicability for the AKP 
era. Some focused on the relation of the Turkish civil society and political society 
(Dikici-Bilgin, 2009; Zihnioğlu, 2013, Sinan, 2015). Cihan Tuğal made extensive field 
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research to portray the AKP’s emergence and its co-optation of (Radikal) Islamists and 
the process how it could gain consent. He identifies Islamism as a novel form of 
counter-hegemonic politics which is termed as religio-moral populism (Tuğal, 2009). 
Others focused on the nature of Turkish state (Öncü, 2003), and the internal struggle 
within the elite (Yıldırım, 2017) or cultural policy (Sibel, 2015). 
Several case studies have used Gramscian framework to analyze particular 
groups of movement role in hegemony building such as the Gülen movement (Hendrik, 
20009), the trajectory of the MÜSIAD as the Islamists’ main business group (Ayhan – 
Sağıroğlu, 2012), the emergence of the OYAK and the dynamics of Turkish military-
civil relations based on various hegemonic projects (Akça, 2016) or the role of market-
oriented groups in making a pro-privatization hegemonic discourse (Şahin, 2010). 
The Author has shown that Turkish foreign policy conceptualization has a great 
variety of approach. Nevertheless, the detailed analysis of internal, social-political 
changes in Turkey itself affecting its diplomacy got limited attention. He argues that 
Gramscian and Neo-Gramscian approach to analyse the AKP-period’s development has 
relevancy. The scientific literature has already recognized its applicability for the 
Turkish case.  
Concerning the analysis of social transformation and its political affects of 
foreign policy pursuance Yalvaç proposes a Critical Realist approach arguing that the 
AKP has started to create its hegemonic depth in the society in Gramscian terms. 
Nevertheless, he mainly focuses on the theoretical approach and overall picture, and he 
does not give a distinct analysis of this process, especially on the regional level (Yalvaç, 
2012, 2014). The use of (Neo-)Gramscian theory as a possible tool for the 
conceptualization of Turkish foreign policy appear at other authors, however, it remains 
marginalized in the literature (Uzgel, 2009). Even Tuǧal describing the ascendency of 
the Islamist movement to the state power does not analyse the effects of this process in 
detail on the Turkish foreign policy (Tuǧal, 2009). 
To analyse the relation between the global and local structure and reveal the 
dynamics of Turkish foreign policy, the Author argues that Gramscian and Neo-
Gramscian approach may provide the adequate explanatory framework. Why to choose 
Gramsci? Cox and subsequently Gramsci’s main contribution to IR theory was a new, 
systemic level critical theory that moved away from the orthodoxy of state-centric 
interpretations. Thus, the 'traditional' or 'mainstream' IR theories' applicability for this 
research is limited.   
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These theoretical foundations for the methodology of the current work provide a 
unique opportunity to go beyond the ‘traditional’ IR theories explanatory framework.  
Neo-realism offers a rather state-level analysis based on the proclaimed self interest of 
state-actors in a rather chaotic world. According to neo-realist interpretation, the 
structure is constant: the conflicts are the perpetual part of the world order where the 
key element of the self-interest is the given state’s survival. In this anarchic, belligerent 
world the various actors seek for balance of power to ensure their security and 
subsequent survival.  
The main weakness of Realism for the current research is threefold. Firstly its 
negligence towards intra-state actors, especially towards social movements, civil society 
does not permit to reveal important factors behind the changes in Turkish foreign 
policy, and the role of non-state actors in shaping Ankara’s relations with the region. 
Secondly, Realism does not give enough attention to the change. As it was mentioned, 
(neo-)realists see the structure a permanent where only the actors may change (new 
states do emerge, others perish) the system remains the same. This approach does not 
take into consideration the possibility of change: the future will be always like the past 
(Cox, 1981, 131). On the contrary, Gramscianism and Neo-Gramscianism argues that 
the world order change in itself results in conflict. While Gramscianism focuses on 
rather what is going on within the state borders, Neo-Gramscians intend to understand 
the structure and explain the inter-state relations as a derivative of the world order. In 
both theories hegemony occupies a central role.  
Historically its stems from the 70s and especially the 80s when Anglo-Saxon IR 
scholars had to ‘rediscover’ the notion of hegemony and apply for explaining the world 
order after the relative decline of US power following the fiasco in Vietnam. Hitherto, 
traditional concept of hegemony – dominance over other states based on military and 
economic power – was rather banished to the periphery of the discipline.15 A number of 
theorists and historians (for instance Robert Gilpin, Robert O. Keohane, Pauly 
Kennedy) depicted the image of classical hegemonic power – the US and its 
predecessors (Romsics, 2010). 
After the end of the Cold War IR scholars had to trace the contour the new world 
order that even made the thinking about hegemony more popular. This converged to a 
realist and liberal synthesis of hegemony, namely the hegemonic stability theory. It 
                                                          
15 Certainly, hegemony has a long history in international relation thinking, Thukydides was probably the 
first one in discrabing the notion. 
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admits that hegemon emerging from the anarchic world order will be able to establish a 
security and create better prospects for trade and produces goods that benefits every 
country from. In this approach hegemony was described as something based on material 
resources (Keohane, 1984).  
Historical materialism offers a broader understanding of hegemony. In this case, 
hegemony derives from social forces creating their own dominance (hegemony) within 
a state and establishing their ideas projected on a world scale. This process is facilitated 
by material resources, institutions of the state where a given class has managed to creat 
its own order and it is implemented not by force but by the creation of institutions and 
norms. It also depicts a very different interpretation of power. Finally, Neorealism 
focuses on conflicts, wars rather than cooperation something that is always an important 
element in Ankara’s motives towards the Balkans, although dialogue amd growing 
interdependence unravel more precisely the ongoing relations during the last fifteen 
years. 
This feature may suggest that Neo-liberalism could be a better choice. 
Nevertheless, it does not help to understand the social and political changes in Turkey 
and its subsequent effects on the change in Turkish foreign policy. Constructivism may 
probably provide a promising theoretical approach. Indeed, the norms, values and 
identities occupy a central role in Turkish-Balkans relations. The common history that 
current discourse built in shapes Ankara’s ruling elite’s ambitions towards the region. 
The process of common history’s narrative, the Ottoman legacy is constructed shall be 
observed. This school is deemed to be useful in analysing the speeches and various 
forms of narratives that are usually constructed against each other in Balkans and 
Turkey (especially in the Christian-Muslim cleavage, while in Muslim-Muslim relation 
can be perceived as closer and converging). Nevertheless, it could not provide an 
overall picture about the very nature of the Turkish foreign policy because 
constructivism also pays less attention on social forces, internal changes of power. 
To use Gramscianism and Neo-Gramscianism raises a number of 
methodological concerns. Why to choose two theoretical approaches for one 
dissertation? Does this choice produce confusion and weaken the analytical framework? 
The Author believes that the application of the chosen theories does not lead to 
misunderstanding. Firstly, the two theory’s ontological assumptions stem from the same 
problematique, and they observe the same phenomenon with similar tools. The main 
difference between the two approaches is the scope. While Gramsci rather concentrates 
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to changes within one state (although he admits the applicability of his theory for 
international relations), Neo-Gramscianism offers rather a world-level analysis.  
The fusion of these levels means the main theoretical approach of this 
dissertation. The Neoliberal word order and its hegemony helped the emergence of 
Neoliberal state policies that strengthened certain groups. Gramsci argues that the social 
groups that manage to adopt the fastest the new economic world order will be able to 
rule the state sooner or later.  
 
‘Even the geographical position of a national State does not precede but follows (logically) 
structural changes, although it also reacts back upon them to a certain extent (to the extent precisely to 
which superstructures react upon the structure, politics on economics, etc.). However, international 
relations react both passively and actively on political relations (of hegemony among the parties). The 
more the immediate economic life of a nation is subordinated to international relations, the more a 
particular party will come to represent this situation and to exploit it, with the aim of preventing rival 
parties gaining the upper hand (Hoare – Smith, 1999, 398).’ 
 
Stemming from this statement, a very core question arises. Why were Central-
Anatolian (Conservative, Islamist) groups able to acquire (and preserve) the power and 
slowly occupy the administration while traditional Kemalist elite lost its previous 
dominance? Present thesis argues that the Islamists were more successful in adapting to 
the neoliberal world order and enough successful to benefit from the social 
transformation of the last decades. The Author agrees with Yalvaç who states that the 
redefinition of state-society relations as well as economic relations along neoliberal and 
conservative (or Islamist) lines contributed to the change in foreign policy, too (Yalvaç, 
2012, 167). Nevertheless, the precise effects of this change on foreign policy need to be 
researched, analysed and tested – for this occasion, in the case of Balkans. 
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3. Methodology 
The research is based on qualitative methodology and the extensive research of 
primary and secondary sources and their analyses by Gramscian and Neo-Gramscian 
theoretical framework. The time frame of the research limited the possible use of 
sources. As it focuses on the AKP’s period (more exactly from November 2002 to the 
implementation of the presidential system after June 2018), it could not use confidential 
documents, strategies but rely on contemporary, open sources.  
This it analyses the speeches and writings of Turkish decision-makers. Ahmet 
Davutoǧlu – who was probably the main actor in shaping Ankara's external relations 
during the given period – active publishing activities helped to outline the TFP. His 
academic background and writings, especially his famous volume Stratejik Derinlik 
paved the way to understand his view about the region as advisor, later on as Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. The speeches of Recep Tayyip Erdoǧan, as Prime Minister, later as 
President of the Republic also made a compelling contribution to the thesis. The 
discourse-analysis reveals the political elite's perception of the Balkans and the way 
how this image is constructed. Certainly, political statements shall be the object of deep 
analysis and shall be questioned as various intentions are in their background, however, 
the construction of an image and its use in public speeches emerges as an orientation 
point for the researcher. 
Turkish state institutions’ and civil organisations’ publications, statements and 
news also helped the research. Usually these online sources portrayed the scope and 
nature of the given organisation’s activities. Annual reports of the TİKA, the TDV were 
the most useful from this respect.  
Interrelated with the discourse analysis of political leaders’ oral or written 
statements and speeches, field researches in Turkey and in various Balkans countries 
also represent a valuable contribution to the work. Meetings and discussions with 
scholars, journalists, representatives of the administration and politicians represented a 
useful experience for the work. Obviously the outcome of these meeting varies in a 
wide range, and invite to a severe analysis and criticism. Nevertheless, the acquired 
knowledge about the TFP cannot be neglected. These trips also facilitated to use 
primary and secondary sources written in Turkish language that would not have been 
possible to find in Hungary.  
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Official statistical data provided by relevant statistical institutes and 
governmental institutions were also essential contributions. Statistical data show the 
change in economic relations, the effects of the various agreements in boosting trade 
and investment. These highlighted the importance of Balkans for Turkey, at least in 
economic terms.  
Although the thesis focuses on contemporary issues, it could not neglect the past 
which influences the AKP’s domestic and foreign policies greatly. Thus, history books 
helped to describe the importance of the Ottoman Empire and Ottoman heritage for the 
current political situation and narratives.  Books and articles dealing with the Turkey’s 
history in the 20th century also contributed to the better understanding of the AKP’s 
hegemony project. 
Secondary sources were crucial in defining the hypotheses, outlining the 
research questions and understanding the debate(s) about TFP in the literature review. 
Furthermore, they also contributed to mapping the TFP’s institutional background. 
 
1)  books  
2) journal papers 
3) political analyses 
4) newspaper articles 
 
The qualitative analysis of a number of primary and secondary sources hopefully 
may provide adequate tools to justify H1 and H2. The timeframe of the research covers 
six AKP governments that may provide enough samples for the dissertation. During 
these six governments the conduct of Turkish foreign policy has changed 
simultaneously with the emergence of AKP as a hegemon in Turkey. This change also 
affected Turkey's relations with Balkan states, as Turkish presence has become more 
visible and the international scientific community also started to focus on Turkish 
activities. During the last fifteen years, Ankara’s diplomacy has produced a great 
number of events, programmes and foreign policy tools to possess a relatively big 
sample to analyse. 
  
57 
 
4. Literature review on the AKP’s foreign policy 
This dissertation is aiming to produce a comprehensive explanation of Turkey’s 
foreign policy therefore it cannot avoid revealing the main findings of researchers and 
scholars about Ankara’s external activities. Summarising and evaluating these works 
shall constitute a rudimentary part of the thesis even if this review is facing obstacles 
due to the growing size of scientific literature. Much ink has been spilled on trying to 
understand, describe and even forecast changes in Ankara’s external relations. These 
works culminated in a huge literature whose overall presentation is hampered by its own 
size. Despite this problem, it is possible to analyse and find the major tendencies of this 
literature. 
This chapter aims at describing the various narratives about Turkish foreign 
policy under AKP’s era by reviewing the most important theories. Although a number of 
articles, books and papers will be used to explain the AKP’s foreign policy in the 
following chapters, here they are perceived as a part of a narrative. This perception 
creates a different epistemology where the scientific works are constructed by various 
discourses. In other terms, this chapter is essential in order to understand how and why 
the scientific community intended to analyse Ankara’s foreign relations. Revealing these 
main narratives will show that scientific thinking about Turkey-Balkan relations has a 
rather different epistemology whose analysis provides a perfect opportunity for 
research. Finally, this part is also indispensable to see the current scientific approaches 
towards Turkish foreign policy that shall be surpassed in this thesis which aims to offer 
alternative explanation and tools for understanding the AKP’s governments’ motives.   
The main tenets of the possible conceptualization of Turkish foreign policy 
literature shall be analysed through two aspects: 1) in which period and 2) what are the 
main tendencies in describing the country’s foreign relations. It shall be underlined that 
constant debate has been featuring the scientific discourse about Turkish foreign policy 
during the AKP’s era. Although its focus changed from time to time, the main debate 
was always linked to Turkey’s stance towards its Western allies and its opening towards 
the Middle East, or towards either Asian powers, especially to Russia which can be 
identified as Turkish Eurasianism. The discourse about this drift in ‘traditional’ Turkish 
foreign relations still keeps going. Moreover, the Gezi events16 - when developments in 
                                                          
16 Political crisis stemming from the protests against the constraction of a shopping mall in the center of 
Istanbul, next to the Taksim square at the Gezi park. The protests in May 2013 escalated fast to mass anti-
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Turkish domestic politics draw international attention to the country itself - also 
aggravated the debate that Ankara is turning its back to the West not just in foreign 
policy but by creating an illiberal democracy or even a new authoritarian regime 
damaging the Western (democratic) values. The deterioration of the AKP’s perception 
was nourished by its foreign policy manoeuvres that have become increasingly 
unpredictable during the last few years (it is enough to point out the downing of Russian 
jet in November 2015, or the splendid rapprochement to Moscow some half year later).  
Concerning the timing of the above-mentioned debates, the AKP’s foreign policy 
can be divided into sub-periods. After 2002, during the AKP’s first years in power, 
scholars rather focused on the country’s possible EU accession and the community’s 
ability to absorb of related challenges (See more: Rózsa N., 2007). However, early 
works on Ankara’s opening towards the Middle East have appeared, too. Later, due to 
the slowdown in EU accession talks (that gave an impetus to works explaining the 
failure, see: Eralp–Torun, 2012) and growing activism in the neighbouring countries 
pushed scholars towards analysing the ‘new’ features of Turkish foreign policy. After 
Ahmet Davutoğlu’s nomination to the top of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2009, a 
showy debate has been launched about the very nature of Ankara’s ‘real’ ambitions. 
This debate practically resumes the long tradition about the controversy whether 
‘Turkey is leaving the Western bloc or not.’ The Arab Spring in 2011 added a new hue 
to this debate: if Turkey emerges as a model country for the Arab world. The debate 
about the applicability of the so-called ‘Turkish model’ has started to dominate the 
scientific literature, even if the Arab public or political actors did not considered Turkey 
as a plausible model. A short while later, when Ankara’s initial expectations have failed 
in Syria and the Assad regime’s resiliency and stability has remained intact anticipating 
a long-lasting war (2012), and even when President Mohamed Morsi was ousted in 
Egypt (2013) almost eliminating Ankara’s favourite political group, the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the region, scholars began to argue that Turkish foreign policy is in a 
cul-de-sac. Although most analyses in 2015-2016 stated that Ankara has lost momentum 
in the Middle East as well as it has lost its friends, even its foreign policy headed to 
terrible isolation, or even downgraded the country to become a buffer state (Keyman, 
2016). The summer of 2016 brought back the shift (Aydıntaşbaş – Kirișçi, 2017). 
Ankara’s rapprochement to Moscow, its autonomous decision to settle the conflict with 
                                                                                                                                                                          
government protests in the major towns of the country due to the disproportionate use of force by the 
police. 
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the support of Russia and Iran has verified the questions on Turkey’s position towards 
its Western and (new) Eastern allies and its real orientation. 
International academic community offers a great variety of explanations about 
Turkish foreign policy. In order to conceptualise it, the Author distinguishes three main 
narratives. Here he would like to underline that more approaches could be determined, 
however after reviewing a number of works dealing with Ankara’s foreign relations he 
suggested to focus on the following interpretations. Thus Turkey’s foreign policy has 
been addressed through three main approaches: 
1) Turkish foreign policy is reorienting and it is losing its traditional allies 
(US and EU)  
2) The AKP’s has created an extraordinary foreign policy  
3) The AKP’s foreign policy is the continuation of previous governments’ 
external ambitions  
 
4.1. Leaving the friends or justified claims for an 
autonomous foreign policy? 
 
These questions, or rather responses given by scholars, are usually interlinked. A 
number of researchers, foreign policy analysts and journalists who see a rupture 
compared to the previous eras are rather sceptical about Ankara’s external aspirations 
and are prone to spot an ‘alienation’ between Turkey and the West. Especially around 
2009, great variety of articles and analyses have appeared in prestigious Western 
newspapers and journals like Le Monde, Huffington Post, Spiegel or Foreign Affairs to 
discuss whether the West is losing Ankara or not (Nougayrède, 2009; Babalı, 2011; 
Zand, 2009; Çağaptay, 2009) showing that there is a flagrant divergence. 
Western think-tanks and scholars see a slow but steady downturn in Western-
Turkish relations in line with Ankara’s turning towards the Middle East, started to 
question the country’s real orientation. A number of policy papers and articles have been 
published to draw attention to this change. As we can see, these interlinked narratives 
give a strong normative dimension to the evaluation of Turkish foreign policy. A number 
of analysts perceive the ongoing changes as a threat or at least unflattering develpment 
for Western interests and consider them along with unfavourable illiberal or even 
authoritarian turn in the AKP’s domestic politics as a worrying tendency that shall be 
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tackled or at least be given the adequate attention (Cohen, 2010), especially after the 
Gezi events and corruption probes in 2013 (Washington Post, 2014). The events of 
2015, the war against the PKK and weakening the pro-Kurdish HDP and the crackdown 
of Gülenist movement (especially after the coup attempt) also paved the way a new 
wave of criticism.  
The increasing Western distress is rooted in several Turkish foreign poliy 
manoeuvres.  Ankara's overture towards the Hamas, the Prime minister’s speeches in 
Davos (2009) followed by the Mavi Marmara incident deteriorating Ankara’s relations 
with Israel and Turkey’s cordial ties with Iran infuriated the pro-Israeli civil society 
elements in the United States (Falk, 2014, 12). The Turkish government raproachement 
to Syria (until 2011), the liberal visa-policy towards the Arab states and even the scenic 
opening towards Africa after 2005 has given the image that a significant change 
occurred in Ankara. In these years, a great variety of actors changed their attitude 
towards the Turkish government. These events turned the neo-conservatives and their 
think-tanks against Ankara even if initially they were supportive to the AKP. The Israel-
lobby that preliminary supported Ankara in different issues like counterbalancing the 
influential Armenian associations and interest groups in the USA (Öktem, 2012, 78) has 
also become critical towards Turkey. 
Ilan Berman, vice-president of the American Foreign Policy Council argued that 
this ‘monumental reorientation’ was signed by the Turkish blockade of American troops 
launching an attack from the country's territory against Iraq, the cooling attitudes 
towards Europe, the split with Israel and the rapprochement to Syria (Berman, 2010). 
Four years later, he sees that alliance between the US and Turkey is already over. 
Berman points out several reasons like the domestic troubles a. k. a. the Gülen-AKP 
‘civil war’ that also involved the United States into the conflict (Fethullah Gülen resides 
in Pennsylvania), the divergence over Syria and Ankara’s attempt to buy Chinese 
missile defences that made Turkey an uncertain NATO-ally (Ilan Berman, 2014). 
Heritage Foundation analysis (McNamara – Cohen – Phillips, 2010) is also in line with 
the above-mentioned opinion, as it states: 
 
’Turkish and U.S. interests in the Balkans, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Persian Gulf have 
recently diverged. On critical issues, especially energy and the Middle East, Turkey currently stands at 
odds with the United States.’ 
 
American Foreign Policy Council perceives that the growing belligerent rhetoric 
of the AKP and empty threat to neighbours – that consequently overwrites the ‘zero 
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problems with neighbours’ doctrine – without tangible force undermines Ankara’s 
diplomatic influence over Syria and deteriorate the relations with Greece, Cyprus and 
Izrael (Levinson, 2012). Cornell sees that Ankara’s approach to Iran and Sudan after 
2008 and the degrading relations with Israel are clear signs of an “axis shift.” (Cornell, 
2012). Brooking Institute’s analyst, Michel A. Reynolds points out that 
 
 ’Turkey’s current foreign policy represents a clear break with the tradition that characterized the 
republic’s foreign policy for nearly eight decades (Reynolds, 2012, iii).’ 
 
Bipartisan Policy Center’s analysis about Turkish foreign policy, written by two 
US ambassadors evaluates the US-Turkish relations (Abramowitz – Edelman, 2013) 
argues that after 2007, Turkish foreign policy has shifted eastward. This change paved 
the way for growing disagreement with the West. The country’s cordial ties with Iran, 
Syria (before the uprisings) and the Hamas, its sectarian support for the Muslim 
Brotherhood and breaking off the relations with Israel, the most important US-ally in 
the region, have damaged the American-Turkish relations. However, they admit that 
Washington has also been misguiding Ankara over the Syrian conflict leading to the 
drift between Erdoǧan and Assad and they conclude that Washington has to maintain 
close relations with Turkey in order to keep this important ally that shall be a partner in 
shaping the Middle East. Others also argue that despite the strategic drift with the West, 
Washington should ‘anchor Turkey firmly in our court’ (Steckler – Altman, 2011, 48). 
Nonetheless, the conglomerate of Western narratives on Turkey’s international 
position and its government’s motives were never homogeneously ‘negative’ and they 
also provided a wide range of explanations and interpretations. Certainly, the 
assumptions on the seriousness of Turkey’s drift with its allies also diverge. Many 
argues that although a real change can be perceived, it does not mean an irreversible 
process and Washington has to work on keeping and rebuilding good relations with 
Ankara (Larrabee 2008, 2010b). RAND Corporation analyst, Stephen F. Larrabee 
argues that despite many critics that the West is losing Turkey or the AKP-led 
government leaves the country’s traditional allies, Turkish foreign policy just seeks to 
adapt to the Post-Cold War strategic environment which cannot be perceived as a 
rupture (Larrabee, 2010b). However, he admits in various works that the relation 
between Washington and Ankara will face challenges, and deteriorated since 2003 when 
Turkey did not give the permission for US forces to attack Iraq through the country 
(Larrabee, 2010a). He also states his concerns about degrading US-Turkish military 
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cooperation and reveals various issues about which the two states’ position differ such 
as Iran, Syria or the Kurdish issue (Larrabee, 2008). 
Altough other authors also admit the change in Ankara’s diplomatic relations, 
they do not see so much danger in Ankara’s transforming diplomacy. Famous colomnist, 
Cengiz Çandar sees the change cannot be attributed to Turkey’s departure from its 
Western partners but rather linked to a systematic change is the inevitable outcome of 
the end of Cold War and the emergence of new economic actors showing by the 
emergence of G20 (Çandar, 2009). 
Oran Baskin argues that during the 20th century the claim that Turkey changes 
its alliances has been surfacing from time to time (Baskin, 2012). For instance, Western 
observers voiced warnings about Turkey turning to the non-aligned movement in the 
1970’s when the relations between Washington and Ankara chilled down due to the 
Cyprus crisis. He emphasizes that alarmist statements aroused regularly, even when pro-
Western or Pro-American governments were at power in Ankara. He notes that these 
opinions appeared when Turkish decision-makers attempted to diversify their Euro-
Atlanticist position to tackle the perpetually changing international challenges and ‘to 
secure a relative autonomy through regional balances of power, a sina qua non policy 
for any strategic medium power’ (Baskin, 2012, xvii). Philip Robins highlights – still 
prior Davutoğlu’s nomination – that Turkish foreign policy under the AKP took a new 
turn compared to the traditional direction of its Kemalist predecessors, with more 
emphasis on the Middle East (Robins, 2006). However, he sees the party’s new, more 
balanced foreign policy opening a window to the East and becoming more self-
confident as a positive development. According to Robins this change stems from 
various factors. According to him, Turkey is a ’double gravity state’ having strong links 
simultaneously to Europe and Middle East and the AKP, having two-third mark in the 
parliament rather represents a Central-Anatolian counter-elite and a wide, conservative 
population versus the previous Kemalist governments. Without giving to much 
importance to identity issues, he argues that the then pursuit of foreign policy was the 
result of a division of labour between Kemalist-led state apparatus and an AKP-led, 
conservative government (Robins, 2006, 210). Schmid also thinks that despite the new 
Turkish interest in the Middle-East, Ankara could not turn its back on Europe due to the 
economic and political interdependence (Schmid, 2011, 2008). Others also believe that 
the debate about losing Turkey is exaggerated, and they state that Ankara basically 
follows the West and does not want to cancel its ties with the USA or Europe, it just has 
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a new approach towards the Middle East (Csicsmann – Rózsa, N., 2013, 74, Kısacık, 
2012).  
Alessandri deems the ‘drift theory’ as oversimplified explanation of Turkish 
foreign policy (Alessandri, 2010). He argues that AKP’s foreign policy is in search of 
identity due to internal and international changes taken place in recent years; 
nevertheless it does not result in a rupture between Turkey and the West. However, he 
suggests by analysing the EU accession process and its outcomes that the West and the 
EU itself also should reconsider what they can offer to Turkey.  
Some scholars from the Turkish Diaspora living in the West express their 
concerns about Turkish diplomacy as well. These studies usually challenge the current 
Turkish leadership or at least emphasise the disagreements between the West and 
Ankara. As one of the most influential, US-based scholar on Turkey, Soner Çağaptay 
has admitted in a number of works, Turkey has gone through a huge transformation 
during the AKP’s rule. This change has also had an effect on Turkish foreign policy. He 
outlines the main changes in Turkish foreign policy, such as restructuring the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, more emphasis on economic interests and re-articulating bilateral 
relations with its neighbours (Çağaptay, 2013, 802). He also sees a shift between 
previous Turkish-American (Western) relations by claiming that Ankara turns to the 
Middle East (Çağaptay, 2007). However, according to him Ankara’s opening towards 
the Arab World and its Eastern neighbours could not eliminate Turkey’s Western 
traditions. Later, when relations with the Assad regime reached a new turning point and 
recent partners have become adversaries, it clearly showed that the country needs the 
West that is an ‘Indispensable Anchor.’ According to him, Turkey’s economic success 
could not occur without its alignment to his partners. Furthermore, Çağaptay believes 
that the country has remained tied to the West despite the AKP’s endeavours to 
overwrite this heritage. 
Others think that the Erdoğan-regime during his 3rd term tried to make a more 
independent and autonomous Turkish foreign policy which led to more diverging 
opinion about various issues, especially over Syria, with the United States. However, 
according to him this decoupling is not just the Turkish leadership’s mistake but that of 
the Obama administration as well. (Balcı, 2014).  
Turkey’s clash of views with the US over the role Syrian Kurds, especially the 
PYD also led to tensions between the two NATO allies. After the coup attempt, 
Ankara’s spectacular raproachement to Moscow again brought to the limelight the ‘shift 
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theory’. Several analysts argue that the ongoing conflict with Western states and 
domestic reasons push Turkey to affiliate with Eastern powers (Yıldırım, 2016). More 
interestingly, the Turkish Eurasianism got also a growing significance in the scientific 
community. Although ideology to turn towards the East (Asia) has appeared in the 
ninties, got more focus during the last 10 years. Some groups of Turkish intellectuals or 
politicians, like the Kemalist-nationalist ulusalcılar or even Maoist groups under the 
direction of Doǧu Perincek propagated the idea of boosting relations with the Turkic 
world or, even with Iran, Russia and China (Lin, 2014, Aktürk, 2015, Erșen, 2011, 
2013). Seemingly Ankara’s deteriorating relations with the West as well as the Arab 
Middle-East facilitated the establishment of good relations with Moscow. After the 
compromise in Mid-2016, the two powers could solve the diplomatic and economic 
crisis after downing the Russian jet. This settlement boosted Western perception about 
Turkey radical turn in this case not to the Middle East but to Russia. 
As it was shown, mainly Anglo-Saxon and US- or Europe-based scholars usually 
tend to interpret Turkish foreign policy as a break with the previous government’s 
traditional orientation. The optic of their evaluation is the current state of Western-
Turkish relations and Ankara’s behaviour in the view of Western interests. The changes 
could be per se threatening or at least challenging. Nevertheless, some authors are more 
permissive towards the country and while they admit that Ankara’s foreign policy is 
rather new, in spite of the obvious offset, it shall be respected. Turkey does not need to 
choose between these two options: it can establish cordial ties with its Eastern 
neighbours without leaving the NATO or turning his back on the European Union 
membership (Paul, 2009). 
 
4.2. Qualitative change in foreign policy making? 
 
There is another camp of scholars, analysts and journalists who also admit the 
fact of a possible change or rupture, nevertheless, their focus is not set – primarily – to 
Western-Turkish relations but to the change compared to previous, ‘Kemalist’ 
governments. This group has a core composed of pro-government circles who at least to 
a certain level agree with the AKP. It is composed of Islamist intellectuals and a more 
and more disappointed group, called Second Republicans (Ikinci Cumhuriyetçiler). 
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Within this group one can find the students of Ahmet Davutoğlu (Marmara school). To 
avoid the mistake of generalisation and oversimplification, it is worth mentioning that 
one may find other Turkish and Western scholars who are not affiliated with the 
government at all but also share this approach. They perceive a positive transformation 
ensuring a more autonomous foreign policy that fits the national interests of the country 
better, whereas it reflects the geostrategic ‘reality’ of Turkey better as it displays the will 
of more social groups leading to a ‘more democratic’ foreign policy-making. For them, 
the change does not mean a break up with the West, just a more self-conscious conduct 
of external relations. In short, the nature and not the direction of the change, the gravity 
of Turkish foreign policy is in their focus, and they welcome this development.  
The last 15 years were featured by the new, pro-active foreign policy narrative 
that increasingly focused on Turkey’s neighbourhood. However, despite the emphasis 
on Islam in foreign policy narrative, the government has no willingness to change its 
commitment to the West (Ovalı, 2009). Despite various frictions and disagreements with 
the West and especially with US, Turkey has the willingness to maintain its commitment 
and strategic partnership with its Western allies (Kalın, 2010). Yașar Yakıș, former 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and writer of the AKP’s foreign policy programme in 2001, 
states that behind every significant change in a state's foreign policy there lies a change 
in its main parameters such as population, neighbours, natural resources, religion etc. 
While no one can talk about such a change concerning Turkey, there is no a real change 
its commitment towards its Western partners (Yakıș, 2010). 
Probably the main adcovator of this new-style foreign policy was Ahmet 
Davutoğlu himself. His famous book, published for the first time in 2001, Strategic 
Depth (Stratejik derinlik Türkiye’nin uluslararası konumu) was a less-known 
academician’s work just prior his rising political career. In his lengthy book, he intended 
to create a newer geostrategic thinking as well as to (re)position Turkey in the 
international world order (Davutoğlu, 2001).  
 
Turkey’s new position has both an ideational and a geographical basis. In terms of geography, Turkey 
occupies a unique space. As a large country in the midst of Afro-Eurasia’s vast landmass, it may be defi 
ned as a central country with multiple regional identities that cannot be reduced to one unifi ed character. 
Like Russia, Germany, Iran, and Egypt, Turkey cannot be explained geographically or culturally by 
associating it with one single region. Turkey’s diverse regional composition lends it the capability of 
maneuvering in several regions simultaneously; in this sense, it controls an area of infl uence in its 
immediate environs (Davutoǧlu, 2008, 78). 
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Nevertheless, his vision is not unique due to its traditional realist approach. He 
gives Turkey a rather extraordinary position as the country is located in a very strategic 
zone, surrounded by basins and highlands. Turkey is not located just the interception of 
Europe and Asia but it situated close to Africa as well. 
According to him, this special position shall also re-frame the country’s foreign 
policy. As a central state, Turkey should open towards its strategic (closer or further) 
neighbourhood including especially the Middle East,17 and play an active role in 
shaping it relations. 
 
Third, our foreign policy will be conducted autonomously. We suffer from a perception that other powers 
design regional politics and we only perform the roles assigned to us. We need to do away with this 
psychological sense of inferiority which has permeated in many segments of our society and amongst 
political elites. Today, we determine our vision, set our objectives, and execute our foreign policy in line 
with our national priorities. We might succeed or fail in our initiatives, but the crucial point is that we 
implement our own policies. We do not receive instructions from any other powers, nor are we part of 
others’ grand schemes (Davutoǧlu, 2012, 6).  
 
After 2003, when he was appointed to chief foreign policy advisor of the Prime 
Minister, he got closer to realise his academic, scientific vision in practice. By this time, 
he rather avoided getting to much publicity and he gave usually only one interview or 
published an article per year. Nonetheless, he advocated the previous ideas about 
Turkey’s exceptionality and the need for a more pro-active diplomacy focusing on 
solving the problems with neighbours. As the first approaches towards Syria and other 
neighbouring countries were taken prior 2007, one can plausibly argue that the AKP has 
started its ‘easternisation’ before Dautoǧlu took the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
The party’s victory at the general (early) elections in 2007 granted more social 
support for the government which tried to balance between its own electorate and the 
Kemalist establishment. This time EU accession talks were hindered due to the Cyprus 
issue (Cyprus has frozen some 9 chapters by the end of 2006) which put to a deadlock 
the country’s fast EU accession. Due to the emergence of a new war against the PKK 
after 2007 Ankara had to spend more energy on the Middle East. In an article published 
in 2008, Davutoǧlu argued that there was an urgent need for the redefinition of Turkey's 
international position after September 11th (Davutoğlu, 2008, 78). According to his 
concept, geographically Turkey occupies a strategic location, as it is at the intersection 
                                                          
17This narrative in Turkey about the country's central or pivotal position in geopolitical and geostrategic 
terms is not unique and appeared several decades before Davutoǧlu’s book. The Army has been placing 
Turkey as a center of Mackinder and Spykman’s Heartland and Rimland, several athours admitted 
Turkey’s location makes the country an indispensable actor between the Balkans and Middle East, or 
Europe and Asia (see: Egeresi, 2017) 
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of Africa, Asia and Europe. That puts the country into an extraordinary position. This 
view breaks with the previous narratives about Turkey that described the country as 
frontier or a bridge. Furthermore, Davutoǧlu also admits that identity contributes to this 
special status as Turkey incorporated various immigrants from the neighbouring region 
creating diversity within the country. 
The effects of having diverse Caucasian, Balkan, Middle Eastern, Iraqi 
Turcoman and Anatolian groups, are seen in everyday life in today’s Turkey, where 
miscellaneous cultural elements meet under the umbrella of the Turkish state. Turkey’s 
geography harmonises these components subsequently grants Ankara influence over the 
neighbouring regions. 
For principles of Turkish foreign policy, Davutoǧlu defines five distinct 
elements. First of them is the respect of democratic values and the harmonisation of 
democracy and security in favour of the first notion. He believes that Turkey has 
managed to maintain this balance even at times of military intervention in Iraq against 
the PKK. Although conflicts in the South-eastern part of the country were permanent, 
the war against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party did not hinder Ankara to maintain the civil 
liberties since 2002. Then scholar Davutoǧlu sees Turkish democracy as one of the main 
soft powers of the country (Davutoǧlu, 2008, 80). His second principle, the "zero 
problem policy towards neighbours" aims at solving the problems with countries in 
Turkey's environs. The example for the settlement of relations is the rapprochement 
with Syria taking place during the previous years. Thirdly, developing relations with 
neighbouring countries and beyond also constitutes an important pillar of this new-
designed Turkish foreign policy. Davutoǧlu argues that recently Ankara started to 
establish better relations with neighbouring regions and plays a more active diplomatic 
role. By using its influence and proactivity, Turkey could contribute to tackling the Shi'a 
and Sunni antagonism in Iraq, mainly through problem-solving and mediating. 
The fourth principle is based on multi-dimensional foreign policy. This states 
that 'Turkey's relations with other global actors aim to be complementary, not in 
competition.' He especially refers to the US-Turkey relations, the EU process, Russia 
and Eurasia. Ankara has to shape its foreign policy by taking into account these 
relations and strategic considerations. 
The fifth principle - rhythmic diplomacy - aims at providing Turkey with an 
array of diplomatic means to strengthen its international positions. Entering into various 
regional or international organisations, holding summits and forums on Turkish territory 
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makes possible to express this leverage and shape international relations more 
efficiently. 
In Davutoǧlu's concept the democratic Turkey gets a central position. By 
building a democratic state respecting human and civil rights helps to achieve the 
country's foreign ambitions as it ensures legitimacy and has an important normative 
value. References to the 'normative' features of foreign policy recur in his later works as 
well. 
In a paper published in 2012, Davutoğlu describes Turkish foreign policy as a 
value-based one aiming to maintain the stability all over the neighbouring regions. 
Furthermore, this value-based foreign policy pushed Ankara towards to favour popular 
movements seeking democratic transformation in various Middle-Eastern countries. 
However, he engrosses a strong message in this paper about the nature of Turkish 
foreign policy: according to him it shall be independent and based on Turkish (national) 
interest (Davutoğlu, 2012). Then foreign minister still defines Western-Turkish relations 
as a base and something that needs to be maintained, nevertheless he refers to the 
willingness to stand for a more autonomous diplomacy that may lead to further 
antagonism with Washington, or EU-countries.  
The value-based foreign policy has remained a pivotal point in the Foreign 
Minister’s thinking. In another vision paper published right before the Presidential 
elections in August 2014, he states that ‘the core principle of Turkey’s diplomatic stance 
is highlighting and protecting human dignity and struggling for it all around the world’ 
(Davutoǧlu, 2014, 14). He also frames four ‘main steps’ of active diplomacy that shall 
be pursued that outlines the main focal point of Turkey’s international relations. 
According to him, Turkey’s most important strategic relations are held with Europe and 
the US. He states that ‘as a country situated in the Middle East, Central Asia and the 
Caucasus, instead of regarding Europe as an ‘other’ world, Turkey considers itself as an 
inseparable part of European history.’ (Davutoǧlu, 2014, 15). The second pillar of the 
country’s strategic commitment is linked to the neighbouring countries and regions; as 
he states: ‘Turkey used to be known as a Eurasian state, but for the past five to six years 
we have been calling ourselves an ‘Afro-Eurasian state’, because we are at the center of 
the mainland of all human history.’ Accordingly, the third tenet of Turkish diplomacy 
aims at launching new initiatives in Africa, Latin-America and Asia. Finally, he points 
out that the active diplomacy’s last step to work within various international 
organisations, primarily the UN (Davutoǧlu, 2014, 19).  
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Summarising Davutoǧlu’s approach, one can see that the Foreign Minister’s 
vision is very different from the already presented debate. For him, there is no change 
the country’s traditional orientation. It would be impossible to replace European 
commitment by a new, Middle Eastern or Asian one because Turkey is a European 
country based on its history, culture and identity. Thus the opening towards the 
neighbouring regions or even far continents is rather led by a need to give an answer to 
nowadays’ global turmoil. Nonetheless, this active diplomacy is embedded into a strong 
internal-led process, the restoration of Turkey (Davutoǧlu, 2014,19). 
Bülent Aras also sees the AKP-period as a new chapter in Turkish foreign policy. 
In his paper published in 2009 (Aras, 2009) he argues that Turkey has emerged as a 
new, more active player in the international scene and it has become an active peace-
maker in a usually troublesome region, in the Middle East. Sözen states that meanwhile 
Turkey was ‘without a clear strategy in its foreign policy-making’ (Sözen, 2010, 104) 
the AKP ‘brought a clear vision, a new direction, a set of principles, and a new strategy 
for foreign policy.’ He defines the Turkish foreign policy as a normative one based on 
Davutoğlu’s principles. Kiliç Buğra Kanat argues (Kiliç Buğra Kanat, 2010) that the 
AKP government's foreign policy activism means a shift compared to the traditional, 
Kemalist diplomacy. He especially emphasises two new features of this new era. First of 
them is the involvement of civil experts, academicians, journalists, researchers into the 
decision-making process. This development helped the inflow of new ideas and 
approaches which highly contributed to a more opened and multidimensional policy. 
The second one is the growing influence of public opinion over the foreign policy. This 
change has overwritten the highly bureaucratic corporate culture and automatisms and 
opened the way to a better representation of public interest in Turkey’s international 
relations.  Kerim Balcı argues that ‘foreign policy was unified with domestic policy.’ 
(Balcı, 2010, 39). Other analysts state that despite the increased interections of Turkey 
in a more accessible Post-Cold war era, its foreign policy has retained an isolationist 
‘suspicious strain and a decidedly zero-sum approach to security issues’, and the 
Kemalist paradigm has remaind dominant in sheping the country’s external relations 
(Park, 2012, 106), while others think Davutoǧlu’s brought more ethical and normative 
issues on agenda (Dal, 2015, 427) 
Ali Balcı and Nebi Miş also devote importance to the new features of Turkish 
foreign policy. By analysing Turkey’s role in the Alliance of Civilizations (Balcı – Miş, 
2008), they conclude that this new initiative is (also) a tangible sign of a new pursuit of 
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foreign policy. According to the authors, pioneering an international initiative, 
especially becoming a spokesperson of the Muslim world was an unknown element of 
Turkish foreign policy until the AKP’s era.  Ankara’s stance and contribution to the 
Alliance can be perceived as the Middle-Easternisation of Turkey’s foreign policy’ 
(Balcı – Miş, 2008, 401). 
Others – emphasising the novelty of AKP’s foreign policy – point out that the 
previous hard power and security orientation was replaced (or at least revaluated) by the 
extensive use of soft power and a more cooperative stance towards neighbours (Oğuzlu, 
2007; Altunışık, 2008; Kalın, 2010; Hürsoy, 2011, Demirtaș, 2015). İbrahim Kalın, 
former chief foreign policy advisor of Recep Tayyip Erdoǧan, currently Press Secretary 
of the Presidency has made a huge work in order to propagate the rising soft power as 
new, modern tool of Turkish foreign policy at the scientific field. He emphasized the 
novelty of the use of soft power that clearly differentiates the AKP government from the 
Kemalist establishement. Thank to the country’s ‘history of democracy (with all the 
bumps along the way), dynamic civil society sector, sophisticated diplomacy, 
technology, education, a strong economy and multilateral relations with various political 
actors’ it coud become an emerging soft power (Kalın, 2010, 98.). He pointed out that 
new institutions such as Yunus Emre Cultural Centres following the examples of British 
Councils or Goethe Institutes or the TİKA’s increasing involvement in distance regions 
clearly signs the activity of Turkey in the international arena (Kalın, 2008, 2010, 2011, 
2012, or see its personal homepage: ibrahimkalin.com). 
Some argue that the EU accession process pushing Turkey towards 
democratisation led to the change. The democratisation made possible for more groups 
and societal actors to voice their opinion and consequently influence the foreign policy-
making, as the democracy-promoter AKP had to reflect on the claims of the population 
in its foreign policy as well. According to the author, Erdoğan's growing criticism 
towards Israel and the famous ’one-minute speech’ in Davos was a reflection to the 
public demand (Meltem Müftüler-Baç, 2011, 288).  Others think that even the 
slowdown of the accession process pushed Turkey towards a more eastward foreign 
policy (Babalı, 2011). Tarık Oğuzlu argues that during the AKP governments Turkish 
foreign policy has been Middle Easternising (Oğuzlu, 2008). He sees a shift between the 
previous and the then foreign policy pursuit by stating that Turkish decision-makers 
have become more pragmatic and rational than emotional towards the European Union 
and the United States. He explains this development with two events: the EU’s decision 
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to partially suspend the accession talks with Ankara and the American occupation of 
Iraq in 2003. He believes that the background of the ‘dissociation’ of the country’s 
foreign policy stems from paradoxically its Europeanisation as Turkey shall be 
perceived as a European country seeking to adopt a European foreign policy and to 
solve security problems in a non-European region (Oğuzlu, 2008, 5). He also adds other 
factors, such as the AKP has put more emphasis on the country’s Islamic and Middle 
Eastern characteristics and the fact that security situation has been dramatically changed 
in Turkey’s neighbourhood during the recent decade and the country has become less 
concerned about its western identity but it acts rather in own interests (Oğuzlu, 2008; 
Oğuzlu, 2011). 
To reveal the main narratives about Turkish foreign policy, the Author shall not 
neglect the ‘Arab Spring’ and its role in shaping Turkey’s image. After its beginning and 
the tremendous change it has brought in the Middle East, Ankara’s position was 
revaluated by the international scientific and political community. Even if this interval 
lasted approximately for one or perhaps two years and this aspect has become 
marginalised simultaneously with the plausibility of ‘zero problems with neighbours’ 
policy, it was probably the main issue in interpreting Turkey’s role, especially in the 
Middle East. This was the ‘famous’ ‘Turkish model.’ This thesis does not aim at 
revealing the whole debate about the notion and the applicability of this model, however 
the author has to put it into the context of changing interpretation of Turkish foreign 
policy. Firstly, ‘Turkish model’ is not a novelty, as it already appeared in the nineties, 
suggested by the Bush cabinet. Then, this notion referred to the possible applicability of 
a democratic model in the newly established Central Asian (Turkic) countries, helped by 
Ankara (Altunışık, 20011). In 2011, this slogan renewed or re-emerged (Sengupta, 
2014), however that time it targeted Middle Eastern countries. Turkey by supporting 
‘popular’ movements in these states got huge sympathy. Probably less surprisingly, 
Western scholars, journalists and politicians also started to support Ankara’s activity and 
diplomatic efforts (Falk, 2014, 15) to ease and help the democratisation processes in the 
region. Despite the continuous debate about Turkey’s stance towards its allies and 
‘middle easternisation’ of its external relations, the ‘model country’ got positive 
reflections, especially in two distinct groups, the Islamist parties in the Middle East and 
in the West, especially in Washington (Kaddorah, 2010). The New York Times argued in 
February 2011 that the country could be perceived as a model, and the ongoing 
democratisation process as a road map for Arab countries (Cooper, 2011). Even Erdoǧan 
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appeared on the cover of the Time magazine and a lengthy article was devoted to 
unravel his role and influence in the Middle East (his popularity was seemingly 
demonstrated by the success of his journey in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia in September 
2011). Many argued that despite the differences and possible challenges in promoting 
this discourse, Turkey could have a real, positive effect in the launching democratisation 
process (Dede, 2011), and this optimism was strengthened by Western politicians, too. 
Certainly, decision-makers in Ankara also preferred this vision. 
Nevertheless, a number of scholars expressed their concerns about the 
applicability of the Turkish model. At least two different understandings prevail in the 
debate about its notion: firstly, many argue that the model refers to the compatibility of 
Islam and democracy (so the AKP’s experience) while others imagine the long-lasting 
democratisation process hand in hand with the creation of a modern, secular state 
(Altunıșık 2008; Göksel, 2012). 
 This interpretation has to face criticism from two sides. Firstly, many pointed 
out that the democratisation process was not over in the country, and ‘democracy alla 
Turca is still mutating’ (The Economist, 06/08/2011) Secondly, some also emphasised 
the different situation and historical background of the Arab countries making the 
‘Turkish model’ irrelevant in the real context or at least questionable concerning its 
applicability (Gümüscü, 2012; Rane, 2012). Moreover, some also raised the question 
which model Turkey can show: according to them, the secular, Kemalist state 
legitimacy and identity-building could be a better source of inspiration for Arab 
countries compared to the AKP’s experience (Ünver, 2013) or, in other terms, the 
Kemalist modernisation is indispensable for the current success of the AKP’s model 
(Göksel, 2012, 103). 
A few years after the Arab Spring, due to the lasting war in Syria or the Sisi-led 
coup d’état in Egypt and bloody conflicts in Libya discourses on the applicability of the 
Turkish model faded away. The changing (geo)political situation favoured the opinion 
about the sectarian foreign policy and contributed to the decline of positive evaluation 
of Ankara’s foreign ambitions. Furthermore, the events of Gezi in summer 2013 leading 
to riots spreading all over the country and seriously harming the AKP government’s 
image have questioned the very existence of the Turkish democracy (Kilinç, 2014). 
These events, followed by corruption probes, wire-tape scandals and restrictions on 
media freedom convinced many to declare that the ‘Turkish model’ has reached its end 
(Balcı, 2013; Tașpınar, 2014). 
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Although the view about an activist, pro-active Turkish foreign policy did not 
appear, its positive evaluation has been weakend during recent years when Turkey led 
itself to isolation due to the unfavourable developments in the Middle East. Support of 
Russia and Iran that helped the Assad regime to stay in power, the emergence of a 
strong Kurdish entity in Northern Syria enjoying American and Russian backing curbed 
Turkey’s capacities to influence the Syrian developments. Furthermore, the terrorist 
attacks against Turkey committed by the ISIS from the beginning of 2015, the arrival of 
some 3 million refugees brought the Syrian issue to domestic politics. The spillover of 
the conflict also affected the PKK peace process that was terminated in Mid-2015. The 
regional isolation emerged when Turkey withrew some of its ambassadors from 
neighbouring country, from this point of view the fall of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt 
by Sissi-led coup in 2013 showed a clear turning point in Ankara’s regional ambitions. 
Confrontations with other regional powers by the end of 2015 (Russia, Iran, Syria, Iraq, 
Egypt even with the US) convinced more and more analysts to evaluate Davutoǧlu’s 
hallmark of ‘Zero problems with neighbours’ as a daydream that finally led to tensions 
and destabilization. This isolation pried into the foreign policy of Turkey by a number 
of authors (see for instance: Stein, 2015; Grigoriadis, 2015; Aydıntaşbaş, 2016). The 
previously praised Turkish soft power also got more criticism as Turkey started to lose 
its democratic and plularistic image by crushing the Gezi protests (Sandıklı, 2014) and 
had to face diplomatic fiascos in the international level (Angey-Sentuc–Molho, 2015; 
Benhaïm – Öktem, 2015). Lastly, Davutoǧlu forced resignation in May 2016 terminated 
his era in Turkish foreign policy. Some think that the pro-active approach required from 
the diplomatic apparatus started to leave of (interview, Istanbul, 2017). 
 
 
4.3. Continuation of the previous governments’ foreign 
policy? 
 
Another group of authors state that AKP’s foreign policy is rather a continuation 
of previous governments’ policy than a radical change. This kind of interpretation can 
be seen as an academic reflection on the discourse and positioning of the ‘new’ policy 
making. It does recognise the AKP’s achievement nevertheless does not see much 
novelty in it.  Accordingly, the criticisms are twofold. Firstly, they target the discursive 
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level, and focus on the rhetoric of the party by stating it has no much novelty. Secondly, 
some authors argue that the doctrinal inventions of the new diplomacy such as ‘good 
relations with the neighbourhood’ or ‘active diplomacy’ was already launched by 
preceding cabinets and foreign policy makers, especially by Turgut Özal and Ismail 
Cem. 
Many state that Davutoǧlu’s interpretation of Turkey as an ‘extraordinary 
country in an ordinary world’ is misleading and indeed he did not invent a new 
geostrategic thinking but follows a traditional realist approach (Demirtaș, 2014) which 
is driven by imperialist daydreams to establish dominance in the interception of Eurasia 
and Africa (Kıvanç, 2015). By revealing various, early papers of the academician-
turned-diplomat, some states that Davutoğlu basically leans on Anglo-Saxon and 
German geostrategic theorists like Mackinder and Haufstater and he argues that the 
Strategic Depth is a collection of previous articles published in Islamist newspapers and 
it could not be considered as a revolutionary work as it was publicised by many 
journalists and scholars (Özkan, 2014). In his harsh criticism, Özkan states that ‘his 
ideas are pseudoscientific, based on inspiration related to historical destiny rather than 
rational thought’ (Özkan, 2014, 130). According to him, ‘Davutoğlu disowns the 
traditional policy of Turkey’ based on the principle to defend its borders inherited from 
the Ottoman Empire (Özkan, 2014, 126). Özkan also sees many similarities between 
interwar German strategists’ discourse and Davutoğlu’s. Similar expressions, like 
lebensraum (hayat alanı) and concepts are used by the academician. He reframes 
Turkish ‘lebensraum’ through cultural and economic factors expanding it beyond the 
country's borders towards the former Ottoman territories. Özkan also sees Davutoğlu’s 
vision as pan-islamist. However, the foreign minister's concept differs from the 
Abdülhamidian and is closer to a more expansionist, German Mittellage concept. This 
(new) Pan-Islamism is tangible in his Balkans and Middle East policy (Özkan, 2014, 
127-128).  
Furthermore, many argue that a number of expressions and notions extensively 
used by Davutoğlu have already appeared in Ismail Cem’s speeches like good relations 
with the neighbours, opening, cooperation between civilizations (Yeşiltaş–Balcı, 2011, 
10). By going beyond the contestation of Dautoǧlu’s narrative, a number of scholars 
believe that there is a de facto continuity between the AKP's and the previous 
administrations' (especially those after the end of Cold War) foreign policy in real terms. 
The findings of a project interviewing influential foreign policy experts in Turkey 
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conducted by the think-tank USAK in 2009 have shown that the scientific community in 
Turkey rather tend not to see huge rupture with the previous era. The most emphasised 
feature of Ankara’s orientation is the stable link to the Western allies and the country’s 
commitment towards the Westernisation and modernisation (Özdal at al, 2008, 2009). 
As a whole, according to the scholars, the AKP also follows this basic line even if it 
intends to redefine the emphases in its foreign relations. Altunışık thinks that there is no 
other alternative for Turkey, the Turkic or Islamic World, even the ‘Ottoman geography’ 
cannot replace the country’s commitment to the West (Altunışık, 2010). 
In this respect, probably the most parallels are depicted between the AKP and 
Turgut Özal’s period (Özel, 2010; Erhan, 2009, 67; Öniş – Yılmaz, 2009, Keerthi, 
2014). Özal initiated the first neoliberal opening for the Turkish economy which could 
not leave the foreign policy untouched either. He has resumed the Turkish accession 
process to the European Union (then European Economic Community) in 1987 and also 
opened towards the neighbouring regions. He visited Mekka as president of Republic 
which was broadcasted to millions of television viewers in Turkey. He started to 
develop closer ties with Muslim countries and Ankara was one of the first countries 
which recognized the state of Palestine (Keerthi, 2014, 215).  After the collapse of the 
Soviet Union which led to the establishment of independent Turkic states in Central 
Asia, he also launched a very active foreign policy towards them, not just on the 
discourse level but with tangible tools, like the establishment of international 
organisations, forums, giving university grants to thousands of students from these 
countries etc. 
Didier Billion draws many similarities between the current and previous Turkish 
governments’ initiatives in his review on Turkish foreign policy. He argues that the 
previous decades have also seen periods of disagreements and tensions with the West, 
however, Ankara had no real intention to leave this bloc (Billion, 2010). Jung argues 
that the AKP follows the Turkish political patterns (Jung, 2011) Alexander Murinson 
also sees a clear linkage between the era of Özal and the AKP, and the traces of the 
Erbakan government`s multi-dimensional foreign policy in Davutoğlu’s geostrategic 
thinking (Murinson, 2006, 2012). Grigoriadis also argues that Turkey`s foreign policy 
under the AKP is not a novelty. In his comparison of the Davutoğlu doctrine and the 
previous governments’ foreign activism (especially under Özal and Ismail Cem), he 
states that Özal has already advocated a more assertive and multilateral Turkish foreign 
policy that the current Turkish leadership basically follows (Grigoriadis, 2014). Others 
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also emphasise the similar elements of Turkish foreign policy, however they argue that 
if there is a shift, it occurred during the second AKP-government (Meliha B. Altunışık – 
Lenore G. Martin 2011).   
Researchers who perceive continuity between Özal and the AKP do not consider 
a determining difference between the discourses of the leaders of the foreign policy. 
Davutoǧlu’s main narratives have already appeared in other foreign ministers’ discourse 
thus can be portrayed as clichés (Türkeş, 2016). Ismail Cem, foreign minister between 
1997 and 2002 has already announced an ‘opening’ towards the neighbourhood. 
Furthermore, successive governments and foreign ministers also started to appease and 
establish a cooperative atmosphere with the neighbouring countries. Probably the most 
palpable example of normalising the relations with the neighbourhood and overcoming 
Turkey's chronic Sèvres-syndrome in the pre-AKP interval was Ismail Cem’s 
rapprochement to Greece. During various visits he managed to handle outstanding 
disputes and normalized the belligerent relations between Athens and Ankara that 
almost led to an armed conflict in 1996 due to dispute over the delimitation of the 
Aegean Sea border. Furthermore, it was Cem who launched an active diplomacy 
towards the Middle East. By this time with the use of hard power Turkey could force the 
PKK out of Syria which paved the way for the establishment of cordial ties with 
Damascus during the next decade. Cem was also conscious of the importance of the 
peace process, so it was him who appeared as a mediator between Israel and the 
Palestinians; even Arafat visited Turkey (Özge, 2013, 42-45). 
Another sign of the continuity is the EU accession negotiation. Özal applied for 
full membership to the predecessor of the EU in 1987. Ankara has signed the Customs 
Union agreement in 1995. After the troublesome years of the military post-modern coup 
d’ État in 1997, 1999 Bülent Ecevit resumed the process in 1999. By this time, at the 
Helsinki Summit the European Council granted Turkey the candidate for full 
membership status and simultaneously a rapid legislation effort wasmade by Ankara in 
order to boost the accession prospects. After 2002, the new AKP government followed 
this line and accepted many law and harmonisation packages that the EU awarded by 
recognising Turkey as a prepared country in 2004. Almost one year later, in October 
2005, Turkey could start the accession negotiations and in mid-2006 it was able to close 
the chapter on Science and Research. 
The accession process dominated the first term of AKP that is a clear continuity 
with the main priority of the Ecevit administration. Nevertheless, the process seemingly 
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slowed down at the end of 2006 and a number of chapters were frozen hindering the 
negotiations. The elaboration of the issue is too vast for the current study, that is why 
the Author just concludes that in spite of the obvious difficulties, and growing anti-EU 
governmental rhetoric EU accession has remained officially the main foreign policy 
goal for Ankara. Even after the 2011 general election victory, the third Erdoǧan 
government established the Ministry for EU Affairs by proving its commitment to the 
project. 
Ziya Öniş states that AKP’s foreign policy towards the Middle East was driven 
by security, economy and identity factors (Öniş, 2014) that in parts can be 
conceptualised as a continuation of previous governments’ activities, such as Ismail 
Cem’s rapprochement to Greece in the late 1990’s. However, other elements, like rising 
Conservativism and rediscovery of the Ottoman past also shaped the AKP’s stance and 
foreign policy towards the region. According to Öniş, Turkey has started to behave as an 
independent regional power with less emphasis on EU preferences (Öniş, 2014, 207). 
Concerning Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East in recent time, since the 
start of the Arab Spring, he evaluates Turkey’s foreign policy rather a growing sectarian 
one with lots of miscalculations, especially in Syria’s case. He also admits that ‘foreign 
policy has become an important tool for the AKP to consolidate and extend its popular 
support on the domestic front.’ According to him, AKP’s foreign policy was based on a 
new kind of nationalism with conservative and religious overtones, yet outward-facing 
and globalist in its orientation (Öniş, 2014, 214). 
 
4.4. Academic literature on the Turkish foreign policy and 
the Balkans  
After reviewing the narratives about Turkish foreign policy, it is high time to 
elaborate the scientific literature’s stance on Turkish activism in the Balkans. The 
Author has to state that the literature focusing on recent Turkish-Balkan relations is 
rather limited compared to the great number of works dealing with Ankara’s relations to 
the Middle East. In a work aiming to depict the whole range of Turkish foreign policy, 
this difference has to be addressed. Foreign policy experts – IR and FPA scholars and 
pundits – usually focus on current issues and try to explain and forecast the possible 
developments. The change in Turkish diplomacy raised concerns particularly in relation 
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to the Middle East, as the AKP made new friends from old enemies and vice versa.  The 
‘shift’ with strategic Western (especially US) interests clashed in that region and not in 
the Balkans. Furthermore, the importance of the Middle East increased after the Arab 
Spring and due to the long-lasting Syrian and Iraqi wars and the rise of the Islamic 
State, the emergence of a strong Kurdish entity it will probably preserve its particular 
position for the upcoming years as well. Meanwhile the Balkans remained a silent and 
rather peaceful region with at least a weak EU accession prospect. Nevertheless, the 
Balkan Peninsula offers an excellent field to analyse a relatively unchanged Turkish 
foreign policy while the Middle East due to the upheavals and conflicts became a 
moorland full of ambiguities for (Turkish) decision-makers; the competitive 
multipolarity of the Middle East made difficult for Ankara to follow a well-articulated 
foreign policy strategy. That is why to describe Turkish diplomacy in South-East 
Europe; it will easily allow us to understand the very nature of it and see how and 
through which tools Ankara builds its leverage. 
Furthermore, the limited scientific attention does not mean the lack of interests. 
During previous years a number of volumes and articles have been published 
concerning the topic, suggesting that the growing Turkish activism could not be left 
unnoticed, not just in Turkey but in South-East European countries as well. Especially 
in 2009, Davutoǧlu’s famous speech in Sarajevo gave a fresh impetus to understand and 
evaluate Ankara’s ambition towards the region and triggered a discussion about the 
fairness of its motives. Nonetheless, it could not reach the same international attention 
as the Middle East in this context because in the Balkans, one may not speak about a 
drastic change due to the fact that the region's security and political complex has 
remained roughly intact after the end of the Kosovo war (1999) and although difficulties 
have emerged such as the recognition of Kosovo’s independence (2008) Ankara did not 
have to change its partners drastically as it happened in the Middle East. 
Interestingly, no one in the West raised eyebrows over the changing Turkish 
foreign policy in the Balkans. Ankara’s efforts to achieve peaceful solutions for regional 
and inter-state problems were rather welcomed by the Western scientific community. 
The country’s endeavours to settle its deteriorated relations with Belgrade, a traditional 
Russian ally in the Balkans, also did not raise many concerns. Even this was interpreted 
as evidence that Ankara does not pursue an Islamist policy (Vogel, 2010). Its 
commitment towards Bosnia’s future and the stability of the country got very limited 
attention in the shadow of the Middle Eastern problems in the West. Moreover, it seems 
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that Ankara's discourse about a peaceful and stable Balkans has met the intentions of its 
US and EU partners. Consequently, diplomatic activism due to the converging interests 
did not lead to new tensions with Washington or Brussels. 
The debate about whether the AKP’s diplomacy is continuing that of the 
previous Turkish governments’ or not, has already appeared in the literature, however 
with limited influence. Only a few authors argued that it mainly follows the 
predecessors’ traditions (Türkeș, 2008; Rüma, 2010; 2011). However, the novelty of the 
growing activism of Ankara’s diplomatic efforts was more spectacular. Therefore, 
frequent diplomatic visits, mediation attempts and the appearance of various Turkish 
state agencies, like Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency or Yunus Emre 
Cultural Centres also demonstrated that something has changed compared to the 
nineties and literally, Ankara is already ‘ante portas.’ Davutoǧlu’s unusual discourse 
about the prospering Ottoman past when various ethnic and religious groups have 
managed to live together in peace and the Balkans were one of the main economic 
centres of Europe has given a new focal point in analysing Turkish ambitions. The 
Balkans has become the most referred territory in the context of ‘Ottoman geography’ 
(Osmanlı coǧrafyası) an entity that has particular relations to Turkey due to the common 
history and culture (see Turkish experts thinking about the notion: Özdal at al, 2008, 
2009). 
Not surprisingly, Neo-Ottomanism has emerged as one of the main approaches 
when interpreting the regional Turkish activism. In foreign policy, this interpretation 
emphasises the historical and geographic significance of the region and describes the 
new diplomatic activities as a neo-imperial foreign policy ‘whose legitimacy is rooted 
in the Ottoman Empire’s historic role in the Balkans’ (Anastasakis, 2012, 186). 
 Closely connected to this, the question aroused whether it was beneficial or 
rather a threat to tackle. References on the Ottoman imperial past have provided ample 
ammunition to critical views. Even during the nineties when Turkish diplomatic 
activism has increased, a great number of articles were published in various newspapers 
in Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia describing this newly found interest as threatening. The 
media, especially in the above-mentioned countries has been hostile towards Ankara 
(Gangloff, 2005, 1-2). The new activism under the JDP’s rule also paved the way for a 
debate about Turkey’s intentions. Seemingly, this process got a strong normative 
dimension, and by this time (re)opened the way to the ‘Neo-Ottoman hype’ (Bechev, 
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2012b). Nevertheless, many admit that ‘Turkey has to deal with “its” Ottoman heritage’ 
(Gangloff, 2001, 14). 
Probably one of the most discussed books on the subject was written by Darko 
Tanasković, a Serbian academician and former ambassador to Turkey. In his book 
entitled  Neoosmanizam – Povratak Turske na Balkan (‘Neo-Ottomanism – The Return 
of Turkey to the Balkans’), he argued that the emergence of Ankara as a gradually 
growing regional power threatens Serbia as the oriental country would like to reinstate 
its own, previous Empire. According to him, Neo-Ottomanism is ‘an amalgam of 
Islamism, Turkism, and Ottoman imperialism’ that is not just a foreign policy doctrine 
but it appears as a paradigm at domestic level as well. Concerning the diplomacy, 
Tanasković sees the Balkans as a key element in Davutoǧlu’s Neo-Ottomanist policy. 
He believes that the Bosniaks and Albanians constitute the human basis for Ankara’s 
ambitions in the region. Subsequently Turkey has to support its protégés and shape the 
balance of power in the region that Belgrade has to pay attention to. 
Considering contemporary Turkey as rather a threatening actor that seeks to 
support Muslims in detriment of Christians has a vast literature. A number of articles 
were published – shaping the public opinion about Turkey and highlighting the 
unfavourable effects of Ankara’s rising power in the region. Especially the political 
leadership of Republica Srpska seemed to be receptive to this narrative, Milorad Dodik, 
the president of the Serbian entity disseminated his unfavourable opinion about Turkish 
presence. Not surprisingly, Tanasković’s book was published in Banja Luka, the capital 
of the Bosnian Serbs.   
Srdja Trifković, influential Serbian IR scholar and editor-in-chief also sees a 
Turkey as a threat (Trifković, 2011). For him, Neo-Ottomanism is a new attempt to 
create a Green Corridor that a concept with two meanings. Firstly, it refers to a ‘chain of 
Muslim-dominated polities from Istanbul in the South-East to North-Western Bosnia, a 
mere 120 miles from Austria.’ This corridor would assure the dominance of Islam over 
the Balkans and open a door towards Europe. Moreover, the Green Corridor is not just a 
simple geographic notion but a project itself. He believes:   
 
‘That process entails four key elements: (1) Expanding the area of those communities' 
demographic dominance; (2) Establishing and/or expanding various entities under Muslim political 
control with actual or potential claim to sovereign statehood; (3) Enhancing the dominant community’s 
Islamic character and identity within those entities, with the parallel decrease of presence and power of 
non-Muslim groups; and (4) Prompting Muslim communities’ ambitions for ever bolder designs in the 
future, even at the risk of conflict with their non-Muslim neighbors. Understanding this neo-Ottoman 
strategic concept par excellence is essential to a comprehensive understanding of the motives, actions, 
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and emerging expectations of different actors in the Yugoslav wars of 1991-1999 and their aftermath 
(Trifković, 2011, 90)’. 
 
Interrelated with Ankara’s emerging commitment to the region, Islam also makes 
advances in Turkey. Trifković thinks that the JDP’s rule contributes to the islamisation 
of the country as well as the end of Kemalism. In its totality, he sees that Turkey has 
already turned its back on its Western allies, as it was demonstrated by the downturn of 
the relations between Tel-Aviv and Ankara. Concerning Turkey’s project towards the 
Balkans, he argues: 
‘Far from enhancing peace and regional stability, neo-Ottoman policies pursued by Ankara 
continue to encourage seven distinct but interconnected trends centered on the Green Corridor: 
(a) Pan-Islamic agitation for the completion of an uninterrupted Transverse by linking its as yet 
unconnected segments. 
(b) Destabilization of Bosnia resulting from constant demands for the erosion of constitutional 
prerogatives rooted in Dayton, leading to the abolition of the Republika Srpska. 
(c) Growing separatism among Muslims in the Raska region of Serbia, manifest in the demand 
for the establishment of an “autonomous” Sanjak region. 
(d) Continuing intensification of greater-Albanian aspirations against Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Greece, and rump-Serbia. 
(e) Further religious radicalization and ethnic redefinition of Muslims in Bulgaria, leading to 
demands for territorial autonomy in the Rhodope region. 
(f) Ongoing spread of Islamic agitation, mainly foreign-financed, through a growing network of 
mosques, Islamic centers, NGOs and “charities” all along the Route. 
(g) Escalation of Turkey’s regional ambitions and Ankara’s quiet encouragement of all of the 
above trends and phenomena (Trifković, 2011, 93-94).’ 
 
Miloš Marković argues that the Turkish-Islam Synthesis gaining momentum in 
Turkish politics has established the conditions to reconsider the traditional, Kemalist, 
status quo seeker foreign policy and accordingly opened a way towards a new activism 
in the Balkans (Marković, 2011). Marković argues by referring to Davutoǧlu that 
Macedonia is the key partner for Turkey in the region. In one hand, as a new ‘powder 
keg’ the country constitutes a threat to the whole region which increases its importance. 
Furthermore, it connects the Muslims of the Western Balkans with Turkey, as well as it 
cuts the Athens-Belgrade axe. This geopolitical location of the Balkan country raises its 
importance for Ankara that will tend to keep it ‘afloat’. 
Turkish scholars express their concerns about the negative effects of Neo-
Ottomanist discourse (See Altunıșık, 2010) because it is a threatening message to the 
people living in former Ottoman territories. Türel Yılmaz sees that ‘Discussions about 
Ottoman geography in this era is ultimately dangerous’ (Yılmaz, 2010, 333).  Certainly, 
the Turkish scientific community is not homogeneous on the issue. Yașar Yakıș does not 
even consider the Balkans to be a subject of any Ottomanist approach due to the fact 
that the EU is the gravity point for Balkan countries. He only sees the applicability of 
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this thinking in the Middle East (Yașar, 2010, 311). Nevertheless, some Turkish scholars 
think that Turkey can only play a dominant role in the Balkans among the neighbouring 
regions (Mandacı, 2009, 377). 
Hajrudin Somun, former Bosnian ambassador to Ankara also expressed his 
criticism about Tanasković’s ouvrage as he does not agree with Serbian nationalist 
circles about Turkey’s ambitions. He does not consider 
 
‘Turkey’s current foreign policy as neo-Ottoman nor imperial, but as a very pragmatic and 
realistic endeavour to secure the ground under its own feet by establishing a peaceful environment around 
its borders and creating opportunities for its economy to progress (Somun, 2011, 37-38).’ 
 
By referring to the benefits of Turkey’s presence in the region, authors 
emphasise the prospering economic relations, growing trade and the substantial inflow 
of direct investment creating a good base for flourishing the regional relations (Ekinci, 
2014, 2017; Dursun-Özkanca, 2016; Nuroǧlu at al. 2017). Almost every paper focusing 
on Ankara’s activism in the region devotes attention to this issue. Jeton Mehmeti argues 
that in Kosovo Turkish capital is mounting and Turkish investors are active. According 
to him, Turkish companies have undertaken some of the most expensive projects in the 
country for instance the Pristhina International Airport and the construction the highway 
between Kosovo and Albania (Mehmeti, 2012). 
Petrović and Reljić’s research, conducted about the economic dimension of 
Turkish-Balkans relations at the request of SETA, also demonstrated that between 2009 
and 2010 Turkey’s export increased steadily (Petrović – Reljić, 2011). Nevertheless, 
other scholars think that the promising economic growth and developing relations 
should not be exaggerated.  Certainly, it could be perceived as a real and palpable 
change, however, the size of Turkish trade and investment is still limited compared to 
other countries’ share in the Balkans’ countries economy, like Germany, Austria, Italy, 
Greece, or even in some cases, Hungary. Analyses about this issue usually do not devote 
enough importance or just neglect this aspect of the ‘Big picture.’ In the related chapter, 
the Author will highlight the limits of Turkish economic expansion and argues that 
JDP’s governmental rhetoric about the country’s commitment decouples from the 
economic reality revealing the Turkish businessmen's diverging interests and 
opportunities from the government’s willingness or at least discourse. Kenan Esref 
Rasidagić also argues that although the political visits are frequent and the presence of 
Turkish state actors is obviously tangible in the country, Turkish capital follows its own 
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interest and prefers bigger markets compared to a small economy of a country of some 
four million inhabitants. The share of Balkan states’ trade in the Turkish total trade has 
remained low (Rasidagić, 2013, 189; Türbedar, 2011, 142; Kőszegi, 2012). Bechev 
argues that Turkish investments are growing in the Balkans. He points out that even if 
Balkan countries do not acquire too much importance for Turkey, the Balkan countries 
trade heavily with the middle-size power (Bechev, 2012a, 2012b). 
Recently more articles have been published on how EU appears in Turkey’s 
regional policy and how Turkey affects the European Union leverages on the Balkans. 
Demirtaș proposes the Europeanization as theoretical tool to understand Turkish foreign 
policy in the Balkans (Demirtaș 2015). She argues that Ankara intends to benefit from 
its NATO-membership and experiences of EU accession negotiations that granted it the 
most Europeanized state’s position. This comparative advantage among less developed 
Southeast European countries promoted of primus inter pares.  To strengthen its 
position Turkey also has implemented EU/Western institutions such as cultural centers 
or the development agency in the region which contributed to the flourishing relations 
with Muslim communities. Through instrumentalization of EU tools and discourse, 
Ankara tries to boost its influence within the region and even use it for domestic 
political aims if the Turkish government deems it necessary (Demirtaș, 2015, 137). 
Altough the EU is the gravity point of Balkan countries the apparent slowdown of 
accession process reduced the integration enthousiasm of Western Balkan countries. In 
that point, Turkey’s activism gained more importance and it appears as a strategic 
competitor of the EU. Some argues that decline of EU commitment may lead to a 
strengthening of Ankara in the region, thereby potentially undermining EU efforts 
(Vračić, 2016, Dursun-Özkanca, 2016). 
 Another approach is related to the cultural dimension and explains Turkey’s 
involvement through the country’s religious identity and its special relations to the 
Muslim communities living in the Balkans. Thus, Ankara behaves as a protector or ‘Big 
brother’ of Muslim people (Anastasakis, 2012, 186, Egeresi 2013, Gangloff, 2001, 
Öktem 2011). It is legitimised by the interpretation that Turkey as a Muslim country has 
a better understanding of these small and divided communities. This perception made it 
possible for Davutoǧlu to appear as a mediator in the Sandjak. Thus, Turkish 
involvement contributes to the stabilisation of the region and can prevent further 
conflicts as well. Sylvie Gangloff highlighted the Turkish state’s efforts to support 
religious education in the Balkans and strengthen the Muslim communities (Gangloff, 
84 
 
2001). Kerem Öktem conducted extensive field research in the Balkans that was 
published in a study focusing on the growing Turkish influence over the region and 
arguing that after a short Wahabi attempt to establish leverage in the Balkans Turkey is 
getting more room for manoeuvre and intends to create its control over Muslims 
(Öktem, 2011). 
On the other hand, apart from the cultural and religious ties Ankara has to 
address the interest of several million Balkan immigrants living in the country that has a 
special affiliation with the region. Especially Turkish politicians mention this aspect 
(usually during background conversations), that despite its importance was hardly 
addressed by the literature. Just a few articles were published about the issue. For 
example, Erhan Türbedar highlights that the immigrants (or descendants of immigrants) 
constitute a natural lobby in Turkey that is made up of associations, foundations, 
journalists, academicians, parliamentarians and even ministers. This circumstance 
explains why Turkish government could not be indifferent towards the Balkans 
(Türbedar, 2011, 141). 
Despite the multidimensional literature dealing with Turkish diplomacy in the 
Balkans, some shortcomings shall be discussed. First of all, when the literature intends 
to interpret Ankara’s role or activism it usually focuses on the Western Balkans. 
Although obviously the most dramatic change can be noticed in this context and Turkey 
possesses the biggest room for manoeuvre in the post-Yugoslav states in the Balkans, 
other countries, like Bulgaria and Romania also shall not be neglected in a regional 
analysis. For instance, the latter only appears in economic relations and it is hardly 
mentioned in other, like cultural or minority issues. Moreover, Turkey and Bulgaria’s 
relation is usually ‘marginalised’ in the regional analysis, even if it is possible to find 
similarities with the Western Balkans. Furthermore, the diverging aspects are not 
elaborated and explained in respect of these two states.18 Without taking into 
consideration these countries – despite the common historical background, similar 
social structure and problems, and in many cases analogous economic situation – it 
becomes more difficult to understand the engine of Ankara’s ambitions towards the 
region. 
                                                          
18Certainly, the fact that Romania and Bulgaria have entered into the European Union shapes the relations 
and consequently puts both countries in a different context. However, the main differences are not based 
deliberately on this aspect, and they follow a ’regional pattern.’ 
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Secondly, IR or FPA literature hardly unfolds the societal dimension of the 
relations between the Balkans and Turkey. Nonetheless, a number of authors refer to the 
huge influx of Muslims from the region during the collapse of the Ottoman Empire’s 
rule and later due to regional conflicts, ethnic cleansing and oppression of minority 
groups. This process led to the emergence of a huge ‘immigrant’ community; however 
their effect on politics, especially on foreign policy was less studied. Baklaçıoǧlu 
described the foundation of immigrant associations in several volumes and also made 
extensive researches about the 20th century immigration from the Balkans to Turkey. 
Others rather focused on recent immigration (Parla, 2006, 2007; Parla – Danıș - Eder, 
2009), particularly from Bulgaria.19 These researches have shown some aspects of the 
societal dimension, however to a limited extent. In connection to this, as Rüma admits 
research on the activities of non-state actors within the Balkan-Turkish relations and 
their effects on Turkish foreign policy have remained narrow (Rüma, 2010), and it 
needs further studying (See for further reading Baklaçıoǧlu, 2006). Türbedar state that 
Balkan immigrants represent a strong lobby group in Turkey; however, he does not 
elaborate the details of their leverage (Türbedar, 2011). 
Thirdly, the role of the Turkish minority in the Balkans, and its place in Ankara’s 
foreign policy has also got inadequate attention. Onlya a few number of books intended 
to describe the relation between Turkey and its kin living in the peninsula, probably the 
most recent and extensive work is Kader Özlem’s volume (Özlem, 2016). Although the 
Turkish minority constitutes nearly 10 percent of Bulgaria's inhabitants and its political 
party, the Movement for Right and Freedom possesses a measurable political influence 
in the country, the AKP’s relation to the party or its support for the minority has 
remained barely studied. Even the situation of the Turkish minority groups in other 
countries having a more inclusive minority policy did not get many researches during 
the last decade. Albeit Kosovo and Macedonia had to give more rights to its minorities 
compared to other neighbouring countries, like Greece or Bulgaria, the situation of these 
Turkish communities, their political parties and their role in bilateral relations have 
failed to receive much limelight. Thus, the importance of Turkish minority groups for 
Ankara, and their effects on foreign policy making shall be addressed in this thesis. 
 
                                                          
19Tolay gives an excellent overview about the migration literature in Turkey (See: Tolay, 2012) 
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Constructing hegemony: the AKP’s rule in Turkey 
 
1. Emergence of the Islamist counter-hegemonic 
project 
1.1. New hegemonic bloc and the establishment of the 
Republic 
 
Probably the most transformative decades of Turkey are dated back some one hundred 
years ago: the Young Turk takeover which opened the way to the Second Constitutional 
Era, later the Committee of Union and Progress’s adjustment to a single-party 
government, the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire by the end of the WWI and the 
emergence of the young Republic of Turkey under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk. The Young Turk movement whose leaders as counter-hegemonic actors were 
able to seize the power via force in 1908 and launched a deep modernization process 
based on the emerging Turkish nationalism. The Young Turks’ counter-hegemonic 
project was based on the rising class of intellectuals, bourgeoisie and new generation of 
higher raking soldiers in the military that supported a European (especially French) 
modernization. Abdülhamit II (1878-1909) was skilful to counter previous attacks 
against his life/his reign based on the successful co-optation of various tribes, Muslim 
leaders based on Islamism. This Young Turk revolution was a ‘classical’ act of war of 
manoeuvre that managed to (re)introduce a constitutional period and was successful to 
hinder Abülhamit’s counter coup attempt. Although a new sultan could ascend to 
Abdülhamit’s throne after 1909 and seemingly significant changes did not occur at the 
top of the country leadership, in reality a new elite sized the power that started to 
implement a new hegemonic project based on nationalism, especially after the victory 
of the Committee of Union and Progress at the elections. 
 However, continuous wars beginning with the conflict between Italy and the 
Ottoman Empire over Libya, two Balkan wars (1912-13) and the WWI (1914-18) have 
tired the ruling class and put the whole hegemonic project in risk, especially when great 
power troops occupied Istanbul and when Greeks started their military campaign by 
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landing their troops in Izmir (1919). This military collapse following the Armistice of 
Mudros resulted in the Treaty of Sevres (1920) practically meaning the dissolution of 
the Empire.  
 Nevertheless, a young military leader, Kemal Atatürk begun his war to defend 
Anatolia in 1919 which has managed to overwrite the Treaty of Sevres. After finishing 
the War of Independence (1919-1922) successfully, he managed to sign the more 
favourable Treaty of Lausanne (1923) which granted more territory and economic 
freedom of the country. Atatürk emerged as the ultimate triumphant of the chaotic 
period and he has started the transformation of Turkish society and state based on the 
Army and emerging pro-Young Turk elite occupying the key positions of 
administration.  
 The Early Republican modernisation which was rooted in the Young Turk 
revolution endeavoured to create a national, secular and modern state. In Gramscian 
terms, Atatürk’s new elite had two options to cement its project and create its own 
historical bloc: to use state apparatus (especially the Army) as a coercive tool and to 
make consent by co-opting various groups to the new system and creating an ideology 
convincing for the rest of the society. The more a new hegemonic project differed from 
the previous one and lacked legitimacy the more challenge it had to face. Due to the 
amplitude of changes the ‘new’ elite has used more coercion, nevertheless it could 
benefit from a strong military that increased its reputation by winning the War of 
Independence.  
 The religious elite lost its position because it was perceived as an obstacle for 
the modernization. The government has created the Diyanet as directorate for religious 
affairs. The imams and others responsible for the religious life of the society have 
become simple state employees. The state has abolished the Caliphate system in 1924, 
closed religious schools (medrese) and religious courts, later the tekkes, the religious 
buildings designated for gatherings of tarikats. (Kicsi, 2008). It also banned the 
religious orders (tarikat) and communities (cemaat).  Several new rulings like the new 
dress code, new alphabet and new cultural policy indirectly also aimed at reducing the 
role of religiousness within the society and replace it witch a state-dominated 
secularism. Nevertheless, the establishment of Diyanet did not led to the separation of 
religious life from state, on the contrary, the state has created a strong surveillance over 
the population (Vásáry, 2008). Despite these thorough reforms Atatürk had to face a 
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purely religious revolt only one time, in 1930 when a derviș begun a revolt in the 
Western Anatolian town, Menemen which was crushed by the Army immediately.  
 The nation-building had to cope with even greater difficulties. As at least ten 
percent of the population were Kurds, being in overwhelming majority in the East and 
resistance to the Turkification, the hegemonic elite was in an arduous situation. What is 
more, their case was interrelated with the transformation of religious elite: local chiefs 
as religious sheiks were threatened by the secularism and by the Turkification 
simultaneously. Probably not surprisingly, whilst Atatürk was at power there was no 
year without any rebellion in the Kurdish inhabited East. The first and greatest one was 
launched by Said sheik and after a few weeks of bloody conflicts won by the Turks 
(1925). Other revolts had lesser effect, like the bloody war in Dersim (today Tunceli) 
between 1936 and 37, although caused huge loss in life. 
 The coercive power of the state was used succefully to defend the hegemonic 
project but the ruling group had to rely on boosting consent as well. The state ideology, 
the Kemalism (whose principles were articulated in 1937)20 served as the hegemonic 
ideology and was propagated to the whole society. In order to establish the (new) 
Turkey, ruling elit used extensively the education system to disseminate the new, 
secular and nationalist ideas consequently to create from the religious, Muslim populace 
a secular Turk.  
 In the early Republican modernisation, the education eligibility for masses was 
broadening, a new, Latin alphabet was introduced (1928) broking up with the previous 
Arabic-base Osmanlı in line with a ‘modern’ curriculum. New institutions such as 
Turkish History Institute (1931) and Turkish Language Institute (1932) were 
established. The state has opened nationwide cultural centres (halk evi and halk odası) 
to facilitate the dissemination of the new worldview.  In the 1930s, historians 
established the Turkish Historical Thesis emphasizing the importance of the pre-
Ottoman era and sidelining the Ottoman dynasty which was viewed as the main culprit 
of war defeats and cultural backwardness. 
 To summarise, Atatürkist hegemonic project represented in many aspects a 
radical rupture with the previous Ottomans-led-hegemony by placing the secularism and 
                                                          
20 These principles are the following:  Republicanism (cumhuriyetçilik), 
Populism (halkçılık), Nationalism (milliyetçilik), Secularism (laiklik), Statism (devletçilik), and 
Reformism (devrimcilik). 
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nationalism in the heart of the modernisation and strengthening the state and 
surveillance over society and economy (strong statism). 
 The introduction of multi-party system in 1950 that was a major step towards the 
county’s democratization and it has given broader options for new counter-hegemonic 
projects to challenge Kemalist tradion. Nonetheless, strong control actors (veto players) 
and mechanisms intended to deter and hinder counter-hegemonic projects. The 
hegemonic rule in Turkey was challenged mainly by the (radical) Left, Islamists and 
Kurds after 1950 which were usually under state control and met with oppression.  
 Kurdish (nationalist) movement as a mainly single-issue movement (seeking 
independence or at least greater autonomy) has had limited chance for success as by 
definition its programme always alienated the majority of the society (the Turks) while 
had troubles to gain the support of all Kurdish population (religious Kurds tended to 
support other movement or parties) and had to face strong coercive power (namely the 
military).  
 Leftist movements, especially radical ones seeking to achieve a severe social 
transformation also had to face the coercive power of state apparatus that later 
(especially in the 1970s) supported the radical right groups of the civil society to cope 
with Communist threat. As it will be described later, the 1980 military coup has 
beheaded and mitigated the leftist movements. Retrospectively, only the Islamist 
counter-hegemonic project could challenge successfully the Kemalists. The Islamists’ 
road to power was a long and gradual process and has been built on strong social 
transformation. 
  
 
1.2. Naissance of the Islamist Middle Classes and the rise of 
Islamist parties 
 
Turkey has experienced a huge demographic boom after the 70s and a strong 
urbanization due to the mass immigration from the countryside to the major cities. The 
country’s population which was hardly 45 million people in 1980 has reached some 
56.5 million inhabitants in 1990, 68 million in 2000 and some 78 in 2017 (without the 
Syrian refugees) (TÜRKSTAT). Simultaneously, the population of Istanbul increased 
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from 2.9 million in 1980 to almost 15 million in 2017, Ankara from 2.2 million to more 
than 5 million, Bursa has grown from a middle size town of nearly 640 thousand 
inhabitants to a metropolis of more than 2.5 million, Izmir from 1 million to more than 
4 million, other towns faced a sharp rise in numbers such as Konya from 670 thousand 
to more than 2 million, Gaziantep from 800 thousand to almost 2 million people 
(TÜRKSTAT). This mass urbanization was carried out by the establishment of shanty-
neighbourhoods called ‘gecekondu’ that have become an integral part of the major and 
smaller towns after the 1970s. 
By 1980, the urban population outnumbered those living in rural areas which 
clearly represented a change in social structure of the country and predicted a political 
change because of the effect of urbanization on politics (Özcan-Turunç, 2011, 66-67.). 
Due to this rapid population increase and the transformation of cities, the number of 
gecekondu inhabitants has surpassed one-third of the total urban population (Erdenir, 
2015, 199).  
This influx of rural migrants did not change their social status palpably as the 
newcomers – usually unskilled workers leaving the agricultural sector – have remained 
at the bottom of the social stratification. More importantly, the urbanization in terms of 
spreading civic norms and values faced even greater challenges within these rural 
migrant groups who having less option for healthcare, education and social mobility 
opted for preserving their original lifestyle and habits and (re)created their fellow 
village/townsman (hemșehri) and religious (cemaat) associations (Erdenir, 2015, 2000). 
This social transformation – or its lack – favoured the emergence of a large, urban 
conservative and religious electorate that could serve as reservoir of votes first for the 
left, later for the Islamists. 
In the 1970s, it was Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s former party, the CHP that 
intended to capitalize the mass migration to the cities and focused on social politics 
under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit who pushed effectively the party toward the Left. 
This policy awarded the party with electoral successes in that decade, but it could do 
less in order to achieve a real change for the majority of gecekondus. 
This social reality has met the economic neoliberalism of the Turkish elite in the 
1980s. Süleyman Demirel’s ambitious “the 24th January 1980 Decisions” (24 Ocak 
Kararları) in 1980 aimed at switching the country to a free market economy. The 
depositary of this economic policy adjustment was Turgut Özal who has been finance 
minister by this time. The country applied to World Bank in order to finance the 
91 
 
particular structural change and was awarded one of the largest amounts of credit by this 
time.  
However, the economic program was not welcomed by the society, especially in 
the Left. Trade unions, leftist groups who had strong mobilization capacity were 
reluctant. Thus, the political instability of the late 1970s, the constant, bloody conflicts 
between far right and left, the appearance of Islamist threat after the Iranian revolution 
the military intervened in 12 September 1980 and overthrew the government. The mass 
arrests, the closure of political parties and the strengthening of military tutelage in the 
new 1982 constitution highlighted the coercive power of the state and the readiness of 
the military elite to act in order to open the country to the world economy.  
The economic liberalisation continued with Turgut Özal, who became Prime 
Minister in 1983. The new government policy intended to create social consent by 
introducing a conservative, religious (cultural) programme and incorporating capitalism 
in the social ‘common sense.’ Özal opened the way towards export substitution and 
exchange rate depreciation. He enhanced export, privatization, de-regulation and 
reducing state’s influence while weakening trade unions and organized labour. The 
Turkish export increased sharply from a 2.9 billion USD in 1980 to 12.9 billion USD in 
1990. However, the falling living standards led to disturbances in the society and 
undermined the popularity of Özal’s Anavatan Party opening the way to the government 
and economic crisis in the 1990s. 
Thus, the country shifted from import substitution policies to export oriented 
economic liberalization in the early 1980s that supported the emergence of new 
capitalist classes and class dynamics have been altered as well. Until this time, the 
Turkish economy was governed by state centric approach based on centrally shaped 
investment and development project supported by family conglomerates usually 
headquartered in Istanbul and mainly focused on the great sea ports like Istanbul, Izmit, 
Izmir and Adana. Despite the development project, overwhelming majority of the 
country, and especially Central and Eastern/South-eastern Anatolian regions, have 
remained mainly rural and existing local economies stayed in frame of small 
artisanship, commerce and agriculture (Özcan-Turunç, 2011, 65.). Although these 
SMEs faced huge challenges and competition from the state sponsored family 
conglomerates and state run companies, they could turn increasingly to affordable 
financial capital, export markets and new technologies which were impossible earlier 
(Özcan-Turunç, 2011, 68.). Furthermore, the poor locals also suffered the economic 
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changes as their social status and mobility seemed to be even greater danger than 
before. 
The emergence of Islamism as a solution for the problems of deprived social 
classes gained support from the revival of Islamic Brotherhood after the 1950s. Their 
charity networks and philanthropic activities reached these lower social classes. Also, 
during the 1990s they were able to successfully expand their social base within the 
marginalized groups. The Islamist Refah Party’s victory (although just with slight 
majority) in the 1994 municipal elections in Ankara and Istanbul clearly showed the 
change in internal dynamics.  
The triumph of Islamist politicians also gave an opportunity to local Islamist 
business groups to benefit increasingly from local development infrastructural projects 
and public procurements. The Refah which in many cases just resurrected the former 
Leftist discourse about societal justice or ‘Just Order’ (Adil Düzen) gained sympathy in 
among the local poor and a number of SMEs. 
This neoliberal turn has transformed the society and strengthened the Central-
Anatolian business elite during the 1980s and 1990s as well as it contributed to the 
changes in the political landscape. The emergence of the so called Anatolian Tigers was 
a prelude of political adjustment; however, every government’s aim was to establish 
investment-friendly conditions in the country. Despite the gradual opening to 
international markets and accepting a rather export oriented trade policy, these years 
were troublesome for Turkish economy. Ankara had to cope with several crises in 1994, 
1999, 2000 and 2001. The last one particularly damaged the reputation of the 
government parties and contributed in a great manner to the electoral victory of the 
AKP in 2002.  
Furthermore, the Islamic brotherhoods, like Nurcus, Nakșibendis have formed 
alliance with the SMEs and being strengthened by local business groups they could 
even widen their network within the society more effectively. The Fethullah Gülen 
community – probably the most effective in the 1990s and 2000s – was affiliated with 
several thousands of firms. The most influential organization of these companies prior 
to its closure after the 15th July Coup attempt was the TUSKON, the biggest business 
association in Turkey with more than 50 thousand members. 
The newly emerged Islamist entrepreneurs aimed to create their own 
autonomous institutions and lobby groups in order to counterbalance the Kemalist state 
and the secular business groups and strengthen their position vis-á-vis the state. Central 
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Anatolian town, such as Konya, Yozgat, Sivas, Kayseri played a crucial role in this 
endeavour mainly by establishing holdings in these towns and channelling the savings 
of locals and diasporas living in Western Europe (mainly in Germany). The 
inadequacies of the state in health, education or general welfare services attracted these 
groups to exploit the opportunity to fulfil this hiatus and re-allocate resources and social 
benefits to their affiliated communities by using especially municipal sources (Özcan-
Turunç, 2011, 72.). 
The economic adjustment also changed the landscape of business groups. 
Previously the Istanbul-based secular TÜSIAD was the major business association and 
lobby group and was founded in 1971.The first Islamic business association, the 
MÜSIAD was founded in 1990and became the most important Islamist economic 
representative body. It was connected to an aggressive economic expansionist policy 
abroad: it opened a number of foreign offices and in the 1990s become a strong 
supporter the integration to EU markets, it represented a liberal (at least in the economic 
sense) shift in the traditional Islamist side and supported the imparting of capitalism in 
Islamist political circles. As an alternative group to the political centre related TÜSIAD, 
it also advocated smaller and impartial state, greater integration to world economy and 
democratization (Keyman-Gümüșçü, 2014, 32). 
 Thus, the emergence of powerful Islamist business groups and Islamist 
intelligentsia portrayed the naissance of an Islamist middle class as well. The emergence 
of this new class represented a new challenge to the secular upper and middle classes. 
Supported by a growing economic power, the Islamists elements of the society, who 
were traditionally perceived as the periphery, started their political trajectory to conquer 
the high echelon of state. 
The Islamist political movement’s emergence started in the late 1960s and its 
first three decades was shaped by Necmettin Erbakan coming from the Nakșibendi 
order. The politician, who had a degree in engineering, announced their political 
manifesto Milli Görüș (National Vision) in 1969 and created an Islamist political 
movement with the same name. Next year, he established the first Islamist party in 
Turkey, called Milli Nizam Partisi. Erbakan was able to create a convincing electoral 
program for some part of the religious and traditionalist electorate of Central Anatolia, 
mainly in Konya. This electorate granted him a stable base to organize its party 
membership, to enter the parliament. 
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Although subsequent military coups and Constitutional Court’s decisions to ban 
Islamist parties usually put an end to his parties, he was persistent enough to reorganize 
and re-establish these political formations. In 1972 he founded the National Salvation 
Party (MSP) after the closure of MNP by the military intervention in 1971. The Junta 
after the coup of 1980 led by Kenan Evren also banned the party in 1982, and Erbakan 
had to leave party politics for five years.  
In 1987, he returned to politics and founded the Refah Partisi which has become 
one of the most successful parties in the 1990s. A number of factors facilitated its 
electoral successes. Firstly, the military junta of the 1980’s coup intended to depoliticize 
society which suffered from perpetual internal conflict between extreme right and left 
groups in the 1970s. The coup sent thousands to jail and drastically reshaped the 
political landscape of the country and made an end to the extremely dangerous political 
polarisation. To handle the Left-Right cleavages, religion has become an important tool 
to appease the society. The regime introduced compulsory religious education in 
primary and high schools and supported the construction of mosques. 
Another factor also played a role in shaping the perceptions of Islam. Some 
intellectual groups, especially Aydınlar Ocağı (Intellectuals’ Society) during the 1970s 
made palpable efforts to reconcile the Islam and Turkish nationalism. Their so-called 
Turkish-Islam Synthesis gained support especially in the Right by emphasizing that the 
Islam is integral part of Turkish identity and the two (Islam and Turkishness) cannot be 
separated. This new approach re-evaluated the Ottoman past in a positive way (see 
later). 
While the Left was weakened due to the military intervention and governmental 
oppression, more and more people, especially from the local poor turned towards the 
Islamist political party. During this period, Necmettin Erbakan’s Welfare Party could 
benefit from the disillusionment of mainstream political parties, especially during the 
1990s which were characterised by perpetual government coalition crises and frequent 
snap elections. Erbakan could mobilize the disenfranchised lower social classes and the 
Islamist parties emerged as new political forces (Özcan-Turunç, 2011, 69.). 
After the electoral victory in 1996, Erbakan was invited by Tansu Çiller to form 
a government coalition between the RP and DYP. The new alliance between the 
Islamist and Centre-Right was perceived as a threat by the Turkish Armed Forces to the 
secular order of the Republic. When Erbakan has become the Prime Minister in 1997, 
he was soon forced to resign. His party was also closed one year later, in January 1998. 
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Erbakan founded a new party, the Fazilet that could size some 15 percent of votes at the 
1999 election. Nevertheless, the party was also banned by the Constitutional Court in 
2001.  
The constant closure of Islamist parties has engendered a strong disillusionment 
in the Islamist movement. Furthermore, the Neo-liberal turn in Turkey also affected the 
Islamist party politics. Erbakan’s anti-capitalist, anti-Western discourse conflicted with 
the interest of the rising Islamist business circles that preferred political stability, 
economic freedom, new markets including an acceptable political commitment to the 
West for economic reasons (Keyman-Gümüșçü, 2014, 32). 
These circumstances resulted in a political clash within the old Islamist 
movement and the secession of a moderate group led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and 
Abdullah Gül. This group called yenilikciler founded in 2001 a new political 
organization, the Justice and Development Party, the AKP which has become the most 
influential Turkish political party for the upcoming decades. 
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2. The AKP’s hegemony 
2.1. Electoral success: making electoral hegemony 
The AKP’s success in November 2002 was probably the most surprising 
electoral victory in Turkey’s history. The party, founded just hardly more than one year 
before the general election acquired 34 percent of the total votes and entered into the 
parliament as the largest party gaining almost two-third of the mandates. Only one 
party, the Republican People’s Party could pass the 10 percent electoral threshold. The 
other parties – even those who formed the previous government, such as the Nationalist 
Movement Party, the True Path Party or the Homeland Party– failed to gain enough 
votes and remained under the threshold. In such a favourable situation, the AKP could 
form a single-party government which was a unique development compared to the 90’s 
multiparty and weak government coalitions. 
The upcoming elections stabilized the AKP’s position at the top of Turkish party 
system. Every election held during the scope of this work was won by the party that 
ensured a majority in the TBMM or at least made it the main party.  
 
 Chart 1.  AKP's electoral performance (orange: general elections, blue: municipal 
elections) 
As Chart 1 shows, AKP almost managed to increase its share of votes from 34.6 
percent (2002) to 46 percent (2007). Five years later, the party’s electoral performance 
reached almost 50 percent of the total votes. These successful series of victories were 
altered in June 2015 when the party’s support shrunk to 41 percent (meanwhile it 
preserved its main party position at the parliament). Nevertheless, the election on 1st 
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November 2015 brought the party’s support back that passed 49 percent of votes 
making the AKP enable to form a single-party government, again. The results of the 24 
june 2018 elections shows a decline in its electoral performance (it received only 42.6 
percent) however, it is still the biggest party in the TBMM with almost 50 percent of 
mandates. 
 The local level show similar dynamics. The party usually reached around 40 
percent of votes at municipal elections in 2004, 2009 and 2014 that granted the majority 
of municipalities.  For instance, in 2014 AKP won 799 mayoral posts out of 1351 
municipality (59%) and acquired 18 out of 30 metropols (büyükșehir) (Resmigazete, 
06/05/2014). 
Furthermore, the party was able to elect its candidate, Abdullah Gül as President 
of the Republic in 2007 – after a major political crisis – which ensured that the highest 
level of political echelon could be in his hand. The victory in presidential election 
repeated in 2014 in a strongly different situation: that time due to the constitutional 
changes of 2007 the President was elected by direct votes and the candidate was Recep 
Tayyip Erdoǧan. The strong leader’s trajectory from the office of Prime Minister to the 
presidential post strengthened his rule. His partisan and active involvement in politics 
ensured a multilevel dominance of the party from the municipalities to the presidency. 
The emergence of pre-dominant party system is not unique in history, like the 
Liberal Democratic Party in Japan (1955-1994), Conservatives in the United Kingdom, 
but it was a rare momentum in the history if Turkey. Similar pattern could be identified 
during the Democrat Party period (DP) in the 1950s under the leadership of Adnan 
Menderes which was ended by a successful military coup in 1960 or during the multiple 
victories of Turgut Özal’s ANAP between 1983 and 1991 that practically ended due to 
Özal’s trajectory to the post of President of the Republic. However, these parties or 
leaders could not keep the power for more than ten years.  
The AKP’s success can be perceived as a result of a crisis of the then hegemony.  
It is important to highlight that the party’s initial victory in 2002 was rather the result of 
the failure of the government coalition than the promising programme of a recently 
resurrected pro-Islamist party. The Ecevit coalition government (1999-2002) 
represented a compromise between two major centre-right and leftist parties that a 
normalizing national radical party joined. The three years of coalition government were 
challenging for Turkey: the earthquake of 1999 damaged Istanbul, killed nearly 30 000 
people and made the economy more vulnerable and volatile. Corruption cases during 
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this period also damaged the popularity of the government parties. These cases alienated 
the society especially after the financial crises that hit Turkey in 2000-2001. These 
crises rooted from the weakness of Turkish banking sector and a financial turmoil that 
started in November 2000 leading to gradual, unsustainable increase of interest rate 
which culminated in the announcement of the then Prime Minister on 19 February, 2001 
that there was a serious political crisis in the country. After Ecevit’s unfortunate 
declaration about the stalemate, investors started to withdraw their money from the 
country immediately. The Turkish lira devaluated rapidly and in a short while, the real 
economy was also punished by the financial crisis. The political consequences were 
evident: majority of the Turkish people suffered from the crisis. Turkish GDP per capita 
was $2,941 in 2000 but due to the economic recession it decreased to $2,123 in 2001 
while the recovery was slow and the number could grow just to $2,584 in 2002 
(Kumbaracıbaşı, 2009, 98). 
In order to tackle the crisis, the government invited a senior economic expert 
from the World Bank, Kemal Derviș who made huge efforts to reorganize the economy. 
His reforms were in line with the neo-liberal economic policies. Firstly, he managed to 
negotiate a new bail-out package from the IMF and World Bank in exchange for a 
number of financial and monetary reforms. He strengthened the independence of the 
Central Bank, imposed more fiscal discipline on the banking system and financial sector 
and restored the trust of the international investors in Turkey. Privatisation got green 
lighted after severe debates that finally helped to channel new financial sources to the 
state budget enlarging the government’s room for manoeuvre (Szigetvári, 2013, 24). 
The government’s measures could not revive the Turkish economy quickly and 
the snap elections in November 2002 favoured the parties that had no mandate in the 
TBMM this time thus could not be identified with the unsuccessful and corrupt 
government parties. At the election, the AKP could benefit especially from the voters of 
the MHP while the electorate of the two major central-right parties (ANAP and DSP) 
voted comparatively less to the party (Kumbaracıbaşı, 2009, 111). However, AKP could 
also rely on the previous Islamist parties’ electorate as it gained the RP and the FP’ 
electoral strongholds. To summarize, the central right parties that usually dominated the 
party system failed to satisfy the electorate’s demand to fight corruption, ensure 
financial stability and decrease the growing economic inequalities.  
After the break from the Erbakan-led Islamist group, Erdoǧan and Gül managed 
to create a convincing and credible image of a new party. This new image had two 
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pillars. Firstly, the AKP recognized that in such circumstances the electorate prefers a 
‘pure’ political group that cannot be associated with corruption. Because of the regular 
banning of Islamist parties(even its predecessor the Fazilet could not spend much time 
in the TBMM) the party seemed to be a real alternative compared to the former 
government’s well-established parties. The leadership’s choice for symbol also 
supported this general feeling. The party’s symbol – a lighting bulb – portrayed its 
purity as it acronyms also suggested that it is different compared to its political 
adversaries. In Turkish, ‘Ak’ means ‘white’ that also associated with the ‘clean,’ anti-
corruption stance. Thus the dissatisfaction of the voters with the established parties 
played a crucial role in the outcome of the election of AKP (Kumbaracıbaşı, 2009, 83). 
Secondly, the party also benefited from the pro-European stance of the society 
and left behin the anti-EU slogans of the Milli Görüș. This adjustment got strong 
incentive when the Ecevit government revived the dying EU accession talks. In 1999, at 
the Helsinki summit, Turkey got the applicant status and the government began 
implementing a number of harmonization packages in line with the Coppenhagen 
criteria. The opinion polls clearly showed that there was strong support for the 
accession within the society which meant that the EU’s transformative power was at its 
peak during these years. By making a fundamental break with the Erbakan anti-
European tradition the AKP positioned itself as the ideological counterpart of Christian 
Democrat parties declaring the party ‘Muslim-Democrat.’ While AKP’s anti-corruption 
stance was a key factor in the electoral victory, later, its pro-European turn helped the 
party to legitimatize itself in the Kemalist and anti-Islamist political regime which was 
under the surveillance of the Kemalist establishment. 
Due to these circumstances, the AKP has become the sole winner of the 2002 
elections.  Almost two years later, the local election in 2004 has demonstrated that the 
AKP started to create a strong electorate and as Yüksel Taskin argues ‘it started to 
conquer the centre’ (Tașkin, 2008). This political transformation of a pro-Islamist 
political group towards a moderate, centre-right party was a key result of the conquest 
of the traditionalist and religious stronghold of the country: the central and eastern 
provinces.  
The outcome of the snap elections in 2007 also portrayed a steady rise of the 
AKP’s support. Particular domestic political circumstances helped the party’s 
performance again. As the incumbent president of the republic, Ahmet Necet Sezer’s 
presidential period approached to its end, the new presidential elections became timely. 
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The Kemalist groups, especially the Army were suspicious about the AKP’s ambitions 
and many argued that by damaging the secular state they intended to Islamize the 
society. The election of a new president from the rank of the party – possessing the 
majority of the seats – could have been the loss of an important veto power for the 
Kemalists. Prior the nomination of the AKP’s candidate, the TSK published a 
memorandum on its website, declaring that it is ready to defend the country secular 
order. This move, which has become the famous ‘e-memorandum’ was the most serious 
intervention of the Army to the domestic politics. It seemingly backfired, as many 
deemed that the TSK’s action against the legitimate government is a mistake and 
unlawful intervention in the civil politics.  
The general election in 2011 has shown a clear sign of the growing popularity of 
the AKP: it managed to get almost 50 percent of votes. It acquired the support of the 
majority of the main cities and managed also solidify its support in South-eastern 
Anatolia. By this historical outcome, Erdoǧan could consolidate his power and launch 
four party talks about a new constitution replacing the current one.  
The June 2015 general election represents a break in the consecutive electoral 
success of the AKP. The number of the party’s votes shrunk from 23 to 19 million. The 
share of its votes decreased from 49.8 to 40.9 percent which was unprecedented in the 
party‘s history. Nevertheless, it received the highest number of votes that made it the 
biggest parliamentary group with 258 mandates but was insufficient to form a 
government (requiring at least a slight majority, 276 mandates) subsequently this 
triumph cannot be declared as clear victory for the party. The AKP’s leadership started 
the coalition negotiations with opposition parties, nevertheless the dialogue was futile: 
Recep Tayyip Erdoǧan hindered any attempts because many of the possible partners 
were against the implementation of the presidential system. The political deadlock led 
to a snap election 1st November 2015 which ended by the AKP’s victory. 
The party was able to increase its support after June. By launching the war 
against various terrorist groups in July 2015, resuming high-scale operations against the 
PKK within Turkey and Iraq, detaining suspected members of the ISIS and other, leftist 
extremist groups (like DHKP-C) shifted the focus from economic problems and 
democratic issues to terrorism and security that the government could handle 
successfully – at least according to the new millions of AKP’s voters.  
The early elections on 24 Junes 2018 also brought a victory for the AKP, 
nevertheless, its share of votes declined again to 42.6 and it could not reach the majority 
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in the TBMM (295 seats from 600). The introduction of presidential system limited the 
role of parliament thus the loss of majority was not crucial for domestic politics. 
Furthermore, due to the cooperation with the nationalist MHP, the AKP can vote its 
legislative endeavours. 
The successive electoral victories were crucial in the success of the hegemonic 
project because gave the opportunity for the AKP to conquer the different level of 
power echelon from the majority of the municipalities to the Parliament and the post of 
President of the Republic. In other terms these victories gave the opportunity, power 
and the legitimacy to the AKP to fight the Kemalists and cope with new counter-
hegemonic projects. 
This electoral performance was based on consent and as we will see, on 
coercion. Due to the strong position and embeddement in the state apparatus, the 
Kemalist elite representing secular hegemony has remained a major actor and 
accumulated strong veto power (military, courts) that had enough power to slowdown 
and threaten the AKP’s endeavours. Subsequently the electoral victories, even the most 
convincing one in term parliamentary mandates could not give the total state authority 
to the new government party which had to gradually fight for the ultimate primacy in 
the political society and took risks to hinder the control mechanisms of Kemaist elites. 
Thus the first decades of AKP representing a wide range of attempts to boost consent 
and to use coercion represented a rather slow and gradual process of war of position to 
conquer to whole state apparatus.  
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2.2. War of position  
2.2.1. Neoliberalism and economic success 
 
The AKP came to power after a severe economic recession thus it had more room for 
maneouvre to convince the populace to accept deep reforms and economic 
transformation for a further prosperity. These reforms strengthened the country’s neo-
liberal turn initiated by Özal, so from this point of view they did not go against the 
previous governments’ policy. Nevertheless, under the AKP, the neoliberalpolicies 
reached a new phase. Several factors influenced the new government’s commitment to 
neo-liberalism. 
 First, stemming from the social transformation, the role of the Islamist capital in 
the economy has increased and this business interest preferred to support a more 
neoliberal, market-oriented political party which had the willingness to respond to the 
needs of these groups. The AKP demonstrated a strong commitment to free-market and 
economic liberalisation in order to gain the support of these Islamist business groups, 
especially the endorsement of the MÜSIAD (Keyman-Gümüșçü, 2014, 32).  
 Second, the country got an impetus after the 2001 crisis. The AKP’s policy was 
based on the reforms initiated in 2002 by Kemal Derviș in line with the IMF’s 
principles and financial help.21 Going back to Turkey, he started to impart this 
knowledge and to behave as an apostle in disseminating the centre’s hegemonic project.  
The key issue is that the group of Islamist politicians accepted and behaved in 
line with these neo-liberal politicies. As Derviș reforms begun to work and the stagnant 
economy started to grow bringing relative wealth compared to the chaos and decline of 
2000/2001, the project could get the support not just of the Islamist middle class but 
also  main Turkish business groups like the TÜSIAD.  
By the successful implementation of the neo-liberal reforms, the AKP could co-
opt the business groups as well. Despite its critics, especially at the beginning the 
TÜSIAD also demonstrated a strong support towards the government (Uzgel, 2009, 27). 
The great holdings and the Anatolian Tigers also found a new ally in the government to 
cement their economic prosperity. The AKP during the 2000s was particularly 
successful in privatizing the state-owned companies and attract foreign capital which 
                                                          
21 Derviș who was a Turkish economist working for the World Bank and reaching high position can be 
considered in the neo-gramscian term as an actor of the neo-liberal project who arrived at the 
international organization from the periphery and has interiorized the principles of the centre. 
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inflow rocketed after 2005. However, in order to enlarge its base, the party endeavoured 
to favour the small and medium sized companies. Several acts strengthened their 
position. For instance, the Public Procurement Law that initially was biased in favour of 
the big companies was modified several times to help the small and medium size 
enterprises (Çınar, 2013, 49). 
In 2004, the government has founded the Investment Advisory Council (YDK) 
to improve the country’s investment climate and make a common platform for business 
groups. Along with another platform, founded in 2001 (YOİKK), the YDK has become 
an important forum where the representatives of the government, the various business 
groups such as TÜSIAD, MÜSIAD, TOBB and international organizations and groups 
such as the IMF could meet (Bedirhanoğlu, 2009, 56). This also portrayed the 
government commitment for neo-liberal principles and its willingness to encourage 
international investment and trade. 
The support of Turkish business groups has also become an incentive in Turkish 
foreign policy that was worked out in close cooperation with various economic actors, 
e. g. a number of Turkish business associations (which may appear as autonomous 
players in shaping bilateral economic relations (Tür, 2011) and wealthy businessmen 
(several hundred businessmen participate in Turkish presidential or prime ministerial 
visits) in order to boost foreign trade and pave the way towards Turkish investments 
(see later). Furthermore, by promoting peace and stability in neighbouring countries, the 
Turkish government endeavoured to ensure the viable economic relations as well as to 
create opportunities for investment and trade (Pintér, 2013). The increasing importance 
of economic relations has become palpable. Kirişçi characterized Turkey as a ‘trading 
state’ by referring to this change (Kirișçi, 2009).  
Third, the EU also had a major role in boosting the neo-liberal economic policy 
in the country. The EU accession programme required strong market-economy and 
competitive enterprises. The new law of privatization also got support from Brussels, 
thus could be interpreted by the ruling group as some compulsory requirement to 
achieve a national cause. The penetration of foreign companies into the Turkish market 
could have not been possible without the drastic change of the country’s international 
image and the AKP’s success in implementing harmonization packages and the start of 
the accession negotiations with the European Union in October 2005.  
Turkish economy has gone trough structural changes during these years. 
Traditionally the foreign trade was based on export of agricultural and textile goods, but 
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the electronics and automobile industry have become the fastest developing sectors. A 
number of car manufacturers established factories in Turkey (especially in Bursa and 
Istanbul), like Ford, Renault, Fiat, Hyundai, Toyota, Honda, Opel, Mercedes-Benz, 
MAN under the Customs Union with the EU. The Customs Union also facilitated the 
full integration of Turkish automobile industry into the EU market (Szigetvári, 2018, 
85-86). In the electronics industry it could not achieve such development, however, 
strong Turkish brands could appear even in the European markets (Vestel, Beko etc.). 
However, the export-led economic growth in line with the liberalization of the Turkish 
market could not change – except for a few years – the fact that the country’s balance of 
payment and trade was usually in deficit.  
The financial crisis in 2008-2009 affected Turkey negatively; its economy 
contracted by 4.9% and Turkish firms had the highest market exit rate in Europe. 
Similarly, the country experienced the highest unemployment increase (Öniș-Güven, 
2011, 589). However, it has recovered fast due to the healthy and strong bank sector 
(which was reformed earlier due to the 2001 crisis). The tight financial supervision, 
management and independent monetary policy prevent a fast, credit-led expansion of 
household consumption, the opposite of what has happened in several other countries, 
like Hungary (Onur – Watson, 2013, 415-416). 
 The government’s anticyclical policy, even if its stimulus arrived late, also 
helped to  return to fast economic growth: It decreased the tax on consumer durables, 
launched new infrastructural projects and also increased governmental spending in the 
energy, transport and healthcare sectors. In line with the expansionary fiscal policy, the 
monetary policy gave strong support by lowering the interest rate from 16.75% to 
7.25% (Szigetvári, 2018, 88). 
Subsequently, Turkish economy experienced a tangible growth due to the 
continuation of the economic policies started by Kemal Derviș and the AKP’s 
commitment to market-economy, neo-liberal economic policy, privatization and the 
favourable international economic conjuncture. The average per capita income growth 
was 6% between 2002 and 2006 and also remained high (a little over 3%) between 2007 
and 2014 (Acemoglu – Ucer, 2015, 10). When one compares the Turkish economic 
growth rate of approximately 10 percent in 2011 with the EU average 2 percent, 
Turkey’s path becomes convincing. Even after 2015, when terrorist attacks and foreign 
policy crisis with Russia provoked a downturn in tourism and political instability, and 
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the weakening of Turkish lira and the downgrading of Turkey’s credit rating hurt the 
Turkish economy’s image, growth has remained around 3 percent.22  
Despite this economic prosperity, the structural basis of Turkish economic 
growth has changed significantly after 2007, as the state and not the private sector has 
become its engine. Government supported giant infrastructural projects, credit-based 
growth, growing corruption, stagnating productivity and slowing reforms may become a 
structural barrier for further stability and increasing of GDP. However, the AKP was 
smart to prevent a major political disillusionment and gained the votes of disfranchised 
strata by various economic stimuli and political manoeuvres. 
The entrenchment of globalisation, inflow of foreign investments and stable 
economic policy has had direct effect on the population’s standard of living. The GDP 
per capita has increased form 3660 USD in 2002 to 10 800 in 2016. The AKP also paid 
attention to social programs, even if its policy was used for political reasons and 
clientelism-building (see later). The government-spending on education and healthcare 
increased sharply, especially in the less developed provinces and neighbourhoods.  
Health expenditure raised from 11 percent in 2002 to 17 percent in 2007 while 
education got 14 percent of the state budget instead of 10 percent in 2002 (Acemoglu – 
Ucer, 2015, 9). 
Due to the stable financing background, the AKP launched major infrastructural 
projects to boost the investment environment and cater the needs of the socio-
economically disadvantaged (Keyman-Gümüșçü, 2014, 32). By building roads, railways 
(the new Turkish fast-train system), metro lines in the major cities, airports all over the 
country, the party could strengthen its popularity and show that it could boost work 
opportunities. The opening of various construction sites emerged as a constant part of 
campaigns provoking the opposition’s accusations that the government uses these kind 
of occasions as a tool for gaining popularity. 
The government has made strong efforts in order to address the housing, 
education and health care needs of the lower-income groups, especially by supporting 
the TOKI, the government-related housing agency. The programs of the organizations 
have transformed a great number of so called gecekondus (shanty towns) from poor 
neighbourhoods to organized and more livable ones.  The TOKI enlarged its social 
                                                          
22 The TURSKSTAT has changed its methodology of GDP calculating in line with EU calculation 
methods. The new methodology increased annual GDP growth within 2012 and 2015 from nearly 3 
percent to approximately 6% percent. 
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housing project for middle- and low-income groups to build education and social 
facilities and to undertake reconstruction activities. As of September 2017, the TOKI 
has built around 805 thousands housing facilities since its establishment in 1984, (most 
of them under the AKP government) and more than one thousand schools, around 
twenty universities, almost three hundred hospitals (TOKI, 2017). 
 As a result, a larger middle class could emerge, and social mobility has become 
easier for more people, at least in theory. The economic growth also affected the 
Turkish inland and larger social strata could benefit from it. The middle class has 
become larger, poverty and social inequality declined at least at the beginning of AKP 
era. The Gini coefficient decreased from 42.18 in 2003 to 38.44 in 2007, but it has 
increased to 41.2 by 2014 (World Bank). Several opinion polls have shown that 
successful economic policy and economic stability were convincing factors for many 
voters. According to a 2008 poll, some 85 percent of the AKP-voters justified their 
votes by the performance of the economy (Acemoglu – Ucer, 2015, 10). 
In line with strong economic incentives in electoral successes, a weakening or 
even declining economy can harm the AKP’s support and curtail its political 
performance. Recent trends in Turkish economy are alarming despite the GDP growth 
and the highly propagated mega infrastructural projects (new airport, new metro lines in 
Istanbul, fast train railways system etc.). The vulnerability, stemming from the above 
mentioned negative balance of payment and trade deficit, has met with increasing 
domestic political instability and crises since 2013/2015. Although the AKP has been 
able to hold to power, the internal struggle had a rather negative effect on the foreign 
perceptions of the country. The Turkish “war on terror” resulted in the destruction of 
various parts of Southeastern Turkey and a new wave of internal migration that has also 
raised the number of internally displaced persons by several hundred thousand. The 
terror attacks in Ankara and Istanbul also harmed the country’s image and contributed 
to the decline of the number of tourists. The downing of Russian Su-24 in November 
2015 also worsened the country’s economic situation: Moscow’s sanctions on Turkish 
agricultural products, the practical ban on Turkey as a tourist destination and especially 
the breakdown in construction projects of Turkish companies in Russia put a new 
burden on the struggling economy. Making the compromise with Vladimir Putin in mid-
2016, has played an important role in mending the fences with Russia. 
The coup attempt and the following purges also contributed to the declining 
image of Turkey abroad and the outflow of FDI from the country. The demolition of 
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Gülenists’ economic power, the internal troubles, the weakening rule of law all 
contributed to the downgrading of the country by the major credit rating agencies short 
after the coup, giving an alarming sign to the markets. Debates about the manipulation 
of statistical data by the TURKSTAT also gave the impression that the country is rather 
in a negative economic spiral.  
These changes also affected the YTL. The Turkish currency started to depreciate 
and the inflation started to increase in line with the growth of unemployment. Thus, it 
will be crucial for the AKP to handle these economic and financial challenges in the 
near future if it wants to preserve its electoral support. 
 
2.2.2. The role of the EU in hegemony building 
 
The EU has played a key role in the AKP’s hegemonic emergence, chiefly in its 
first period. In 1999, the Helsinki Summit awarded Turkey the candidate status that 
created a common pro-EU sentiment in the elite and within the society based on 
credible promise of accession. Due to this enthusiasm, the Ecevit government made 
efforts to amend the constitution and implement several harmonization packages. This 
popularity of EU was strong enough in Turkey to push Recep Tayyip Erdoǧan-led 
Islamists towards a pro-EU turn. The AKP also continued its predecessor harmonization 
and Europeanization efforts. Between 1999 and 2005 the constitution was changed three 
times with a strong parliamentary consensus. The Ecevit-governent has voted three 
harmonization packages while after 2002 the AKP managed to accept six packages with 
the support of the CHP. Important changes proved that Turkish Islamist-Kemalist elite 
were resolute to launch the negotiations. It was the AKP that annulled the capital 
punishment23 from the Turkish legislation and narrowed the infamous Terror Law’s 
scope. More importantly it also could take steps in weakening the TSK’s control over 
the civil governments (however Ecevit has started this process) by limiting the role of 
the National Security Council and driving out the TSK’s representatives from several 
state institutions such as the Higher Education Council (YÖK) (Kalkan, 2016, 16.) 
Ankara demonstrated its readiness to tackle even the Cyprus question which was a clear 
adjustment compared to the previous governments’s policy (Ulgen, 2009). The AKP 
                                                          
23 The previous governement voted in favour of restricting capital punishment in Turkey in summer 2002, 
nevertheless, it was the AKP that annuled it in every circumstances and from the constitution. 
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government backed the Annan Plan aiming at the unification of the two territories of the 
divided island. Unfortunately for Turkey, the Greek Cypriots refused the plan (while 
majority of Turkish Cypriots voted yes) at the 2004 referendum that terminated the 
short-term prospects for solution and prevented Ankara to finalise the unification 
process of the divided island before the accession of Cyprus. After the efforts to fulfil 
the Coppenhagen criteria, the European Commission in 2004 deemed Turkey ready to 
start the negotiation which was launched in October 2005.  
Paradoxically, Turkish enthusiasm has soon been replaced by disillusionment.  
Several factors contributed to the decline of the accession’s credibility. Firstly, signals 
from the European Union strongest member states have showed that the EU has not full 
support for Ankara due to various political considerations such as the situation of 
Turkish Diaspora in Western Europe or the absorption capacity of the EU itself in case 
of a country of some 75 millions inhabitants wants to join (Rózsa N., 2008). Some 
member states’ special conditionality for Turkey hampered the negotiations even when 
in case of some chapters the European Commission declared that Ankara fulfilled the 
required benchmarks thus it was ready to open (Müftüler-Baç - Çiçek, 2017, 185-190.) 
It was less surprising that Cyprus became the major obstacle in the accession 
process. By the end of 2008, the European Commission blocked eight chapters, one 
year later Cyprus blocked further five chapters (Torun-Eralp, 2012, 87.). The other 
country that hampered the opening of new chapters was France due to Francois Sarkozy 
strong opposition of Turkish accession. Due to these circumstances the negotiations 
advanced slowly as Table 1. shows and consequently Turkish enthusiasm evaporated 
fast. 
 
Chapters 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Opened 1 5 4 2 1   1  1 1 
Closed 1           
Freezed 8 3  6        
Unfreezed        1  1 1 
Table 1. Changes in the status of EU accesion negotiation chapters (2006-2016) 
(Source: EC) 
 
Nevertheless, the AKP continued making new reforms even if the importance of the EU 
in this process gradually decreased. The upcoming years have demonstrated that the 
AKP needed the EU project even if it used a more belligerent rhetoric towards the 
community. Firstly, the Turkish government could use the reform packages for its self-
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help. Due to the relative consensus within the Turkish society over the need of EU 
accession, the government could justify its packages – especially during its first term – 
as inevitable compromises and changes that were necessary for the final cause. 
Secondly, international actors, like the EU itself could defend the government in its 
struggle against the ‘kemalist’ establishment. Their role was particularly important 
along with the US in 2007 when the AKP had to face the TSK’s famous e-memorandum 
that led tona government crisis and snap elections, or in 2008 when the Chief 
Prosecutor, Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya turned its request to the Constitutional Court to 
ban the party due to its activities against secularism (Ulgen, 2009). The Constitutional 
Court finally avoided banning the government party that won the 2007 election, but 
confiscated the half of its fortune. 
Nevertheless, the accession’s de facto significance for the Turkish society 
declined in the 2010s. The main legislative packages, like the 2010 referendum and 
constitutional changes were hardly featured by the EU accession agenda, but the need 
for Turkey’s own democratization without any foreign influence. Although after the 
2011 elections, a separate institution, the Ministry of European Union Affairs was 
established in order to facilitate the accession process, not much palpable efforts have 
been taken to achieve this goal. 
The decline of the EU’s transformative power influenced this change. The global 
financial crisis hit the Eurozone states severely and the EU lost its enlargement impetus 
– only Croatia could join during the last 10 years, in July 2013. Simultaneously, 
Greece’s economic turmoil damaged its image of prosperous stable economic 
community (Öniș - Kutlay, 2017). While the EU used economic benefits as incentives 
to strengthen its conditionality on candidate countries its attractiveness after the crisis 
decreased due to economic downturn, bail-out packages, internal debates, austerity 
packages resulting in harsh budget and salary cuts (especially in Greece) and mass 
demonstrations in almost all Mediterranean member states. 
In line with crisis management, internal cohesion and solidarity within the EU 
was also undermined. Subsequently, its conditionality towards external partners has 
been diminished. Furthermore, the EU’s norms such as democracy, human rights, 
freedom of press did not find way in certain foreign relations where usually the 
community sees itself as a normative power that created ambiguities. For example, 
European powers pragmatic stance to Abdel-Fattah Sissi’s coup in Egypt in 2013 that 
deeply disturbed Egyptian-Turkish relations as well, still nourished criticism in Turkey. 
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During the Arab Spring, the EU was less critical towards the authoritarian regimes 
handling human rights order to keep the economic relations viable and defend its 
economic interests. By this time, when Turkey’s decision-makers portrayed the country 
as a strong defender of human rights and stressed for international intervention in Syria 
to save human life, Turkish elite and society could see a growing difference in foreign 
policy between Brussels and Ankara (Öniș - Kutlay, 2017). 
Later on, the EU’s inability to tackle the refugee crisis on its own also decreased 
the Turkish enthusiasm. As the poor management of the challenge showed the acute 
collective action problems and pushed individual member states to tackle with it alone 
even further undermining the internal cohesion. All in all, from outside, this problem 
raised concern about the EU commitment to human rights, value-based foreign policy 
and its capacities as a successful and strong international actor. Furthermore, the rising 
xenophobic and Islamophobic rhetoric in the EU also gained much attention in the 
Anatolian state that further worsened the image of the human rights promoter (Öniș - 
Kutlay, 2017). 
The end of 2015 also showed that the EU is not able to handle a major crisis 
without external partners: it needed Turkish involvement that drastically changed the 
balance of powers between the EU and Turkey. Ahmet Davutoğlu’s meeting with EU 
leaders in November 2015 was pressured as a great event in the Turkish media that 
demonstrated the emerging power of Turkey. The EU-Turkey refugee deal (EU-Turkey 
Statement) that hampered the unregulated flow of refugees to Greece via Aegean Sea 
later also served as a pretext for tensions between the AKP leadership and the EU. The 
unfulfilled visa-liberalisation and the slow reimbursement of EU funds was put on the 
agenda and the main Turkish foreign policy actors from the President to the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs criticized the community and threatened to open the border for the 
masses of Syrian refugees. Albeit these threats have not materialised yet, they highlight 
that the EU’s role in Turkish domestic politics has changed drastically. 
Seemingly, the more the AKP has secured its power and weakened its opponents 
(sometimes even with the EU’s support), the more its need for the EU has declined. The 
Turkish accession process faced huge difficulties because of the opposition of several 
member-states since the very beginning. Nonetheless, the state of the rule of law and 
human rights in the country questions the willingness of the Turkish side to the 
accession. Especially after the 15 July coup attempt on which the perceptions diverge in 
Brussels and Ankara about, the relations have become frosty. As it was discussed 
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previously, the EU and several EU countries still contribute to the AKP’s success but in 
a clearly different way compared to the 2000s: the rhetoric has shifted mainly from the 
image of a democratic partner towards an external threat. 
 
2.2.3. Changing identity discourse  
 
The AKP put a new identity in the heart of his discourse which constituted a 
strong difference compared to the previous unitary discourse. The Turkish nation-
building process launched during Kemal Atatürk`s era particularly focused on the 
assimilation and Turkification of various Muslim groups living in Anatolia for centuries 
or even being newcomers from the Black Sea zone, from the Balkans or from Caucasus 
as refugees, like Tatars, Circassians, Abkhaz, Bosniaks, Albanians or even Turks.  
The immigration policy24 was complemented with by other tools to assimilate 
the immigrant and minority groups of the country.  From the very beginning of the early 
Turkish Republican era massive assimilationist policies were implemented in order to 
create a modern nation state from Turkey.25 After Atatürk`s death this policy did not 
change too much. During the conservative Adnan Menderes governments various 
pogroms were carried out in Istanbul paving the way to the mass emigration of Greek 
and other Christian communities. Later on, when Kurdish nationalism started to emerge 
                                                          
24 Although by this time Ankara was opened the influx of hundreds thousands of immigrants, the 
legislation and practices showed that migration policy was shaped by a well-defined strategy. In the Early 
Republican period, authorities preferred the groups having a closer, `Ottoman` identity. Due to these 
feature Balkan immigrants were welcomed, especially Turks whose integration because of the common 
language and ethnicity meant the smallest difficulties. Other Muslim groups from the Balkans, such as 
Bosniaks, Pomaks, Torbeshes were also preferred because they shared the common cultural values, the 
same religion and they had no states which could be a threat by supporting any prospective secessionist 
attempt. Albanians were also accepted with more suspicion, because they possessed with a given state 
(however, important part of Yugoslav immigrants were Albanians, usually from Kosovo). Other groups 
from the Caucasus region were usually welcome due to the same reason; however, authorities were more 
‘attentive’ as they were coming from the USSR. Other former Ottoman subjects, despite the fact that they 
were Muslims, were usually not allowed to install in Turkey. This decision was serving mainly security 
reasons: Arabs `created` their own states – even they were not independent – by fighting against Ottoman 
forces in the WWI. The memory of this bloody intermezzo shaped in a great manner the Turkish 
leadership perceptions about them. Concerning Kurds, albeit Turkish authorities thought that their 
assimilation would be an easy task were rather resistance to the Turkification attempts, and they were 
revolting regularly from Said sheik`s rebellion in 1925, until Dersim rebellion (1936-1938).  These 
attempts were oppressed by force and they managed to handle the Kurdish question at least till the 
beginning of 60`s. 
25 During this process national symbols were accepted (national anthem, flag), name of towns and villages 
were Turkified, and campaigns were launched to boost Turkish speaking among non-Turkish groups. The 
famous 1934 name law also claimed the Turkification of names, and it prohibited the use of names having 
non/Turkish etnhic endings such as –os or -ić. Furthermore settlement and immigration policy was 
accepted to prevent the emergence of immigrants `ethnic ghettos and also to increase the number and 
proportion of Turkish elements in the non-Turkish, usually Kurdish territories (Çağaptay, 2003). 
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in the 60s and 70s Turkish governments oppressed these initiatives as well.  The war 
launched by the PKK in 1984 has given a new phase in Tukish state – minority relations 
as the Kurdish secessionist or at least nationalist project got strong incentives. This war 
against the PKK led to the death of tens of thousands, degrading security in South-
Eastern Anatolia and the appearance of a strong, nationalized Kurdish constituency.  
The official Turkish discourse refused to recognize the presence of other ethnic 
groups within the country`s border (except the Greek, Armenian and Jewish minorities 
accepted in the Lausanne Treaty, 1923). This state policy was clearly defined in the 
Turkish constitution of 1982 when in the second paragraph it stated that “The State of 
Turkey, with its territory and nation, is an indivisible entity. Its language is Turkish.”26 
The preambule also argued that Turkishness and secularism are the basis of the 
Republic of Turkey.27 
The AKP has reshaped this discourse although the very basis of Turkish 
nationalism was kept untouched. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan reformed the traditional 
national rhetoric by recognizing the existence of other (Muslim) communities in 
Turkey. In his speeches, he often refers to Kurds, Lazs, Circassians, Bosniaks, 
Albanians and other Muslim minority groups.28 The change in Erdoğan’s speeches is 
rather the sign for the acceptance of the reality. Despite of the efforts of almost one 
hundred years of assimilationist policy Turkey could not be considered as a real nation-
state, it needed to recognize its multiethnic features. Albeit the most numerous minority 
group is the Kurds, the governmental rhetoric effected the other, much smaller and 
better integrated minorities (including immigrants groups, like Albanians and Bosniaks 
themselves). 
Compared to the Kemalist and nationalist governments the AKP admitted the 
existence of Kurdish and other minority groups and emphasized the need for a more 
inclusive national identity which is based on the notion of Turkishness as a political 
notion rather than an ethnicity. The AKP used the Islamist discourse emphasizing the 
inclusiveness of religion and propagated the importance of Islam which was attractive to 
the religious Kurdish voters. The AKP’s opening towards the minority groups by 
                                                          
26 Turkish Constitution, 1982. 
27 That no protection shall be accorded to an activity contrary to Turkish national interests, Turkish 
existence and the principle of its indivisibility with its State and territory, historical and moral values of 
Turkishness; the nationalism, principles, reforms and civilizationism of Atatürk and that sacred religious 
feelings shall absolutely not be involved in state affairs and politics as required by the principle of 
secularism; 
28Since 1965 there is no question in census about the ethnicity or mother tongue, nevertheless, it did not 
changed during JDP`s governments, either.  
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launching radio programmes and later, a Kurdish language channel and emphasizing the 
importance of minority issues linked this new discourse to the democratisation which 
proved to be an effective tool to promote its hegemonic project. 
 
2.2.4. Promise of democratization 
 
Counter-hegemony projects may focus on law and rights to broaden their own 
social background and co-opt other, less enthusiast communities as well (Hunt, 1990, 
315). The AKP has articulated a pro-democracy and human right seeking agenda 
including constitutional changes based on the Coppenhagen criteria as the party’s 2002 
election programme shows (AKP, 2002). 
This agenda got a strong support from the EU (and during the first years from 
other parties as well) that even boosted the social support of the party. The AKP 
focusing on democratization could convince the Liberal groups of Turkey to get support 
for this national cause (Uzgel, 2009; Bedirhanoğlu, 2009). In order to legitimize itself in 
a politically hostile environment and to survive prospective interventions of various 
veto players, it used the democratization process to weaken traditional Kemalist elites 
and to meet with the appeal of the social periphery and business groups (the TÜSIAD 
called for democratization already in the mid-1990s). The AKP positioned itself at the 
heart of the long-lasting Turkish democratization, claiming that it had to tackle anti-
democratic traditions, the overwhelming power of the military and other threatening 
groups as well as to realize the political rehabilitation of the deprived lower income 
social groups. It also pushed for a pro-Islam agenda in form of liberal democratization. 
Subsequently it could represent the interest of Islamists groups, Nurcus, Gülenists and 
so on while found the basis for cooperation with Liberal groups (Türkeş, 2016, 192). In 
a broader context, the AKP also managed to get international support (thus from US and 
EU) for the political transformation in name of democratization. 
Symbolic issues such as headscarf-wearing appeared in the party’s rhetoric as an 
important step towards democratizing the oppressive system that prohibited the 
existence even a soft form of secularism. This issue ruled the political discourse for 
years; it provoked a number of manifestations and protests by Kemalist groups and 
almost led to the banning of the AKP in 2008. The lifting of headscarf-ban in the 
universities in 2010 and state administration was a clear victory for the party. The 
education reforms in 2012, reorganizing public education system in favour of imam-
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hatip schools and traditionalist, religious curriculum was also related to fulfil the 
demand of Conservative and religious electorate (making consent) and strengthen the 
party’s own hegemonic project. 
The AKP’s handling the Kurdish question has been presented as a 
democratization issue as well; when it has become clear for the party leadership that the 
PKK cannot be tackled only by military tools - as interventions in Kandil region 
brought minor effects for the conflict - it turned to a more liberal political solution by 
launching the famous “Kurdish opening” in 2009 (Kürt açılımı) which was transformed 
into the “Democratic opening” (Demoratik açılımı) later in 2010 by unifying the various 
minority-group oriented openings and starting at the very beginning of 2013 the “peace 
process” (Barıș süreci). This change in Turkish state’s attitude to the Kurds was a major 
alteration compared to the previous policy. From the Atatürk era to the 1990s Turkish 
state denied the Kurdish identity and suppressed the ethnic group, in the 1990s the 
assimilationist policy remained intact nonetheless several leading groups admitted the 
existence of the minority (Özdemir – Sarigil, 2015, 180). This change also affected the 
other minority groups as well. In 2005, Erdoğan in his famous speech in Diyarbakir 
addressed openly the ‘Kurdish problem’ stating that ‘the problem does not belong to 
one part of this nation but rather it is the problem of all’ (BBC, 12/08/2005). In 2009 
and 2010, the AKP launched a number of ‘openings’ towards the previously oppressed 
or denied minority groups. Alevi, Roma and Kaferi openings were taking place in this 
period leading to conferences, workshops and meetings with the participation of AKP 
politicians. The party communicated these openings as a rupture with the oppressive 
policies and a further step towards the democratization of the country. What is more, the 
Kurdish opening was renamed in 2010 as a democratisation process.  
Nevertheless, the openings had minor palpable outcome. The Kurdish one 
mainly focused on settle the PKK issue thus the government wanted them to lay down 
the weapons. When a small group of PKK militants arrived from Irak to Turkey at 
Harbur with a promise of amnesty in late 2009, the Turkish public opinion was shocked 
to see how the Kurdish party (DTP) and its sympathisers hosted the group as national 
heroes. The fast downturn in AKP public support following the event practically ended 
the Kurdish opening even if it was never terminated officially.  The DTP was banned by 
the Constitutional Court by the end of 2009. 
Despite the valuable effort of the party to give more rights to minority groups, 
their impact was only a minor one. The AKP’s reforms have given radio air time to 
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Bosniak, Armenian, Kurdish groups, as it was mentioned, in 2009 it launched a new, 
Kurdish television channel.  In 2010, political campaign in Kurdish language was 
allowed. Kurdish education was also allowed in a limited manner:  in 2010, the state 
opened a Kurdish language department in a university in the south-eastern town of 
Mardin. Two years later a law introduced elective Kurdish courses in secondary-
schools, in 2013, education in the mother tongue was allowed in private schools 
(Özdemir – Sarigil, 2015, 183), and several further reforms were envisaged. On the 
other side, the government’s main aim was to disarm the PKK that is why it entered 
with secret (in Oslo, in 2009-2010) and later rather open negotiations with the terrorist 
organisation at the beginning of 2013 by involving Abullah Öcalan. 
The failure of the Kurdish opening highlighted the inability of the AKP to cope 
with the issue despite its pro-minority, Islam and common history based discourse. The 
party could co-opt an important segment from the Kurdish society, nevertheless it failed 
to tackle the Kurdish nationalist constituency and to solve the PKK question. 
Subsequently it did not address the main ethnopolitical requests of Kurds like broader 
language education, autonomy etc. that was culminated in the very fast collapse of the 
Dolmabahçe agreement between Kurdish nationalist groups and the government in the 
first half of 2015. 
 
2.2.5. Conflicts with veto powers 
 
As it was shown, the AKP follows permanent war rhetoric where the party and 
its leadership occupy a defensive, central position. As the party is always under attack, 
it always has to defend itself which is consequently the interest of its electorate. 
Acording to this narrative these voters can face oppression or restriction after any 
failure of the party (Çınar, 2013). Nevertheless, the party had to face strong veto 
powers29 and real adversaries that represented a real threat for its leadership in form of 
party closure initiatives and soft or hard coup attempts. These phenomena also casted 
doubt on the state of Turkish democracy, and demonstrated its weaknesses.  
Although this thesis does not want to give a detailed analysis on civil-military 
relations in Turkey, it is important to point out that the hegemonic order created by 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk between 1923 and 1938 has remained intact. The 
                                                          
29 Veto powers are institutions that can hinder the government’s endeavours. The main veto powers in the 
Turkish context were the TSK ( and the National Security Council) and the Constitutional Court. 
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democratization opened the way to other parties, political life has developed into a 
moral pluralistic, nonetheless the statist tradition, the Kemalist elite and secular-
Kemalist hegemonic cultural policy under the tutelage of various actors.  
The main players that possessed serious institutional veto were the 
Constitutional Court and the Turkish Armed Forces. The first one previously closed 
down the Islamist parties while the later also forced various governments in the past to 
resign (lastly against the RP by a postmodern coup in 1997). Nevertheless, other actors 
could also appear as strong opposition, like the president (Ahmet Necdet Sezer between 
2000 and 2007), political parties, universities (academic staff and students), trade 
unions, business associations, non-governmental organizations, religious sects and 
movements and mass media (Kumbaracıbaşı, 2009). 
This defensive position was extremely dominant during the first years of the 
AKP rule. The Kemalists considered the party’s political manoeuvres as part of an 
Islamist hidden agenda.  As it was mentioned above, the biggest challenges from the 
Kemalists came in 27 April 2007 when the Army issued a memorandum, penned by the 
then Chief of General Staff, Yașar Büyükanıt on its website threatening the government 
with an intervention in protection of secularism (e-memorandum). The act intended to 
hinder the election of Abdullah Gül, the AKP’s candidate for the presidential position. 
The declaration led to a political turmoil. The parliament remained inconclusive about 
Gül’s election because the CHP members did not join the session, thus without the 
presence of the necessary member of deputies it was impossible to elect anybody. In 
order to tackle the political stalemate, early elections were organized in July 2007 where 
the AKP could stabilize its electorate. While this time other parties, like the MHP could 
enter in the parliament and they joined the voting session about the President of the 
Republic, Abdullah Gül could be elected.  Finally the AKP could solve the political 
crisis by strengthening its position. After a few days of the e-memorandum, a secret 
meeting took place between the Chief of General Staff and the Prime Minister. 
Although the contenu of the meeting is not public the upcoming weeks portrayed the 
political triumph of the AKP. 
 On 14 March 2008, the Chief Prosecutor, Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya turned to 
the Constitutional Court to ban the AKP. The indictment revealed the party’s Islamist 
policies and accused it of harming the secular tenets of the state clearly defined in the 
constitution. The issue got national and international attention as despite the frequent 
banning of parties in Turkey, it was still extraordinary to ban a government. The 
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Constitutional Court has rapidly concluded the issue (usually the procedure on a party 
closure took some one year). Five members from eleven voted against the closure thus 
the required 3/5 majority was not achieved (Sevinç, 2009, 267). 
The AKP survived these two major crises, nevertheless the following years led 
to more sophisticated but coercive politics. The infamous Ergenekon (2008–2013) and 
later Balyoz (2010-2013) cases were not launched by the government although they 
were organized and boosted by AKP-allies. 
 These probes were the tipping point in the secular elite and the AKP’s balance 
of power. The indictments of both cases were based on the theory that there were forces 
behind the scenes that were committed to the overthrow of the government. According 
to the Ergenekon indictment, a clandestine ultranationalist group (called Ergenekon) 
was embedded deeply and secretly in the state structure (deep state or derin devlet) and 
were plotting against the government.  
The first Ergenekon trial started in 2008 and in the upcoming years more than 
one dozen indictments were submitted to the judiciary. During this period several 
thousands of people were accused claiming that they were part of the clandestine 
organization. The people who had to face trials came usually from the secular or leftist, 
nationalist (ulusalcı) side. The Turkish public opinion was deeply bifurcated by the 
cases. Some saw in line with the narrative of the given judiciary that this was a good 
opportunity to fight against secret groups’ non-legitimate manoeuvres against the state. 
This perception has resonated with some chapters of Turkish history when suspicious 
groups, plotters intended to gain control over the state by overthrowing the government. 
The existence of the infamous ‘Gladio’ as counter-guerrilla organization in Europe also 
hinted that similar groups could exist in Turkey. Some suspicious affairs, like the 
famous Susurluk car crash in 1996 whose victims were the Deputy Chief of the Istanbul 
Police Department, a Member of Parliament and the leader of Grey Wolves highlighted 
the interlocking of mafia and political circles. 
The other, increasingly growing group over time perceived the probes as a tool 
to weaken the Kemalist and secular groups and silencing the critics over the AKP. The 
length of detentions, the time inconsistency of the indictments and the great number of 
charged people nourished this assumption. Despite the detention of several thousand 
people, just 275 were condemned in 2013.  
The Balyoz case had similar features, although it was clearly linked to the 
military. The affair started with a puzzling package of documents and CDs handed over 
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to the liberal Taraf newspaper at the beginning of 2010 that turned to the judiciary. This 
material, especially the three CDs constituted the basis of the probe named after the 
secret coup plan: Balyoz. According to the digital material, the plan was created at a 
military seminar in March 2003. The plotters would have thrown the country into chaos 
by bombarding mosques and attacking a Turkish plane over the Aegean Sea and 
blaming the incidents on the Greeks. After provoking unrest in the population the 
military could have intervened and overthrow the government. 
The trial started in December 2010 with impressive press and media coverage 
and active involvement of Taraf that published articles based on the evidences found in 
mysterious package. The detention of military personel, even retired generals also 
damaged the prestige of the TSK, however, the military did not do anything to hinder 
the trial.  
In September 2012, a total of 331 military members were convicted; one year 
later, in October 2013 the Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the convictions of 237 of 
the accused (Jenkins, 2014). Although the convicts’ lawyers have argued that the CDs 
could not be used as proof because these CDs were created in 2003 but surprisingly the 
documents containing the plans were written in Microsoft World 2007, neither the 
lower court nor the Supreme Court of Appeal did not take into consideration this 
controversy.  
The situation did change several months later, when the Constitutional Court 
decided in July 2014 to retrial the case. The convicted plotters were acquitted in 2015 
based on false evidence (Hurriyetdailynews, 31/03/2015). The case for Ergenekon was 
similar. In 2016, the Supreme Court of Appeals declared that previous court rulings 
were mistakes because the Ergenekon Terror Organization’s „crimes and hierarchic 
structure was not exposed” and “its leader was not evident” (Hurriyetdailynews, 
21/04/2016); by Spring 2017 every convicted was acquitted. 
This ’regime change through law’ reveals the slow transformation in the state 
structure and the weakness of the separation of powers. The AKP made efforts to cut 
back the military tutelage, especially with the support of the European Union. The 
judiciary and legislation played a central role in it. The government implemented this 
project via three main tools: 1) changing the military related legislation, 2) 
delegitimizing the military’s intervention in civilian politics, 3) punishing the military’s 
endeavours to meddle in domestic politics (Esen-Gümüșçü, 2016).  
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It lowered the role of the National Security Council (MGK) which was a strong 
supervisory institution over the civilian government. After some amendments, civilians 
got the legal opportunity to be appointed as secretary general of the MGK. (2004) and 
transform the board to an advisory institution. To decrease the MGK’s power, it lost its 
supervisory role over the High Education Board (YÖK), the unlimited access to any 
public agency; the MGK’s meetings were attenuated (Sarigil, 2012, 11-12). 
The AKP eliminated the State Security Courts (2004), in 2006 it reduced the 
right of military courts to prosecute civilians in peacetime. The constitutional 
amendments passed after the referendum victory in 2010 continued to limit the 
military’s juridical separation. It allowed civilian courts to try officials in case of crimes 
against state security, constitution and also decreased the military courts’ jurisdiction to 
the ‘military service and military duties’ (Sarigil, 2012, 11-12). To summarize, these 
changes contributed to the change of balance of power in Turkish domestic politics. The 
decline of the military and Kemalist’s elite power opened the way towards cementing 
the AKP’s hegemony. 
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2.3. Moment of hegemony 
2.3.1. Cementing the AKP’s power 
 
Although hegemony refers on a stable situation, but in reality it is recreated by 
ruling elites and challenged by counter movements on daily basis. In case of Turkey, 
AKP’s hegemonic project was challenged not just by other parties, political groups but 
in a limited manner, by the state administration as well. Thus, the party’s surprising 
electoral victory in 2002 did not lead subsequently to a total hegemony over the state 
structure, even if it granted prospects to create one. The AKP’s weak position was 
tested in two main cases, the TSK’s e-memorandum and the Constitutional Court’s 
decision about its closure.  
The AKP could survive these challenges and boosting its social support had a 
convincing electoral victory in 2011 with almost 50 percent of votes. The upcoming 
years until mid-2013 can be perceived as a clear moment of hegemony when the veto 
powers were weakened and transformed/reshaped in a pro-AKP way. After two 
parliamentary cycles in power, the party could occupy the higher echelons of state 
administration and judiciary. Abdurhaman Yalçınkaya’s term ended in 2011 as Chief 
Prosecutor, and Abdullah Gül appointed Hasan Erbil who did not opened any new cases 
against the party. Other state institutions whose leaders were appointed by Ahmet 
Necdet Sezer got new, pro-AKP figures. Like in case of state apparatus responsible for 
religious affairs (Diyanet), where Mehmet Görmez had replaced Ali Bardakoǧlu who 
intended to keep the institution responsible for the execution of works concerning 
religious affairs far from daily politics (Cornell, 2015). 
By this time the conquest of the judiciary and the civilianization of the military 
could be also finished. In the separation of powers, the independence of judiciary is a 
key element that creates a strong control over the government intensions. Nonetheless, 
its independence was always questioned in Turkey, as the Kemalist establishment used 
it and it could rely on such powerful actors like the Constitutional Court of the Supreme 
Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK). Furthermore military court also served as a 
basis for the autonomy of the military.  
The 2010 constitutional referendum was crucial in adjusting the top of the 
judiciary system. The lower echelon of the judiciary was rather dominated by pro-
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government supporters while the higher courts could be considered as Kemalist 
strongholds (Jenkins, 2014). The amendments increased the membership of the 
Constitutional Court and the HSYK. The Constitutional Court’s member was raised 
from 11 to 17 and in order to make their appointment more democratic, the TBMM and 
the President could elect the members (previously only the President appointed them).  
The HSYK’s membership increased from 7 to 22 regular members and 12 
substitutes and the selection also became more pluralistic: Supreme Court of Appeals 
and the Council of State would not be the only responsible for the selection of 11 
members but the President as well while 11 members would be elected by the country 
all 13 000 judges.  
The AKP has ensured that these adjustments could serve its interests because the 
new positions were filled by its own candidate thus the referendum merely smoothed 
the path to political reshaping of these institutions (Jenkins, 2014). The gradual 
weakening of the TSK’s position also reached a new stage after 2011. The above 
mentioned criminal cases have lessened the social trust in the military. Furthermore, 
they resulted in the early resignation of the Chief of general Staff Ișık Koșaner along 
with the army, air and navy force heads in July 2011.  Despite his effort to “defend” his 
military officers, the arrests have continued that pushed him to resign as protest at the 
jailing, after just one year at office. The next Head of Armed Forces, Necdet Özel had a 
closer relation with the government. The Prime Minister’s position compared to the 
previous times has become stronger. 
Thus, after the 2010 referendum and the June 2011 elections, no real challenger 
has remained on the political field for the AKP. Due to its successful economic policy it 
could boost consent nationwide, however, the party has made huge efforts to cement its 
power in the local politics and lower echelon of the society. The alliance between AKP 
and the conservative, religious electorate seemed to strong be pillar of the party’s 
hegemony. As Cihan Tuğal pointed out that for Islamists, their ‘engagement changed 
face during AKP rule. So did the pious person's relationship with and perception of the 
state. Due to the AKP's empowerment, religious activists and pious people felt more in 
tune with the state, they even felt like they were a part of the state’ (Tuğal, 2009,158). 
The emergence of the conservative leaders, like Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül at the national 
level made it possible for the pious voters to identify with the state enhancing the role of 
political society in establishing consent (Tuğal, 2009,159). 
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Probably the AKP’s main method of co-optation was the party itself and local 
party politics. Firstly, the AKP have become from a minor party to the most influential 
political organization of the country possessing more than 9 million members (Table 1). 
By having this huge membership, it could open local branches in every corner of the 
country, and it cemented a relatively stable electorate. It has more members than the 
other parties altogether that facilitated for the party to create its electoral hegemony,’ as 
almost every second votes should have come from its own party members. This also 
highlights the strong interaction between the AKP and the society. 
 
Party name Number of members, 
2017 (Person) 
Proportion of the votes 
(November 2015 elections, %) 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) 9 368 917 39 
Republican People’s Party (CHP) 1 198 194 10 
National Action Party (MHP) 494 490 7,6 
People’s Democratic Party (HDP) 34 478 0,7 
Table 2. Turkish Political party membership and their proportion of votes (Source: 
Yargıtay) 
Secondly, the AKP was also successful in creating local support by establishing a 
distribution process for in-kind benefits. This policy was the updated version of the 
Refah Municipalities’ social programmes. During the AKP’s period these programmes 
have been implemented at national level, financed by state funds and administered by 
province governors and sub-governors (Çınar, 2013, 50). The availability of these in-
kind helps such as coal in winter depends on the will of the government so it became a 
’charity’ without legal entitlement. Election periods create an opportunity for the AKP 
to influence these programmes by providing greater benefits and create more solidarity 
with the poor subsequently gaining more votes even from the losers of the neoliberal 
policies. These charity policies constitute an important source of the party’s popular 
appeal (Çınar, 2013,51). 
Conditional Cash Transfer programme also constitute a part to influence the voters’ 
behaviour. The first programme was launched in February 2002 in six districts with the 
support of World Bank loan. Later, the then AKP government decided to maintain and 
enlarge the programme whose nationwide implementation started in 2004. By the end of 
2011 some 2,9 million children were enrolled in it, the budget of the CCT reached some 
400 million USD (Aytaç, 2014, 1218).  
123 
 
As the programme’s implementation is carried out by governors and sub-governors 
appointed by the state, they have the opportunity to increase the number of recipients in 
electoral districts where the incumbent party faces an ideologically close challenger. 
Aytaç’s researches prove that the administration made efforts to direct resources to 
these districts. Even scandal occurred when Tunceli’s governor was accused by 
electoral manipulation prior the 2009 local elections because he used these funds to 
reinforce the AKP’s reputation. The government party defended him in this scandal, and 
he later was able to continue his career in an other, more populous and richer province 
(Aytaç, 2014). 
 
2.3.2. Ottomanalgia 
 
Political elites have a relative flexibility to shape national identity by 
manipulating the national memory through the hegemonic history education, state 
institutions (such as history institutions) and pro-government media. By creating a 
national memory that is shared by the majority of the population may produce consent 
that can serve as a pillar of hegemonic project. Politicians tend to rely on the existing 
majority views on memory politics (Bakiner, 2013), however, political elite can turn 
their back to the accepted view and replace it with a new one by skilfully using history. 
The ‘use’ of Ottoman past gained political momentum in Turkey and has become an 
important element of AKP’s hegemonic project. 
In Turkey, one shall distinguish various interpretations of the Ottoman Empire 
that stems from the different reading of the past. However, these readings are 
interconnected and various images of the Ottoman Empire exist: '(1) the Ottoman 
Empire as the cradle or apex of civilization; (2) the image of the Ottoman Empire as an 
Islamic Empire; and (3) the image of the Ottoman Empire as a liberal, multicultural 
empire (Czajka-Wastnidge, 2015, 2).' 
The identity of the newly-founded Republic of Turkey was based on negation of 
the earlier, Ottoman period. Some historians, such as Muhettin (Bergin) – one of the 
depositaries of the new identity making – advocated the rejection of the Ottoman history 
from the new history-writing. He stated that the Empire was a repressive, non-Turkish 
state (Boyar, 2007).  
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Although the criticism from the academic level perpetuated, the popular history 
books and many times poems glorified the Ottoman past (or at least some part of it) that 
altered the society’s possible negative views about the previous regime (Boyar, 2007). 
The rehabilitation of the Ottoman past was a slow and long process in Turkey. During 
Atatürk’s era the new regime identified itself as the opposite of the past represented by 
the Ottomans. Some influential historians, like Köprülüzade Mehmed Fuad and Ahmed 
Refik have made attempts to unify Ottoman history with Turkish history. The gradual 
reintegration of the Ottoman past got a new level when at the second congress on 
Turkish history, Atatürk foster daughter Afet İnan made a step to Turkify the Ottoman 
era and set in the Turkish History Thesis (Boyar, 2007, 18.).  
Despite the efforts of some historians to appease the Turkish history with that 
period on the 1930s, anti-Ottoman view has remained determinant. The harsh dismissal 
of the imperial past was a clear sign of the early Republican elite’s identity-making that 
later evolved in the Secularist-Kemalist groups affiliation with the pre-Ottoman and 
Atatürk era compared to the emerging Religious-Islamist elites that rather had pro-
Ottoman views (Zenzirci, 2014). The regime that abolished the Sultanate and the 
Caliphate has intended to modernize in a forced top-down manner the society. Its 
legitimacy stemmed from the pre-imperial time as the Turks Central Asian roots were 
emphasized, especially after creating the tenets of Turkish history in the 30s. This era 
rather identified the Ottomans with the dynasty – symbol of backwardness and the 
depositary of bigotry that contributed to the decline of the empire making it the 
infamous ‘Sick man of Europe’ – while it emphasized the glory of Turkish soldiers and 
people during the previous centuries.  
The use and meaning of the term ‘Ottoman’ has changed in the 20th century 
(Danforth, 2014b). While nowadays common popular products, like the famous 
Karagöz are remembered as part of Ottoman folklore, in the 1930s it was labelled as a 
Turkish game. The Ottoman Army was rather perceived as Turkish Army and in the 
official discourse; the old Ottoman architectural heritage has become Turkish one in the 
Atatürk period. 
A positive interpretation of the Ottoman past has gained momentum after the 
end of one-party system. The 400th anniversary of Constantinople’s conquest has served 
as a unique pretext to start a debate about the role of the Ottoman dynasty. Although 
Fatih sultan, the famous conqueror of Istanbul was rather presented as a Turk, the 
efforts to emphasize its multicultural features and tolerance towards Christian religious 
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minority shaped the public perceptions about Ottoman tolerance. Thus, the celebrations 
contributed to the re-evaluation of the past facilitating the gradual rehabilitation of the 
term ‘Ottoman.’  
Some intellectuals, as the poet Yahya Kemal have promoted the idea of 
Ottomanism, the importance of the Ottoman heritage re-evaluation. After 1950, a 
number of associations have been established like Fethi Derneǧi, İstanbul Fethi 
Derneǧi, İstanbul Enstitüsü or later on Yahya Kemal Enstitüsü (Çetinsaya, 2003, 365.).  
This revival was also influenced by the emergence of a conservative-religious 
centric party, the Democratic Party (DP). The religion and the positive interpretation of 
Ottoman past have appeared in the DP’s campaigns as a tool to mobilize. This 
development also favoured the reconceptualization of the past. Main conservative-
nationalist intellectuals like Banarlı argued that for a ‘Great Turkey’ it was needed to 
use the Ottoman Turkishness (Osmanlı Türklüǧünü). Although the Ottomans’ 
rehabilitation was rather a nationalist-conservative project, in the late 60s the far-right 
also incorporated the idea. From this point of view, Dündar Tașer’s role was crucial in 
making the Ottomanism consistent with the Ülkücü movement. According to him, the 
road to the Türk-İslam Sentezi passed trough the Ottoman idea. Other representatives of 
Ülkücü movement, like Erol Güngör, Seyyid Ahmed Arvasi and Nevzal Kösoǧlu also 
admitted the importance of Ottomans in Turkish history (Çetinsaya, 2003). 
The gradual rehabilitation of Ottoman past was also advocated by pious Muslim 
groups and Islamists circles, especially by religious orders (tarikat). They have played a 
key role in the revival of the Ottomanism in sense of imperial, historical and cultural 
heritage. One of the most influential promoters was the prominent poet and thinker, 
Necip Fazıl Kısakürek. The rifai Sufi order also provided the ‘Ottomanist revival’ with 
some thinkers like Münevver Ayașlı, Samiha Ayverdi, Ekrem Hakkı Ayverdi, Erol 
Güngör and Nihad Sami Banarlı (Ongur, 2015, 420). The reconciliation of Ottomanism 
with Islamism helped the Islamists to enrich their opposition in ideological terms, to 
form a new, Conservative identity and to find a useful discoursive tool to sheltering 
these groups against the secular state’s pressure and control (Ongur, 2015, 420).  
Nevertheless, in the second half of the 20th century, the Ottoman past has 
become a useful tool for political actors to legitimise and justify their domestic and 
foreign policy endeavours. The gradual discovery of the Ottoman Empire in Turkish 
foreign policy discourse has begun in the 1970s. In the 1990s, not just Turgut Özal but 
Süleyman Demirel, Tansu Çiller and Ismail Cem refered positively to the Ottoman 
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Empire and the Ottoman past (Yanık, 2016). After the Cold-War, even a new group of 
intellectuals has appeared. The so-called Neo-Ottomanists advertised the slogan ‘make 
peace with history and geography’ (‘Tarihle ve coǧrafyayla barıșmak’) admitting that 
Turkey should not leave behind its Ottoman past that may grant more political 
manouver in foreign policy relations. 
In these decades, state and non-state actors have recognized the importance of 
the Ottoman past and started to instrumentalize it in order to support their respective 
political causes. The references to the empire became frequent in the 1990s, but despite 
some efforts that were discussed in earlier chapters, nostalgia to the Ottoman past could 
not get strong state support in a Kemalist regime that was based on Western modernism 
and secularism. 
After 2002, it has changed. During the AKP era Ottomanism has received a 
much broader dimension. As Ongur highlights, the society itself assumed the pivotal 
role in promulgating Ottoman images. The gradual appearance of Ottoman past and the 
rehabilitation of the Empire had a long history and several groups of intellectuals 
supported the process in the 1950-2000. Nevertheless, the AKP governments played a 
central role in strengthening the Ottomanostalgia.30 By bringing the Ottoman past back 
the Kemalist modernisation project got a new challenge as per definitionem Ottomanism 
contradicts to the Republican era. Current Ottomanism is based on perception of 
continuity between Ottoman and Turkish history, questioning of the compatibility 
between Western and Turkish moralities, acknowledgement of the Turkic identity in 
addition to its Ottoman and Islamic identities, and nostalgia for Istanbul (Ongur, 2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
30 It is important to emphasize that Ottomanostalgia does not mean a simple reference to the Ottoman past 
but rather a broader use of Turkish history especially the periods having an Islam connotation. It 
practically means that not just Ottomans but Seljuks also get more limelight in the national cultural 
policy. 
127 
 
2.3.3. Making Neo-Ottomanist cultural policy 
 
The AKP’s hegemonic project strongly relies on memory politics that 
distinguish themselves from the Kemalist regime by promoting different reading and 
emphasis of history. Although the emergence of Turkish-Islamic synthesis during the 
1970s and its official victory in history books after the 1980 coup d’état paved the way 
towards a new approach to the Ottoman Empire and the unprecedented popularity of the 
Empire reflects to the changes in the society and the political elite. 
After 2002, conservative, pious part of the society that was oppressed or 
neglected by the Kemalist elite could turn towards a famous, Ottoman past openly. In 
line with this quest for the golden age of Turkish history, economic growth created a 
strong and prosperous state that in many views the current stage has resembled to the 
previous greatness. The AKP’s elite also relied on this image and what more started to 
support it. Thus, the majority view has met with the new elite’s perception what was 
unified, consumed into the new hegemonic project. Thus Turkish Islamists met with a 
growing need for a glorified past that could be easily absorbed for the AKP’s goal. The 
party that had to convince its religious electorate about their right choice at the 
elections, among others could use the image of the pre-secular Empire whose leader was 
the ruler of the Islam World.31 Furthermore, by revitalizing, reinstating the Ottoman 
‘grandeur’ could also be convincing for Turkish nationalists.  
Subsequently, the key element in the AKP’s Neo-Ottoman hegemonic project is 
to emphasize and interlink the Islam, conservative values and moral with the Ottoman 
past and making the ‘Ottomanness’ contemporary. The various state mechanism of 
memory transmission met with a popular appeal and non-state actors’ endeavours. Thus, 
contemporary Neo-Ottomanism is based on a number of tenets.  
 
1) Change of vocabulary to the previous time. AKP politicians frequently use 
Ottoman expressions in their speeches, especially in case of Ahmet Davutoğlu. 
Furthermore, Erdoǧan’s identification with Ottoman Sultans also appeared. 
Albeit the Turkish President has never positioned himself as a sultan, pro-
Erdoǧan circles frequently refer to him as a sultan. By mentioning with the great 
sultan of Turkey, like Fatih Sultan Mehmet he is placed in a context where he is 
                                                          
31 Interestingly, Turkish state tradition and the Turkish-Islamist synthesis reinforces the image of the 
Sultan rather than the Caliph. 
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interpreted as the political follower of the Ottoman dynasty who seeks to make 
Turkey great again.  
2) Ottomanist cultural symbols’ instrumentalisation in political discourse and 
architectural representation as a tool of Kulturkampf. The architecture became 
an expression of power for the AKP. Beyond the leading AKP politicians’ 
vocabulary, symbols referring to the Ottoman heritage got increasing importance 
in political representation. Probably the most famous example of this change is 
the symbol of Recep Tayyip Erdoǧan presidency, the building of the Aksaray. 
The Turkish ‘White House’ which has been built in the Atatürk forest in Ankara 
(Atatürk Orman Çiftçiliǧi) occupy a vast territory and with its size (more than 
one thousand rooms) demonstrates the emerging power of Turkey. It does not 
just represent the political occupation of a lieu de mémoire, but its structure and 
ornamentals having an Ottoman style refers to a symbolic transformation in the 
representation of power.  
Probably the case of Gezi park portrays the most tangible example of the 
Kulturkampf of the AKP era. The original plan to reshape the Gezi park – a 
small park next to the historical Taksim square, at the heart of Istanbul – was 
based on demolishing the site and building a shopping mall and apartment 
complex designed as an Ottoman-era barrack. The project was turned down due 
to the mass protests all over the country that lead one of the greatest crisis of the 
party in 2013. Concerning this neighbourhood of the Istanbul, in 2017, a mosque 
started to be built next to the Taksim square. 
Other clear example is the changing of election songs: for the 2017 referendum 
the pro-AKP campaign among several Erdoǧan-focused songs has used the 
Ottoman Army’s marching songs openly advertising an Ottoman cultural 
product as the AKP’s symbols. The ‘no’ (CHP) campaign has chosen as its main 
term the Izmir marșı, a song dedicated to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. 
3)  In line with the growing importance of the Ottoman symbols, more and more 
steps were taken in order to weaken the Atatürkist cultural – especially built – 
heritage. It is palpable in case of Ankara whose downtown was mainly 
constructed during the early republican era. Many buildings remaining from that 
period have been demolished in favour of new construction projects. The case of 
Atatürk’s Marmara köșkü (Marmara Kiosk) in the Atatürk Orman Ciftliliǧi 
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(Atatürk Forest Farm) it has been destroyed during the construction of the 
Aksaray, the Presidential Complex (Diken, 18/05/2018) 
4) Neo-Ottomanist heritage policy. Archeological preservation projects constitute 
an important part of identity politics. They contribute to shape the nation’s 
perception about its own history as well as perception about its neighbours. 
Countries intend to boost their cultural leverage even through the international 
institutions, see the lobby activities at the UNESCO World Heritage. Thus, 
heritage politics during the AKP have become determining in redefining Turkish 
history and the stance of the Republic to its Ottoman past.  
Turkish restoration policy got a fresh impetus during the AKP. The sites of 
Ottoman heritage get greater attention than before. Old town of Eskișehir, 
Ankara, Gaziantep were restored or renovated. In a broader context, the national 
development agency, the TİKA started to revitalize Ottoman legacy in the 
neighbourhood (see later).  
5) Increasing success of TV series and the emergence of ‘Ottomannes’ in popular 
culture. Probably the most visible part of the revival of attendance towards the 
Ottoman past is the Goldan Age of TV series related to the Empire. The 2000s 
have bought an unprecedented success for Turkish soap operas makers, because 
these products have become popular not just in Turkey but in its neighbourhood 
as well. The Turkish television series industry’s export was 10 thousand USD in 
2004 while in 2016 it reached the 350 million USD (Itohaber, 17/10/2016). The 
85 film makers produce around 50-70 new series per year, however, like in the 
USA, around 50 percent of them are terminated before the season due to the 
competition (Deloitte, 2014). 
This success is based on a number of factors like length of the episodes (that is 
around 120-150 minutes in Turkey, much longer than in Hungary) favouring the 
advertisement, Turkish state support, the professionalization of the sector and 
the cultural proximity in the neighbouring region. 
The skyrocketing number of Turkish TV series offers a wide range of themes. 
As of October 2016 around 130 series are aired in Turkish TV channels. Some 
10 percent of these series are related to the Ottoman era.32  
                                                          
32 Like Filinta (2014- ), Diriliș: Ertuǧrul (2014- ), Bir zamanlar Osmanli: Kiyam (2012), Osmanli Tokadi 
(2013-2014), Muhteşem Yüzyıl (2011-2014), Muhteşem Yüzyıl: Kösem (2015 - ), Elveda Rumeli (2007-
2009), Osmanlı'da Derin Devlet (2013), Fatih (2013), Çırağan Baskını (2014), Son Yaz Balkanlar 1912 
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6) Although the proportion of these series is not that high as one can expect, some 
of them are usually among the most viewed series. The Muhteșem Yüzıl was the 
most profitable series in 2013. The importance of these series is boosted by the 
inclusion of political actors. For instance, Recep Tayyip Erdoǧan and his wife 
visited the Diriliș cast sending a message that he favoured the Ottoman past 
(Sofuoğlu, 2017). 
7) Academic ‘opening’ towards the Ottomans: history books, conferences, 
researches etc. Academic circles also admit the importance of the imperial past 
as 13 out of 163 Turkish universities (all of them was opened after 2002) bear 
openly Ottomanist references in its name (Ongur, 2016). 
8) Changing in holidays. Although Turkey’s national holidays are fixed and mainly 
based on secular events related to Atatürk’s era and the War of Independence 
while some religious holidays, like Kurban bayramı are also represented. 
However, the AKP has made efforts to strengthen festivals, holidays related to 
the Ottoman past, too. As it was mentioned before, the anniversary of the 
conquest of Istanbul has given an impetus to the thinking about Ottoman past. 
The Islamist political movement extensively used this occasion in the 1990s 
(which was supported by the mayor of Istanbul who was Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
in this time) as a counter-hegemonic event, while after 2002 it has become a 
national cause. The political emphasis has been reduced during the 2000s and 
the event started to become a real festival with pro-Ottoman emphasis (Sibel, 
2015). Along with the series focusing of the splendid Ottoman past, a film was 
also produced about the conquest of the former Byzantine capital with strong 
references on Mohamed and Islam. The AKP used other occasions, like the 
Mehmet Akif Ersoy anniversary to promote Ottoman and Islamist cause. The 
famous poet – writer of the Turkish anthem – was interpreted in 2010 as an 
Ottoman figure who represented the multiculturalism of the Empire (Koyuncu, 
2014, 110-130). 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
(2012), Payidaht: Abdülhamid (2017 - ), Seddülbahir 32 Saat (2015), Hürrem sultan (2003), Vatanım 
Sensin (2016-), Yunus Emre "Aşkın Yolculuğu" (2015), Harem (2012-2013), Kurt Seyit ve Şura (2014), 
Yasak (2014), Kırık Kanatlar (2005-2007) series. 
131 
 
Many argue that the Ottomanalgia and the references to Ottoman past are boosted by the 
society. For instance, historical soap operas cannot be so successful without such a great 
popular interest. Nevertheless, existing grass-root interest got strong incentives from the 
state. The government plays a central role in the Ottomanist revival. AKP politicians are 
pivotal in advocating the Ottoman linguistical terms, references in their discourse which 
subsequently instrumentalizes the Ottomanness for their purpose. National agencies are 
central in realizing the reconstruction the Ottoman space by for the purpose of the 
cultural policy. By choosing the state representation as Ottomanist, the state itself 
admits its gravity toward a cultural policy which is based the revival of Ottoman 
heritage interlinked with and Islamic view.  This Neo-Ottoman hegemonic project 
intends to boost consent in the whole society, convincing for the pious and nationalist 
groups, and even for the Kurds who can identify the Ottoman Empire as a multicultural 
state which respected or at least accepted the identity of various ethnic and religious 
groups. 
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2.4. Moment of crisis 
2.4.1. Challenges of the hegemonic order 
 
The AKP’s dominant position and relative peaceful hegemony had to face a 
number of new challenges that required the increasing use of coercive power of the 
society. The first challenge arrived in late May 2013 when handful protesters have 
clashed with police in heart of Istanbul, in the Gezi Park, next to the famous Taksim 
square. The initial cause was the first move to eliminate the small Gezi Park in order to 
build a new shopping center by restoring the former Ottoman-style military barrack 
which has been demolished in early Republican era.  
The police’s violent action generated nation-wide protests where hundred 
thousand people, especially youth manifested against the transformation of the park and 
later against the government. The clashes between the protesters and the police went 
violent hundreds of people were injured and eleven were killed during the riots. The 
centre of the demonstrations was Istanbul, the Taksim square and Gezi park, but other 
cities, like Ankara, Izmir also gave place to similar protests. The participants 
communicated via social media, through twitter and facebook that enable them to 
swiftly organize the resistance and cope with riot police more effectively. It also granted 
them an advantageous position to disseminate their ideas on bigger platform 
subsequently these events could reach higher national and international echo. 
The Turkish government’s reaction was severe. The police used tear gas and 
armed vehicle to clear the park and its surroundings and after several clashes the police 
managed to retake the Gezi Park in middle of June. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan labelled the 
protesters as looters (çapulcu) which also fuelled the anxiety.  After end of the month 
the violent demonstration were vanished but social tension remained and peaceful 
protests were organized for the upcoming weeks and months.   
The event got major media focus, not just in Turkey but all around the world, 
and the police’s violent actions raised concerns and criticism in the EU. The several 
hundred thousand people who joined the event came from Leftist radical groups as field 
research showed. Thus the social background of the protests was thinner than presented 
by major Western media. Nevertheless the Gezi events have highlighted the political 
dissatisfaction within Turkey and questioned the democratic features of the AKP’s rule. 
The need for coercive use of sate power has demonstrated the deficiencies of the 
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hegemonic process. Although the government handled the Gezi protests relatively 
easily, it harmed the AKP’s reputation, especially abroad.  
Probably the last chapter of the AKP’s endeavours to create hegemony and face 
with its political adversaries was the already mentioned internal conflict between the 
government and the Gülen movement which started a couple of months after the Gezi 
events. The movement has emerged as one of the most successful Islamist religious 
movement in Turkey which decided to take more political role instead. Fethullah Gülen 
Islamist preacher started to create his own community in the 1970s in Izmir and by 
advocating a peaceful and opened interpretation of Islam based on dialogue and 
tolerance stemming from the Nurcu movement (see more: Kicsi, 2008). He was able to 
gain support and create a strong movement. He was also successful in convincing a 
number of emerging SME’s and by establishing the financial background, he was keen 
to promote the importance of high quality education. By doing this, he could foster a 
chain of prestigious educational institution in Turkey from the crèches to a dozen 
universities and establish the most renowned high-schools whose students usually 
topped the university entrance exams’ scores (Hendrik, 2009).  
Along with the educational achievements, the Gülen movement also created its 
own media conglomerate with its own television channels (Samanyolu, Odatv) and a 
number of newspapers like the Zaman which has become the most read newspaper in 
Turkey.  
The Gülen movement established schools, universities all over the world and 
due to its reconciliatory and moderate Islamic thinking he could find supporters among 
Western countries which were usually welcoming toward a Muslim group promoting 
dialogue between different religious groups and emphasizing the peaceful nature of 
Islam. Thus, the Gülen movement’s associations, educational institutions could create a 
strong network abroad and serve as a useful tool of soft power of Turkey.  
The intentions of the movement’s leadership to enter into politics or play a role 
in Turkish domestic politics was revealed in 1999 by a secret tape which recorded an 
internal session when Fethullah Gülen was talking about the need of infiltration to the 
administration and judiciary. The unveiled tape has scandalized the public and outraged 
the Kemalist elites. Before being detained, Gülen has moved to the US, to Pennsylvania 
where he waited for the end of the trial launched against him (the case was dropped a 
couple of years later when the AKP came to power). 
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Although the AKP’s core came from different Islamist political movement, like 
Milli Görüș, and intended to create good relations with religious Islamist movements, 
like Nurcu and Nakșibendi, it could not neglect the most influential (chiefly in terms of 
economy and media) Islamist group as well. The party, especially during the first years 
welcomed the educated people who were considered as loyal cadres in the war of 
position against Kemalist establishment. The coalition between the AKP and Gülen 
movement was realized in media, financial support and political support as the 
Ergenekon and Balyoz cases has shown that they contributed to the debilitation of 
Kemalists and intimidation of many opponents and critical voices (Yeșil, 2016). After 
the trials, from the Kemalist side has not remained any real challenger for the AKP, and 
the previous alliance between the party and powerful Islamist religious movement 
ended. That is why these probes were crucial in weakening and deterring secular and 
left-wing foes and it decreased the pressure of Kemalist and Leftist groups on the 
government. They also harmed the image of the previously unreachable and 
unpunishable TSK. 
The clash of views over given issues, like Mavi Marmara incidents in 2010 or 
the government handling the Kurdish issue by involving the PKK in the peace process 
already predicted that a major conflict was to come. The aggressive actions of the police 
in the Gezi park events that aggravated the crisis and triggered large-scale 
demonstration and clashes in the whole country was also linked to the movement in the 
pro-government media. The AKP’s attempt to close the Gülen high-schools in autumn 
2013 has failed but clearly signed the prelude of an open conflict which finally started at 
the end of the year. The rupture between the two allies has become obvious. 
In 17 December 2013 some prosecutors (like Zekeriya Öz who was one of the 
former prominent prosecutor of Ergenekon case) launched three corruption operations33 
that led to the detention of some 50 businessmen, public service employees, pro-
government figures and some politicians, like the sons of Zafer Çağlayan (Minister of 
Energy) Erdoğan Bayraktar (Minister of Environment and Urbanization) and Muammer 
Güler’s ones. What is more, in a probe the son of the Prime Minister, Bilal Erdoğan’s 
name also appeared (Egeresi, 2014). 
                                                          
33 One of the cases was opened because of Turkey’s illegal trade with Iran  bypassing the US embargo 
where the state-owned Halk Bank, Süleyman Aslan and an Iranian businessman, Reza Zarrab have been 
playing a central role; the second was opened against the Oğuz Bayraktar, the chairman of the TOKI and 
the third one was linked to Mustafa Demir, mayor of Istanbul central district, Fatih. 
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The surprisingly mass and coordinated detentions led to a government crisis 
which pushed Erdoğan to restructure the cabinet by replacing four ministers by new 
faces. Nevertheless, the government immediately began to accuse the movement which 
was called as ‘Parallel State’ (Paralel Devlet) that it launched an attack against a 
government; thus the movement has been securitized and the original issue (high rank 
corruption) were switched to a domestic political conflict.  Some two months later, prior 
the 2015 March local elections, a new tape scandal has reached the public. This tape 
targeted Prime Minister Erdoğan and his son Bilal Erdoğan. However, the party 
leadership was able to tackle this crisis, the Prime Minister actively participated in the 
election campaign and his charisma contributed to the AKP’s success. According to the 
polls, he managed to strengthen his endorsement among the AKP supporters.  
The deep crisis affected the state administration which represented an internal 
threat to the government and the Prime Minister’s entourage. The AKP’s response was 
coercive, again. It targeted Gülen Movement’s conglomerations and state institutions 
along with a harsh anti-Gülen campaign in the pro-government media while the 
Gülenist press has become publicly critical towards the AKP leadership.  Purification 
has started in state administration resulting in the dismissal or relocation of several 
thousands of policeman, judges, prosecutors etc. The corruption cases were taken away 
from the original prosecutors (they later fled the country) and closed.  
The government started to replace the management of various Gülenist 
conglomerates and holding by state appointed trustees. The case of Koza-Ipek holding 
clearly showed this adjustement: just with a few days before the elections of 1 
November 2015 the Gülenist press belonging to the holding has become pro-AKP after 
the new trustees have been appointed. The Asya Bank’s management was also removed 
and a board of trustees took over the bank. The nationwide newspaper, the Zaman’s 
case led to even greater tensions: in April 2016 Turkish police had to assault the 
headquater of the Gülenist newspaper in order to forcefully replace the editorial board.  
The 15 July coup attempt which was perpetuated by the Gülen movement 
according to the government and majority of Turks, practically put an end to the 
conflict. The TBMM announced state of emergency (OHAL) almost immediately and 
granted the government almost unlimited power (the OHAL could be extended 
according to the legislation and the AKP since July 2015 every time has used this 
opportunity). The mass detentions begun the day after the failed coup: the purge against 
the Gülen movement membership not only affected the state but the private sector. 
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According to the Turkey purge, some 50 thousand people was arrested, 90 thousand 
detained and more than 150 thousand persons were fired (turkeypurge.com).  
The educational institutions related to the movement were closed almost 
immediately: one dozens universities, several thousand primary and high-school. The 
movement has lost the remnant of its economic and media assets, as the TUSKON was 
dissolved and a number of companies were confiscated. As of spring of 2017 some 900 
firms were nationalised. The Gülen media had to face the same fate. The Zaman was 
closed as well as the still existing pro-Gülen press. 
The anti-Gülen war passed the country borders as the Turkish government has 
asked all countries having Gülen associations or school in their territory to close them 
down. Only few a states replied favourably and acted in line of the request of Ankara. 
The European Union member states or the main NATO ally, the US have refused to 
close these institutions which generated tensions between Ankara and them. 
Washington’s reluctance to extradite Fethullah Gülen to Turkish authorities to bring 
him home for a trial also foreshadowed the two states’ stressful relations. The AKP 
mobilized its foreign branches, the UEDT organized mass anti-Gülen and pro-AKP 
protest all over Europe and the government created – still prior the attempt – the Maarif 
Vakfi which aims to acquire and manage the (former) gülenist schools abroad. 
The large-scale detentions have turned to witch-hunt according to many, and 
some has pointed out that in several cases it was used against non-gülenist groups, like 
in the case of the Kemalist-secular opposition Cumhuriyet newspaper. The dismissal of 
university personnel during 2016-17 also nourished speculations that the government 
uses the OHAL and detentions as a pretext to weaken every political opponents and to 
intimidate critical segment of the political sphere. 
 
2.4.2. Successful crisis management and growing 
authoritarianism 
 
Similarly to other political parties in power, the AKP took advantage of its 
growing leverage on state institutions, media ownership to direct the public attention to 
issues preferable for the government, however, the use of this advantage with coercive 
measures increased after mid-2013.  
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The AKP’s agenda-setting emerged as a useful tool to prevent opposition groups 
from gaining momentum and to strengthen the party’s omnipotent image. The 
credibility to act and solve problems is not the unique to the AKP, however, the party 
was remarkably successful in shaping national agenda and coping with gargantuan 
problems. Furthermore, due to the continuous threat of coups, party closure and 
internal-external (real or imagined) adversaries, the AKP created a perpetual war 
rhetoric. Under these above mentioned threats, its electorate had no other option but to 
join forces and if it wanted to defend its only parliamentary representative. This menace 
emerged from every part of the Kemalist system, even from its main political party, the 
CHP. Particularly the militaristic and ‘uncivilized’ manifestation of the CHP’s anti-
Islamization that condemned the headscarf-wearing women that attended state 
ceremonies with their husbands received attention (Çınar, 2013, 43). In 2007, when the 
case of the presidential election led to political crisis, CHP also organized protests, the 
so-called Cumhuriyet mitingleri (Republican meeting) – large manifestation in order 
defend the secular state – that were seen as threat by the Conservative voters.  
Although the AKP put efforts to enlarge its electorate, especially among the 
Kurds and other minority groups, to create a more inclusive national identity it also used 
polarization and social ruptures, cleavages for its own interest. Thus polarization in 
daily Turkish politics has gained momentum and the society has become increasingly 
bifurcated. The government has a big role in boosting the situation which in order to 
keep its electorate and mobilize voters has turned towards more belligerent rhetoric and 
cultural/historical divisions. As Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has revealed in 
one of his famous statements: “In this country there is a segregation of Black Turks and 
White Turks. Your brother Tayyip belongs to the Black Turks.” (Acemoglu – Ucer, 
2015, 19). 
The AKP was also successful in political crisis management and shape national 
discourse by finding new enemies or simply alienating the political challengers. The 
handling of Gezi protests of 2013 was a clear manifestation of this practice when 
Erdoğan called the young protesters vagabonds (capulçu) who drank alcohol in mosques 
and attacked a woman because she was wearing a headscarf. This political manoeuvre 
repeated itself at the end of 2013 when corruption cases were launched by the so-called 
Parallel state (Paralel Devlet) namely the Gülen movement. 
However, the more power the AKP has gained the more it has become 
majoritarian, or even authoritarian. While the democratization process was one of the 
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main slogans of the AKP and it could represent the transformation credibly to the world 
during its first decade at power, after the Gezi event, its pro-EU and pro-democratic 
image begun declining and losing momentum. Simultaneously authoritarian tendencies, 
such as unfair campaigns, gained ground increasingly even if the electoral process 
(voting day) has remained basically intact and lawful.34 As a whole, increasing political 
violence, political pressure on dissent, censorship in the media and mass detentions 
(especially) after the coup attempt evolved the Turkish political system from a tutelary 
democracy to a less democratic one. The growing authoritarian features of Turkey led to 
entitle its regime as illiberal, defective or majoritarian democracy or even competitive 
authoritarian regime after 2011 (Esen-Gümüsçü, 2016 1583). In this system the 
elections remain free and continue to function as the main pillar of democratic 
competition of various parties – thus legitimizing the current power –, but the 
competition between these political actors becomes unreal or even unfair. By creating 
its own hegemonic bloc, AKP could acquire the control over the media abridging the 
opposition parties’ access to voters and weakening their campaigns. During the 2015 
campaigns or even more recently, in 2017 referendum campaign the AKP got 
significantly more air time and favourable content in the television and radio channels. 
The AKP benefited from the state media which intended to broadcast the President or 
the Prime Minister’s election rallies rather than the opposition leaders’ ones. Erdoǧan 
during the run-up of 2014 presidential election got exclusive support by state television 
channels which aired the opening ceremony of various state assets (OSCE, 2014). 
Moreover, through partisan distribution of state resources the government also 
has taken advantage in the campaign and curtailed the prospect of opposition for 
electoral victory. A number of cases have shown that opposition party rallies during the 
2015 campaign were hindered by the AKP-led municipalities or by the police (OSCE, 
2015). Media freedom has been also diminished in Turkey – despite the positive 
beginnings after 2002, the situations started to deteriorate after 2009 (Chart 2) 
                                                          
34 The rightfullness of the elections is also under question after the 2017 referendum when the Electoral 
Commission changed the rules of counting unsealed votes just a few hours before the end of voting. 
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Chart 2. Media Freedom in Turkey (Source: Freedom House) 
Furthermore, the failed coup attempt of 15 July 2016 has given an opportunity to 
make a major transformation in the military-civil relations.  The mass detention of 
generals and admirals following the coup attempt (some 40 percent of the military 
leadership was detained or dismissed). These high rank military personnel were 
replaced by promotion of lower ranks, so seemingly the military could handle this 
change, nonetheless the competency of this fast-tracking officers can raise questions 
(Haugom, 2016). One may claim that this purge within the military eliminated the 
possible threat for coup attempt from hardliner Kemalists or any surviving Gülenist 
groups.  
The attempt also gave to opportunity to broaden the civilian oversight and 
decrease the independency of the military. According to the new legislation, the Chief 
of Staff is appointed by the president.  The Chief of Staff and the General Staff was 
transferred from the Prime Minister’s office to the Presidency while the commanders of 
Sea-, Air and Land-forces have become subordinated to the Ministry of National 
Defence. Furthermore, the President and the Prime Minister got the right to directly 
command these commanders. 
The Supreme Military Council (YAŞ) – board responsible for promotion of 
military personnel – got new civilian members: above the already member Prime 
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Along with the mass detentions and restructuring the chain of command the 
military education went through changes. Military high schools were closed and 
military academies were transferred to the new National Defence University which is 
subjected to the Ministry of Defence like the military facilities. Above these changes, 
the military has lost the Gendarmerie and the Coast Guard which have been transferred 
to the Ministry of Interior.  
Due to these changes, the TSK was severely restructured and the civilian 
control, especially the Ministry of Defence’s position was strengthened. Hulusi Akar the 
Chief of Staff managed to preserve Erdoğan’s support and he kept his power and later 
he was promoted to Minister of Defence. By curbing its independency and boosting 
governmental oversight the TSK’s pacification project by the AKP can be perceived 
successful. At least for now, this major Kemalist veto player has been subjected to the 
civilian government which position has never been such strong compared to the 
previous ones after the transition to multi-party system.   
The 17 December corruption cases also opened the way toward the deeper 
politization of the judiciary as the government angrily started to boost its surveillance 
over top institutions, predominantly over the HSYK. The previous reforms were 
reversed in a limited manner. In new law at the beginning of 2014, the Minister of 
Justice gained strong control over the HSYK and the authorisation to initiate 
investigations against the members which was perceived my many as a tool for 
intimidation (Daloğlu, 2014). Although the Constitutional Court annulled this 
adjustment, it has given enough time for the AKP to tackle the political and institutional 
crisis of the corruptions scandals and begin the cleaning of the judiciary from the 
Gülenist members. In October 2014 the outcome of the HYSK members’ elections were 
taking place in a highly politicised climate and finally brought the victory of the AKP. 
Some 8 out of 10 people elected by the vote of the country’s prosecutors and judges 
could be considered as pro-government, and along with other state actors (like the 
President) appointed people, the government could rely on 15 members granting a 
comfortable majority in the board.  
The purge of the top courts from the Gülenists reached its new étap after the 
coup attempt when two members of the Constitutional Court were detained (AA, 
16/07/2016). Moreover, like the military, the whole judiciary system had to face a 
severe detention and dismissal after 15 July. This purge cleansed the Gülen followers 
from its ranks, however it also undermined the independency of the institution.  
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2.4.3. Towards Caesarism? 
 
The administrative or judicial ‘coup attempt’ in 2013-14 in form of corruption 
cases, later the military coup attempt in 15 July 2016 highlighted the troubles of the 
AKP hegemonic project. However, the most surprising feature of these challenges that 
it can be evaluated as internal power struggle within the same Islamist historical bloc 
that preliminarily aimed to loosen later to eliminate the Kemalist, particularly the 
military leverage. As it was showed, the party and the movement cooperated closely in 
this issue, and the AKP granted the opportunity to the Gülenist to seize a great number 
of positions in state administration, judiciary, law enforcement and even in the military. 
This power struggle over the control of state can be conceptualized as Gramsci’s 
Caesarism. According to him, caesarism appears when the stalemate between the rival 
groups results in the emergence of a strong leader (like Caesar or Napoleon). Similar 
scenario may occur when the power struggle and stalemate is restricted to the dominant 
group. Theory suggests that in case of such a harsh and palpable power struggle more 
coercive practices may emerge. Thus governmental reactions in Turkey such as the 
introduction and extension of OHAL, detentions and arrests could be perceived as the 
implementation of state coercion. Furthermore, theses moments give a unique 
opportunity toward the fast emergence of a strong leader who can handle the crisis; 
however in case of Turkey the struggle did not result in a new leadership but the 
empowering of the current one.  
What can be detected in Turkey after the 15 July attempt is the strengthening of 
man’s position and step towards one-man-rule (even detriment of many who occupied 
leading position in the party).35 Since the 15 July, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan could 
accumulate more power that he has managed to do during the previous 14 years. 
 The strong leader discourse has been strengthened after Mid-2016 and the 
President has appeared in the pro-government media as the saviour of the country. The 
mass pro-democracy manifestations after the failed coup attempt also reinforced this 
image, and according to the polls, his popularity increased slightly in the post-coup 
attempt era, at least for a short while. The internal and external threats, the successful 
                                                          
35 Changes in party leadership, (forced) resignations in autumn 2017 even in case of Ankara and Istanbul 
whose mayors were in power for decades and accumulated symbolic powers as well. 
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battles against the terrorist groups have made necessary a strong leader who could 
handle them – at least in theory. Erdoğan took advantage of these developments.  
The key element and presumably the last momentum in the AKP’s and 
Erdoğan’s hegemony building was the 16 April 2017 referendum victory (and the 
process was finished after the 24 June 2018 pre-election when the new system was 
implemented). The referendum which was won by a slight majority (some 51.4 percent 
against 48.5) gave a green light for the common AKP-MHP constitutional amendments 
that introduced the presidential system in Turkey. Although the majority of the 
modifications would be implemented after the 3 November 2019 elections one may 
state that the process to cement the AKP and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s power has 
reached its final stage. Shortly after the referendum, Erdoğan has become party 
member36 and in May he has been elected the chairman of his party, again (AA, 
21/05/2017). 
The constitutional amendments granted strong power to the president. The 18 
measures affecting nearly 80 articles introduced the presidential system, reshaped the 
judiciary. The prime ministry’s institution has been abolished and subsumed to the 
president which had had before only symbolic power and had to represent the whole 
nation. Thus, the new president does not have to be impartial any more: the adjustments 
repealed the article prohibiting his party membership. The president got the 
authorisation to issue decrees, however, these cannot overwrite the laws and cannot 
contradict to fundamental and civil rights expressed in the constitution.  
Thus parliament can limit the president’s room for manoeuvre, if it votes with 
simple majority against the will of the head of state.  Nevertheless, the new election 
system – presidential and general election are held in every five years, in the same day – 
will favorize the strongest party and strongest candidate which would be in the 
foreseeable future, the AKP and its presidential candidate. In this case, the party would 
be able to secure an absolute majority in the parliament and having its party leader at the 
presidential palace. In this case, the one-man rule seems to be more likely as the party 
possibly would not oppose its own leader and head of state.  
The amendments have curtailed the parliamentary scrutiny over the executive. 
Deputies can only submit written questions to the ministers or vice-presidents but not 
the president. The impeachment process has also become more difficult. The parliament 
                                                          
36 He had to resign from this post when he was elected to the President of the Republic in August 2014. 
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needs 3/5 to vote about launching an investigation; if it is done, a 15-member 
commission appointed by various parties has to write a report. This report can only be 
submitted the to supreme court, if 2/3 majority of the commission members support it. 
In other terms, it is unlikely that the AKP being in majority would enhance a politically 
sensitive report. If it cannot reach a majority in the elections, probably it will be able to 
block the submission.  
Concerning the judiciary, presidential oversight has been strengthened by the 
amendments. The number of HSYK’s numbers was reduced from 22 to 13. Four 
members will be appointed by the president, while seven by the parliament. The 
remaining two persons will be the Minister of Justice and his deputy who are practically 
appointed by the president. The Constitutional Court’s membership was also decreased 
from 17 to 15 and 12 of them will be appointed by the president. The AKP having a 
strong majority in the parliament, the president can create a partisan top-ranking 
judiciary. 
 The case of constitutional amendment also showed the changes in internal power 
struggle and the transformation of AKP’s hegemonic project. The AKP had to cooperate 
with the MHP thus co-opting the radical nationalist party in Turkey’s domestic power 
structure. Without the MHP’s help, it could not receive enough support in the 
parliament neither enough votes in the referendum. Thus co-optation of previously 
opposition groups after purging the Gülenist from state administration was a necessary 
act to strengthen the party’s social support. This turn in power politics was not restricted 
only to the MHP camps.  
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2.5. Limits of AKP’s hegemony 
2.5.1. Societal features and electoral geography 
 
The previous chapter have presented the construction of AKP’s hegemony. Its 
politics to co-opt and to make social consent resulted in an electoral hegemony. This 
hegemony is maintained even with increasingly authoritarian tools such as unfair 
campaign condition or even by limited election manipulations. Nevertheless, the AKP’s 
electoral performance clearly showed the successfulness of its politics of consent (and 
coercion) but also highlighted its limits. The success of its hegemony was tangible: the 
most important change compared to the 1990s’ election patterns after 2002 was the 
decline of protest voting. While the pre-AKP decade was characterised by weak 
governments, growing anti-system sentiments and mistrust that strengthened high 
election volatility based on high percentage of protest votes (Kumbaracıbaşı, 2009, 
108), one can see the contrary during the AKP’s era.  
The election results showed that the AKP usually could acquire some 35-50 
percent of votes while the other parties could not represent a real challenge. Only three 
other parties have managed to regularly pass the 10 percent electoral threshold (in 2002, 
only one).As it was shown, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s party could occupy the centre-
right, conservative, pious electoral niche of the former DP, AP, ANAP etc. The Islamist 
political movement, which was a strong political player in the 1990s, after the break up 
between the yenilikciler and the Erbakan loyal Aksakallı group, weakened the core, 
more radical Islamist groups electoral support. Despite the foundation of a new, pro-
Erbakan Islamist party, the Saadet Partisi in 2001, radical Islamists could not enter the 
parliament again as their electoral performance usually remained around five percent, 
too far from passing the threshold. The only exemption is the 2018 election: due to the 
electoral alliance with the secular CHP it could get one mandates in the TBMM. As a 
whole, it is safe to say that the AKP was a successful actor in co-opting and moderating 
some part of the radical Islamist groups (Tuğal, 2009). 
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Chart 3. AKP's electoral performance and its share of parliamentary mandates (%) 
(Source: Turkish Electoral Committee) 
Nevertheless, as Chart 3. shows, despite its electoral performance, the elections 
usually led to the AK’s decreasing parliamentary representation. In 2002, the party 
could have almost two-third of the mandates while in June 2015, it could not size the 
simple majority in the 550-steat TBMM. In November, it could gain 317 mandates, 
however, it was short of 13 deputies to size adequate majority for constitutional 
changes. This forced the party to find political allies. Finally, a minor opposition group, 
the MHP was eager to ally with the government party. The elections of June 2018 led to 
a new decline in votes for the party. 
 
 
Chart 4. CHP's electoral performance and its share of parliamentary mandates (%) 
(Source: Turkish electoral Committee) 
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The main opposition party, the CHP usually remained between 25-30 percentages of 
votes, representing the support of the mainly Kemalists and Leftist electorate (Chart 4). 
Geographically the Western part of the country, the most urbanised regions, such 
as the Aegean littoral, represents its main constituency. Other important feature of the 
CHP is that its core electorate is based on Alevis and in a limited manner, to the 
descendants of Balkan immigrants living in Western Turkey. Its relative weakness in 
the main cities such as Istanbul and Ankara highlight the characteristics of the previous 
decade’s urbanization process in Turkey: the mass influx of rural people to the major 
settlements did not mean that they would embrace Kemalism. Instead, they rather 
favoured conservative and religious values, making them a strong constituency for the 
AKP. Furthermore, the failure of the CHP to open to local poor and create a real and 
convincing leftist program hindered the party to enlarge its electorate in these areas. It 
positioned itself as the only defender of the secular principles, accused the AKP of 
making attempts to weaken the Kemalism and implement its own Islamist agenda. This 
was a useful tool to mobilize its electorate, but prevented the political group to open 
towards non-secular, non-Alevi electorate and by that leaving the vast majority of voters 
to the AKP. 
The traditionally second biggest opposition group, the MHP whose electorate is 
dispersed almost all over the country, also had limited room for manoeuvre against the 
AKP. Although the distance of party program, party values are the smallest compared to 
the government party in the Turkish political landscape, because its radical, nationalist 
program which has embraced the Islamist ideas some decades ago under Alpaslan 
Türkeș’s leadership, it could not size much protest votes from the AKP’s electorate. 
That is why the MHP’s range of votes varied between 11-16 per cent which was not 
enough to form a government (Chart 5). 
The alliance with the AKP and internal power struggles within the party 
leadership led to defection of some prominent figures led by Meral Akșener. She 
established a new party called İYİ Parti37 in October 2017 and entered in the 
parliamentary and presidential elections in June 2018. The party intended to gather the 
anti-Erdoǧan protest votes from the Right (Akșener also run for the presidential post). 
Despite the efforts, it could not challenge the AKP or the MHP, but at least could enter 
in the TBMM with 10 percent of votes. 
                                                          
37 İyi means good in Turkish. 
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Chart 5. MHP's electoral performance and its share of parliamentary mandates (%) 
(Source: Turkish Electoral Committee) 
The third opposition group, the Kurdish political movement and it parties also 
face strong limitations. Although the majority of the constituency is based on nationalist 
Kurdish voters and some liberal parts of Turkish society, it was difficult even for them 
to pass the high electoral threshold.  
 
Chart 6. Kurdish parties' elecotral performance and their share of parliamentary 
mandates (percentage of votes for independent candidates in 2007 and 2011). 
In 2002, the DEHAP getting 6.22 percent could not get into the parliament, in 
2007, the DTP managed to form a parliamentary fraction by handful of independent 
candidates. In 2011, the BDP could hardly outnumber the DTP’s 2007 results. The HDP 
was successful enough to enter the TBMM as a sole party gaining 13 per cent in June 
2015 and repeating this move in November 2015 by having 11 per cent of votes (Chart 
6). 
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The gradual advancement of Kurdish political movement that positions itself at 
the Leftist side and says that it is an all-Turkey party, do not represent a real option for 
overwhelming majority of the AKP’s voters. Although by the co-presidency of 
Selahattin Demirtaș and Figen Yüksekdağ, it was able to acquire more votes from the 
Kurdish electorate in the East in 2015, recent developments such as the anti-PKK war 
and mass detention of party members including the party leaders strongly weakened its 
prospect to get into the parliament in 2019. 
Turkey’s electoral landscape seems to be stable: the AKP occupying the centre 
predominates the party system while other groups – Kemalists, Leftists, nationalists and 
nationalist Kurds have their own parties with relatively solid constituency. However, the 
internal struggle between the AKP and Gülen movement, the coup attempt affected the 
political power relations. After purging the state administration from Gülenists, the 
AKP needed to re-evaluate its relations with opposition groups. Several of them, like 
the secular-nationalist group, called ulusalcı was rehabilitated after the Ergenekon and 
Balyoz cases and got new state positions for support. The MHP has allied with the AKP 
in order to gain more power in state administration and prospectively high positions 
after 2019 elections. This change reveals that despite having strong electoral support, 
the AKP’s hegemonic project cannot neglect other groups. As Hunt argues, the 
hegemonic force has to make compromises with subaltern groups and incorporate their 
interests in the hegemony to boost consent (Hunt, 1990). Thus, the AKP will probably 
pay more attention on nationalist and secular groups and will put more emphasis – at 
least rhetorically – on Atatürk and national will. 
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Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans 
1. Decomposing the Balkans  
1.1. Ottoman heritage and kin in the Balkans 
 
The process of the Balkans’ conquest by Ottomans lasted more than 150 years 
from the occupation of Gallipoli (1354) to the successful siege of Belgrade (1521). The 
gradual conquest of Macedonia (1371), Bulgaria (1392), Serbia (1458), Kosovo (1454), 
Bosnia (1463) and Albania (1475), including the eastern parts of Croatia and central 
Hungary (1526/1541) brought major changes in the region. Without going into details, 
the following centuries under Ottoman rule had a deep impact on the region in several 
aspects. The Empire granted the longest political unity that the region had experienced. 
Even its name, the ‘Balkans’ originated during Ottoman rule (Map 1.) 
Maria Todorova distinguishes between (legacy as) continuity and perception. 
She argues that continuity means the survival of the characteristic of an entity at the 
time of collapse, while perception can be defined as “the articulation and rearticulation 
of how the entity is thought about at different times by different individuals or groups” 
(Todorova, 2009, 198). First, the 400-550 years spent in a common state created a 
mutually shared heritage for the people living together as a base for ‘continuity’. Not 
only did Muslim Turks learn Slavic words, but a great number of Turkish (Ottoman) 
words were incorporated into Slavic or Albanian languages. Furthermore, the Ottoman 
legacy still persists in the forms of the regional cuisine, music, demography, shared 
history and even has an effect on state- and nation-building processes through the 
legacy of faith-based communities, the millet system. As Todorova summarises: “The 
Balkans are the Ottoman legacy” (Todorova, 2009, 162). 
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Map 1. Ottoman conquest of the Balkans 
151 
 
In contrast, the Balkan nations have a different stance to this common past. Late 
19th and early 20th century works stated that the Turks brought destruction to the 
conquered lands, without the capacity of building anything of value due to the lack of 
civilisation. The most influential historian of the 19th century, Ranke used the proverb 
that ‘Where the Sultan’s horse-hoof treads, grass never grows again’ which frequently 
appeared later in articles and books about the Ottoman Empire (Boyar, 2007, 93-94). 
This image of Ottoman oppression in line with the destruction and backwardness that 
hindered Bulgarians, Serbs, Greeks and other people in the peninsula from reaching a 
higher level of development was often repeated in the West and in the Balkans as well. 
Moreover, it has become part of the national identity that the Ottoman period 
constituted an era of destruction and bloodshed without any meaningful progress, which 
led these countries to slip into oblivion.  
The forced Islamisation of Christians has been accepted as the dominant theory 
in the historiography of these countries, however, recent studies have pointed out that 
forced conversion was not a common practice in the Ottoman Empire (except for 
devșirme) and that Islamisation itself was a rather complex social process (Merdjanova, 
2013, 2). Probably not surprisingly, Muslim people and Turks have different 
perspectives about the shared history. For Turks, the Balkans played a significant role in 
the creation of a victim mentality. The textbooks and articles about the loss of the 
Balkans and the Danube, the images of the devastating wars and flight of Muslims, the 
rape of women contributed to cementing this victimisation into the national identity 
(Boyar, 2007, 142). 
Second, the long-lasting Ottoman centuries made possible the emergence of a 
‘constructed’ Ottoman heritage. The Empire needed well-built infrastructure for its wars 
against the Habsburgs and a professional administration to rule the conquered 
territories. They constructed a huge number of bridges, caravanserais, roads and 
fountains in order to make transportation and travel easier and faster. Later on, clock 
towers became a symbol of modernisation in the 19th century and in the beginning of the 
20th century, like in Anatolia. Ottomans also paid attention to the needs of the growing 
Muslim population, thus they erected mosques which were usually demolished by the 
secessionist Christian countries. The loss of the built Ottoman legacy was devastating in 
certain countries even if the majority was Muslim, such as in Albania where before 
1945 there were 1,667 Ottoman mosques, while only around 50 could survive the 
communist era due to the regime’s aggressive atheism (Kılıç, 2010, 5). 
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Muslim communities 
 
 Muslim people are the most important remnants of the Ottoman Empire in the 
Balkans. Due to the settlement of Muslim populations and Christians’ conversion to 
Islam, the Muslim faith became almost omnipresent in the Ottoman-conquered regions. 
Its spread was gradual. Ottomans – following the Byzantine Empire’s population 
transfer policy – installed Turkic tribes and groups (e. g. yörük) en mass to strategic 
parts of the Balkans, like in the Edirne region and in northwestern Bulgaria during the 
14th-15th centuries. In Bosnia, one part of the Slavic population converted to Islam by 
the beginning of the 16th century, while in Albania this was a long-lasting process, with 
mass conversion taking place mainly in the 18th century (see more: Noel, 1999).  
Muslims became a privileged group of the population, as until the mid-19th 
century they were the Sultans’ only subjects who had the right (obligation) to complete 
military service. Furthermore – especially following the first successful liberation wars 
of Christians during the first quarter of the 19th century – they were preferentially 
employed in the state administration (Ortaylı, 2004). Finally, Muslims (and especially 
Turks) were an integral part of town culture as they usually represented a significant 
proportion of the urban population. 
The successive territorial losses of the Empire in the 19th century changed this 
situation. Concerning the Balkans, the first quasi-independent state was created by 
Serbs; it was followed by Greeks (1821-1831). Internal rebellions in Herzegovina and 
Bulgaria triggered the Russo-Ottoman War (1877-1878) which paved the way to the 
foundation of the Bulgarian Principality as an almost independent entity in 1878, and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s occupation by Austria-Hungary. Seven years later, Bulgaria 
seized Eastern Rumelia. During the Balkan War (1912-1913), the entire Ottoman 
presence in the peninsula was essentially eradicated. By that time, the Empire had lost 
Albania, Macedonia and western Thrace (Map 2). 
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Map 2. Territorial losses of the Ottoman 
Empire 
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Rebellions followed by mutual massacres between Christians and Muslims, 
clashes and killings of regular armies and irregular troops resulted in huge losses. 
During these wars, Muslims were expelled and massacred, reducing their number. After 
becoming rather second-class citizens of new Christian-led states (even if weak 
minority protection clauses were included in the treaties), their emigration towards the 
shrinking Ottoman Empire’s territories continued. The general perception by that time 
about the fate of Muslim population was that they would vanish sooner or later, due to 
their immigration or assimilation, consequently their ‘presence’ was perceived as being 
rather temporary. 
During the 20th century, the Muslim population usually had to face oppressions, 
assimilationist or dissimilationist policies including (forced) population exchanges and 
sometimes even massacres. Although these were more tangible at times and in some 
cases less marked, they contributed to the declining share of Muslims in the total 
population of the Balkans. Whereas according to estimates this figure could reach up to 
30-40 percent in the 19th century, nowadays they constitute only 16-20 percent of the 
roughly 49 million inhabitants of the region (Map 3). 
Various factors contributed to the decline of their number. The first aspects were 
ethnic cleansing and mass killings. Ethnic cleansing during the territorial losses of the 
Ottoman Empire occurred frequently. The rebellion of Bulgaria and the Russo-Ottoman 
War was accompanied by battles and atrocities committed by both the Russian and 
Ottoman armies, and gave an impetus to mass migration, mainly the exodus of Muslims 
towards the remaining parts of the Empire. Numerous authors argue that the wars and 
influx of refugees to the Empire contributed to a significant population restructuring in 
the peninsula. During these years some 500,000 people left their homeland and settled 
in the remaining territories of the Ottoman Empire (McCarthy, 1999, 37-91). Until 
1879, around 380,000 people fled just to Istanbul (Ipek, 1999, 108), and by the 
beginning of 1890s the immigrants’ number surpassed 760,000 (Kayapınar, 2012, 374). 
The two Balkan Wars (1912-1913) stimulated a new wave of migration from the 
Muslim-inhabited areas toward the new borders of Ottoman Empire, which had lost an 
enormous part of its territories on the Balkans. By that time other hundreds of thousands 
of people were forced to move to western Anatolia. In a few years, they had to escape a 
war again, when the Greek army launched its offensive from Smyrna/Izmir toward the 
inner territories of Anatolia (McCarthy, 1999, 339). 
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Map 3. Muslim population in the Balkans 
156 
 
Ethnic cleansing and massacres also happened during World War II, especially 
in the former Yugoslavia, where after the Axis Powers’ invasion an internal war started 
between various groups (e. g. chetniks and communist partisans, while in Croatia the 
Ustasha regime contributed to the deaths of several hundreds of thousands of people). 
Although these clashes, killings did not target a particular religious group such as the 
Muslims, they also suffered heavy casualties between 1941 and 1945. The second 
substantial wave of ethnic cleansing was linked to the post-Cold War period. The 
dissolution of Yugoslavia culminated in new wars in Bosnia (1992-1995) and in 
Kosovo (1999)38, and was accompanied by massacres like the mass killings in 
Srebrenica in 1995. These armed conflicts also resulted in huge mass emigrations 
towards various western European countries and towards Turkey itself.  
Second, even in peacetime various governments intended to reduce the share of 
the Muslim minority by ‘sending’ them to Turkey. For instance, after signing the Treaty 
of Lausanne and proclaiming the Republic of Turkey (1923), the new state had to face a 
huge loss of population, lack of manpower and, closely related to this, economic 
difficulties. The Greek-Turkish population exchange also aggravated the situation 
because in exchange for the more than 1.5 million Greeks (Orthodox) who left, only 
around 600,000 Turks (Muslim) arrived from Greece. Later on, Ankara signed treaties 
with Balkans states such as Bulgaria (1925) and Romania (1934), accompanied by the 
benevolent immigration from Yugoslavia which made it possible to settle around 
410,000 Turks (Düman, 2009), Bosnians and Albanians in Anatolia.39 During the 
communist era, forced emigrations (e.g. Bulgarian Turks’ exodus in 1989) contributed 
to decline of the Muslim population there. After the regime change, emigration 
remained a threatening phenomenon; while during the 1990s Turkey was also a feasible 
destination, the EU accession (or the start of EU accession negotiations) directed the 
overwhelming majority of Muslims from Balkan states towards the core EU countries. 
The third main change concerning the situation of Muslim populations in the 
Balkans was their nation-building process and the formulation of their ethnic identity. 
This process varies according to each ethnic group. However, it is important to review 
                                                          
38 In Kosovo, the UCK’s formation in 1996 started an internal armed struggle for the independence of the 
autonomous region from the shrinking Yugoslav state. Their activities culminated in armed conflicts with 
the Serbs, and even massacres occurred in 1998. However, these killings influenced the internal 
community and NATO to bring an end to this internal conflict by bombing Serbia and pushing it to 
withdraw its army from Kosovo. 
39 At that time the Turkish Great Assembly accepted two settlement laws in order to ease the resettlement 
of various ethnic groups and the Turkification of Anatolia. These also contributed to the settlement of 
different nomadic groups (e.g. yürüks). 
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this change because it is a determining factor for the current Turkish foreign policy’s 
opportunities. As this topic is covered by a vast literature, here the author will make just 
an attempt to summarise and highlight the main trends and steps of this process. 
The nation-building process among Muslim people did not start at the same 
time. In the case of Bosniaks, the evolution of nation formation was strengthened by 
Austria-Hungary, especially by the statesman Béni Kállay. For Albanians, it started 
from the third quarter of 19th century as a response to the Russian threat, which gave 
rise to the famous League of Prizren. The League was a short-lived attempt, and 
Albanian nationalism had to wait two decades for its revival. In line with this alienation 
of Ottomans from their European territories, Muslims in the Balkans began finding 
other reference points of self-identification. Albanian Muslims claimed that they were 
autochthonous in their lands, where they would have to remain even after the loss of 
Ottoman authority (Boyar, 2007). 
Finally, several small and dispersed groups like torbeshes in Macedonia or 
Pomaks in Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey were not strong enough to create national 
identity. The Pomaks whose number (several hundred of thousands) could have served 
as a basis for nation-building process in theory, the geographical and political divisions 
(they are living in three countries) did not permit to create a political entity (they are in 
majority only some distinct, small area). They were weak to resist to the assimilationist 
policies of Turkey, and were highly integrated in the Bulgarian national concept based 
on the common language. 
 
Country Numbers 
Share of total 
population 
(%) 
Status (majority, minority, 
diaspora, etc.) 
Kosovo* 1,600,000 92 Absolute majority 
Albania 1,640,000 58 Absolute majority 
Bosnia 1,850,000 49 Relative majority 
Macedonia 700,000 33 Large Minority 
Montenegro 110,000 17 Significant minority 
Bulgaria  900,000 8-14 Significant minority 
Serbia 220,000 3 Significant minority 
Greece 
(Western 
Thrace) 
130,000 1 Minority 
Croatia 50,000 1.5 Minority 
Romania 50,000 0.5 Minority 
*without Northern Kosovo 
Table 3. Approximate size of Muslim minorities in southeast Europe, by country  
Source: Öktem (2010), censuses 
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The Table 3 shows that the Muslim population is heterogeneous in its size, share 
and legal status. Around 7 million people are Muslims which represent approximately 
14 percent of the total population of the region. These factors vary from state to state, as 
Muslims are the main state constituent communities in Kosovo and in Albania, whereas 
they are important not-in-majority groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, 
enjoying special rights granting them privileged status in the administration. The third 
country group is composed of Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia and Romania, where Muslims 
are only a minority. In these countries their percentage varies between nearly 10 percent 
and just 0.5 percent. 
Group Presence in countries Number Share (Muslims) 
% 
Albanians 
(Muslims) 
Albania  
Kosovo  
Macedonia 
Serbia 
Montenegro 
1,640,000 
1,600,000 
   550,000 
     35,000 
     23,000 
52 
Slavic 
speakers 
Bosniaks  
Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Serbia (Sandjak) 
Montenegro (Sandjak) 
Kosovo 
Macedonia 
      Goranis 
      Kosovo 
      Serbia 
Torbeshes 
Macedonia 
Pomaks 
Bulgaria 
Greece 
      Slavic Muslims 
                 Serbia 
                 Montenegro 
      Montenegrins 
                 Montenegro 
 
1,850,000 
   145,000  
     47,000 
     27,000 
     20,000 
 
     10,000 
       8,000 
 
      10,000 
 
130-70,000 
      60,000 
 
      22,000 
      24,000 
 
      12,000 
32 
 
 
 
Turks 
 
(Tatars) 
Bulgaria 
Greece 
Macedonia 
Kosovo 
Romania 
Romania 
590 -700,000 
     70,000 
     70,000 
     18,000 
     25,000 
     20,000 
12 
Romas 
Especially in Bulgaria, Serbia    
and Macedonia 
200,000 
3 
Table 2. Approximate number of Muslim minorities in southeast Europe, by 
linguistic group. Source: Öktem, censuses 
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According to their ethnicity, as the subsequent table presents, Muslims also do 
not constitute a homogenous group. Most of them are Albanians, whose group is 
followed by Slavic speakers, especially by Bosniaks, although small but important 
groups could be distinguished within Slavs such as Pomaks and Torbeshes. The third 
largest groups are the Turks who constitute the largest ethnic minority in Bulgaria; 
nevertheless, they only inhabit Macedonia and Kosovo sparsely, where their numbers 
do not reach 100,000 or even 5 percent of the total population. The last Muslim group is 
constituted of Romas who are spread all over the region. Due to ontological problems, it 
is methodologically difficult to define the correct size of the Roma ethnic group in these 
countries. Consequently, their numbers are usually based on estimates especially in 
cases where the number of people avoiding answering questions about their ethnicity 
and religion was high, such as in Bulgaria. 
Although they are all Muslims, their social status is not homogenous either (Map 
4.). Romas are usually in the periphery of society, even where Muslim Romas live 
among other Muslims such as Turks or Albanians. As a contrary example, Turkish was 
perceived during the 20th century as a sign of ‘town culture’ that made the language and 
Turkish speakers’ status remain high or prestigious in several countries or regions such 
as Kosovo and Macedonia, especially among Muslims. Other groups, like Albanians in 
Kosovo, are the main and leading ethnic communities.  
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Map 4. Muslim communities in the Balkan 
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After the withdrawal of the Empire, organisations representing local Muslims 
were institutionalised and became independent from the Ottoman centre (Merdjanova, 
2013, 11). Depending on their share within the population, Muslim communities 
managed to acquire a certain level of religious autonomy. Their status was challenged to 
a great degree during the communist era, as Balkan states usually applied forced 
secularisation policies to weaken religious identity instead of ethnic ones. For instance, 
in Bulgaria in the early 1950s the state demonstrated great support for Turkish identity 
by allowing and aiding ethnic associations and campaigning against ‘backward’ 
religious customs and traditions. Albania went the furthest in anti-religious policies by 
banning all ‘religions’ (1967) and declaring the country an atheist state (1976). 
The collapse of communism created a very different situation for the ruling 
elites: they had to find a way to integrate Muslim communities where they were in a 
minority or to re-organise state-religion relations (organisations, foundations/charities, 
property issues, etc.) in a democratic manner. The intra- (Serbia, Bulgaria) and inter-
community debates, internal struggles for power (Montenegro), in line with the 
persistent Islamophobia and constant lack of financial or material resources, created 
fertile ground for Turkey to appear as a protector of its kin. 
 
Evlad-i Fatihan: The Turkish minority in the Balkans 
 
The Turkish minority experienced a similar history to other Muslim groups: it 
lost its privileged status with the collapse of the Empire and the community had to face 
mass emigration waves towards Turkey, facilitated by bilateral agreements or simply 
just forced exodus. These unfavourable, dissimilationist policies reduced their numbers 
in every country, but despite the difficulties, the Turkish minority still constitutes an 
important element of the Balkans’ social fabric. Geographically, Turks live in the 
‘neighbouring’ regions of Istanbul: in Kircaeli in South Bulgaria, in the Rodope 
(Bulgaria, Greece) and in Macedonia and Kosovo, usually in the mountainous and 
peripheral regions such as Centar Zupa (Macedonia) or Prizren/Mamușa in Kosovo. 
They live in greater number in the distinct, but strategically important region of 
northeast Bulgaria called Deliorman, where Ottoman sultans settled Turks in the 15th 
century. Later on, Turks and Tatars were settled in Dobrudja, which became part of 
Romania in 1878. 
162 
 
Within the greater Muslim community Turks represent some 10-12 percent. 
They constitute a measurable minority in four Balkan states such as Bulgaria, 
Macedonia, Kosovo and Romania (in the later one, Turkic-language speaking Tatars 
also live in greater numbers). According to the official census their number is also in 
decline following the pattern of the majority population of these countries. The only 
exemption is Kosovo, where the Turks’ number and share increased in the last census; 
this change is probably linked to the growing social status of Turks and the emerging 
importance of Turkey. Nevertheless, they remained marginal groups (Table 5). Turks 
accounted for almost 4 percent of the population of Macedonia and around 8.8 percent 
of Bulgaria, where they are a strong minority.  
 
Bulgaria (year of census) 1992 2001 2011 
Total 8,487,317 7,932,984 7,364,570 
Turks 822,252 746,664 588,318 
Share (%) 9.69% 9.41% 8.80% 
Macedonia (year of census) 1991 1994 2002 
Total 1,964,285 2,063,964 2,022,547 
Turks 78,880 78,019 77,959 
Share (%) 4.02% 3.78% 3.85% 
Kosovo (year of census) 1991 2006 2011 
Total 1,956,196 2,100,000 1,739,825 
Turks 10,445 8,400 18,738 
Share (%) 0.53% 0.40% 1.08% 
Romania (year of census) 1992 2002 2011 
Total 22,810,035 21,680,974 20,121,641 
Turks 27,578 32,098 27,698 
Share 0.12% 0.15% 0.14% 
Tatars 22,754 23,935 20,282 
Share (%) 0.10% 0.11% 0.10% 
Table 5. Number of ethnic Turks in southeast Europe. (Sources: national 
censuses) 
 
Thanks to their numbers, they are also represented in politics. They have 
political parties in every country and they are usually present in the parliament, too. In 
some cases, like in Romania, special political representation status was granted by one 
minority seat for the tiny Turkish community (and another one for the seemingly small 
Tatar minority). Elsewhere, like in Bulgaria even ethnic or faith-based political parties 
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are banned, and the ‘constitutional nationalism’ forced the Turks to create their ‘liberal’ 
political party, the Movement for Rights and Freedom (Poulton, 1997). 
 
 
 Status Main laws Education Political 
parties 
Elections 
Bulgaria Unrecognised 
as minority 
Council of Europe 
Minority Protection 
Agreement 
primary and high school 
optional language 
MRF, 
DOST 
Present 
Kosovo Officially 
declared 
minority 
(mandate 
guaranteed for 
elections) 
Constitution, 
Council of Europe 
Minority Protection 
Agreement 
Turkish primary and high 
schools 
KDTP, 
KDP 
Present 
Macedonia Officially 
declared 
minority 
Ohrid Agreement, 
Council of Europe 
Minority Protection 
Agreement 
Turkish primary and high 
schools 
THP, 
TDP 
Present 
Romania Officially 
declared 
minority 
(mandate 
guaranteed for 
elections) 
Constitution, 
Council of Europe 
Minority Protection 
Agreement 
Turkish primary and high 
schools 
RDTB Present 
Table 6. Status of Turkish minority groups in southeast Europe 
 
Their minority status, privileges and rights vary according to the given state’s 
legislation (Table 6.). Although the EU accession process strengthened pro-minority 
legislation, Balkan states have usually granted only limited rights for their minorities. In 
the case of Bulgaria – having strong anti-Turkish sentiments and witnessing ethnic 
tension in the late 1980s and early 1990s – the Turks enjoy only limited rights in 
education. The situation is better in the other countries. In Romania, the constitution 
emphasises the importance of minorities and the protection of minority rights. For those 
living in Macedonia, the Ohrid Agreement gives a special status. In Kosovo, where the 
constitution and minority protection legislation was closely monitored by the 
international community, the rights awarded to minority groups are quite generous, even 
if local Turkish intelligentsia complain about infringements of the minority’s rights and 
their alleged oppression.40                        
                                                          
40 Complaints and dissatisfaction date back to the Yugoslav era when Turks were supported by Serbs in 
order to weaken and counterbalance the Albanian national movement.  
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1.2 The Balkans ‘in’ Turkey 
 
As it was already mentioned, the immigration from the Balkans was usually 
welcomed by Ankara. The immigration policy of the early republican era facilitated the 
arrival of former Ottoman (Muslim) subjects (Çaǧaptay, 2003, 612) while Christian 
Turks – Gagauzs – were not welcomed in Turkey. Demonstrating the perceptions of the 
time, the Turkish embassy in Sofia sent a report to the government about the migration 
to Turkey of the Pomaks, the Turks and the Gypsies who had been ‘accommodating to 
Turkishness’. According to the report, it would be a national mistake not to accept these 
people because if they were to stay in Bulgaria, they would increasingly be 
accommodating to ‘Bulgarianness’, leading to the loss of these populations (Boyar, 
2007, 138). These thousands of people who had arrived at that time to Turkey were 
easily integrated/assimilated into the Turkish society. 
A new wave of emigration towards Turkey occurred in the communist era. 
Albeit during that period Ankara intended to change its immigration policy and to 
preserve the Turkish communities (and other Muslim groups ready to immigrate) in 
their homelands, it had to permit the new exodus due to the pressure of Balkans states 
and the deterioration of the situation of the Turkish minority as well. At the beginning 
of that époque, various settlement agreements guaranteed the emigration of the Turkish 
minority toward their kin-state. One of the most remarkable pacts was the agreement 
with Yugoslavia signed in 1954 which made the immigration of about 200,000 people 
to Turkey (and a significant Albanian influx to the Macedonian Republic of Yugoslavia, 
changing the ethnic proportions of the member state) possible. The various treaties 
enabling the free movement to Turkey (serbest göç) and the family reunification 
(Bulgaria, 1967-77) also contributed to the growing number of immigrants in western 
Turkey. 
The most significant exodus of this period was the so-called ‘big excursion’ 
during the summer of 1989, when around 350,000 Bulgarian Turks left their homes to 
settle in Turkey, fearing the growing Bulgarian oppression and possible bloody clashes 
with the authorities. Due to the fall of the communist regime by the end of the year and 
the starting transition in Bulgaria, around a third of these people, especially the 
unqualified workers (Petkova, 2002, 53), returned to their homes. Albeit the Turkish 
state had no official settlement policy at that time, it attempted to place the newcomers 
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on the eastern part of Anatolia – without palpable results, as the immigrants preferred to 
settle in the western cities where they usually had relatives. 
The transition period in southeast Europe opened a new chapter in the history of 
migrations. The political cause of migration was replaced by rather economic reasons: a 
significant part of the newcomers arrived in the hope that they could find a job and 
escape from the unemployment and economic crisis which hit the Bulgarian Turks 
hardest. This tendency was strengthened by the decision of the Turkish authorities to 
ease the visa conditions. Furthermore, a new group of immigrants, namely refugees 
appeared after the war broke out in Yugoslavia. These people usually arrived from 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia. 
Although the emigration towards Turkey was most apparent during the last 
century leading to the emergence of a millions-strong community, not everyone having 
a personal tie to the Balkans has an active relation with the region – immigrants and 
their descendants usually have some kind of emotional link, especially the preservation 
of familial consciousness about the roots of the grandmother or grandfather who left the 
region many decades ago and not more. In addition to these sentimental relations, the 
new waves of immigration, particularly after 1945, created the basis for the emergence 
of a new phenomenon: the appearance of immigrants’ associations (göçmen dernekler) 
aiming to transform these emotional ties to self-help and pressure groups based on the 
common history, culture and language. 
 The first associations began to form around the 1950s. The first, more permanent 
organisation was founded by Turks coming from Greece’s eastern regions, the so-called 
Western Thrace, which could preserve its Turkish population despite the population 
exchange between Greece and Turkey in 1922-23. That is why these immigrants are 
referred to as ‘Western Thracians’ (Batı Trakyalı). The influx of thousands of Turks 
from Kosovo and Macedonia also paved the way for the foundation of new associations, 
such as the Vardarlılar (later Rumeli) Türkleri Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği (Turkish 
Culture and Solidarity Associations of Vardarlı (Rumeli) Turks), in 1950. The third 
group of göçmen dernekler was created during the forced assimilation campaign in 
Bulgaria, which caused huge protests in Turkey. Their membership was usually 
recruited from the Bulgarian Turks, who received new ‘reinforcements’ from the 
settlement of thousands of Turks during the ‘big excursion’ in the western part of the 
country. The constant (partly economic) emigration from various parts of the Balkans 
made it possible to create new associations or to enlarge the scope of an existing one. 
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The growth in the number of ‘göçmen dernekler’ from the middle of the 1980s 
coincided with the boom of the similar ‘hemşehri’ organisations. The institution of 
hemşehri (‘hometown organisation’) refers to an association comprising of a group of 
people who settled from a given – usually – village or small town to the same district 
(mahalle) of a city; the common territorial origin, tradition, history and similar 
experiences facilitated the creation of closer and more institutional links between people 
coming from the same place. Because of the skyrocketing demographic growth of 
Turkey during the 1980s and 1990s after the war against the PKK in its eastern parts, 
mass immigration took place toward the more convenient urban agglomerations which 
at least in theory offered employment and a better standard of living.41 The policy of the 
state after the coup of 1980 created a need for such organisations as well, by dissolving 
trade unions and banning political parties (Toumarkine – Hersant, 2005). 
 These associations provided a network and helped their members to integrate 
into their new neighbourhood; it also provided financial aid in times of crisis (Aktaş–
Aka–Demir, 2008, 5). After a while, some of them started to outgrow the frameworks of 
a simple, cultural self-aid organisation by allocating some political and economic 
leverage to the local level. Although the government was usually suspicious towards 
them, and intended to obstruct their activities, the institution of ‘hemşehri’ had become 
an integral part of Turkish life.  
The case of immigrant associations represented a different issue and because of 
the state’s suspicious approach toward hemşehri organisations they intended to 
distinguish themselves from the above-mentioned organisations, despite the similarities 
(Toumarkine – Hersant, 2005). Due to the fact that they were formed by ethnic Turks or 
Ottoman-Muslims originating from a different country, which they had to leave because 
of the discriminations and atrocities, they received a more favourable judgement from 
the authorities (Toumarkine – Hersant, 2005, 23). The most important difference 
between a simple hemşehri and göçmen organisation is that the most important and 
influential entities of the second group were recognised as having public utility (kamuya 
yararlı dernek), which meant that they can benefit from state subsidies while the others 
                                                          
41 During that time (1980-2000) the population of Istanbul increased from 2.8 million to 11 million 
inhabitants; in Ankara from around 2 million to 3.7 million, and in Izmir from around 1 million to 2.3 
million. Anatolian towns also experienced significant changes. In Bursa the number of inhabitants rose 
from 400 thousand to more than 1 million; in Konya, we can see similar numbers. 
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can only receive aid from municipalities.42 Furthermore, they managed to reach the 
nationalist wing of Turkish politics, which provided them (especially during the 1980s) 
with a defence against dissolutions and positive discrimination in the eyes of the state. 
After the coup in 1980 they were entitled to be part of the ‘national cause’ (milli dava) 
which also guaranteed some state aid – despite the fact that these associations did not 
belong to the state administration (Toumarkine – Hersant, 2005, 23). 
Moreover, some of the leaders of these associations managed to become political 
entrepreneurs by creating a well-organised entity from the growing membership, 
benefiting from a constant supply from the Balkans. One can observe this process 
through the example of the Bal-Göç. The Association of Culture and Solidarity of 
Balkan Turks (Balkan Türkler Dayanıșma ve Kültür Derneǧi – Bal-Göç) was founded 
in 1985 by a small group of immigrants (nine people altogether) from Bulgaria 
(Balgoc.org.tr). The chairman at the time, Mümin Gençoğlu, born in Kircaeli, and a 
well-known businessman in Bursa, started to expand the association by creating new 
branches all around Bursa (in the city and in the district as well). A year later they 
already had a branch (şube) in Adapazar, and later in Inegöl. Benefiting from the influx 
of immigrants during the ‘big excursion’, a third of whom finally settled in Bursa,43 the 
Bal-Göç managed to open new branches in Çanakkale, Orhangazi and Düzce. 
In parallel to the assimilation campaign in Bulgaria, other groups were founded 
to protest again the oppression of the Turkish minority in the neighbouring countries. In 
Izmit, a few months after the protest of 15 people at the beginning of 1985, Hüsmet 
Erdoğan established Kocaeli Balkan Türkler Dayanıșma ve Kültür Derneǧi. The next 
organisational step was the creation of the Balkan Türkleri Göçmen ve Mülteci 
Federasyonu (B.T.G.M.F.) in 1987 from the existing Bal-Göç associations. The Bursa 
Bal-Göç provided the leader of the Federation because its membership outnumbered its 
counterparts’ by exceeding 25,000. During the 1990s, the Bal-Göç Federasyonu was 
enriched by new branches and new groups. In 1991 Adem Süsler, together with 13 other 
immigrants, founded the Balkanlılar Dayanıșma ve Kültür Derneǧi (BAL-DER) in 
Istanbul (Balkanlilar.org). 
                                                          
42 The following associations possess the ‘public utility’ title out of 406 associations: Bal-Göç Bursa, 
Izmir, Kocaeli, Batı Trakya Türkleri ve Yardımlaşma Derneği (Istanbul), Makedonya Göçmenleri Kültür 
ve Dayanışma Derneği, Bosna Sancak Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Deneği (Istanbul), Bulgaristan Türkleri 
Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği (Istanbul);  see the list on the homepage of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 
43 Nowadays it represents around 50 thousand people. 
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The emerging role of the Bal-Göç was demonstrated when its chairman, Mümin 
Gençoğlu was awarded a seat in the TBMM after 1991. After his death (1993), the 
association did not cease to function. ‘Inheriting’ the post at the top, Gençoğlu’s son, 
Turhan Gençoğlu continued the work of his father by enlarging the organisations. In 
2005 the leadership of Bal-Göç reached a new level as five various federations of 
immigrants from the Balkans established the Balkan Rumeli Göçmenleri 
Konföderasyonu. By 2011, the Confederation was made up of 9 federations44 and 143 
associations (BRGF Booklet, 2011, 2), and nowadays the Bal-Göç provides the main 
pillar of this organisation.45  
They have settled in large communities in some districts of Istanbul and partially 
in Bursa. People coming from the same regions and towns, like other hemşehri 
organisations in Turkey, started to organise their local branches too. We can see similar 
patterns between the history of Bal-Göç and BTTDD (Hersant, 2005). 
The growing number of göçmen associations and their branches has paved the 
way for their growing importance in local politics. As they possess a disciplined 
membership which constitutes an essential part of a district, they managed to become an 
important actor in elections. The political parties of cities having numerous göçmen 
associations intended to establish good relations with them, and vice versa. During the 
past two decades a mutually beneficial cooperation emerged between them.  
Political parties started to put the leaders of these associations, or people having 
good relations with the dernekler (and usually of Balkan origin) on their voting list. This 
mutual aid helped to establish good relations with the ‘notables’ of these associations 
who sometimes managed to become a member of local elites, even EPs in Ankara. 
In order to compensate the support of such associations, the municipality usually 
tries to support their activities. As it is prohibited for them to give direct financial 
                                                          
44 The federations are the followings: Akdeniz Balkan TürkleriFederasyonu (Adana), Balkan Göçmen ve 
Mülteci Dernekleri Federasyonu (Bursa), Balkan Türkleri Federasyonu (Edirne), Dış Türkler ve Akraba 
Toplulukları Kültür Eğitim, Sağlık ve Spor Federasyonu (Sakarya), Eskişehir Muhacir Dernekleri 
Federasyonu (Eskişehir), Rumeli Balkan Federasyonu (Istanbul), Ege Balkan Rumeli Dernekleri 
Federasyonu (Izmir), Izmir Balkan Dernekleri Federasyonu (Izmir), Ege Balkan Türkleri Federasyonu. 
(BRGF Booklet, 2011). 
45 Another well-known organisation is Batı Trakya Türkleri Dayanışma Derneği (Solidarity Association 
of Turks of Western Thrace - BTTDD) which has offices in western Europe as well, especially in 
Germany and Belgium (Jeanne, 2005). In Brussels they managed to establish good relations with MEPs 
and EU institutions in order to defend the interests of Turks living in Greece, and to give voice to the 
troubles of this community and its fight for rights. This lobby activity is vital in Germany, too. Although 
the Turks of Greece have groups in western Europe, they have settled in immense numbers in the 
Marmara region of Turkey, especially after the beginning of the Greek civil war (1947-1949) during 
which the BTTDD was founded (1946). 
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donations to these associations, they prefer to give them material aid. This support can 
vary from providing a lecture hall for a conference organised by the organisation, 
supporting cultural events such as picnics or festivals, or providing buses for electoral 
tourism in Balkan countries. In Izmit, the municipality established a Cultural Centre of 
Balkans upon the request of local immigrant association (Bal-Türk, 2011, 43). 
Furthermore, the various cultural happenings supported by the local elites helped to 
maintain the identity of the immigrated communities and strengthen their sense of 
‘Balkan history.’ At these events, the presence of traditional folklore groups of these 
communities and guest dancing groups from the Balkans demonstrates Turkishness and 
the regional identity of these communities at the same time.  
This background mainly contributed to the prospering cultural life of these 
göçmen associations. Furthermore, these organisations intended to provide aid for their 
membership, or newcomer immigrants in order to solve their problems with the 
authorities (citizenship, social aid, social security, etc.) and to ease their integration into 
the Turkish society. 
Nurcan-Özgür Baklacıoǧlu identifies two main groups among the associations. 
Immigrants coming from the Western Balkans – thus usually having Bosniak, Albanian, 
Kosovar, Torbeshi ethnic backgrounds – have founded Rumeli associations, while 
others (usually Turks) arriving from Bulgaria and Romania have established Balkan 
organisations (Baklacıoǧlu, 2007, 78). This distinction corresponds to the different 
identities that they have. The first group rather identifies itself in line with a broader 
historical space and emphasises the historical legacy. In their case, the link (usually) to 
Turkey was ‘Ottomanness’, the shared cultural and religious heritage. The path of 
integration to the Turkish society followed the emphasis on this common legacy and the 
acceptance of loyalty towards the state, even if the local identities (Sandjak, Prizren, 
Kosovo, etc.) have survived over time. Strikingly, for instance the Bosniak associations 
protested against the introduction of Bosniak language radio programmes in 2005, 
stating that they should be considered part of the nation and they do not seek any 
minority status. For Bulgarian Turks, the case was different: coming from a highly 
secularised milieu and giving their ‘Turkish’ identity, the emphasis on common 
language and ethnic identity gained more ground than shared (Ottoman) history.  
These differences appear on the agenda of these associations: the so-called 
Rumeli groups are more active in propagating the Ottoman heritage of the Balkans. By 
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doing this, these organisations contribute to the daily practice of neo-Ottoman cultural 
practices focusing on ‘Ottomanness’ closely linked to Islam and the past. 
 
1.3. Portraying the Balkans – the region in the AKP’s rethoric 
 
In this chapter the author makes an attempt to analyse the discourse of Turkish 
foreign policy leaders about the Balkans. By doing this, he intends to portray how is the 
region is described in their speeches, which are its features and what kind of policy is 
articulated.   
Probably the most famous speech is Ahmet Davutoǧlu’s lecture held in Sarajevo 
16 October 2009. He addressed to his audiance at Sarajevo, among his very first 
journeys to the region as a state representative (Davutoǧlu, 2009). The regularly quoted 
speech he gave an overall overview about his concept about the region, about its 
position in space and time, and he also revealed his thought about the special Turkish 
interests.  
 He underlined that there are three main characteristics of the Balkans.First of 
them, that the region is a ‘geopolitical buffer zone’ between Europe, Asia and Africa. 
Secondly and thirdly, Balkans is a geo-economic and cultural meeting point as well. It 
interconnects people, cultures, and economies which grants for it a special situation. 
Following this stream of thought he offered a rather unusual approach to define the 
Balkans’ position: 
 
’Because of this, when we speak of the Balkans, we say it's the periphery of Europe. But is the 
Balkans really a periphery? No. It is the heartland of Africa-Eurasia (Davutoǧlu, 2009).’ 
 
However, he linked this central position to the apogee of the Ottoman Empire. 
As he states: 
‘During the Ottoman times, in the 16th century, the Balkans was at the centre of world politics. 
That was the golden age of the Balkans. This is a historical fact. Who created world policy in the 16th 
century? Your ancestors! They weren't all Turks. Some were of Albanian origina, others were Greek 
converts. Mehmet-pasha Sokolović is a good example. Were it not for the Ottoman Empire, he would 
have been a poor Serb peasant with a small farm or whatever, because they didn't have developed farming 
in this part of the world then. Thanks to the Ottoman state, he became a leader in world politics. Ottoman 
history is Balkans history, in which the Balkans held special importance in the history of the world 
(Davutoǧlu, 2009).’ 
 
According to him, the most emblematic remnants of this era, was Sarajevo 
which has been a  
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‘a miniature of Ottoman heritage. If you don't understand Sarajevo, you cannot understand 
Ottoman history. Sarajevo is the prototype of Ottoman civilization, the template for Balkans ascendant 
(Davutoǧlu, 2009).’ 
 
The foreign minister thought that this region having the above mentioned 
geostrategic, geo-economic and geocultural features, it cannot be a centre but a victim 
of external forces, too. The remedy for the instabilities and problems would be the 
’reunification’ of the region. In his vision, he describes a stronger and more cooperative 
Balkans which can put back again from a peripheral position to the centre. 
 
 ’It all depends on which part of history you look to. From the 15th to the 20th century, the 
history of the Balkans was a history of success. We can have this success again. Through reestablishing 
ownership in the region, through reestablishing multicultural coexistence, and through establishing a new 
economic zone (Davutoǧlu, 2009),’ 
 
As he emphasized, the region’s past could be a key to find patterns to follow in 
order to (re)establish prosperity. Reflecting to the three main characteristics of the 
Balkans, he put these features and the Ottoman heritage as key elements for the future, 
as he stated: 
 
’We desire a new Balkans, based on political values, economic interdependence and cultural 
harmony. That was the Ottoman Balkans. We will restore this Balkans. People call this 'neo-Ottoman'. I 
don't point to the Ottoman state as a foreign policy issue. I emphasize the Ottoman heritage. The Ottoman 
era in the Balkans is a success story. Now it needs to come back…(Davutoǧlu, 2009)’ 
 
As the main keeper of the Ottoman heritage, Turkey has had a special status for 
Balkans: 
‘Turkey is partly a Balkans country, partly a Caucasus country, and partly a Middle Eastern 
country. There are more Bosnians living in Turkey than in Bosnia! There are more Albanians in Turkey 
than in Albania, more Chechens than in Chechnya, more Abkhaz than in Abkhazia. Why? Because of the 
Ottoman heritage. For all these different nations in the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East, Turkey is 
a safe haven, their homeland. You are welcome! Anatolia belongs to you, our brothers and sisters! And 
we are confident that Sarajevo belongs to us! If you wish to come, come! But we want you to be secure 
here, as owners of Sarajevo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. What is happening in Bosnia is our responsibility 
(Davutoǧlu, 2009).’ 
 
For Davutoǧlu, Turkey’s special mission – an active, security-seeking foreign 
policy – was legitimized and justified by three tenets. Firstly, the common historical-
cultural heritage provided Ankara with an explanation why to it had has to be concerned 
by the regional issues. Turkey appeared as a securer and inheritor of the Ottoman 
heritage what it was own responsibility to take care of. Secondly, the acceptance of the 
existence of Bosniak, Albanian or Chechen communities within the border of Turkey – 
which was a break from the traditional nation-state approach perceiving the country as a 
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clearly Turkish state – explained that political elites needed to reflect to the cultural and 
historical affiliations of millions of these people. Turkey, as the last shelter of Balkan 
and Caucasus Muslims had to be aware of its own responsibility and behave as a Kin-
state towards these related communities. And thirdly, he added to these arguments a 
rather normative one: Turkey’s involvement into the regional affairs (’reintegration’) 
should have been accepted and respected because Ankara did everything in order to 
make safer this point of the world and assure the security and peace. 
In his speech, he clearly rejected the ‘Neo-Ottomanism’ which expression, he 
believed, jeopardized this reintegration as it could be threatening by having a territorial 
expansion connotation. The foreign minister stated that Turkey did have not the 
willingness to redraw the Balkans’s countries’ borders, rather the opposite; it intended 
to boost political cooperation, economic prosperity and peaceful cultural exchange.  
To evaluate his speech it is important to note that it was well targeted to the 
audience. Why is it so important to emphasize the Ottoman heritage? Why it is so 
important to deal with the several times mentioned Ottoman heritage if it is already in 
the Balkans and survived hundred years? One can say that people living in the Balkans 
might recognize the great cultural value of these monuments, traditions and they should 
take care of them without having any support of another country. Here the importance 
derives from the people, especially from Balkans Muslims. In Davutoğlu’s view the 
Ottoman period was a constituent interval for these communities as they are the 
remnants, heritage of the Ottoman era. This assumption may be particularly valid in 
case of Bosnia and Bosniaks. For them, one of the most important identity constituent 
elements is their religion, Islam. Their conversion took place during the 15-16th century 
under Ottoman rule, so for them by emphasizing the so-called heritage the scholar-
diplomat grabs their attention by focusing their identity. The message is clear: as their 
identity is strengthened by their religion and history, they will be more cooperative and 
responsive to Turkey. 
In order to understand the deeper geostrategic thinking in the background of the 
lecture, it is compulsory to show the foreign policy’s main source, Ahmet Davutoğlu’s 
famous book Strategic Depth where he determined the Balkans’ position in the Turkish 
foreign policy and Ankara’s strategic interests in the region. When he elaborated in 
2001 the main focus points of the Balkans, he laid particular stress on two countries, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. According to him: 
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‘Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo which directly concern Turkey, are in this conflict zone 
[previous wars like Yugoslav war – author], and they aresituated with great extent in this geopolitical 
vacuum zone and the cleavage line of geocultural confrontation area. The two consisting base axis of 
Balkans’ geopolitics are Drava-Sava axis whose centre is Bosnia and Herzegovina situated between 
Croatia and Serbia, and Morava-Vardar axis with the centre in Kosovo, located between Serbia, 
Macedonia, Bulgaria and partially Greece (Davutoǧu, 2001, 291).’ 
By revealing the Post Cold War developments in the region he stated that three 
main global structural conflicts contributed to the outbreak of wars in Bosnia and 
Kosovo, as 1) the conflict between the United States and Europe/Germany, 2) 
disagreement between the three country groups: United Kingdom/France, Germany and 
Russia, and 3) the transfer of this antagonism to level of international law and 
organizations. Davutoğlu stated that Germany and other Western European powers by 
contributing to the dissolution of Yugoslavia asserted their influence over Eastern 
Europe and the Balkans (Davutoǧlu, 2001, 294). The above mentioned antagonism was 
handled by the Dayton agreement and the previously realized military campaign in 
Croatia granted for Germany to path to Adriatic Sea and for the United States to 
legitimize its presence in the region (Davutoǧlu, 2001, 295). He evaluated the Dayton 
Agreement as not a real solution of the problem just a postponing of the crisis. 
Concerning Kosovo’s issue in 1999, he believed that it stemmed from the change of 
balance of power in the Middle East and the Balkans.  For this time, he distinguished 
two main blocs, an alliance between the United Kingdom, France and Russia against the 
bloc of United States and Germany. The conflict ended by the strengthened position of 
the US due to the NATO’s involvement and the establishment of KFOR.  
Nevertheless, he did not miss to reveal the Balkans own equilibrium either. As 
focusing to intraregional balance of power he believes that Slovenia and Croatia – 
similarly to Austria and Hungary – will approach to Germany and Italy. Serbia 
establishes closer ties with Russia and Greece. As a reaction for this process Albania 
and Macedonia make attempts in order to control it. Romania, taking advantage from 
the Danube, it has a role of bridge between Central Europe and the Black Sea. In this 
matrix, Turkey was preliminarily unprepared to tackle these crises. Due to these 
challenges, it also needed to face its own history and to stay close to intraregional 
balance of power (Davutoǧlu, 2001, 301). Davutoğlu pointed out that the most crucial 
point for the peace in the Balkans was Macedonia which had difficulties with its 
neighbours and with its Albanian minority which constituted measurable proportion of 
the population.  
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As the international rivalries shaped the future of the region, internal 
antagonisms also emerged and (traditional) Serbian-Greek alliance that Bulgaria may 
join due to the presence of Turkish minority in the country may form an axis in the 
Balkans. In this case a Bosniak-Albanian-Turkish alliance may emerge to 
counterbalance the above mentioned bloc. Romania and Serbia because of their 
Hungarian minorities may create an alliance to tackle the Hungarian movements 
(Davutoǧlu, 2001, 302). As he concludes the Drava-Sava line is a Bosniak-Croat-Serb 
geocultural conflict zone, and the Morava-Vardar line give place for Albanian-Serbia-
Macedonian geocultural conflicts which could lead to prospective ethnic tensions and 
conflicts (Davutoǧlu, 2001, 303). 
According to him, comparing Turkey’s current position to the late 19th century’s 
one, a clear decline could be remarked. Other powers, such as Germany and Russia 
managed to keep their influence tangible in the region: Hungary, Croatia and Slovenia 
stayed close to Germany, while Serbs closely cooperated with Russian interests. 
Remaining countries, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece depending on their interests 
intended to join these groups. The United States, which emerged as a third actor in the 
region needed to rely on Bosniaks and Albanians – people who could not be integrated 
into Slavic-Orthodox, or Catholic axis – in order to assure its own position in the 
Balkans and maintain the internal balance of power. Turkey had to cooperate with the 
US in order to accomplish its own goals in the region. 
He argued that Turkey have to tackle the negative, anti-Osman and anti-Turkish 
image created by Greece and Serbia. Davutoğlu stated that ‘Turkey, especially in the 
Balkans, has to create new balance and harmony between internal political culture and 
foreign policy (Davutoǧlu, 2001, 316).’ By claiming a new balance, he refered to the 
need to create an image of a moderate Islam on one hand, and to support Muslims and 
to restore the Ottoman heritage (Davutoǧlu, 2001, 316). When he elaborated the 
elements of this policy, he distinguished five main pillars. Firstly, he emphasized the 
importance of the historical heritage being in the peninsula: ‘...there were two groups 
which supported traditional Ottoman-Turkish Balkan policy: Bosniaks and Albanians 
(Davutoǧlu, 2001, 316).’ According to him, due to their conversion to Islam and their 
above mentioned support, their fate was linked to the Ottoman Empire: 
 ‘When Ottomans were strong, these people gained big influence in the Balkans in name of 
Ottomans, while when the Ottomans were weakening and [the Empire]collapsed they were affected by 
the greatest knocks  (Davutoǧlu, 2001, 316).’ 
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Davutoğlu argued that biggest gain for Turkey was that after the Cold War these 
two people have managed to create in their own countries a new political system which 
was closer to their cultural past than the previous one had been. He has given even 
greater importance for these countries. 
 ˇBosnia and Herzegovina is still Turkey’s political, economic and cultural advanced outpost 
reaching the interior of Central Europe. Albania is as for the barometer of Turkey’s Balkans policy. A 
Turkey which does not support Albania to provide stability and security in the Balkans, it has no 
opportunity to possess a permanent influence in the region [Davutoǧlu, 2001, 317).’  
 
At this point he compared Albania to Azerbaijan concerning the two countries 
impact for Adriatic and Caspian Sea, respectively. He argued that these people were the 
most important means for Turkey to influence the Balkans, as he highlighted: 
 ‘The belt starting from Northwest, with the Bihac–Central-Bosnia–Eastern-Bosnia–Sandjak–
Kosovo–Albania–Macedonia–Kırcaali–Western-Thrace’s line reaching Eastern-Thrace is characterized as 
Turkey’s in terms of Balkans geopolitical and geocultural life vein (Davutoǧlu, 2001, 317).’ 
 
Certainly, the Yugoslav war caused huge number military and civilian 
casualties. Massacres done by Serbs in Eastern Bosnia and in Sandjak also contributed 
to the depopulation of Muslim inhabited regions. All in all, these killings and ethnic 
cleansing cut the afermentionned line.  
Reflecting to strategic thinking, he put Kosovo’s position to the strategic centre 
of this zone: it interconnected the Bosnia-Sandjak axis with the Macedonia-Albania 
axis. Davutoğlu concluded that helping these communities to live in this ‘belt zone’ by 
providing them security, conserving their cultural treasure, strengthening their economic 
and social infrastructure and establishing communication between them would grant a 
strong position for Turkey in time of peace and conflict over the region (Davutoǧlu, 
2001, 318). 
Secondly, he underlined the interregional dependency (bölgelerarası bağımlılık) 
as an important pillar of foreign policy. According to him, the fact that Turkey reaches 
the Caucasus, Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, it yielded the country a huge 
strategic advantage compared to other countries of Balkans. Having a flexible and 
multi-dimensional diplomacy, Turkey became able to benefit from its unique 
geopolitical position. 
Thirdly, he pointed out that Turkey had to closely follow the intraregional 
balance and used a flexible diplomacy to adapt to it (Davutoǧlu, 2001, 319). He outlined 
three country groups following concentric circles graviting to Kosovo. The first group 
was composed from Albania, Kosovo (by this time, still part of Serbia) and Macedonia. 
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The second one was constituted from Greece, Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), 
Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Turkey. The third grouping refered to the 
neighboring countries which were able to influence the intraregional dynamics and 
intervene into regional issues: Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary and Romania. Dealing with 
the challenge affecting these groups, he revealed that ‘The first group’s most sensitive 
point is the relation between Macedonia and Albania.’ In this circumstances Turkey 
needed to improve the bilateral relations and also seek to influence Macedonia in order 
to grant the most possible citizenship rights for Albanian minority (Davutoǧlu, 2001, 
20). Concerning the second grouping, ‘...the most basic aim to prevent Bulgaria to 
create with a Serbian and Greek alliance an anti-Turkey regional alliance (Davutoǧlu, 
2001, 320)’. According to him, in order to tackle the third group, Turkey needed to 
increase the level of contact and needed to establish better communication, especially 
with Romania due to economic reasons, and in a prospective crisis, it needed to keep 
opened the traffic and trade on the Danube.  
Fourthly, he emphasized the importance of common and own projects and 
organisations such as Balkan Summit and Southeast European Platform. Furthermore, 
he suggested that in order to preserve the region’s cultural heritage (especially the 
Ottoman-Turkish heritage, hit the most during conflicts) to establish a ‘Balkan 
UNESCO’ as well (Davutoǧlu, 2001, 321). 
Fifthly, he pointed out the ‘global strategic tools’ such as NATO or Islam 
Conference Organisation could be helpful for Turkey in order to boost its influence all 
around the region. According to him, Turkey may bring to the Islam Conference 
Organisation its problems in the Balkans but not as Islam-Ottoman issue but rather an 
Islamic World problem (Davutoǧlu, 2001, 321). 
Davutoğlu described the international dynamics through a realist approach. 
According to this opinion, the traditional balance of power and great powers’ rivalry 
have determined the development of the last decade(s). From this point of view, 
Balkans was rather defenceless and passive beholder of these events and it is considered 
as a victim of external forces. Turkey seeking to influence these conflicts was rather a 
weak actor with limited efficiency. It had to re-evaluate its position, although for the 
prospective future, as Davutoğlu notes Ankara shall focus more on its identity and 
cultural heritage to determine its interests and opportunities in the region. 
In his book, he presented Turkey’s foreign policy by emphasizing the 
importance to regional balance of power which may be perceived as a rather defensive 
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and status quo seeking foreign policy. In this respect, the academic scholar does follow 
the traditional Turkish foreign policy goals in the Balkans. 
Nevertheless, the tenets varied. He did not refer just on countries but on 
communities, too. He hinted on Muslims, but usually on Bosniaks and Albanians. He 
determined a ‘belt’ of strategic importance from Bihać to Eastern Thrace, which was an 
axis of various Muslim people like Bosniaks in Bosnia, Bosniaks living in the Sandjak, 
Muslim Albanians in Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia, and he also mentioned Turks. 
However, he followed the realist approach and he rather focused on two countries, 
Bosnia and Albania (and partly on Kosovo, because by this time the republic was not 
independent), as they were the geostrategic centres of the region. The tools to 
‘legitimize’ Turkey’s interest towards these two countries were the religion, the 
common history and culture (Ottoman heritage). 
Davutoğlu refered several times to minority issues, especially Bosniaks 
(Sandjak) and Albanians (Kosovo and Macedonia) but he did not mention Turkish 
minority (or other Muslim groups such as Torbeshes or Pomaks) just twice. A weak 
reference to them was Kırcaali, traditionally the only Turkish inhabited county in South 
Bulgaria where Turks were in majority. The lack of reference to them also made a 
hiatus for the geostrategical division of the Balkans, as Davutoğlu did not mention the 
historically important North-South ‘axis’ from the Danube to Istanbul, coming from 
Dobrudja passing by Northeast Bulgaria and reaching Eastern Thrace trough Edirne. 
The absence of this axis was also problematic because early Turkish settlement policies 
were focused on the installation of Turkic tribes in these regions, especially in 
Deliorman in order to assure the stability at the Danube zone and the terrestrial 
connection between Ruse/Varna and Edirne/Istanbul.  Later in the 19th century, Tatar 
and other Muslim refugees from the Black Sea region also were settled in great number 
in Dobrudja and Eastern Bulgaria as well. 
The negligence of the Turkish minority and the emphasis on the importance of 
other Muslim groups especially Bosniaks and Albanians places the Turkish kin policy 
on a much broader base. According to his book, although the preservation of minorities 
(so Turkish groups as well) was a key factor in order to preserve the peace in the region 
itself, but he extended the culturally-historically relevant kin communities’ definition 
from a given ethnic one to a broader religious one. That was why not just Turks but 
Albanians and Bosniaks could have been considered as ‘brothers and sisters.’ 
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Davutoğlu has refered in several speeches to this kinship. For instance, at the 
end of August 2011, Davutoğlu made his Eid payer in Sarajevo. By this time, he met 
with with Mustafa Ceriç the then Chief Mufti of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bakir 
Izetbegoviç. After visiting the tomb of Aliya Izetbegoviç, he stated: 
 ‘I am very happy to celebrate with my Bosniak brothers. Allah renders this celebration as a 
delight opportunity for Turkey, for brothers being in Turkey, for all brothers being in Bosnia and the 
Balkans, for Islamic world.’ Later he added ‘in our tradition, we celebrate together with our family. Me 
too, I came to Sarajevo as to my house with my family to celebrate. [...] Bosniaks are our family 
(Davutoǧlu, 2011a).’ 
 
Also in 2011, during his visit in Mamuşa, Kosovo he emphasized again the 
brotherhood and kinship: 
Kosovo is our homeland like our own homeland. People of Mamuşa are our own family. You are 
like our Anatolia’s own children in our heart. […] Kosovo looks like a state of 3 years, but for us, it is a 
622 old state (Davutoǧlu, 2011b). 
 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan also made references to kinship in several speeches, as 
he used often the „brother” expression. However, in his famous speeches he usually 
used this kinship for the communities of a broader geographical area, not just to the 
Balkans but for the Middle East as well. After the AKP`s landsline parliamentary 
election victory in 2011, he stated: 
‘Believe me, Sarajevo won today as much as Istanbul, Beirut won as much as Izmir, Damascus 
won as much as Ankara, Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin, the West Bank, Jerusalem won as much as Diyarbakir 
(Erdoǧan, 2011).’ 
 
After getting the most votes in the local election 30 March 2014, he also 
reflected to the related communities in a similar manner:  
‘I wholeheartedly greet our 81 provinces as well as sister and friendly capitals and cities of the 
world from Ankara, from the AK Party headquarters. I’ve just addressed via teleconference thousands of 
people who gathered in Skopje Square. They were sharing the joy you have here in freezing weather.  I 
first want to express my absolute gratitude to my God for such a victory and a meaningful result. I thank 
my friends and brothers all over the world who prayed for our victory. I thank my brothers in Palestine 
who saw our victory as their victory. I thank my brothers in Egypt who are struggling for democracy and 
who understand our struggle very well. I thank my brothers in the Balkans, in Bosnia, in Macedonia, in 
Kosovo and in all cities in Europe who celebrate our victory with the same joy we have here. I thank my 
suffering brothers in Syria who pray for our victory although in a great pain, facing starvation and under 
bombs and bullets (Erdoǧan, 2014).’ 
 
During the above mentionned teleconference he refered again the brotherhod 
being between Turkey and Macedonia (Albanians, Macedonians and Turks). In October 
2013, he also used this concept in a speech being held in Prizren, Kosovo: ‘We all 
belong to a common history, common culture, common civilization; we are the people 
who are brethren of that structure. Do not forget, Turkey is Kosovo, Kosovo is Turkey!” 
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(Erdogan, 2013). Stating that `Turkey is Kosovo, Kosovo is Turkey!` led to a minor 
international scandal, the Serbian leadership in that case has reacted sensitively. 
Tomislav Nikolić, Serbian president of republic harshly condemned the speech.  
While Turkish opinion leaders take part in identity making by their discourse, 
they also explained Turkey`s involvement into regional issues by reminding to the 
security aspects. Davutoğlu`s famous Sarajevo speech was already an example for that, 
but in other lectures he also revealed this aspect.  
In a lecture, at the Institute of International and European Affairs, to emphasize 
the importance of Bosnia for Turkey, he said:  
’If there is a crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina, when there was crisis, for many people in the 
centre of Europe it was important, but for Turks all the Bosnian turned their face to Istanbul and to 
Ankara and said: Help us! and thousands of them came us refugees to Turkey. Aliya Izetbegović the first 
thing he did, he called our president and our people. Whenever there is a crisis in the Balkans we have a 
refugee camp in at Edirne which is a barometer. If you want to understand how things are going to 
Balkans look at the refugee camp. Because if there is a crisis in Bosnia all of the people staying there are 
Bosniaks, if there is in Kosovo, all of them are Albanians, in Macedonia all are Macedonians. Why? 
Because in Turkey we have more Bosniaks than in Bosnia, more Albanians than in Albania... (Davutoǧlu, 
2010)’ 
 
Erdoğan also emphasized the importance of peace and stability, for instance in a 
speech held in Sarajevo, 2010, he stated: ‘Without providing peace and stability in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, there can be no peace and stability in the Balkans (Today 
Zaman, 07/04/2010).’ 
In 2011, Davutoğlu summarised the main tenets of Turkish foreign policy 
towards the region: 
Being herself a Balkan country, Turkey is committed to being a force for peace, stability and 
wellfare in our common neighborhood. We are pursuing a foreign policy fashioned around the vision of 
averting crisis, developing a sense of ownership of regional problems, promoting dialogue and mutual 
confidence, and giving everyone a stake in cooperating with each other. I must add that regional 
cooperation and partnership schemes also serve as potent vehicles in achieving these goals. They help us 
transcend borders, build a larger sense of belonging and create a more secure area of 
interaction (Davutoǧlu, 2010b). 
 
To conclude, Turkish leadership looks at the Balkans as a region having strong 
Ottoman legacy and based on the shared history, culture and religion (Islam). The 
statement about belonging the Muslim inhabited territories highlights the mentality and 
the vision how the region is perceived in Ankara. This constituting legacy triggers the 
Turkish activities to defend it especially the Muslims who have no international 
protector. Simoultaneously, decision-makers believe that their country makes the region 
more stable, balanced and by strengthening the cooperation between various Balkan 
states may enforce peace and economic prosperity. 
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2. Co-opting the Kin: Neo-Ottomanist features of 
the foreign policy 
2.1. Main patterns in Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans until 2002 
 
The loss of enormous parts of its territory in the Balkan Peninsula by the end of 
the first Balkan War (1912) caused a huge tragedy for the Ottoman elite and 
intellectuals. Symbolising the last chapter of a century-long decline, the Empire had to 
give up millions of Muslim subjects as well as nearly the whole Balkans, considered as 
core territories for over five hundred years. The immediate consequence of the 
territorial changes resulted in mass immigration of Muslims into the Ottoman Empire, 
to Anatolia.46 Simultaneously, this change particularly affected the Young Turks 
because the movement’s strongholds laid in the Balkans, and the majority of their 
members originated from the region. Thessaloniki or Selanik, the birthplace of Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk, also hosted the first conference of the Committee of Union and Progress 
after the successful coup d’état in 1908. Basically, the Balkans represented the reformist 
part of the Empire.  
Ottoman intellectuals perceived the disastrous Balkan Wars (especially the first 
one, in 1912-1913) as a humiliation. Small Balkan countries were able to quickly 
overcome the Ottoman army and even threaten Istanbul. Furthermore, these states were 
recently the periphery of an immense empire: it was even more frustrating for the 
Ottomans that they had not been defeated by Great Powers but rather by minor states 
(Boyar, 2007, 78.). As Yusuf Akçura, a leading intellectual wrote about the war: ‘We 
were driven out by our former shepherds and servants’ (Boyar, 2007, 79).  
The new Turkish Republic founded on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire accepted 
the status quo in the Balkans. The acceptance of that policy was facilitated by various 
treaties concluded with Balkan states. Additionally, Turkey and the Balkans states’ 
willingness resulted in various settlement agreements supporting the immigration of 
hundreds of thousands of Turks, Albanians and Bosniaks into Turkey.47 Ankara wanted 
to recover from the huge loss of population after the long-running and exhausting wars 
                                                          
46 This immigration created the base of a huge immigrant community in Turkey. See more about the 
demographic consequences of these wars: McCarthy, 1996; Turan, 1998; Ağanoğlu, 2001. 
47 The number of immigrants between the two World Wars varies between 410-450 thousand. See more: 
Duman, 2009. 
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(1911-1923) by accommodating Muslim immigrants (see later) from the peninsula 
while Balkan countries attempted to create homogenous nation-states. 
However, Turkish embassies keenly followed the southeast European states’ 
attempts to convert Muslims after the retreat. For Ankara, maintaining a Turkish 
cultural presence in the region was an important goal that had to be supported by 
providing funds. Due to this cultural heritage, Islam also played a major role as a 
cornerstone of Turkish culture and the main obstacle to assimilation in the new Balkan 
states. Even Yașar Nabi, a prominent writer in the early republican period who strongly 
propagated the need for a secular state recognised that religion was the core element of 
the resistance against the assimilation policies (Boyar, 2007, 139). 
From the very beginning, Ankara wanted to maintain peace in the Balkans, a 
behaviour which differed from that of other losers of World War I in the region such as 
Bulgaria. In spite of articulating a revisionist policy in order to regain the lost territories, 
Turkey endeavoured to establish close relations with the neighbouring countries. 
Turkish diplomats made efforts to mend fences with the other states and create a new 
image of a Turkey that was committed to creating a coalition of like-minded states 
rather than revive the Ottoman domination (Balkas, 2005, 444). 
The emergence of Mussolini’s Italy as a threat to the region between the two 
World Wars also facilitated the rapprochement of the Balkan countries and mobilised 
the Turkish foreign policy’s forces (Oran, 2010, 151, Balkas, 2005, 444-447). Even the 
idea of the ‘Balkan entente’ could appear in the Turkish diplomacy for the first time, as 
Hüseyin Ragıp Baydur, a diplomat, presented the issue to the Romanian foreign 
minister in 1926 (Balkas, 2005, 444).  The fact that Atatürk’s Turkey became the engine 
of that project was rooted mainly in the security dimension: the Lausanne Treaty created 
a demilitarised zone in western Thrace and in the Straits region, which made the 
defence of the western border extremely difficult (Türkeș, 1994, 130). 
Due to the similar security considerations in the shadow of a more and more 
irredentist and aggressive Italy, Greece and Turkey engaged one another to create a 
close cooperation and to dismiss the prospective mutual threats.48 Ankara wanted to 
extend this process and it made various attempts to ensure the existing status quo by 
involving the other countries of the peninsula. Thanks to these efforts, in February 1934 
                                                          
48 In 1930 Greek Prime Minister Venizelos signed a Treaty of Friendship, Arbitration and Conciliation 
which was followed by various visits from both sides. In 1933 the two countries signed an Entente 
Cordiale. 
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Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania and Turkey signed the Balkan Pact, which included the 
suspension of territorial claims and the strengthening of the current order in the 
peninsula against Bulgaria and Italy (Türkeș, 1994, 139).  
Despite the initiative’s original aim, the Pact could not create a stable regional 
defence system because some countries such as Bulgaria refused to join the group. In 
1937, Yugoslavia unilaterally signed a treaty of amity with Bulgaria and Italy, thereby 
irritating Greece and sowing distrust within the alliance; Turkey made some attempts to 
appease the members without any major success (Degerli, 2009, 144). A few years after 
the ceremonial signing, the Balkan Pact fell apart due to the Italian and German 
invasions. Greece and Yugoslavia were easily occupied in 1941, while Albania fell 
already in 1939. Turkey was able to avoid direct involvement in World War II (at least 
until 1945 when it became clear that the US-USSR-led collation would win), and it had 
to balance between the Axis and the Allied Powers. 
During these decades, successive Turkish governments intended to influence the 
domestic public opinion about Balkan countries in line with their foreign policy 
interests. For example, due to the rapprochement with Greece in the 1930s, the number 
of anti-Greek articles decreased in Turkish newspapers (especially compared to the 
1920s), while anti-Bulgarian statements and allegations of the oppression of the Turkish 
minority in Bulgaria remained high on the agenda. Later, when the circumstances 
changed, Turkish decision-makers decided to ban some critical writings: in 1937, upon 
the request of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Halil Yaver’s book entitled Nereye 
Gidiyorsun Türkiye? (Turkey, Where are You Going?) was banned based on the claim 
that it contained derogatory statements against the current ally, Yugoslavia. On another 
occasion in 1943, an anti-Bulgarian book, Bulgarya’daki 1,300,000 Türk (1,300,000 
Turks in Bulgaria) was also prohibited from circulation (Boyar, 2007, 83). 
After 1945, Ankara had to face the polarisation of world politics and the 
emergence of the Iron Curtain. The possible Soviet threats concerning the eastern 
provinces and the status of the Straits pushed Turkey into the Western bloc. By creating 
closer ties with the West, accepting the Marshall aid (1947) and joining NATO (1952), 
Turkey became a trusted ally of the US, especially in the period of the Menderes 
governments (1950-1960). 
Concerning the Balkans, Ankara had to react to the emergence of the bloc-
system in the peninsula which overwrote the previous Balkan balance of power and 
decreased the room for manoeuvre. The 2nd Balkan Pact was the only palpable attempt 
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to create a local ‘bloc’ to counter-balance the possible Soviet expansion – the security 
dimension of which is obvious from the Turkish point of view. The signing of this Pact 
occurred due to the Soviet-Yugoslav confrontation of the time and the friendly relations 
between Turkey and Greece. Furthermore, the Turkish-Yugoslav rapprochement was 
followed by the signature of a settlement law making possible the immigration of some 
150,000 people to Turkey. However, the Pact ended just a short while later. Stalin had 
died in March 1953, which created a new political atmosphere for Tito’s Yugoslavia 
trying to approach Moscow. The Cyprus-problem after 1955 led to a deterioration of 
relations between Athens and Ankara, which made further cooperation impossible 
(Uzgal, 2010a, 626). 
From the second half of the 1950s onwards, Turkey had even more limited room 
for manoeuvre in the peninsula. Nevertheless, in the mid-1960s Turkey turned again to 
the Balkans in order to balance Greece’s influence and gain the neighbour countries’ 
support for the Cyprus issue. In 1965, only the highly isolated Albania responded to this 
attempt by voting in favour of Turkey in the UN General Assembly on the Cyprus 
question. During the following years, Turkey intended to create closer relations with 
Romania, Yugoslavia and, albeit with less success, with Bulgaria (Uzgal, 2010a, 627). 
The problem of minority issues and growing nationalism emerged again in the 
1980s which forced Ankara to act. The relative peace of the region was disturbed by the 
forced assimilation policy of the Zhivkov regime in Bulgaria which was based 1) on 
acquiring legitimacy for the communist system despite facing growing economic 
difficulties; and 2) the possible threat posed by the Turkish minority in the eyes of the 
Bulgarian leadership, who considered the Turks as the ‘fifth column’ of Ankara. The 
‘revival campaign’ took place during the winter of 1984-85 when hundreds of 
thousands of Turks’ names were changed from Muslim to Bulgarian ones. This process, 
which officially ended with the total Bulgarisation of the country, galvanised mass 
Turkish resistance and armed clashes in the Turkish-inhabited regions (especially in 
southern Bulgaria). Ankara protested at various international forums against the 
assimilation policy of Sofia in 1984-85, but with minimal impact. Finally Ankara had 
no other choice but to follow the previous policy to ‘solve the minority problems’ by 
accepting huge numbers of immigrants as in 1950-51, or during the 1970s. 
In 1989, when Turkish protests and clashes started to spread again in the 
country, Zhivkov decided to permit the Turks to leave the country. After his famous 
radio speech, in which he stated that Turks could leave the country if Turkey opened its 
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borders,49  325-350,000 Turks left the country between May and August. By the end of 
the summer, Ankara closed its borders in order to avoid the looming humanitarian 
catastrophe because of its difficulties to provide accommodation and food for the 
immigrants. 
The collapse of the communist system in 1989-1990 created a new situation in 
the region. This change was followed by two general trends, namely increasing 
nationalism and economic downturn in every country of the region. The end of the Cold 
War also created a relative power vacuum as the Soviet Union ceased to exist, and the 
European Union (or the new Germany) was not ready to fill this vacuum (the 
Yugoslavian War clearly demonstrated the weakness of the Union). Furthermore, the 
United States did not have a special interest in the Balkans. 
The transition of post-communist countries to a democratic and capitalist system 
created the opportunity for Turkey to be involved in the Balkans again. Cycles of 
continuity can be perceived in Turkish diplomacy towards the region during the post-
communist era. Three separate cycles can be distinguised between 1990-1998, 1999-
2002 and 2003-2008, respectively (see: Türkeș, 2008). These cycles were linked to an 
active leader in the Turkish foreign policy who intended to open towards the Balkan 
countries. These attempts were disturbed by wars or change in the internal politics 
which prevented Ankara from upholding its (growing) involvement. Whenever the 
conditions for a new activist foreign policy were suitable, Turkey started to become 
more active in Balkan politics and economies. 
The first ‘cycle’ was linked to the dawn of the new era. Turgut Özal, the popular 
Turkish president of that time announced the slogan of ‘Adriyatik’ten Çin Seddi’ne’ 
(From the Adriatic to the Chinese Wall) which briefly summarised the new engagement 
of Turkish foreign policy around the globe.50 During that period new treaties were 
signed between Balkan states (Bulgaria, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, etc.) and 
Turkey. The security aspect was of course not lacking among the reasons for these 
agreements, especially in the case of Bulgaria (Türkeș, 2002, 194). The military and 
security agreements dominated the beginning of the period. Ankara signed military 
agreement with Bulgaria boosting the security of eastern Thrace and the Straits. Ankara 
                                                          
49 This statement was euphemistic because of the fact that Bulgarian citizens were not to permitted to 
leave the country to Turkey. That is why the Turkish Prime Minister, Turgut Özal stated that his country’s 
borders were always open. 
50 Other famous slogans, such as ’Turkey cannot be prisoner of the Misak-i Milli (National Pact) borders’ 
also highlight this change in the Turkish foreign policy and the willingness to benefit from the changes of 
geostrategic circumstances. 
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also entered in military cooperation with Albania by signing. Turkey also did not 
hesitate to sign these agreements with the newly independent Western Balkan countries. 
(Uzgal, 2001, 50-55). 
In line with these agreements, Turkey also intended to assure the stability in the 
Balkans, especially after the collapse of Yugoslavia. Although at the very beginning of 
the conflict, Ankara supported the integrity of the country (Uzgal, 2010b, 823), later it 
had to reconsider its stance and began to favour dissolution. In 1992, at the Helsinki 
Summit of the CSCE, the then Prime Minister, Süleyman Demiral attempted to 
convince the Central Asian Turkic Republics and Azerbaijan to support the Bosnian 
government and also negotiated with President Bush to launch a military intervention 
(Hale, 2013, 203). Later in 1992, Ankara even proposed an ‘Action Plan’ for the UN 
Security Council to solve the conflict. In the case of Bosnia, Turkey constantly insisted 
on the necessity of multilateral intervention (Türkeș, 2008, 11), and Ankara made 
efforts to draw international attention to the situation of Bosniaks (Hale, 2013, 202), 
while it also provided arms to Bosnians in the last phase of the war. Within the 
framework of the UN special forces (UNPROFOR), it sent 1,500 troops to the 
peacekeeping forces as well as contributed to the training of Bosnian officers with the 
prospect of strengthening regional stability (Uzgal, 2001, 53). 
This commitment to multilateral intervention did not prevent the Turkish 
political circles, especially the Islamist and ultra-nationalist parties, from playing the 
‘Bosniak card’. Public opinion favoured the Muslim population and considered the war 
and massacres in Bosnia as the same plight that occurred in the 19th and early 20th 
centuries in the Balkans with Muslims (Hale, 2013, 202). During the Yugoslavian 
conflict – at least rhetorically – Turkish leaders declared that Bosnia would not be a 
‘new Andalusia’ and they ‘used’ the issue in domestic affairs to gain popularity, e. g. 
Tansu Çiller visited Bosnia during his electoral campaign. Turkish public opinion was 
shocked by the Srebrenica massacre against Bosniaks by Serbian forces in July 1995.  
Despite these wise diplomatic efforts, from the beginning of Turgut Özal’s 
presidency until the mid-1990s Turkish foreign policy was interpreted as neo-
Ottomanist, with the intention of reinstating Turkish leverage throughout the region (in 
former Ottoman territories) and even to create a “green belt” based on Muslim countries 
(or countries having sizable Muslim populations). This belt would have consisted of 
Bosnia (the Bosnian-Croatian Federation), Albania, Macedonia and Turkey – and in 
order to link these states it needed the Sandjaks of Serbia and Kosovo as well. 
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Ismail Cem, foreign minister (1997-2002) intended to disperse these suspicions 
and create closer relations with other countries influencing the region, especially with 
Greece. By using a more flexible diplomacy (a recurring expression in Davutoǧlu’s 
vocabulary) and rapprochement with the neighbours, he managed to undertake 
spectacular achievements on the rugged way towards accession to the European Union. 
Apart from the new wave of rapprochement, Turkey retained its policy towards 
the crisis in the region. Like his predecessors during the first years of the 1990s, Ismail 
Cem also intended to prevent the escalation of wars or crises through international 
cooperation. After the famous collapse of Ponzi scheme in Albania (1997), he also sent 
troops for peacekeeping.  Similarly to the Bosniak case at the beginning of the Kosovo 
crisis, the Turkish leadership avoided openly expressing its commitment. It even saw 
this as a dangerous precedent for further disintegration in the Balkans, especially in 
Macedonia (Hale, 2013, 204). Later it became active due to the changes of Turkish 
public opinion and the willingness to become involved in the final settlement (Gangloff, 
2004). In that case too, the most important aim for Ankara was to ensure the security of 
the region. Ismail Cem visited Belgrade in March 1998, while Süleyman Demirel, the 
President of Turkey also emphasised the necessity of peace between Albanians and 
Serbs. The Turkish involvement in the conflict also resulted in sending F-16 fighters for 
the operation. Around 8,000 refugees were hosted by the country and it also sent 
material aid for those fleeing Albania. After July 1999, Ankara once again sent some 
1,000 troops to Kosovo as part of the KFOR peacekeeping mission.
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2.2. Foreign policy of co-option  
 
After analysing the AKP’s leadership discourse about the Balkans, it can be 
concluded that the region is usually referred as part of an Ottoman legacy where Turkey 
has a duty to defend its heritage including Muslim people and the common history; the 
proximity and strong cultural/identity ties compelled the country to play a more active 
role in shaping the fate of southeast Europe.  
For this reason, it is more surprising that in the AKP’s rhetoric, the so-called 
religious kin became more important compared to the ethnic kin, even if in some cases 
Turkish parties or their politicians eventually received strong support from Ankara. The 
case of Bosniaks and Bosnia highlight this feature of the AKP’s policy. Although 
Bosnia’s importance for Turkey and especially for the religious communities increased 
during the 1992-1995 war and Ankara tried to play an active role in supporting the 
religious kin, AKP put even more emphasis on this state and started to actively use this 
in domestic political discourse.  
As Ahmet Davutoǧlu suggested in the book entitled ‘Strategic Depth’, Turkey 
started to increasingly focus on Bosnia and Herzegovina and also on Kosovo and 
Macedonia, especially after 2009. The frequent visits to these countries and the regular 
references in domestic discourse to the historical sites located in these states, as well as 
diplomatic support in regional and international issues, coined the AKP’s activism in 
the Balkans at the political level, while economic cooperation was also brought into the 
agenda (see later).  
Turkey was among the first states that recognised Kosovo’s independence in 
February 2008, and later signed a number of agreements with the new country. Turkish 
diplomatic support was also demonstrated in the case of Macedonia, which could count 
on Ankara even during the 1990s to counterbalance Athens (Turkey is the only NATO 
member state which recognises FYROM as Macedonia).  
Turkish commitment to its kin is clearly visible in the case of Bosnia. Davutoǧlu 
launched the ‘Friends of Bosnia’ group in 2010 and established a trilateral mechanism 
between Turkey-Bosnia and Herzegovina-Serbia which aimed to strengthen the 
cooperation between the three states and solve several problems. One of the foreign 
minister’s main successes was the declaration about Srebrenica. When Croatia initiated 
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its own trilateral mechanism, Turkey was ready to join and boost good relations 
between Zagreb and Sarajevo.51 
The foreign minister’s trilateral mechanism initiated in October 2009 has grown 
from simple meetings of foreign ministers to presidential and economic summits 
encompassing substantial political and economic dimensions. After his nomination to 
the ministerial post, Davutoǧlu made enormous efforts to launch the mechanism. Before 
reaching the presidential level (summit in April 2010), he met his Serbian and Bosnian 
counterparts five times (see Table 7.). His efforts to revitalise the diplomatic relations 
were successful: Belgrade presented an agreement to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
ambassador, while the Serbian National Assembly passed the resolution condemning 
the Srebrenica massacre as a ‘crime.’ The rapprochement between these countries was 
also galvanised by Recep Tayyip Erdoǧan’s prime ministerial visit to Belgrade, the first 
in 23 years (Pavlović, 2016, 20). 
 
Date of Summit Place Participants 
10/10/2009 Istanbul foreign ministers 
08/11/2009 Ankara foreign ministers 
14/12/2009 Sarajevo foreign ministers 
15/01/2010 Belgrade foreign ministers 
09/02/2010 Ankara foreign ministers 
24/04/2010 Istanbul presidential/foreign ministers summit 
26/04/2011 Karadjordjevo presidential summit 
11/04/2013  economic ministers 
14-15/05/2013 Ankara integration into EU structures, 
cooperation 
24/09/2013 New York foreign ministers 
23/09/2014 New York foreign ministers 
18/08/2015  economy ministers 
19/10/2015 Belgrade Trilateral Trade Committees 
23/09/2016 New York meeting on the margin of the UN General 
Assembly 
21/09/2016 New York meeting on the margin of the UN General 
Assembly 
26/10/2016 Istanbul trade committee 
06/12/2017 Belgrade foreign minister level 
29/01/2018 Belgrade regional cooperation and investment 
Table 7. Turkey-Bosnia and Herzegovina-Serbia trilateral consultation 
mechanism’s summits (2009-2018) Source: own research, MFA 
 
                                                          
51 Seven meetings were organised within the framework of Croatia-Bosnia-Herzegovina-Turkey trilateral 
mechanism. As it was initiated by Croatia, the summits between foreign ministers ceased after its 
accession to the EU in 2013.  
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The first presidential trilateral consultation was held in Istanbul on 24th April 
2010 with the participation of head of states of Turkey, Serbia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the respective foreign ministers. The Istanbul Declaration adopted 
after the summit underlined the importance of cooperation and its enlargement toward 
new fields such as economy, environmental protection, etc., while the leaders also 
agreed to participate in the 15th anniversary commemoration event of the Srebrenica 
massacre. 
The summits were useful forums to entrust political cooperation between these 
countries even if it has remained fragile. Furthermore, the trilateral mechanism has been 
enlarged to the economic field as well (see later), that offered palpable and mutually 
beneficial economic cooperation for the three sides. 
The short history of the trilateral mechanism demonstrated the difficulties and 
the weaknesses of the initiative. Political and diplomatic frictions between the three 
participatory states overshadowed the summits, especially at the presidential level. The 
first crisis emerged after the election of the head of the nationalist party, President 
Tomislav Nikolić of Serbia in March 2012. His statement about the ‘crime’ in 
Srebrenica caused mistrust in Sarajevo for Bosniaks, while Erdoǧan’s statement about 
his promise to Aliya Izetbegović to protect Bosnia and Herzegovina also sowed discord 
among Serbs and Croats. All in all, the summit had to be postponed, officially due to 
Nikolić’s overbooked schedule (Pavlović, 2016, 27). 
The next crisis occurred after Erdoǧan’s famous statement in Kosovo that 
‘Turkey is Kosovo, and Kosovo is Turkey’ on 23rd October 2013. In reciprocity, 
Serbian President Tomislav Nikolić cancelled his participation in the next trilateral 
meeting, and in the upcoming years the mechanism missed several high-level summits. 
In 2014, the common Turkish-Bosnian naval military exercise in Neum (a 
Bosnian port) was cancelled due to the pressure of Croatian and Serbian deputies 
because they perceived the participation of the Turkish ship Mehmed Mustafa Sokollu 
as a sign of a threatening neo-Ottomanist manoeuvre (later Ankara withdrew from the 
exercise). Linked to this incident, anti-Turkish sentiments were further heightened by 
some news as well, such as in 2014 when various websites published a statement 
attributed to Erdoǧan saying that "100 million Turks will defend the Bosniaks if 
anybody touches them” and that “Turkish warships will sail into Neum". The reaction 
of the Bosnian Serb Milorad Dodik, President of Republika Srpska, was harsh and he 
condemned the Turkish president’s worlds as "a plain and brutal attack of the top 
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official of the Republic of Turkey against the peace and stability in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina". Later on he visited Belgrade in order to meet with the Prime Minister and 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. Turkish ambassadors delegated to Sarajevo and Belgrade 
assured the politicians that the news was false (Balkaneu, 15/07/2014). The issue was 
settled, but it highlighted the prevailing anti-Turkish sentiments in the region, especially 
in Republika Srpska. 
Furthermore, structural problems also weaken the effectiveness of the 
mechanism. Republika Srpska is seemingly excluded from the cooperation. Only one 
high-level summit (in Karadjordjevo in 2012) was held in presence of the presidential 
trio of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Later on, only Bosnian politician Bakir Izetbegović 
participated in the summits. His constant participation also raised eyebrows in 
Republika Srpska where the Turkish initiative was usually perceived as a threatening 
act, and even Belgrade was criticised by Banja Luka for entering into this kind of 
partnership with Turkey.  
The existing mistrust was fuelled further by the statements of the Turkish 
leadership. Erdoǧan emphasised several times that Aliya Izetbegović asked him to 
protect Bosniaks after his death. Even if this conversation’s authenticity can be 
questioned, its use to send a strong political message to the Turkish electorate is 
obvious. Furthermore, the Turkish president’s good relationship with Aliya 
Izetbegović’s son, Bakir Izetbegović demonstrates the two leaders’ politically beneficial 
cooperation which alienates the Serbian side even if Ankara emphasises its commitment 
to the integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. To evaluate the mechanism, one can see that 
Turkey rather uses it to strengthen Bosnia and Herzegovina’s regional role and support 
the Bosniak side in the domestic politics. 
The kin-state mentality towards the religious kin also prevails in the support 
towards Muslim communities. As Table 6. shows, depending on their share and number 
within the total population, the Muslim communities possess various educational, 
religious rights and organisational structures. Turkey was ready to help these 
communities even during the 1990s, nevertheless the AKP intended to strengthen this 
support and increase its activism. A palpable test for Turkey’s power projection is its 
involvement in the internal dispute between Serbia’s two muftis and its mediation 
between Muammer Zukorlić and Adem Zilkić. Although Davutoǧlu was enthusiastic 
about the project, he was not able to settle the internal power struggle over the 
leadership of Muslims in Serbia.  His efforts and several visits to the Sandjak proved 
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futile, and even Erdoǧan’s historical trip to the region could not solve the issue 
(Balkaninsight, 17/10/2011). This political intervention occurred upon the request of the 
then Serbian President, Boris Tadić and it was not an adventurous Turkish diplomatic 
act.  
The security dimension has remained an important aspect in Ankara’s relations 
with the Balkans. During the AKP’s era, the region could avoid major wars, even if 
some clashes occurred during the given period, especially in Kosovo in 2004. The end 
of wartime hostilities led to the decrease of peacekeeping troops in the region (in 
Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina); nevertheless, Turkey intended to keep its share 
high among international troops. This occurred in line with its commitment to the 
region, but in the given context, it shall be perceived as a soft power tool to send a 
strong message to the relevant states that Turkey is ready to defend them.  
Turkey’s activities in the region relied on multilateralism as well. Regional 
organisations, like the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) or the South East European 
Cooperation Process (SEECP) have become useful forums to boost the country’s 
positive image and its commitment to regional cooperation. Turkey held its term of 
chairmanship-in-office between June 2009 and June 2010 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
10/05/2018).  
Turkish foreign policy advocating regional stability, security and cooperation 
also pushed towards stronger economic cooperation. The trilateral consultation 
mechanism launched by Davutoǧlu in 2009-2010 rapidly took on an economic 
dimension. The first trilateral meeting with the participation of economic and trade 
ministers was organised on 11th April 2013. The participants agreed to adopt a 
Declaration on economic and trade cooperation and a Protocol on the establishment of 
the Trilateral Trade Committee (Pavlović, 2016, 21). The first trilateral business forum 
was held under the presidential summit in 2013. A fair for Turkish products in Sarajevo 
is held annually since 2003 (Pavlović, 2016, 23). 
One may argue that Davutoǧlu’s role in forging a more identity-based and active 
regional foreign policy was important, but after his resignation and the ‘realistic’ turn in 
Turkish foreign policy, Ankara’s stance towards the region changed. One could actually 
argue the opposite: the main pillars of Turkey’s diplomatic relations and initiatives have 
not changed since May 2016. The trilateral mechanisms function well, the foreign 
policy institutions operate according the previous policies (see later) and Turkey keeps 
‘protecting’ its kin. 
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2.3. Institutions of co-option 
 
Over the past thirty years Turkey has created a diversified institutional 
background for power projection and established valuable ‘soft power’ capacities. This 
institutional framework during the AKP era was implemented, and even highly 
propagated, in the case of the Balkans; institution such as the TİKA or Yunus Emre 
Cultural Centres have become Turkey’s ‘trademark’ in the region, thereby boosting 
Ankara position.  
As in the literature review and the introductory overview about Turkish foreign 
policy, it was already addressed these institutions’ role in global foreign policy making; 
here there will be analysed their role in the Balkan context. As the main argument of the 
thesis, that the AKP’s foreign policy is the projection of its domestic hegemonic project 
based on a cultural policy focusing on neo-Ottomanist features, the activities of the 
institutions will be studied to identify the elements of this cultural policy elaborated in 
previous chapters. 
Figure 1 shows the TFP institutional background (until summer of 2018). While 
traditional diplomatic activites are carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is 
important to emphasise that there is a permanent increase in foreign policy related 
institutions during the AKP era. Furthermore, not only state institutions take part in 
shaping the country’s foreign relations. The parliament is an important decision-making 
institution (it decides about international intervention, ratify international treaties etc.) 
and in form of interparliamentary committees and friendship groups the members 
establish direct links with other countries decision-makers.  
Turkish local administration can be also active in boosting foreign policy 
relation by organizing events at the governorate or city level. In close cooperation with 
civil society and state incentives, town are important part in strengthening 
intercommunity cooperation, especially by establishing twin city programmes.  
Despite the activities of civil society, NGOs, faith based religious movements 
and so on, the main actor in the field of foreign policy making are the Office of 
President of the Republic and the Office of Prime Minister (after the June 2018 
elections the later one was annulled). The most important foreign-policy related 
agencies and institutions (TİKA, Diyanet, AFAD etc.) are subordinated. 
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Turkish development assistance and its depositary: The TİKA  
 
Probably the most well-known Turkish foreign policy institution is the 
Presidency of Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TİKA) 
which was founded under Turgut Özal as a subordinate institution of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, in 1992. Its primary aim was to boost relations with the newly 
independent Turkic Republics, so its activities mainly focused on the Caucasus and 
Central Asia. The élan towards these new countries had a great impact on Turkish 
foreign policy in the first half of the 1990s; however, due to domestic political crises 
and the growing EU orientation after 1999, Ankara changed its orientation.  
In 2002 (before the AKP’s election victory), it was relocated under the Prime 
Ministry’s Office, and promoted from the status of agency to presidency in 2011. 
Simultaneously, the TİKA has become one of the main sources of Turkish official 
development assistance (ODA). In line with the economic performance of the country 
and its ambitious foreign policy agenda, Ankara has started to pursue a more 
enthusiastic development assistance programme, claiming that it would like to position 
itself among the most important donor countries. Consequently the TİKA enlarged its 
scope in terms of both its tools and fields of activities.  
According to OECD data, Turkish ODA amounted to 26 million US dollars 
(USD) in 2003 (constant prices). It has been gradually increasing and in 2005 it has 
reached 532 million USD, in 2008 735 million USD, then in 2009, it decreased to 665 
million USD, probably due to the global financial crisis. After this lurch, the ODA’s 
growth received a fresh impetus. In 2010 it was 920 million USD. After the beginning 
of the Arab Spring, it started to boom. Turkish ODA reached 2,422 million USD in 
2012, and it increased to 3,502 million USD by the end of 2014. This huge rise in 
development assistance was mainly linked to the civil war in Syria. As reported by 
official OECD data, the amount that the country received skyrocketed during the 
previous years. In 2012 Syria received 40 percent of total Turkish ODA (around 1,000 
million USD), while its share reached approximately 65 percent of Turkish ODA (2,291 
million USD) by 2014 (OECD).  
Nowadays, Turkey’s development assistance has become a symbol of the 
country’s commitment to an active foreign policy. The ODA’s share in national GNI 
has reached some 0.7 percent in 2016, which has made the country one of the biggest 
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contributors during last years. Even if Ankara spends the overwhelming majority of this 
money on Syria, the efforts are spectacular from a medium-sized, developing country.  
During the AKP period, the Balkans had a special role in the distribution of 
development assistance funds. The region was usually the recipient of some 5-10 
percent of Turkish ODA (without Syria).  
 
Chart 7. Turkey’s ODA towards the Balkans (million USD) and its share in the 
total Turkish ODA without Syria (%). Source: OECD 
  
The amount of ODA in the Balkans decreased sharply in 2011, which can be 
explained by the redirection of sources towards the Middle East. Although it increased 
in the upcoming years, nevertheless it could reach the 2010 levels only in 2014.   
Considering the ODA flows at a country level, Turkey always favoured other 
countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Egypt52 and Syria after the Arab Spring, 
which received even more assistance than the entire Balkans during that period. 
Nevertheless, some Balkan countries were among the top 10 largest ODA recipient 
countries, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2008 (10th rank), in 2009 (5th rank), in 
2010 (7th rank), in 2012 (10th), Kosovo in 2010 (10th) or Macedonia in 2010 (4th).  
 Meanwhile the TİKA’s share was some 20 percent in 2009 in the distribution of 
development assistance. The Turkish ODA is usually concentrated in Asia (the Turkic 
Republics, Afghanistan and increasingly in the Middle East) but the Balkans usually get 
                                                          
52 Until Sissi’s coup d’état, Turkey supported Egypt with a great amount of ODA (some 500 million USD 
in 2012 and 2013; which dropped to only 5 million USD by 2014).  
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the second biggest aid in a regional comparison. The agency’s offices were opened 
gradually in Albania (1996), Bosnia and Herzegovina (2008), Croatia (2016), 
Montenegro (2007), Kosovo (2005), Macedonia (2006), Romania (2005) and Serbia 
(1992/2009). 
 
Country Albania BiH Croatia Monten. Kosovo Macedonia Romania Serbia 
Projects 435 845 35 306 580 840 135 225 
Table 8. The TİKA’s projects by country in southeast Europe (Source: TİKA, 
2018) 
According to the TİKA’s statistics, the institution has realised 3,401 projects in 
the Balkans between 1992 and 2017 (Table 8). Based on the nominal distribution of 
them, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia were the two main beneficiaries of the 
TİKA’s activities, together accounting for some 50 percent of the projects. Around 17 
percent of the projects targeted Kosovo, while Albania (13%), Montenegro (9%) and 
Serbia (6%) had comparatively fewer projects. The proportion of Romania and Croatia 
is almost negligible (TİKA, Balkanlar, 2018). 
While the different time periods since the opening of the TİKA offices could 
substantially affect the number of projects, the annual distribution can give a more 
precise overview about their activities. According to the average annual distribution of 
projects, Bosnia and Herzegovina shows the biggest activity with almost 94 realised 
projects each year, in other terms, nearly one third of all the TİKA’s projects in the 
Balkans focus on Bosnia and Herzegovina. The second ‘most active’ office was in 
Macedonia (76 projects/year), while Kosovo only ranked third with 48 projects 
annually. Interestingly, Croatia was the fourth most active with 35 projects (TİKA, 
Balkanlar, 2018). 
In the region, the TİKA typically focuses on education by providing Turkish 
language courses, and financing the restoration/construction of schools. The support of 
the institution varies in a large spectrum. At the cultural level, it can provide Turkish 
regional programmes, like in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2005 (TİKA 
Faaliyet Raporu 2005), or support for Turkish teaching and cultural events. Turkish aid 
is also provided for equipment in hospitals, schools and cultural centres. While the 
Balkans usually receives 20-30 percent of the TİKA’s total development assistance 
expenditures, the aid is not distributed equally. The TİKA generally focuses on Muslim-
inhabited regions in the peninsula such as Bosnia, Albania or Kosovo. Mainly Christian 
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countries, like Croatia, Romania or Bulgaria commonly receive less aid than the others, 
which can also be explained by their accession to EU which promotes them to a more 
developed level. However, in religiously mixed countries (except for Macedonia) the 
institution is rather active in the Muslim-inhabited territories, as in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina where the majority of the projects are concentrated in the Bosnian-
Croatian Federation. The example of Serbia shows a similar pattern: though the TİKA is 
also active in Voivodina, most projects are realised in the Bosniak-inhabited Sandjak 
region. This region is Serbia’s most underdeveloped area, facing high unemployment 
and further economic difficulties – the TİKA’s help seems to be particularly important 
and beneficial there. 
Another particular element of the Turkish ODA in the Balkans is the successive 
renovation of Ottoman buildings – bridges, mosques or fountains, and so on. This 
activity can be considered as a tool to bring the Ottoman past closer for the (usually) 
Muslim people as their ancestors converted to Islam during the imperial era. These 
renovation projects received public attention even in Turkey, because the state 
television sometimes reports on the opening ceremonies (with the participation of 
Turkish and local pop groups) of a restored bridge or mosque. These events as bridge-
making projects play an important role in shaping the local public opinion especially in 
Bosnia, which is considered by Turks as the ‘little brother.’ The TİKA, becoming the 
means for supporting the Muslims in the Balkans (Demirtaş 2010: 73), also presents 
itself as the main supporter of Turkish minorities by providing them with financial 
recourses for cultural activities or the publishing of local Turkish newspapers. Beyond 
the ‘history-building’ initiatives, the organisation contributes to deepening the role of 
religion and religious (state) organisations. For instance, the construction of the Islamic 
Cultural Centre and Selimija (the largest Muslim religious complex in the country) was 
completed by the TİKA in 2014. Thus, its activities not only help the survival of the 
Ottoman heritage, but also that of the Islamic presence in the region as well. 
 
Cultural dimension through a neo-Ottoman prism: Yunus Emre Institute  
 
Under the AKP, Turkey’s cultural diplomacy and soft power capacities have 
been expanded. Similarly to other countries’ cultural centres (e. g. Germany’s Goethe 
Institutes, France’s Institut Français) the AKP government established their Turkish 
counterpart. The Yunus Emre Foundation was established to promote Turkish culture 
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and maintain the cultural links with the Turkish Diaspora (Kaya, 2011) as well as to 
strengthen the Turkish cultural presence to those sharing the same heritage (‘akraba 
topluluklar’). The Balkans received a special interest in the process of establishing the 
network of cultural centres. The first YEI abroad was opened in Sarajevo, and currently 
it is one of the biggest Yunus Emre cultural centres in the world. During the following 
years an impressive number of centres have launched their activities: Tirana (2009), 
Skopje (2010), Fojnica (2011), Pristina (2011), Prizren (2011), Bucharest (2011), 
Constanța (2011), Shkoder (2012), Peja (2012), Podgorica (2014), Belgrade (2015) and 
Zagreb (2016). 
The activities of YEI in the Balkans cover the ‘usual’ tasks of a cultural centre, 
such as providing language courses, books, journals to make the audience more familiar 
with the Turkish civilisation, and organising various events. These institutions are 
becoming the centres of teaching Turkish in abroad; the implementation of Türkçe 
Yetenek Sinavı (Turkish Sufficiency Exam) has given them the opportunity to issue 
official Turkish language certificates – a task previously belonging to the TÖMER. The 
Institute has created a Turkology project by supporting various Turkology departments 
all around the world, providing them with books (with the cooperation of Ziraat Bank) 
and other equipment.  
Concerning the cultural activities of the institutes, one may conclude that the 
representation of Turkish culture focuses on promoting traditional cultural elements. 
Beyond the language courses, YTB offers ebru courses (traditional paper marbling), in 
some cases ney courses (Turkish music instrument). The events portraying Turkish 
culture rather emphasise traditions such as coffee culture, Turkish wedding customs, 
etc., while programmes about contemporary Turkish culture are promoted to a lesser 
degree.  
 
Co-option through education: YTB and TMV 
Another relatively new institution, subordinated to the Prime Minister’s Office, 
is the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (Yurtdışı Türkler ve 
Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı – YTB) which aims to 1) preserve the ties with the 
Turkish diaspora and maintain its cultural/identity-based engagement with the 
‘motherland,’ 2) coordinate the activities of foreign students who come to Turkey to 
study,  3) support cultural and social events  of Turkic people, Turkish minorities and 
other ‘related people,’ mainly Balkan Muslims, like Albanians and Bosniaks. 
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For regions in the Balkans which do not possess a significant Turkish diaspora, 
the above-mentioned last two pillars are more important. The Turkish state has been 
advocating an ambitious programme to provide scholarships to the ‘related 
communities’ to pursue their studies in Turkey since the fall of the Soviet Union. 
However, this policy’s dynamics have changed during the last nearly thirty years: 
Ankara concentrated rather on the Turkic republics in the 1990s, while after 2000 one 
can see a global opening towards other regions as well. Turkey’s intention to become 
one of the leading education hubs was demonstrated by the increase of the international 
students’ numbers. During the AKP era, the number of foreign students was multiplied 
almost sevenfold and it increased from 15 thousand to nearly 102 thousand. The country 
is going global, which is represented by the growing share of African countries’ 
students. 
* Serbia and Montenegro until the 2006/2007 academic year 
Table 9. Number of foreign students studying at Turkish universities Source: ÖSYM, YÖK 
 
In the case of the Balkans, this increase was only threefold (from 2,145 students 
to 6,431), highlighting a clear decline in the share of the region in total student numbers: 
it decreased from 14-18 percent to only 6 percent (Table 9). This slower dynamic does 
not mean that the Balkan countries would have lost their importance for Ankara. 
Instead, it shows that Turkey is making greater efforts to incorporate other continents 
and regions in its educational scope, while for the Balkans, Turkey’s relevance did not 
change drastically during the last 15 years.  
Country 2002/03 2004/05 2006/07 2008/09 2012/13 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 
Albania 520 532 545 499 507 748 858 955 
BiH 352 462 494 516 430 390 415 464 
Bulgaria 948 1,111 1,169 1,147 1,263 894 832 1,853 
Croatia 12 12 15 10 19 25 27 23 
Kosovo - - - - 735 1,139 1,235 1,255 
Macedonia 275 292 309 307 535 720 748 860 
Montenegro - - - 22 150 146 180 209 
Romania 38 44 56 61 66 115 121 150 
Serbia* - 188 239 180 217 540 569 662 
Balkans total 2,145 2,641 2,827 2,742 3,922 4,717 4,985 6,431 
Balkan share 14.3% 17.9% 17.8% 15.1% 9.1% 7.0% 6.0% 6.3% 
TOTAL 15,017 14,794 15,893 18,158 43,251 67,838 83,068 101,877 
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What is more important in this respect is that Ankara does not see the provided 
scholarships as a simple tool of brain-drain, but a useful means to build an international 
network of pro-Turkey people. As the diaspora strategy of the economic organisation of 
DEIK points out: the more time people spend in Turkey and become more familiar with 
Turkish culture, the more responsive and positively inclined they will be towards the 
country when they return and can support it in many aspects. Thus, the emerging 
proximity diaspora (Yakınlık Diasporası) will be crucial for the realisation of Turkey’s 
foreign policy and economic goals. There are two paths to build a pro-Turkey 
community abroad: 1) to invite young people to the country and provide them with 
quality and modern education which can be successfully used when they return to their 
country of origin, or 2) to establish Turkey-related schools (and from this respect, 
cultural institutions) which can also educate gifted students at high-standard educational 
institutions abroad, in host countries. The YTB is the main tool for the first initiative, 
while the Türkiye Maarif Vakfı serves the second option. 
In 2012, YTB launched the Turkish Scholarship programme (Türkiye Burslari) 
as a result of the unification of other state actors’ scholarship programmes. Thus, the 
organisation has become the main institution dealing with foreign students. Every year, 
it provides several thousand scholarships under a variety of forms: from undergraduate 
level to post-doctoral research grants, depending on the length and the field of study, 
possible applicants can choose among a great number of opportunities. For students 
coming from the Balkans the YTB has created a special scholarship for the region called 
‘Balkans Undergraduate Scholarship’ (Balkanlar Lisans Bursu). This is available for the 
citizens of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia and Greece.  
As it was already mentioned, the Presidency seeks to strengthen the ties between 
the related communities and Turkey. However, the YTB’s activities reflect the multi-
faceted identity of Turkey that Davutoǧlu was referring to. In other terms, people who 
immigrated in great numbers to Turkey (nourishing its Balkans or Caucasus-based 
identity) and were integrated into Turkish society are perceived as related communities. 
Consequently, Balkan Muslims and Caucasian Muslims who were welcome during the 
late Ottoman and Republican era are part of the YTB’s scope, alongside the 
linguistically related ‘Turkic people’ from Central Asia.  
The activities of the institution clearly follow this line. It supports a great 
number of events to bring together the Balkan Muslim and Turkish state representatives. 
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Furthermore, the institution is also involved in making contacts with migrant 
associations as they have meetings (e. g. Bal-Göç) (Baltürk 2011) where the 
associations can present their problems and claims through this official channel. 
The Presidency’s official monthly paper (+90 or Artı 90)53 also follows these 
lines. The paper portrays the YTB’s scope of operations and various narratives that 
allude to a theme important to these communities. In these stories three topics appear 
repeatedly: discrimination in Europe, assimilation and adoption, as well as the Ottoman 
Empire (Öktem, 2014, 16). The majority of articles focuses on western Europe (the 
situation and problems of the Turkish diaspora), while other regions and communities 
receive less attention.   
The Ottoman Empire and the Ottoman past emerge as sources of pride and 
common heritage that link Balkan Muslims, Turks, Caucasus Muslims, etc. This forges 
the various communities together, creating a sense of nostalgia for the former empire, in 
line with the representation of neo-Ottomanism in Turkey itself as well.  
Ankara has established a new organisation recently in order to strengthen the 
state’s educational presence abroad. The so-called Türkiye Maarif Vakfı (Turkey Maarif 
Foundation – TMV) was founded weeks before the 15th July coup attempt. Officially, its 
mission simply places an emphasis on ‘raising good people based on the Anatolian 
knowledge’. 
 In fact, it aims to take over Gülenist institutions and run them as a Turkish state 
educational body in line with the principles determined by Ankara. Thus, Maarif Vakfı 
has emerged a key actor in combatting the Gülenist movement abroad. By April 2018, 
the organisation had begun its operations in a total of 70 countries. It has gained control 
over 76 Gülenist schools (mainly in Africa) and opened 29 others in ten countries. After 
nearly two years of operation, it provides education to some 10 thousand students (AA, 
12/04/2018). 
Although Gülenist schools were not taken over and Turkey’s endeavours to 
close them in southeast Europe failed, Maarif Vakfı opted for establishing a parallel 
system, thus buying existing schools and transforming them ‘into educational bridges’. 
By building up a competitive educational network all around the world, Ankara aims to 
weaken the Gülenist influence and present an alternative to the local elites. 
                                                          
53 +90 is Turkey’s international calling code.  
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In the Balkans, Maarif Vakfı’s presence is still in an embryonic phase, even if 
negotiations are ongoing and it has already managed to open some schools. It is 
currently operating in five countries. The negotiations with state authorities paved the 
way to start education in several places in the 2017-18 academic year. In Albania, MV 
has signed a protocol with the Canada Technical Institute for provide university 
programmes, while negotiations are ongoing with other universities as well (such as 
New York University, Luarasi University). In Macedonia, the Woodrow Wilson School 
has been bought by the Foundation which will provide Albanian language education 
until the 6th grade, which will be replaced by English until the end of high school 
studies. According to the curriculum, the students will also learn Turkish 
(Türkiyegazetesi 15/04/2018). The Foundation managed to operate one primary school 
in Prizren and one in Pristina, Kosovo. In the case of Bosnia, TMV has signed an 
agreement with the Islamic Union to rent a campus where it plans to open a 
kindergarten, primary school and high school by the beginning of the 2018-19 academic 
year (AA, 30/11/2017). 
Turkey’s endeavours to establish a (secular) educational system abroad were 
launched with domestic considerations in mind. The novelty of this state policy will be 
bear its fruits over the decades to come. However, this expansion of Turkey may have a 
long-lasting effect on the Balkans. Although the majority of pupils and students look to 
western Europe for further studies, the Turkish presence can help raise several 
generations of pro-Turkey people in the region. Even people who have pursued their 
studies in Anatolia or have learnt Turkish strengthen Turkey’s leverage.  
 
The Diyanet and religious diplomacy  
 
The Diyanet is Turkey’s state apparatus to control and manage religion in the country. 
Established in 1924 as an institution belonging to the Prime Minister, its main task was 
to instrumentalise religion as part of the ongoing hegemonic project. As religion started 
to become a mobilising force in elections after the death of Atatürk, the Diyanet’s status 
started to increase in importance. In 1975, the Turkey Diyanet Foundation (Türkiye 
Diyanet Vakfı, TDV) was founded in order to finance various Diyanet-linked projects in 
Turkey and abroad, too. Consequently, the TDV’s donations made possible the 
realisation of various projects, such as building mosques, providing education and other 
services which could not be covered by the Diyanet’s budget directly. Later, the TDV 
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was awarded tax-exempt status and in 2005 the AKP government placed in on the list of 
institutions that do not need any permission to collect money (TDV, Hakkımızda, 
2018). By now, the TDV has become the most important institution to build religion-
affiliated infrastructure in Turkey and abroad as well. Between its foundation and 2016, 
it constructed 3,603 mosques, 419 mescits, financed 2,582 Qur’an courses and five 
educational centres in Turkey, while abroad it has built more than one hundred mosques 
in 25 countries. Only in 2016 it completed the construction of 14 mosques in the 
Crimea, in Belorussia, in Palestine (9 mosques), in the Philippines, in Japan and in Haiti 
(TDV Faaliyet Raporu, 2016, 30).  In 1978, 18 Turkish consulates of religious services 
(Din Hizmetleri Müșvarlıǧı) were created and 21 attachés for religious services (Din 
Hizmetleri Atașeliǧi) were sent to embassies in Europe, the United States and Australia. 
The Diyanet’s importance is growing. This phenomenon became particularly 
apparent especially after the 1980 coup when the junta demonstrated strong support for 
the Turkish-Islam synthesis, as well as for building a great number of mosques and 
putting courses about religion in the secular curriculum. After 2002, the Diyanet 
emerged as one of the tools to express the AKP’s hegemonic project at home and 
abroad as well. In the domain of TFP, the internationalisation of the institution has 
gained momentum in line with domestic political considerations. Recently this feature 
has appeared increasingly on the international stage in the form of combatting the 
Gülenist movement. 
After the Cold War, every Turkish government used the Diyanet as a tool for a 
more active foreign policy in Central Asia and the Balkans, which marked a crucial 
change compared to the previous policy when the institution had to focus only on 
Turkish citizens (abroad). Despite the lack of detailed statistics on the number of 
Turkish citizens, the Diyanet pursues a variety of activities based on kin (religious) 
relations in the Balkans. Albeit the Ottoman Empire’s gradual territorial losses have left 
Muslim communities alone and they were reorganised independently from the Turkish 
state, the Diyanet expressed its commitment to supporting them after the Cold War, and 
the local leaders also articulated their need for Turkey’s help (AIS rapor, 1995).  
In 1995, the institution launched the Eurasian Islamic Council (Avrasya İslam 
Șurası) whose agenda is set by the Diyanet (Öztürk, 2016, 23), aiming to bring together 
the religious leaders from Central Asia to the Balkans. Until 2018, the Diyanet 
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organised nine meetings,54  while it had seven regional events in Bulgaria (2007), 
Montenegro (2008), Romania (2009), Kosovo (2010), Macedonia (2011), Albania 
(2013) and in Turkey (Edirne, 2015) with the participation of respective Balkan 
countries (avrasyaislamsurasi.diyanet.gov.tr, 07/06/2018).  
These events gave the opportunity for the Diyanet’s leaders to deepen the 
institutional ties with their counterparts and strengthen Turkey’s relations with them. 
The invitees can reveal their needs and ask for financial and material support; even their 
participation is financed by the Diyanet. The most prominent figures of Islam 
institutions in the Balkans are regular visitors of these forums. Participants in the past 
have included the likes of Mustafa Ceriç, the (former) Chief Mufti of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Süleyman Recebi, the (former) Head of the Islam Union of Macedonia, 
Muammer Zukorlić, the (former) Chief Mufti of the Islamic Community, Sabri Koçi, 
the (former) Chief Mufti of Albania, or Mustafa Hacı, the (former) Chief Mufti of 
Bulgaria. Apart from the Diyanet representatives, Turkish politicians, ministers, even 
prime ministers and presidents (Necmettin Erbakan and Recep Tayyip Erdoǧan) also 
appear(ed) in the events showing the highly political side of these forums.  
The meetings’ agenda is also determined by the host institution which means 
Turkey-related topics are well represented in the events. The declarations resonate with 
Turkish domestic issues; this was very clear in 2016 when it condemned the coup 
attempt and supported the fight against the FETÖ (Gülenist movement) (AIS/SONUÇ 
BİLDİRGESİ/14/10/2016). 
The Diyanet-appointed religious affairs attachés and religious coordinators (the 
former are not part of the embassy staff, such as consultants, and their salary is paid by 
the TDV) and even extra staff is sent for religious occasions (Solberg, 2007). Through 
this institutional background, its activities cover a large spectrum: 
 
1) Religious services: The Diyanet’s attachés for religious services deal with 
the religious needs of Turkish citizens, however, they are active among the 
Turkish and Muslim (minority) groups. In Kosovo, for instance, they are 
responsible for religious activities in the Turkish-inhabited Mamușa village 
(Kılıç, 2009, 17). For Ramadan the Diyanet also sends extra religious 
personnel to the region. The number of persons varies depending on the 
                                                          
54 In chronological order: 1995 in Istanbul, 1996 in Istanbul, 1998 in Ankara, 2000 in Sarajevo, 2002 in 
Gazimağusa, as well as the 2005, 2009, 2012 and 2016 events, all held in Istanbul. 
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community’s needs and size, but in the case of Bulgaria, between 1993 and 
2008 a total of 227 people were sent (Kılıç, 2009, 15). 
 
2) Education: The institution also supports religious education in Turkey from 
Qu’ran courses to imam-hatip school education and even university or PhD 
studies. The permanent staff also take part in selecting and sending students 
for theological studies to Turkey in cooperation with YÖK (Solberg, 2007). 
 
3) Restoration activities: Restoration projects also belong to its portfolio. TDV 
has restored several mosques of national (Turkish) importance, like the Kırık 
Camii or the I. Murat Hüdavendigar Türbesi mosques (Kemal Hakkı Kılıç, 
2009, 18). 
 
4) Construction: Its activities also include the construction of new mosques, 
usually in cooperation with a Turkish town. In Bosnia, until the end of 2017, 
the Diyanet built several mosques (e.g. in Gorajde, Olovo). The largest 
construction project is the Namazgah mosque in Tirana (TDV, 2/11/2017). 
Furthermore, the Diyanet also took part in cooperation with the TİKA in 
building and providing academic support for the Faculty of Theology at the 
University of Tirana (Kılıç, 2010, 5). 
 
5) Publishing services: Tens of thousands of religious books and prayer 
calendars (printed in the given language) were distributed in the Balkan 
countries. In the case of Bulgaria, the Diyanet sent 250 thousand religious 
books (mostly the Qu’rans) between 1993 and 2009 (Kılıç, 2009, 16). 
 
6) Twin city cooperation: Furthermore, it is involved in providing material 
support and circumcision tours, even restoration services in close 
cooperation with Turkish cities.  
 
7) Mutual visits: There are mutual visits between the Diyanet and the respective 
countries’ religious leadership. Probably the most frequent visits have 
occurred between Turkey and Bulgaria: between 1992 and 2009 19 
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delegations arrived from Turkey (Kılıç, 2009, 16). The participation of local 
leaders at the AIȘ is also supported by the Diyanet. 
 
8) Miscellaneous: Other activities usually cover support for pilgrimages to 
Mecca, Islamic holidays, further material aid, or providing ‘iftar dinners’ 
(TDV, 18/06/2016).  
 
In Bulgaria, the Muslim denomination is administered by the Supreme Muslim 
Council and the Chief Muftiate. It has around 1,500 mosques and masjids, and employs 
some 1,000 imams. The main problem with the state is the lack of appropriate financial 
support. In 2016 the Chief Muftiate was given 360,000 LEV (around 180,000 EUR) and 
half of this sum was earmarked for the renovation of old mosques while the Orthodox 
Church received 3 million LEV (some 1.5 million EUR), the Catholic church 50,000 
LEV (25,000 EUR) and for the Jewish community a further 50,000 LEV was awarded. 
This subsidy is not sufficient for the running of institutions and schools, which thereby 
offered an opportunity (or created a need) for increasing international support. After the 
foundation of High Islam Institute in Sofia in 1989, its leaders applied for financial help 
to various international organisations without success. Finally the Diyanet expressed its 
readiness for support; after 1993 it started to send personnel to the Institute 
(Dünyabizim, 27/01/2017) and after 1998 when the two states concluded an agreement, 
it started to finance the Islamic religious education of the country by maintaining the 
High Islam Institute and three higher education institutions (in Ruse, Sumen and 
Momchilgrad). It keeps sending teachers to them. Every year, the graduates can apply 
for Turkish institutions to continue their studies. The Diyanet even provides the most 
talented students with short-term courses in Turkey (Kılıç, 2009, 15).  
Beyond the religious attaché based in the embassy, 15 imams (2017) work in the 
country. By its help, Turkey contributed to maintaining Islamic education in line with 
the Bulgarian authorities to prevent possible radicalisation among Muslims and 
decrease the potential Wahabbist influence within the community. Moreover, the 
Diyanet condemned the attack against mosques and Muslims in Bulgaria, like the event 
at Jumaya mosque in 2014.  
In Romania, the Islamic faith is recognised as one of the 18 religious 
denominations. The community’s main organ, the Muftiate can receive material state 
support for maintaining mosques and other buildings, however, it is more occasional, 
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which means that it must ultimately rely on its own and international sources. Thus, 
Turkey and the Turkish businessmen’s groups play a major role in financing the 
community’s activities. Ankara appeared as a depositary of Hanafi Islam and started to 
support the local community. In 2006, a protocol was signed between the Muftiate and 
the Diyanet in order to officially channel the Turkish support. 
The re-opening of the Muslim Seminar at the Kemal Atatürk National College 
(Kemal Atatürk Ulusal Koleji) in Medgidia (Dobrudja) was one of the most influential 
events for the Islamic community. This is the only Islamic theological institution in the 
country. The Diyanet signed a protocol about the maintenance of the school in 1995. A 
new agreement was signed in 2006 aiming to provide religious personnel and imams, as 
well as to support the training of local personnel from Romania in Turkey (Cupcea, 
2018, 294-295). 
The Muslim Community of Albania had to reconstitute itself after decades of 
prohibition in 1991 (Merdjanova, 2013, 40). It runs 7 imam-hatip high schools and one 
university called Bedër that provides theological studies (Jazexhi, 2015). In Albania the 
Diyanet does not run theological education institutions, however, it competes with the 
Gülenist movement, which is well-embedded in the Albanian religious structure and 
runs the Bedër University. Furthermore, the Diyanet – via TDV – is building the largest 
mosque in the country in the very centre of Tirana.  
The Islamic communities of former Yugoslavia show different patterns. The 
small number of the Turkish minority and the relatively better position curtailed the 
Diyanet’s leverage, however, the lack of adequate financial revenues, and the need for 
political support provide fertile ground for broadening its activities in the Western 
Balkans. The Diyanet (TDV) contributed to the construction of mosques and the various 
communities could always count on the Diyanet’s aid. Nevertheless, intra- and inter-
community debates offered a good opportunity to mediate between the factions. The 
Sandjak and its mufti, Muammer Zukorlić’s quarrel with the chief mufti of Serbia led to 
the establishment to the ‘Turkish initiative’. The Turkish mediation only had minor 
success, but the Diyanet started to pay the salary of imams who left the two Islamic 
Unions (one led by Zukorlić, one led by Zilkić). 
The appearance of secular Turkey as a protector – or rather – manager of 
Muslims in the region was usually welcomed. Nevertheless, the increasing effect of 
domestic political issues like the conflict with the Gülenist movement overshadows its 
secular image and the Turkey-sent imams’ blatant political rhetoric raises concerns for 
208 
 
state authorities. After the 15th July coup attempt, its task was to weaken the position of 
Gülenist movement in the region as well. The Diyanet’s activities show the Turkish 
state’s commitment to strengthening the religious life of Muslim communities. Its 
financial and material support is usually welcomed by these communities, however, the 
direct interference in their internal affairs garners less sympathy. Turkish diplomacy, 
with the involvement of the Diyanet, has tried to solve the crises between the two 
Muslim communities of Serbia without success. It could only bear fruit in Bulgaria 
where after years of domestic conflicts and debates, the bifurcated Islamic community 
was unified under Mustafa Haci.  
 
Media (Anadolu Ajansı and TRT) 
 
Turkish media outlets are also present in the Balkans and they not only provide 
news about the region but also organise (or co-organise) various events through which 
they actively participate in shaping the perceptions about Turkey in southeast Europe 
and vice versa.  
The national news agency, the Anadolu Ajansı (AA) aims to become one of the 
leading news agencies all over the globe. Particular efforts were made to achieve this 
goal such as providing news coverage in foreign languages, in the most widely spoken 
languages like English, French, etc. The Bosnian language was also incorporated into 
the AA agenda.  
Turgut Özal initiated the establishment of an international Turkish channel 
concentrating on the Central Asian republics: in 1992 they founded the TRT Avrasya 
channels. Under the AKP major changes have taken place. In 2009, TRT Avrasya was 
renamed TRT-TÜRK while a new channel entitled TRT Avaz which provides 
programmes with Azeri, Kazah, Kyrgyz, etc. subtitles was established. Nowadays TRT 
has 14 TV channels while it has three international radios as well. Furthermore it also 
runs a webpage which provides news in over 40 languages that cover the Balkans as 
well. The Diyanet television channel (Diyanet TV) also broadcasts various programmes 
about religion in the Balkans, the situation of Muslim communities and the Diyanet’s 
activities.  
Several television programmes were prepared to portray the region. An example 
is the Balkan Ekspresi (Balkan Express) in 2010 which was a train tour of 22 towns in 
the region (including Greece and Hungary) broadcasted by the TRT in cooperation with 
209 
 
the Turkish national railway company (Haberler, 29/06/2010). TRT usually works in 
cooperation with the TİKA, Turkish Airlines and other institutions. Sometimes it 
organises programmes in Balkan countries, like in 2012 in Skopje, where a concert with 
participants from various Balkan countries was broadcasted (Haber7, 02/09/2012). 
The issue of the Balkan wars and forced emigration also appeared regularly on 
TV programmes. The Balkanlar ve göç (Balkans and migration, 2005) was a series 
devoted to various waves of migration from the peninsula to Anatolia between the late 
18th century until the beginning of the 1990s. In 2012, for the anniversary of the Balkan 
Wars (1912-13), a series was broadcasted entitled ‘Son Yaz Balkanlar 1912’ (Last 
Summer in the Balkans, 1912) portraying the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The year 
of 2012 was dedicated to the wars and the forced migration for the scientific community 
as well: a great number of conferences took place in Turkey and the Balkans, while 
papers and books were also published for the occasion. 
Not surprisingly, several programmes devoted to Srebrenica were also put on 
air: Mavi kelebeǧin izinde or a new TV series about the life and struggle of Aliya 
Izetbegoviç. The TRT also transmits the annual commemorations about Srebrenica, not 
just in Bosnia and Herzegovina but in the Balkans and Turkey as well. 
Finally, the author has to note the effect or Turkish telenovellas/soap operas. As 
it was already mentioned that these series are produced by private companies, their 
importance in boosting Turkey’s image is quite impressive. These series depicting the 
developing country (and usually Istanbul) and showing a roughly similar culture to the 
people have become increasingly popular. Various TV channels have bought several 
series which started to dominate the airwaves after 2008. 
These institutions’ activities are proof of Turkey’s presence and influence in the 
region. The TİKA logos and descriptions about its projects can be found everywhere in 
the Western Balkans, even in the most remote, Muslim-inhabited areas. Yunus Emre 
Cultural Centres provide language education and cultural programmes for hundreds of 
students all over the region. The growing prestige and usefulness of the Turkish 
language can be detected by the relatively stable number of Turks in these countries, 
despite the natural assimilation process.  
By boosting Turkey’s positive image and creating strong links of ‘friendship’, 
‘brotherhood’ and ‘trust’ between the communities, Ankara can gain momentum in its 
diplomatic relations and contribute to the daily nation- and identity-building process of 
these people, influencing their development in a more Turkey-friendly way. 
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Like in memorial politics, Turkey makes strong efforts to keep the memory of 
Srebrenica alive and to establish an inter-ethnic faith-based solidarity. Turkish state 
television, TRT regularly broadcasts commemorations about the event, not just in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Turkey, but also about other Balkan countries as well. The 
TİKA has created a Srebrenica Museum in the centre of Sarajevo to support the 
preservation of the memory of the mass killing in the town. Although the massacre is 
interpreted as an attack against Muslims, the context, such as the killing of Bosniaks, 
also highlights the devastation of the Ottoman legacy.  
Furthermore, these projects are presented in Turkey as well. The opening 
ceremonies of key Ottoman restoration projects, noteworthy cultural events appear in 
the Turkish media and sometimes are even broadcasted by TRT. The news and 
broadcasting send strong messages to the Turkish audience at home: the government is 
ready to defend its kin and takes care of them and the remaining Ottoman heritage. The 
participation of Mehteran to the opening ceremony of the renovated bridge in Mostar or 
Konjic in Bosnia and Herzegovina embodies the sentiment that the Ottoman Empire is 
back, however, for ordinary Turkish television viewers this act is a commemoration 
about shared history and traditions. The Turkish political leadership was also present at 
these events in 2004 (Mostar) and 2009 (Konjic). In the case of Mostar, five Turkish 
ministers took part in the ceremony (NTV, 23/07/2004). Certainly, the same image can 
disturb the Christian population whose nation-building process was built on the fight 
against the Ottoman Empire, thus it can trigger an almost opposite reaction compared to 
that of the Turkish audience. 
Beyond the strong media coverage of the TİKA, YEE and other cultural 
activities, the Turkish state supports actively the organised trips for Turkish students to 
visit the famous places in the Balkans, the ‘lieu de mémoires’ of the Ottomans.  
Turkish tourists who visit Western Balkan countries in great numbers can also 
see the signs of the TİKA and other institutions’ work, thus it strengthens the 
perceptions about the government’s commitment to preserve the common Ottoman 
heritage. This message is particularly important for those who perceive themselves as 
descendants of Balkan immigrants or refugees.   
The Turkish diplomacy and use of soft power capabilities had tangible 
achievements. The perceptions about Turkey started to improve in the region. 
According to Gallup’s opinion poll in 2006, 67.1% of the people in Kosovo, 71.3% in 
Macedonia, 56.3% in Albania and 50.9% in the Bosnian-Croatian Federation perceived 
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Turks as ‘friends’. Five years later, in 2011, this proportion was even higher. In Kosovo 
(without Kosovska Mitrovica) 94.7%, in the Bosnian-Croatian Federation 66.7%, in 
Albania 69.2% and in Macedonia 70.3% of the people stated that they consider the 
Turks as friends. Taking into consideration the high percentage of Muslim people in 
these Western Balkan countries, these results are not a surprise. Nevertheless, similar 
changes could be detected in case of non-Muslim countries (or those having a tiny 
Muslim minority) as well. Even in case of Republika Srpska where the friendly 
perception was only 8.2% in 2006, it increased to 33.8% in 2011. In Montenegro, it rose 
from 25.7% to 30.4%, in Croatia from 24% to 33.5%, while in Serbia it decreased from 
21.1% to 17.4% (Egeresi, 2013, 54). 
Unfortunately there is no available survey about public perceptions concerning 
Turkey and Turkish presence in southeast Europe from recent years, and especially after 
the coup attempt. The lack of comparable data makes it difficult to outline the 
developments since 2011. Nevertheless, it is safe to say that the country’s image has 
changed due to its domestic political dynamics. Firstly, the Gezi protests in the middle 
of 2013 deteriorated Erdoǧan’s image. Furthermore the conflict between the AKP and 
the Gülenist movement (later FETÖ) over hegemony and the growing authoritarianism 
in the country weakened Turkey’s democratic credentials. In line with the internal 
troubles, the failure of the TFP in Syria and its realignment also decreased its soft power 
as a potent middle power. The manifestations of Turkish domestic politics in diplomatic 
relations abroad also nourished the debate about Turkey’s role in the region. Its direct 
campaign against well-established Gülenist networks, schools and foundations has 
created a dilemma for the political elite regarding whether to cooperate with Ankara and 
risk internal and Western criticism, or to resist and comply with the Western 
community’s standards. Some countries preferred to support Turkey while others were 
more reluctant; but the debate about Turkey’s interference in internal politics gained 
ground. In light of the ‘traditional’ debate about neo-Ottomanism (in the interpretation 
of Turkey’s expansionist, pro-Islam foreign policy) which was rather unwelcome in 
Christian circles, especially in the eyes of Bosnian Serbs, a more direct and 
interventionist Turkey appears more threatening to many people. 
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2.4. Societal actors and hegemony: relations with TFP 
 
Without going into details about the role of societal actors, civil society in 
foreign policy making, and their role within the hegemony building, this sub-chapter 
aims at revealing the most relevant societal actors’ links to the hegemonic project and 
their contribution to Turkish foreign policy in the Balkan context. Three main actors are 
identified partly based on previous chapters: the immigrant associations whose links are 
close to the country of origin as many of the members are dual citizens. The second 
important group in this respect is the Turkish cities themselves. These two groups are 
interconnected, as the associations can directly influence the local government politics 
and take part via municipal institutional frameworks in shaping foreign relations, thus 
‘local diplomacy.’ And finally, the faith-based movements’ (tarikatlar) role should be 
addressed too, which are an integral part of Turkish society. Furthermore, they have a 
strong presence abroad as well, especially the Gülenist movement which has become a 
terrorist organisation in the eyes of the Turkish authorities. Nevertheless, it has 
established a strong network and institutional background in southeast Europe, which is 
difficult to dismantle from Ankara. Finally, the role of business associations in foreign 
policy making shall be revealed as well, however, this issue will be closely analysed in 
the next chapter focusing on the economy. 
 
Dernekler: influencing the Balkans and local government 
The migrant organisations with well-established networks in Turkey, unifying at 
least a measurable part of immigrants and subsequently influencing local politics, and to 
a lesser degree, national politics, have direct and indirect leverage towards relations 
with southeast Europe. The direct relations can be identified as trans-border activities 
based on the dual citizens (dual electorate) and their personal affiliations with their 
home (village, town or region), which does not only mean personal attachments but 
occasionally strong family ties. Through direct cultural, educational, etc. cooperation, 
they contribute vigorously to intra-regional relations.  
Beyond the vibrant trans-border relations, these associations can influence 
Turkish foreign policy at the state level, usually indirectly. Via parliamentary deputies, 
inter-state visits and lobbying they are (albeit minuscule) parts of Turkish foreign policy 
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making. Furthermore by their highly visible social and cultural activities in Turkey 
itself, they can contribute to national agenda-setting (e.g. consider the protests during 
the Kosovo war, etc.). 
 
A) Trans-border relations 
 
Migrant associations have direct leverage over Balkan countries through political 
participation by virtue of their dual citizen membership. The dual citizens can 
participate in elections in the country of origin; a greater number of active citizens 
correspond to greater involvement in domestic politics of the sending country. This 
feature of trans-border relations is rather typical for ‘Balkan’ associations and especially 
in the case of Bulgarian Turks whose number is measurable in the Bulgarian elections. 
They appear as strong backers of Turkish minority parties whose electoral performance 
correlates strongly with the size of the Turkish minority. 
The collapse of communism in southeast Europe facilitated the formation of 
Turkish minority parties. Except for Bulgaria, the small size of Turkish minorities in 
Balkan countries did not permit their parties to become more than minor actors in 
politics. They can also benefit from the legislation of some countries where the minority 
parliamentary mandates are usually guaranteed by a constitution (Romania, Kosovo). In 
Bulgaria, where the percentage of Turks varies between 6-9%, the Turkish political 
party, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (Hak ve Özgürlükler Hareketi in Turkish; 
Dvizenie za Prava i Svobodi in Bulgarian) enjoys a greater room for manoeuvre. 
Additionally, it has remained the most stable political party in Bulgarian politics since 
its foundation (4th January 1990), being part of a government coalition three times 
(2001-2005, 2005-2009 and 2013-2014). 
From the very beginning, the MRF’s leadership intended to create friendly 
relations with the immigrant associations in Turkey. The Bal-Göç was the main partner 
in this process, thanks to the size of its membership. By means of the Kasim Dal’s work 
to establish more links with Turkey, from the end of the 1990s other associations were 
also linked to the HÖH. These associations supported deepening the relations because 
of cultural and political considerations. The common history and relatives remaining in 
Bulgaria facilitated this process, but the willingness to solve pragmatic issues, like the 
pension question with Bulgaria also played an important role in the cooperation.  
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The membership of these organisations sought to receive their pensions accrued 
for their work before 1989, denied by the Bulgarian state. In order to solve this problem, 
they worked on establishing good relations with the Bulgarian government. For 
example when in 1997 the newly elected Prime Minister, Ivan Kostov decided to 
approach Turkey by creating good economic and political relations, he visited Bursa 
and stated that he would solve the pension problem – the immigrant community holding 
Bulgarian flags demonstrated its expectations (Gangloff, 2000, 306). 
Sadly, the promise was not kept, therefore the upset associations had to find 
other partners – and the most logical solution was the MRF. To emphasise the 
cooperation, the Bal-Göç and other organisations started to join in a higher level of the 
electoral campaign. The MRF – having the strong support of associations – created a 
deliberate identity policy based on the memories of the assimilation campaign (1984-
1985) and the clashes in 1989 between Turks and Bulgarian authorities. The organised 
policy of ‘lieux de mémoire’ was added to this process: the commemorations of the 
clashes’ casualties became the convening venues for election programmes and a source 
of legitimacy for the MRF (whose interpretation of the events can be summarised along 
the lines of: ‘If we are not in the parliament these events can happen again’). 
The göçmen dernekler also joined these events because the loss was common; 
lots of immigrants lost their relatives at that time, and it also demonstrated the 
cooperation amongst the community – both in Bulgaria and in Turkey. Moreover, the 
legislation and the special status also facilitated the emergence of closer cooperation. 
The immigrants of the ‘big excursion’, as was already mentioned, received Turkish 
citizenship by preserving their Bulgarian one, and thereby becoming dual citizens. A 
vast amount of inhabitants benefited from this status (compulsory military service in 
Bulgaria rather than in Turkey, etc.). 
By being dual citizens, the Bulgarian Turks living in Turkey became extremely 
important for the MRF to mobilise and secure their votes for the parliamentary and local 
elections. This phenomenon emerged most visibly during the 2001 parliamentary 
elections. Although the Bulgarian legislation permitted voting for citizens living abroad, 
the small number of voting stations abroad and the difficulties of going back to Bulgaria 
decreased the number of Turks taking part in the elections. Their number converged to a 
few thousand during the 1990s. Nevertheless, the small participation rate changed in 
2001 when 38,000 votes were cast for the MRF in Turkey. Accounting for a significant 
share of a total of 340,395 votes, the mobilisation of Turks from Bulgaria in Turkey 
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granted the party around 3 parliamentary mandates out of 21. Moreover, a large number 
of voters were transferred from Turkey to Bulgaria in order to strengthen the electorate 
of the party, especially in the most important constituencies.55 Since there are no 
detailed statistics about the number of voters coming by buses from Turkey, it is 
difficult to estimate, but they should be between ten and twenty thousand. Furthermore, 
the deputies of these associations managed to convince the authorities to grant residence 
permits for the illegal immigrants from Bulgaria (mostly Turks) in the hope that they 
would participate in the Bulgarian parliamentary elections and vote for the MRF (Parla 
– Kaslı, 2009). 
This strategy became a standard practice during the upcoming elections. In 2005, 
the party received 39,858 votes in Turkey (and gained 3 seats than in the last 
parliamentary elections), and around twenty thousand people passed the border to vote 
(Dayıoğlu, 2005, 452). Four years later, in 2009 the votes of Turkish dual citizens in 
Turkey increased to 93,903 – almost double the previous results which awarded them 5 
more mandates (Özgür-Baklacıoğlu, 2012, 477). Although the Bulgarian courts later 
decreased this number by 18,400 votes, claiming that they were secured by a voting 
fraud, the achievement still seems spectacular. Moreover, we can add some thousands 
of voters voting in Bulgaria, coming by bus from Turkey. The electoral system was 
changed for the 2009 elections, and the purely proportional system was replaced by a 
mixed one, where 31 seats of 240 are distributed by the first-past-the-post method. The 
MRF was especially successful in acquiring these mandates: they received 5 of them. 
The involvement of various göçmen dernekler in these election results is 
obvious. The mobilisation of dual citizens played a great role in this process in which 
the immigrant associations had influence. In order to help this process, the MRF 
intended to create and maintain close relations with these organisations, which finally 
contributed to a parallel campaign in Turkey prior the general elections. The visits of 
MRF leaders always become more frequent before elections (and vice versa), whereas 
the demonstration of cooperation and unity represents an important part of the 
campaigns. After mobilising some parts of the possible electorate, the associations also 
help to send them to their destinations in Bulgaria – this is based on the cooperation of 
                                                          
55 The example of Kircaeli shows the importance of this feature. The town is a centre of the only district 
of Bulgaria where Turks constitute the majority of the population. Nevertheless, they are in minority in 
Kircaeli, so in the case of a possible cooperation between Bulgarian parties, the leadership of the city can 
change to the detriment of the MRF, as it happened during the municipal elections in 1999 when the 
nominee of the Bulgarian Union of Democratic Forces defeated the incumbent mayor, who was the 
candidate of the MRF. 
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local elites’ members. The municipalities provide buses for the organisations along with 
non-financial support for other social activities.  
 
Year 2001 2005 2009 2013 2014 2017MRF 
Seats 21 34 37 36 38 26 
Votes (share) % 7.4 12.8 14 11.31 14.8 8.99 
Votes 340,395 467,400 592,381 400,466 487,134 315,976 
Votes from abroad 39,000 44,000 93,903 54,353 59,938 22,000 (approx.) 
Table 10. MRF’s electoral performance (Source: Bulgarian Electoral 
Commission) 
 
These bus trips, mutually beneficial for every actor, create unique opportunities 
for immigrants living in Turkey to return for a short while to meet relatives and visit the 
places of their childhood. This factor is far from negligible from the point of view of the 
election results: at the 2005 election, the Bal-Göç sent 10,000 voters to Bulgaria 
(Balkan, 2005). The cooperation between the leaders of the Turkish minority living in 
Balkan countries and immigrants’ associations present in Turkey is not limited to the 
Turks of Bulgaria. We can see similar patterns in the recent history of other groups. 
During the 2000s the levels of activity of other immigrant communities also increased. 
The Batı Trakyalılar sent thousands of voters to the elections in Greece. For the 
elections in Kosovo, the Kosova Rumeli Derneği (Kosovar Rumelian Association) 
organised a trip to the country for around one thousand people (Timturk, 2010). It is of 
course clear that the ‘electoral tourism’ of small associations, backed by relatively small 
communities, had a less palpable impact on elections. Turkish representation in the 
Kosovar parliament is rather the result of international requirements and constitutional 
guarantees than the great number of the Turkish minority turning up to participate in 
elections. However, this kind of mobilisation contributes to the success of the minority 
groups and strengthens the feeling of belonging to a wider community.56 
                                                          
56This process, emerging during the last decade, has attracted the attention of local authorities and public 
opinion as well. This raised problems especially in Bulgaria, where the Turkish votes from abroad 
represent a significant supply for a Turkish party – and are therefore usually regarded with suspicion. The 
problem of electoral tourism became a campaign topic with the emergence of the Bulgarian radical right-
wing party called Ataka (Attack) in 2005. Volen Siderov, the leader of the party, regularly called for the 
restriction of the votes of dual citizen Turks living in Turkey. At the beginning of 2007, prior to the 
European parliamentary elections, they managed to amend the electoral code. Due to support from other 
right-wing parties (even one coalition partner of the MRF supported the amendment), the Bulgarian 
Parliament accepted a law requiring 3 months permanent residence in Bulgaria or EU member states from 
Bulgarian citizens. Infuriating the Turkish minority by the law, the Bulgarian parties managed to prevent 
the possible victory of a Turkish party at the elections by wiping out 185,000 voters from the electoral 
register (Bg-Turk, 05/04/2007).  This act was repeated in 2012, before the local elections, as the 
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B) Leverage on the administration: state and local level 
The migrant associations contribute to shaping Turkish foreign policy towards 
the region via several means. It is safe to say that despite their activities at a local level, 
their leverage on a national level, particularly in the field of foreign policy making is 
minimal. For instance, the association leader Mümin Gençoğlu spoke about the defence 
of the Turkish minority in the Balkans only twice during his two-year-long mandate in 
the 1990s (Yenigün, 2004, 519). His son as a leader of the Confederation had numerous 
meetings with high-level leaders (Bülent Arınç etc.), but it would be hard to say that 
they have transformed the Turkish foreign policy toward the Balkans. Beyond this 
direct involvement the associations address parliamentary deputies elected from their 
electoral district. For instance via inter-parliamentary friendship groups these deputies 
can also get into contact with their counterparts and even represent these associations’ 
agenda in foreign travels and in the parliamentary debates. 
Otherwise the leaders of the main associations tend to become members of 
(prime) ministerial or presidential visiting groups in the neighbouring countries, and 
they have the right to speak to the Greek or Bulgarian prime minister about their 
problems and ask for some form of resolution (Yeşilbahçe, 2011, 299). Furthermore, 
they also have the opportunities to have regular meetings with various Turkish 
institutions which also play an important role in Turkish foreign policy making such as 
the TİKA or YTB (YTB, 2012). 
The immigrant organisations also become influential actors after the clash within 
the leadership of MRF in Bulgaria. Enjoying the support and friendship of Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan, Kasim Dal, the vice president of the party split from Ahmet Doğan in 
2011. After experiencing a growing popularity as a possible new leader, Kasim Dal 
tried to convince the immigrant organisations to support him. As he was the main 
contact person of the MRF toward Turkey, and he contributed substantially to the influx 
of Turkish capital into Turkish-inhabited regions in Bulgaria, he could expect a palpable 
support from these organisations. Even so, only one of them, Bul-Türk decided to side 
with him, while the others, including the most influential Bal-Göç, continued to favour 
the ‘traditional’ leadership. Seeing that this happened despite the fact that Turkish Prime 
                                                                                                                                                                          
government managed to pass a similar law, requiring longer residence (see more about the legislation: 
OSCE and Venice Commission joint opinion, 2011). 
For the 2017 March election, the number of ballot boxes was decreased in Turkey. Previously Bulgarian 
citizens in Turkey could vote at 140 electoral venues, however, before the election this number was cut 
back to 35 (Özlem, 31/03/2017). 
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Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan openly supported Dal against Doğan, demonstrates the 
autonomy of these associations from the Turkish (state) foreign relations (Kircaalihaber, 
2012). 
Although the political aspect has an overwhelming priority in the relations of 
Turkish immigrants and minority groups, the cultural side of these links also needs to be 
presented as a multi-level tie. As it was pointed out earlier, these associations have 
greater leverage over the municipalities which can directly finance and support their 
activities in the Balkans. These relations not only facilitate the ‘electoral trips’, but the 
realisation of a broad spectrum of events too. The associations can take part in mutual 
local-level visits and via twin city relations they can indirectly contribute to shaping 
bilateral relations. At various historical conferences and festivals they invite both local 
(immigrant) and foreign (from the Turkish or other minority group) participants to 
perform together. Furthermore, they play an important role in maintaining 
Turkish/Ottoman traditions in the Balkans and in Turkey as well (Baklacıoǧlu, 2007, 
105). They support the community remaining in the country of origin to preserve its 
identity by sending books and organising cultural events. For the public in Turkey, their 
publications, newspapers portray the region of origin, the cultural and historical heritage 
and even the current political issues. The Balkan Sentezi newspaper is particularly 
active in politics (Baklacıoǧlu, 2007, 106) 
These associations are able to shape Turkish public opinion for their cause; 
historically, Bal-Göç associations are successful in disseminating information regarding 
the current status of the Turkish minority group in Bulgaria. The various protests during 
the war in Bosnia (1992-1995) and ethnic conflict in Kosovo (1998-1999) led by 
Rumeli organisations showcased their visibility and importance.  
 
Twin city programmes 
 
Another important part of the cultural and diplomatic aspects is the emerging 
importance of twin town relations between towns in Turkey and the Balkans. This 
phenomenon is not new; the earliest twin town agreements were signed during the first 
half of the 20th century in western Europe. After World War II, these relations started to 
rise steadily and spread all over the continent. This process received a great impetus 
from the European Communities in 1989, when it started to support them in line with 
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the concept of bringing people closer to the concept of uniting Europe. After the 
collapse of communist regimes the number of twin towns swelled with participants 
coming from Central and Eastern Europe. 
Various factors can lead to signing such an agreement, but it is usually based on 
historical, cultural and geographical (proximity) aspects. For example some cities, 
suffering heavy losses during World War II signed an agreement by commemorating the 
casualties, or in order to demonstrate their rapprochement. Searching for ‘exotic’ 
partners can also influence a town’s leadership to choose a twin with less common 
characteristics. Finally, cities or districts where a substantial share of inhabitants 
originated from another region or town can be inclined to create a common historical 
memory as a bridge between two localities. The mass deportations and population 
exchanges after World War II paved the way towards this type of cooperation in Central 
Europe; we can see this phenomenon in the case of Hungarian towns, which lost 
significant parts of their German inhabitants, a historical event which later motivated 
them to establish cooperation with towns in Germany. 
The twin town relations between Turkish and Balkan towns usually follow this 
historical-demographic pattern. In the case of Bulgaria, there is a correlation between 
the proportion of Turkish inhabitants in a given town and twinning programmes with 
Turkish towns – usually having a stabile immigrant community. But the opposite also 
holds true: a higher proportion of immigrants from a Balkan country increases the 
probability of establishing relations with Balkan towns.  
We can see this phenomenon in the case of various towns. For example, 
Kircaali, a major Turkish-Bulgarian town has concluded agreements with Tekirdağ and 
Gasiosmanpaşa (a district of Bursa) and other towns with a Turkish community in 
Greece, e.g. Komotini. The main districts possessing a great number of immigrants in 
Istanbul or in Izmir have also already established some relations of this kind. 
The next stage for cooperation between towns was the establishment of 
municipality associations. In Turkey there are several organisations for this purpose, 
like the Union of Turkish World Municipalities (Türk Dünyası Belediyeler Birliği – 
TDBB) which was founded in 2003. Although the TDBB is usually based on Turkish 
cooperation, and the overwhelming majority of its membership is from Azerbaijan, 
Turkey and Central Asian countries, Balkan municipalities with negligible Turkish 
communities also joined the organisation. Moreover, the Balkans is considered in the 
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activities of the Union as a part of the ‘Turkish world’, as they organise various events, 
conferences about the region.  
It is difficult to say that the establishment of these relations is related only to the 
lobbying of göçmen associations. It should be considered as a tool of the municipality to 
enlarge its electoral base and demonstrate its readiness to strengthen the local identity. 
As many of the mayors possesses Balkan ancestors (or some of them were born in the 
peninsula), to find a partner town in the Balkans means creating a bridge through 
history and culture to the roots – as well as it means the same for some groups of 
inhabitants in the given town. Certainly this link is reinforced by the immigrants’ 
organisations as well. 
This phenomenon is highly noticeable in the case of Bursa. The mayor, Recep 
Altepe (AKP; elected in 2009, re-elected in 2014 and remaining in office until the end 
of 2017), who also has family ties to the Balkans, intended to transform the city’s image 
as the example of good relations between Turkey and the region. As he stated in 2012 
during a meeting of BALKANSIAD (Balkan Sosyal İktisadi ve Akademik İşbirliği 
Derneği – Balkans Social Economic and Academic Cooperation Association) organised 
with the participation of two AKP deputies (Mustafa Öztürk and Mustafa Kemal 
Şerbetçioğlu) and Turhan Gençoğlu among others, that  
‘Due to the investments realised by Bursa, the city has become a bridge between Turkey and the 
Balkans. Contrary to the previous periods, the meetings that we participate in are full of Turkish flags. A 
huge sympathy towards Bursa and Turkey has emerged in every corner of the Balkans. […] From here, I 
would like to thank our civil society organisations and our businessmen for their support for our work 
(Yeni Safak, 2012).’ 
 
The activities of twin town programmes are plentiful. Apart from the mutual 
visits followed by cultural folklore groups’ performances, these relations also pave the 
way for financial cooperation such as the renovation of mosques, establishing parks, 
playgrounds57 and so on. This also can ease getting aid from Turkish state actors, like 
the TİKA.  
Bursa, one of the best examples of cities intending to boost economic-cultural 
cooperation with the Balkans, has a great variety of activities, investments in the Balkan 
peninsula. The leadership of the city enjoyed good relations with the Movement for 
Rights and Freedom (Bursa Municipality, 2012). Furthermore, Bursa’s leadership 
follows the state foreign policy’s tenets towards the Balkans.  The city, in close 
cooperation with the TİKA, supports schooling (Cuba) in the region, and encourages the 
                                                          
57 See the example of Kircaali, in Bulgaria. 
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restoration of various Ottoman buildings, mosques (Sinan Pasa Cami in Kacanik – 
Albania, Gazi Baba türbesi, Rifai Dergahi in Skopje and so on), and organises religious 
happenings often in close cooperation with the Diyanet such as sünnet şöleni (banquet 
of circumcision) in order to emphasise the cooperation of Muslim communities within 
the region. In cooperation with various religious NGOs, it also launched the Continuous 
Cooperation and Communication Project with the Balkans (Balkanlarla Sürekli İşbirliği 
ve Temas Projesi) which aimed to organise events, bring together various actors and 
NGOs, provide a forum for networking and establish the basis for further cooperation 
(balkanisbirligi.org 2018). 
Due to the active Balkan presence, and relative wealth of Bursa, it has also 
attracted the attention of Balkan states. The most noteworthy evidence of these 
developments is the growing interest of Macedonian or Kosovar diplomatic activity 
towards the city. For instance, in May 2012, a conference about the investment 
opportunities was held in the city by the cooperation of the Embassy of Kosovo and the 
Bursa Commerce and Industry Organisation (Bursa Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası) in order to 
promote Kosovo as a destination for Turkish investments, which highlights the 
importance of Turkish local actors in bilateral relations. 
Although internal reasons are oftentimes grounds for establishing sister city 
relations (associations’ lobbying, historical ties, etc.), the Turkish state also pushed to 
strengthen these links.  Ahmet Davutoǧlu supported giving more room for manoeuvre 
for the Turkish cities. In 2011, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs signed an agreement with 
the Municipality of Istanbul about cooperation in areas such as education, foreign 
relations, diplomatic events in Istanbul and marketing activities abroad. Under this 
framework, the Ministry organised several seminars for the municipality personnel 
(Demirtaș 2016, 159). Kadir Topbaș, the incumbent mayor of Istanbul was given an 
award for his activities in foreign policy making as the leader of the biggest city in 
Turkey at the ambassadors’ conference in 2011, which clearly highlights the emerging 
importance of cities for the Turkish foreign policy makers. 
Another, but also important aspect of Turkish-Balkan twin city programmes is 
the cooperation of various congregations. The local muftis in Turkish towns and those 
from the Balkans can contact each other via the Diyanet and support the construction 
and renovation of mosques, participate in religious holiday celebrations and send 
financial and material support. Under this kind of cooperation the Muslim 
congregations organise the ‘circumcision tours’ and the mutual visits of local muftis – 
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who can visit other Turkish state-related or non-governmental charity organisations in 
the hosting country. These programmes are supported by the Diyanet because whereas 
building a new mosque (abroad) is legally prohibited for the Diyanet and the TİKA, 
they can nevertheless assist twin city programmes (Öktem, 2012, 44-45.). The “Twin 
Town programme” (Kardeș Șehirler Projesi) conducted by the Diyanet and TDV has 
led to the establishment of ties with 209 towns in 95 countries. For the year of 2015-16, 
TDV has supported these projects with almost 110,400 EUR (TDV Faaliyet Raporu, 
2016, 32). 
The vigorous relations between cities also contribute to the realisation of the 
governmental agenda. The AKP’s rhetoric about common history, cultural heritage and 
mutual belonging (like Erdoǧan speech about Kosovo in Prizren, in 2013) are also 
present in the mayors’ discourse as well. The aim to present Turkey as a provider of 
stability whose historical obligation is to defend its cultural heritage (and thereby the 
Muslim (and Turkish) kin in the region) received strong support from the 
municipalities. Their activities, as the author has already portrayed, are in line with the 
state’s endeavours and institutions. They support the renovation of mosques and other 
old Ottoman buildings, they take part in religious activities like circumcision tours, 
Ramadan activities and they organise events regularly with participants from the region 
concerning the common history and Ottoman legacy, the role of Islam in the Balkans, 
along with publishing and various marketing projects. The commemoration of 
Srebrenica is also part of the annual schedule of several municipalities. These projects 
and events are usually realised with the financial support of the state institutions (the 
TİKA, the Diyanet, etc.) which  arrange their activities not just in parallel but in some 
cases complementary to the state’s actions (for instance, the TİKA cannot build new 
mosques, however, the Diyanet can already contribute via municipal cooperation to the 
construction of new places of worship). Last, but least, municipalities can be also active 
in boosting economic relations by organising events, supporting business associations 
and investment opportunities. 
By doing this, they have become strong public diplomacy promoters, especially 
the municipalities with close relations to the Balkans, like Bursa, whose former AKP 
mayor was a driving force behind these programmes. This kind of ‘local diplomacy’ 
diversifies the tools of foreign policy making and their activities are easily put in the 
‘national’ hegemonic framework, especially in the cultural field, which was 
demonstrated by the cultural activities of twin town and other municipality level 
cooperation. 
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Faith-based social networks and charity organisations 
 
Sufi Islam has been an integral part of the Ottoman world for centuries leading 
to the establishment of the religious brotherhoods called tarikats that have accumulated 
a strong social base throughout centuries. In the Balkans, these movements were active 
in spreading Islam in the newly conquered areas. The Naqshbandi became dominant in 
Bosnia and Bulgaria, while the Khalwati order had greater influence in Albania, Kosovo 
and Macedonia. The Bektashis gained momentum from the 17th century and became 
popular in Albania and Macedonia. The territorial losses of the Ottoman Empire 
weakened their position; the communist regimes pursued a rather belligerent policy by 
outlawing (Bulgaria, Albania) or proscribing (Yugoslavia) them (Merdjanova, 2013, 6). 
After surviving the Cold War, these religious movements were reborn, even if they play 
a less important role than previously. Probably the strongest among them is the Bektashi 
order, whose followers are numerous in Albania’s southern territories. 
The tarikats had a ‘luckier’ history in Turkey, even if the state’s efforts towards 
secularisation had a negative effect on them and in 1925, they were banned by Atatürk. 
Surviving decades of the early republican period, they were legalised by the Democrat 
Party in 1950, which wanted to acquire the support of the religious electorate. In 
response to the challenges in the secular state, the tarikats emerged from a smaller, 
exclusive brotherhood to a network of loosely organised communities (cemaat), 
essentially faith-based social networks that could maintain and even strengthen their 
position and became well-embedded into the Turkish society (Solberg, 2007). As a 
network of several hundred thousand or even million people, they possess political and 
economic leverage. Without going into details, it is enough to point out that the most 
prominent one, the Nakshibendi movement played a role in the emergence of an 
Islamist political movement (Milli Görüș) and the establishment of other religious 
movements, like Nurcu, Işıkçı, Menzil, the Erenköy community, alongside the 
Süleymancı and Gülenist movement.  
Several neo-Sufi communities appeared in the Balkans after the end of 
communism. Basically, they strive to build close relations with religious institutions and 
rather focus on religious education by providing various courses, translating their 
leaders’ or founders’ works into local languages, and in some cases, in cooperation with 
Turkish state actors to build/renovate/finance local religious schools, mosques. 
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Naturally, their activities are in line with the Turkish Sunni-Hanafi traditions similar to 
the Islam in the Balkans, which make their endeavours more acceptable for local 
authorities who sometimes consider them as allies to prevent the emergence of Wahabbi 
leverage.  
Turkish charity organisations are active in the Balkans, too. The most prominent 
ones were established during the 1990s and they maintain close ties with the Islamic 
movements and faith-based religious networks. The associations and foundations have 
given a safe opportunity for these networks and pious Muslims to channel their 
voluntary and ritual alms, donations for higher purposes. They were quick to enter the 
international level in the 1990s; the various Balkan wars (the conflict in Bosnia in 1992-
1995, in Kosovo 1998-1999 and in Macedonia in 2001) enhanced their profile in 
parallel with a growing focus on the region and its co-religionists from Turkish society 
(Solberg, 2007). 
The establishment of the Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and 
Humanitarian Relief (İnsan Hak ve Hürriyetleri İnsanı Yardım Vakfı – İHH) was 
directly influenced by the events in Bosnia. It was established by Milli Görüș in 1995, 
and it distributed aid to war victims and refugees in Bosnia; it was the sole Turkish 
charity organisation that entered the country during the conflict. It also participated in 
helping locals and refugees during the war in Kosovo. After the end of war activities, it 
also kept ‘spiritually’ supporting  the Balkan Muslims by providing them with religious 
books and publications in the following years. Although it focuses more on war zones in 
Africa and the Middle East, and it is one of the biggest supporters of Syrian refugees in 
Turkey and IDPs in Idlib, they pursue projects in the Balkan region too.  
Despite its engagement in other parts of the world, it is the most active Turkish 
charity organisation in the Balkans. In 2017, in cooperation with Ministry of Sport and 
Education, the İHH undertook a motorbike tour (MotoBosna) from Istanbul to 
Srebrenica in order to commemorate the anniversary of the massacre (İHH, 
14/06/2017). The convoy later joined the 15th July commemorations in Turkey. The 
organisation distributed some 10,000 aid packages among 4,500 people in 2017 for 
Ramadan (İHH, 29/05/2017). It also organised drug prevention workshops with local 
authorities, NGOs and Turkish institutions, like YEE in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia (Sandzak) (İHH, 29/04/2017). 
The organisation also took part in catastrophe management after severe flooding in BiH, 
Albania and Macedonia during the previous years. It contributed to the construction of 
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new mosques in Albania in several places like Tush (2014), Grude Fushe (2015), in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Gorazde (2014). Other associations, like the AYDER, a charity 
organisation founded in 2005 and close to the İHH, also have minor activities in the 
Balkans. 
The Cansuyu Aid and Solidarity Association (Cansuyu Yardımlașma ve 
Dayanıșma Derneǧi) was established as a pro-Saadet organisation in 2005 in response 
to the earthquake in Pakistan (Solberg, 2007). In the following years, Cansuyu provided 
aid packages and organised iftars in Kosovo and Macedonia, however, recently it rather 
focuses on the Middle East and Africa. Nevertheless, it continues to provide aid 
(kurban) during religious holidays in the Muslim-inhabited regions in the peninsula.  
Deniz Feneri is probably one of the more well-known Turkish charity 
organisations, which was founded in 1998. It has close links to the AKP. It was awarded 
the right to collect donations without further state authorisation (Deniz Feneri, 
Hakkımızda, 018). The organisation usually provides kurban for religious events and 
sends material aid to several thousand poor families, however, the Balkans play a lesser 
role in its work compared to the Middle East or Africa in this respect. In 2007, it sent 
clothes and tools for the Haxhi Sheh Shamia school’s dormitories in Albania. In the 
same year, it constructed a faculty building for a university in Mostar (Deniz Feneri, 
Balkanlar, 2018).  
Faith-based communities also created foundations that have become active in the 
Balkans. One of most important organisations is the Aziz Mahmut Hüdayi Foundation 
which was established by the Erenköy community in 1985 aiming to provide support for 
religious, educational activities and aid for people in need. Beyond its programmes and 
schools in Turkey, the Foundation has become active abroad as well, in the Balkans and 
in Africa as well in line with the Turkish state policy. By now, it operates four faculties, 
6 high schools, 20 imam hatip schools, 23 Qur’an courses, one imam institute, two 
research centres, 14 cultural centres, 56 dormitories and 12 day-care centres globally 
(Hudayvakfi, Eǧitim hizmetleri, 06/01/2018). 
Aziz Mahmut Hüdayi Foundation started its local activities during the Kosovo 
war by distributing aid to the locals. After the conflict, Istanbul International 
Brotherhood and Solidarity Association, which belong to the community, opened a 
permanent office in Pristina. It follows the ‘traditional’ activities of other religious 
movements like providing Qur’an courses and opening dormitories in close cooperation 
with local religious authorities. It managed to launch a Hafz course in 2005 in Gjakova. 
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Since its foundation some 30 people have become hafiz (2018, 55) and they reopened a 
medrese (Büyük medrese) in 2006 as well (Solberg, 2007). In Giljan, they constructed 
the Ali Yakup Efendi dormitory (TimeBalkan, 04/12/2016).58 They run two dormitories 
for boys in Prishtina and Prizren respectively, while they opened Rabia Hatun Hifz 
course and they have a female student dormitory under construction is Prizren. They 
have built a mosque in Viti (Medine mosque) (2017, 13). 
The community became active in the early 2000s in Albania and Macedonia as 
well. In Skhodra, the community started to support the Haxhi Sheh Shamia madrasha in 
2000 via the Istanbul Foundation (Shoqata Istanbul). Due to the support, the institution 
started to grow: it has separate education for girls and boys and offers dormitory 
accommodation. In 2014 they opened a kindergarten, in 2015 a primary school, while 
two years later they established a cultural centre. The prestigious school offers high-
quality education and its students tend to achieve good results at school competitions. In 
line with the modern facility, the school has around 1,100 students, which makes it one 
of the biggest pre-university educational institutions in a country of less than 3 million 
people. Moreover, it is able to pay the best teachers, who can earn 30% more than in 
other local schools (TRT, 24/01/2018). 
These recent projects were carried out with the support of Turkish state 
institutions and Üsküdar municipality (Üsküdar is the district of Istanbul where the 
Erenköy community was founded). The TİKA provided computers and other tools to 
enhance education capacities and recently it also contributed to the construction of 
primary schools. Even Recep Tayyip Erdoǧan participated in the opening ceremony via 
videoconference (TİKA, 2016).59 They also financed the construction of mosques, for 
instance the Haxhi Sheh Shamia Mosque in Albania and contributed to the renovation 
of Hamidiye Medrese in cooperation with Deniz Feneri and Kadinana Mosque in Stip 
(Ali, 2018, 305). 
The prestigious Nurcu community only has a few representatives in the Western 
Balkan countries, and they are not as influential (Solberg, 2007), nevertheless, their 
presence is growing. One of its foundations, the Hayrat Vakfı provides aid during 
Ramadan. (hayratvakfi.org, 2018). In cooperation with the Hayrat Derneǧi (Hayrat 
Association), which was founded in 2013 for charity works, in 2017 it was awarded the 
                                                          
58 Ali Yakup Cenkçiler was born in Giljan and became a prominent theological scholar in Fatih, Istanbul. 
59 The President’s participation at this type of event is not unprecedented, he often takes part at similar 
occasions. 
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right to collect donations without state permission. It takes part in humanitarian 
activities in Syria and other parts of the world (Hayrat Yardım, 2018, Tarihçemiz). 
The Hayrat Vakfı, which is one of the engines of the Osmanlı education in 
Turkey – its activities are underpinned by a protocol signed with the Ministry of 
Education as well – offers Osmanlı courses in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sarajevo), in 
Kosovo (Prizren and Pristina) and in Macedonia (Skopje and Tetovo) through its local 
branches (Hayrât Balkan İlim, Kültür ve San'at Vakfı), in cooperation with the Yunus 
Emre Institute (TimeBalkan, 03/11/2017). 
 The Süleymancı movement (whose founder, Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan was born 
in Bulgaria) have much stronger positions in the region. The community seeks to teach 
local Muslims about the Turkish Sunni-Hanafi tradition and it is opposed to the spread 
of Wahabbi Islam. Consequently they are active in religious education and provide 
Qur’an courses and run several dormitories where the students receive a strict religious 
education (Solberg, 2007). 
The community’s institutions are run by various foundations and NGOs whose 
projects cover ‘traditional’ areas such as supporting religious holidays (providing 
kurbans), organising events, conferences, providing scholarships, publishing and 
translation activities. Among these pro-Süleymancı associations the more prominent in 
the Balkans are the Balkan Education and Culture Association (Balkanlar Eğitim ve 
Kültür Derneği) and the International Development and Union Association (Uluslararası 
Kalkınma ve İşbirliği Derneği). 
The Süleymancıs entered into Albania in 1996 and they opened around ten 
dormitories in the country. In the early 2000s they appeared in Macedonia, Kosovo and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, where they established dormitories (Solberg, 2007). 
The Gülenist movement is the most influential faith-based network in the 
Balkans. It was established as a neo-Nurcu movement and emerged over the decades as 
an influential transnational quasi-political network with massive educational assets not 
only in Turkey but all over the world. At its peak, it operated around 300 schools in its 
country of origin and more than 1,000 in as many as 160 countries, including 120 
charter schools in the US (Watmough – Öztürk, 2018b, 34-37.) 
Although other Turkish religious movements have networks abroad, they mainly 
focus on the Turkish diaspora groups without forging strong links to the host countries’ 
authorities, or in other cases they remain active only in the religious field and work 
together almost exclusively with the Muslim authorities. The Gülenist movement, 
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however, implemented a different strategy based on adaptability to the host country’s 
customs and sensibilities (Balcı, 2014). Compared to other networks, the movement did 
not push a religious agenda; its religious background usually remained hidden from 
view; for instance, it did not enter into public debates about the representability of Islam 
in public spheres despite the issue’s importance in western Europe. Furthermore, they 
rather intended to build close ties with Christian and Jewish groups in the West, 
emphasising the importance of the dialogue between religions and the need for mutual 
respect, thus their adaptability proved fruitful. As Balcı points out: “Host countries 
welcomed the Gülenist community because it offers institutions and services that 
benefit local populations without attaching religious strings” (Balcı, 2014). 
In order to build a network abroad, the movement usually followed the same 
model in every country: after sending some members from Turkey, who managed to 
establish a local umbrella organisation – usually a foundation – in the host country, they 
opened various levels of educational institutions, regularly primary and high schools, 
and in several cases, even universities. At the beginning, these institutions received 
financial support from the community in Turkey, until they became financially self-
sustainable. Donations were crucial for expansion, and later these financial 
contributions were paid back through various means to the medium or larger-sized 
businesses and contributors (e. g. they could become suppliers of schools, etc.) 
(Watmough – Öztürk, 2018b, 41-42). 
It is important to stress that these educational institutions function as 
international schools providing English-language curriculums, and they are for-profit 
organisations demanding fees from the majority of their students (even if they usually 
grant scholarships in some cases). According to this business model, these institutions 
intend to provide a competitive and state-of-the-art knowledge (in languages and 
sciences) within a secular curriculum. As their operation has to be approved by the host 
state, they have to comply with the domestic regulations of the given country where 
they reside. They are open to everyone, not just Turkish expatriates; moreover, to avoid 
any conflict with the authorities about religion, they do not implement any religious 
agenda. As prestigious secular schools, they can appear as a possible choice for secular 
or non-Muslim students while they also give the chance for Turkish migrants to advance 
in integration into the host society while receiving valuable knowledge. While these 
schools enjoy the support of local and state politicians and authorities, they emerge as 
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social mediators (Balcı, 2014) between the immigrant minority and the local majority 
through homogenising education. 
To strengthen the good relations and boost their positive image, Gülenist 
foundations or umbrella organisations intend to create good social relations with the 
host communities (not just at the state, but at the local level as well, especially with the 
municipalities where their schools and colleges are located), which was a major 
component in their success. These institutions regularly organise cultural events. Their 
programmes vary depending on the host country’s context, but they are usually related 
to Islam. Gülen himself appeared as a person advocating the dialogue between 
civilisations and religions, and emphasised the peaceful nature of Islam, so the 
movement benefitted from generally positive perceptions even in non-Muslim 
countries. Naturally, these programmes also give impressions about Turkey and the 
Turkish Islamic traditions because the members coming from the country portray their 
own cultural heritage and context. 
 After the end of Cold War, it was the Gülenist movement among the social 
actors that was able to exploit the collapse of communist regimes in the East and also 
create a strong presence in the West the most successfully. Gülenist organisations were 
even more popular in Central Asia than Turkish state initiatives and could establish a 
strong network of schools and universities. In Africa, the movement was the first to 
open Turkish schools and a real engine in promoting Turkish political and economic 
interests on the continent. The Gülenist business organisation TUSKON, which opened 
offices all around the world, supported the expansion the Sub-Sahara Africa by 
convening business forums and conferences, usually with the support and participation 
of Turkish state authorities. During the last twenty or thirty years, the movement 
established strong relations with the host societies, and contributed to ‘elite’ formation, 
especially in Central Asia, where tens of thousands of students graduated from the 
Gülenist schools. Although the majority of the students do not create or preserve close 
ties to the organisation, the possibility of networking is tremendous, especially if former 
students enter into political or administrative careers. 
So, the movement could emerge as a useful tool of Turkish soft power. Turkish 
diplomacy tried to benefit from the Gülenist network, their knowledge and good 
relations with the host country’s administration. The movement’s contribution to 
promoting Turkishness and Turkish culture all around the world resonated well back in 
Turkey as well. The famous Turkish Language Olympiad demonstrated at home that 
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Turkish language education is advancing abroad and the importance of the country is 
growing not just in Central Asia, but in Africa as well.  
Not surprisingly, the Gülenist movement also appeared in the Balkans. Like in 
Central Asia, the collapse of communist regimes and the transition to democracy paved 
the way towards the region in the early 1990s. The first schools were established in 
Albania and Bulgaria (1993), while gradually they gained ground in Macedonia (1996), 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1997) and Kosovo (2000) (Öktem, 2012). Although they 
are seemingly more focused on Muslim-inhabited states, their activities in Romania 
highlight their willingness to go beyond the Muslim communities and deliver a more 
inclusive educational programme.  
Gülenists were welcomed by these countries who perceived them as an adequate 
partner to re-organise or (re-)establish Islam and Islamic education and religious life in 
a democratic context. The movement’s attempts were very successful in Albania, where 
the state had to rebuild its relations with the Islam almost from its very foundations.  
The medreses established after the early 1990s by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates were facing serious financial difficulties when their founders stopped the 
support; the Muslim community turned to the Gülenists who were already operating in 
the country and had established a good reputation. Thus, the movement took over the 
first school in 1995; in 1998 they acquired the medrese of Kavajë. When the Katari 
Foundation gave up the medrese in Tirana, the Gülenist movement seized it. In 2010, 
the movement reconstructed the medrese and a mosque (built in the Arab style) in 
Korça. The movement entered into the realm of religious education rather as an 
exception (Öktem, 2012, 50). Similar endeavours took place in Bulgaria, where the 
Gülenist network started its activities in religious schools; nevertheless, these 
institutions were placed under the custody of the Turkish state in 1998 after an 
agreement between Sofia and Ankara.  
The movement’s representatives, coming from a secular state and promoting a 
moderate, dialogue-seeking approach were convincing for state authorities to deter and 
prevent the possible spread of radical Islam, and the emergence of Wahabbism among 
Muslim groups. Thus, the movement established a strong institutional background over 
the past 20-25 years. It has opened a foundation in almost every Balkan country and 
took part in the educational system by establishing schools and even universities. The 
Table 11 shows the movement’s penetration in the region. 
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Country Foundations University High school Primary school Kindergarten Language centre Other 
Student 
number
s 
Albania 
Fondacioni 
Gülistan  
Tirana, 1993 
 
Bedër Tirana, 
2011 
Mehmet Akif Ersoy College 
(for boys) 
Tirana, 1993 
MAEC (for girls) Tirana 
 Mehmet Akif Ersoy 
kindergarten, Tirana, 
2006 
 
Meridian course 
centre Qendër 
Kursesh Meridian, 
Tirana 
Medreses: 
Liria, Elbasan 
Hafiz Ali Korça 
Kavajë 
H. Mahmud Dashi, 
Tirana 
Vexhi Buharaja, 
Berat 
Korçës, Korçë 
 
6,500 
Hasan Riza Pasha College, 
2001 
X x 
Turgut Özal 
Education 
Instituion 
(Joint Stock 
Company), 
2001 
Epoka 
University 
Tirana, 
2007/2012 
 
Turgut Özal High School 
Tirana 
X x 
Turgut Özal High School 
Durres 
X x 
Memorial International School 
of Tirana 
X x 
Total  2 6 4 5 1 5 medreses  
BiH Bosna Sema 
International 
Burch 
University, 
Sarajevo, 2008 
Richmond Park International 
School, Sarajevo, 1997 
X x  Fidan tourist 
agency 
 
Hikmet publication 
2,800 
Richmond Park College, 
Sarajevo, 2005 
   
Richmond Park International 
School, Tuzla, 2003 
X x  
Richmond Park International 
School, Zenica, 2009 
X x  
Richmond Park International 
School, Bihać, 1997 
(former Una Sana College 
(Unsko-Sanski Koledz) 
X x  
 International 
primary school, 
Mostar, 2013 
  
Total  1 5 5 4    
Bulgaria 
  Drujba High School, Sofia, 
1999 
X x Language Centre Zaman newspaper 
1,100 
 Drujba High School, Plovdiv, 
2005 
X   
Total   2 2 1 1   
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Croatia 
     Sjajna zvijezda 
edukativni centar, 
2008 
 
200 
Total      1   
Kosovo 
Fondacioni 
Atmosfera 
2004 
 Mehmet Akif Ersoy College 
Pristina 2000 –> moved to 
Lipjan in 2010 
X x   
2,500 
 MEAC, Prizren, 2006     
 MEAC,  Gjakova, 2010 X x   
  International School 
of Pristina, 2002 
x   
 Hasan Nahi High School 
Pristina, 2013 
    
   YLLKA, Prizren, 2010   
Total   3 2 3    
Macedonia 
Tolerance and 
Safak 
Foundations 
 YKC Skopje Avtokomanda 
High School 
YKC primary 
school 
  Evar Tourist 
Agency 
 
Zaman newspaper 
2,000 
 
  YKC Skopje Butel High 
School 
   
  YKC Gostivar    
  YKC Struga X   
  YKC Strumica    
  YKC Tetova Bölgesel lisesi    
Total   6 2    
Montenegr
o 
       
 
Romania 
Lumina 
Lumina – The 
University of 
South-East Europe, 
Bucharest, 2010 
International School of 
Bucharest, 1996 
X x   
2,200 
 
  Școală Spectrum 
București 2003 
x   
 Liceul International de 
Informatica, Constanţa, 1994 
    
 Liceul International de 
Informatica, București, 1995 
    
  Școală Spectrum 
Constanţa 2003 
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  Școală Internațională 
Spectrum,  Cluj, 2010 
x   
  Școală Internațională 
Spectrum, Iași, 2010 
x   
  Școală Internațională 
Spectrum,  Ploiești, 2010 
   
  Școală Internațională 
Spectrum, Colentina, 
2016 
   
 Liceul Teoretic International 
de Informatica, Colentina 2016 
X x  Lumina Wolves – 
Clubul de Baschet 
(Pallady campus)  
Școala de fotbal Lucian 
Sanmartean (Pallady) 
Sport clubs 
  International School 
of Oradea, 2017 
x   
Total   4 9 4    
Serbia 
   Bejza primary 
school 
 Bejza education 
centre 
 
80 
Total    1  1   
 
Table 11. Gülenist organisations and educational institutions in southeast Europe 
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Gülenist schools have become popular in these countries, as they appeared 
relatively early after the regime change with an offer of good English education for 
affordable prices for the middle class or even for the elites. Several thousand students 
were enrolled in these institutions; some of them later on went to Turkey for further 
studies. Although the majority of the students were not involved in the movements’ 
activities, Gülenists could find supporters among the elites. In what is probably the most 
famous case, the President of Kosovo, Hashim Thaci enrolled his son in the Yahya 
Kemal School.  
The Turkish state did not hinder the emergence of Gülenist network in the 
region. Although from a distance, Turkish authorities could work together with 
movement in boosting Turkey’s image. This was even easier in the 2000s when the 
AKP and the Gülenist movement cooperated for years. The case of the two Turkish 
universities in Bosnia and Herzegovina clearly showed that the cleavages never 
disappeared between the various Turkish factions. Although the Gülen-linked Burch 
University and the AKP-affiliated International University of Sarajevo are located 
across from one another, in a pleasant neighbourhood of Sarajevo, they never entered 
into cooperation with each other (Öktem, 2010). 
After the corruption scandals in 2013-14, the existing cleavages soured into deep 
ruptures. The AKP’s hegemonic building process seeks to weaken or eliminate its 
internal adversaries, and this trend has appeared on the international level too. The coup 
attempt accelerated the conflict. The Turkish state representatives placed the closure of 
the Gülenist institutions on the agenda and asked Balkan countries to extradite Gülenist 
sympathisers.  
Ankara has voiced the need to combat the movement at a presidential level; the 
Turkish diplomatic apparatus started to campaign against the Gülenist network and 
influence in order for the host state’s administration to hand over Gülenists, close the 
movement’s schools and associations and cut or at least weaken its financial sources. 
All institutions having offices abroad are involved in the conflict. The Diyanet started to 
gather information about Gülenist foundations, schools, media outlets and individuals. 
This kind of intelligence activity was not restricted to the Balkans but the religious 
authority conducted them in Europe and Central Asia as well. Moreover, it also started 
to campaign against the network in line with the priorities of Turkish diplomacy.  
The successes of purges outside the borders showcase the leverage of Turkey 
and the current status of relations with other states. The majority of the countries did not 
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comply with Turkish demands. The institutions were not closed, nevertheless some 
people were extradited. Bulgarian authorities opened investigations against a dozen 
organisations allegedly having links to the movement. In August 2016, they also handed 
over Abdullah Büyük, a prominent Turkish businessman who fled the country in 2015 
and requested asylum, without the official extradition request of Turkey and despite the 
ruling of two Bulgarian courts about his deportation. Other seven alleged Gülenist 
supporters were deported to Turkey in October 2016 (Balkan insight/31/05/2018). 
Another country cooperating with Turkey in this issue was Kosovo, which 
detained a teacher – Uǧur Toksoy – in October 2017, however, the prosecutor later 
withdrew his request citing lack of evidence. In contrast, Pristina extradited six 
Gülenists – among them the director-general of Gülenist schools in the country - to 
Turkey. These people were employed in the movement’s schools in March 2018. After 
the six Turkish nationals were sent back to Turkey, the Prime Minister, Ramush 
Haradinaj sacked the Minister of Interior and intelligence chief saying that the event 
occurred without his knowledge. The authorities argued that the extradited teachers had 
no valid residence permit; however, Kosovo's Ministry of Internal Affairs clarified that 
it had revoked the residence permits of those arrested (Balkan Insight, 29/03/2018). 
Other extraditions from the regions are rather sporadic. Albania announced its 
intention to deport one suspect in 2017, namely Muhammed Yasir Aydoğmuş and his 
family, based on the international arrest warrant issued by Ankara. He was captured 
when he intended to enter into Italy from Durrës. Nevertheless, there is no news about 
his extradition to Ankara since his arrest at the time of writing. 
Despite the pressure coming from Turkey, some countries in the Balkans, like 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia are considered as ‘safe’ for the 
movement’s members (Hurriyetdailynews, 15/08/2016). In Albania, the government 
only took one direct decision again the community’s schools, thus prohibiting these 
institutions from showing Turkish flags and other symbols (Exit, 01/05/2018). 
Nevertheless, the situation can change dramatically for the movement as Turkey 
keeps pressuring its local partners to extradite its members and close their schools and 
associations. After the coup, many Turkish parents stopped sending their children to 
Gülenist schools, which consequently had to rely more on local and international 
students. In the wake of all these difficulties, the majority of these organisations 
continued to provide Turkish-language education. Nevertheless, the fear is apparent. In 
Bosnia the Sema Foundation that runs the Gülenist schools was sold first to an 
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American organisation, and was later given to a British foundation which is also linked 
to the movement. Right now, these educational institutions use the British flag under the 
name of Richmond Park Schools. 
 
To conclude, the Turkish society has its own links with the Balkans. It possesses 
various tools to maintain the inter-regional relations and even to shape or at least 
influence state politics. Although the migrant associations’ leverage on Turkish foreign 
policy is very limited, there is a common interest between state representatives and civil 
society leaders to cooperate. By inviting some of these leaders to official visits, 
undertaking consultations with them, or supporting their programmes, the authorities 
show their co-option into the hegemonic bloc. This happens mainly at a local level 
(sometimes strengthened by ministerial visits) where the AKP mayor works together 
with them in order to win votes and gain support from a minor, but very well-organised 
group.  
The interregional cooperation between twin cities also underpins the co-optive 
nature of relations: Turkish local authorities, municipalities and muftiates all follow the 
policy and the rhetoric of the centre. By doing so, they also become part of the 
hegemony-building process, not just at home, but increasingly abroad, even in the 
cultural field.  
The coup d’état attempt and the government reaction has showed the deep 
struggle over hegemony in Turkey. The purge against the Gülenist movement/FETÖ 
was successful and dismantled its economic, educational and social tenets in Turkey, 
however, the conflict did not end at the state border but rather spread to the international 
stage. This import of Turkey’s internal debates presented a dilemma for southeast 
European states. Basically, the Balkan countries made attempts to stay neutral in this 
struggle, however, in some cases, like Bulgaria and Kosovo, they have struck a 
compromise with Ankara. Nevertheless, this internal conflict and the political 
developments in Turkey itself eroded its leverage.  
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2.5. Local allies: the co-option in practice 
 
The Turkish activities led to finding local allies who have become promoters of 
the AKP’s vision in the region. Even Davutoǧlu’s own charisma and network served as 
a useful tool in this respect. In Macedonia, a group of Muslim intellectuals led by 
Adnan Ismaili (a close friend of Davutoǧlu) founded a publishing house (Logos A) 
which printed the translation of various works of Turkish and Islamist thinkers. 
Davutoǧlu’s Bosniak students from Kuala Lumpur are also employed in the state 
administration of Bosnia (Öktem, 2012, 26).  
Local, pro-Turkey charity organisations can also be found in the region. In 
Albania, the most important among them is the ALSAR. It is led by Mehdi Gurra, who 
graduated from a Turkish university, has close relations to Turkish governmental 
institutions and charity organisations. Its leader usually participates in high-level 
meetings where even the Turkish president is present. The ALSAR pursues the 
‘traditional’ pro-Islam charity activities such as providing Qur’an courses and other 
religious education, participating in the renovation or construction of mosques, 
providing aid packages for the poor and orphans, or supporting cultural activities. The 
former is a clear example how the AKP’s hegemony is constructed abroad. The local 
leadership acts together with Turkish institutions and organisations in the realisation of 
projects which are in line with the hegemonic project, thus strengthening and co-opting 
the co-religious community in the Balkans, and boosting the leverage of Hanafi Islam 
and the legacy of the Ottoman past. As it was already mentioned, Mehmet Akif Ersoy 
emerged as a leading historical figure of ‘Ottomanness.’ Not surprisingly, the ALSAR 
has organised a conference about him as well in 2016 with the participation of the 
AKP’s Minister of Education, Nabi Avcı (Haberler, 11/03/2016). 
A good example of intra-institutional cooperation was the new mosque of Tush 
in Albania. The project was realised thanks to the common work of ASFAR-İHH-TİKA 
and Konya municipality between 2012 and 2014. Importantly, the mosque was built in 
the Ottoman style. The collaboration also opened the doors of the first hifz school in the 
country (İHH, 06/12/2014). 
At a political level, two groups were more receptive to the AKP. They can be 
perceived as ‘natural’ allies, but their leverage is limited. Firstly, the Turkish parties, as 
local representatives of the Turkish minority which receive support through the network 
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of state institutions like the TİKA or the Diyanet. One (sometimes two) Turkish parties 
usually manage to enter the parliament, even where the community is small like in 
Kosovo, Macedonia or Romania. Despite their small number, this is facilitated by the 
minority-friendly domestic legislation of the given country, the domestic political 
landscape, and probably also to the role of Turkey (even if the “Ankara factor” is hardly 
measurable, it is fair to think that even a small community can enjoy greater room for 
manoeuvre if it has a strong and influential supporter in the international arena). Mahir 
Yaçılar, President of the Kosovo Democratic Turkish Party (KDTP) served as Minister 
of Environment and Spatial Planning between 2007 and 2011, and in 2011 he became 
Minister of Administration and except for a short interlude he could secure his 
ministerial post. In Macedonia, where Turkish parties are always present in the 
parliament, Furkan Çako, a member of the Turkish Democratic Party was appointed 
minister without portfolio by Prime Minister Nicola Gruevski. 
Country name/Parties Election years 
Bulgaria (240 seats) 2001 2005 2009 2013 2014 2017 
Movement for Rights and Freedoms 
(HÖH) (1991) 
21 34 37 36 38 26 
Democrats for Responsibility, Solidarity 
and Tolerance (DOST) (2016) 
      
 Other parties60        
Macedonia (120-140 seats) 2002 2006 2008 2011 2014 2016 
Democratic Party of Turks in Macedonia 
(TDP) (1990/1992) 
2 2 1 1 1 1 
Party for the Movement of the Turks in 
Macedonia (THP)  
1    1 1 
Movement for National Unity of Turks 
(TMBH) (before 2008) 
   1   
Kosovo (120 seats) 2001 2004 2007 2010 2014 2017 
Kosovo Democratic Turkish Party 
KDTP (2001) 
3 3 3 3 2 2 
Kosovo Turkish Union Party (KTBP) 
(2010) 
      
Kosovo Turkish Justice Party (KTAP) 
(2013) 
      
Romania (334-329 seats, Chamber of 
Deputies) 
2004 2008 2012 2016   
Democratic Turkish Union of Romania 
(RDTB) (1990) 
1 1 1 1   
Table 12. Turkish minority’s political parties in southeast Europe 
 
By contrast, it is difficult to see the direct benefit from these appointments. 
Lobbying usually happens behind closed doors. Only a few examples showed the 
                                                          
60 People's Party "Freedom and Dignity" HŞHP (2012),  Party for Democracy and Justice (DAP) (1993), 
Movement of the Democratic Wing (DKH) (2003). 
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palpable support of the Turkish parties. For instance, the Movement for Rights and 
Freedom voted against the law declaring that there was an Armenian genocide. This 
issue was brought to the parliament by the right-wing radical party ATAKA in 2007 
(Novinite, 25/04/2007). 
But even the fight against the Gülenist movement/FETÖ did not receive the 
expected assistance. Critics were publicly against the Turkish political leadership in 
Kosovo because of its failure to cancel its relations with the movement and the lack of 
harsh actions (Yeniakit, 28/12/2016). 
However, the Turkish parties are not unanimously pro-AKP in the region. The 
MRF, which is the strongest Turkish political movement boasting a respectable 
electorate in Bulgaria (and even in Turkey) does need Ankara’s support at all. There 
was a personal animosity between its long-standing leader Ahmet Doǧan and Recep 
Tayyip Erdoǧan. The MRF and the AKP are opposites ideologically, too. The MRF is a 
liberal (one could argue left-wing) party which sits in the ALDE group in the European 
Parliament. As many Turks in Bulgaria, the party leadership is secular. Furthermore, the 
MRF is well-embedded into the Bulgarian political elite and has good relations with 
Russia. This led to internal clashes when the then president of the party, Lütfi Mestan 
expressed a strongly pro-Turkey stance when it downed a Su-24 jet which entered into 
its airspace on 24th November 2015. Mestan was removed from his position, 
demonstrating that the real leadership is still in the hands of the founder of the party, 
Ahmet Doǧan, who was not co-opted by Turkey. Shortly after the political fiasco, 
Mestan started to organise a new party with Ankara’s support. His new political 
organisation, Democrats for Responsibility, Solidarity and Tolerance or DOST (which 
means ‘friend’ in Turkish) was founded in 2016 and participated in the general elections 
in March 2017. However it fell short of entering the parliament while the MRF could 
maintain the majority of Turkish votes and stay in the legislation. 
The emergence of a strongly pro-Ankara Turkish party clearly highlights the 
internal divisions in the Turkish minority leadership. Ankara has demonstrated its 
support to Mestan: at the DOST’s founding conference many Turks participated from 
Turkey, such as Fatma Betül Kaya, the deputy chairperson of the AKP at the time, the 
deputy chairman of the MHP Semih Yalçın and the Turkish ambassador to Sofia, 
Süleyman Gükçe (Balkan Insight, 12/04/2016). Later, Turkish Minister of Labour 
Mehmet Müezzinoǧlu called Bulgarian Turks to vote for the DOST in the 2017 general 
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elections, which was also a sign of open political support from the AKP (Novinite, 
06/03/2017).  
According to the Bulgarian Prosecutor-General, an independent NGO called 
Batu Platform Association working in the mainly Turkish minority-inhabited Kircaali 
illegally supported the DOST’s campaign. Allegedly the organisation received some 
100,000 EUR in a transfer via a Turkish bank to buy food packages and later distribute 
among the DOST’s members and activists (Balkaneu, 20/10/2017). Furthermore 
Turkey’s support infuriated the nationalist Bulgarian parties who called the DOST a 
‘Trojan horse’ of Ankara. 
Certainly, Mestan’s party was not the only attempt from Ankara to launch a 
counter-hegemony project against the MRF. Kasim Dal, who was also a prominent 
figure of the party, founded a new organisation which received even less votes than the 
DOST. Until now, the DOST has posed the greatest threat to the MRF, but despite 
Ankara’s support it could not convince the majority of Bulgarian Turkish voters. It 
received strong support from the Bulgarian voters living in Turkey which meant that the 
AKP’s support was influential for this electorate (Çelikdönmez, 2017).  
Concerning the Turkish political organisations, the AKP’s local branch has to be 
mentioned. The so-called Union of European Turkish Democrats (UETD), which was 
established in Germany as foreign affiliate of the party in 2004, has created local 
branches all over Europe where a measurable Turkish (citizen) community was 
available. For the Balkans, the number of Turkish citizens is small, it varies around 25-
30 thousand altogether. Its most important political dimension – the number of voters – 
is also negligible compared to Western Europe. The number of voters enlisted for the 
2018 elections was 1,350 in Albania, only 2,462 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1,667 
voters in Kosovo, 2,517 in Macedonia, 571 in Serbia, and 6,819 in Romania, whereas 
Bulgaria had the highest number of possible voters with 7,602 registered people 
(Turkish Electoral Committee, 2018). Among these countries UETD owns local 
branches only in two countries, in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia.  
Naturally, its main focus is on Germany where more than half a million Turkish 
voters live, however, it appeared in smaller communities as well. It aims to promote the 
AKP in the diaspora, thus it organises meetings, conferences and intends to boost pro-
AKP sentiments in the electorate. Usually during the campaign periods in Turkey, the 
local branches host Turkish ministers, or even the prime minister or the president of the 
Republic. Due to the location of the community, the centre of gravity is in western 
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Europe, mainly in Germany, in the Netherlands and in Austria. Nevertheless, the 
gradual deterioration of the relations between these countries and Ankara, in parallel 
with an erosion of the public image of the Turkish regime, has led to diplomatic crises 
over campaigning in these countries before the 2017 constitutional referendum. By this 
time these three countries prohibited the campaign of Turkish ministers and even the 
president’s participation in these activities. This rule has been kept, thus for the 24th 
June 2018 general elections the AKP’s leadership chose another country as the site of 
its largest campaign meeting for the diaspora, namely Sarajevo. The event received 
major media coverage, highlighting Bosnia’s importance in the AKP’s narrative. 
Other political allies can be parties and communities that have more affiliation 
with religion. In the mostly secular context in southeast Europe, the list is tiny. As 
“Muslim” heritage and identity suffered huge losses during the communist era, the 
revival of Islam after 1989 did not reach high levels in the region despite the endeavours 
of various Gulf actors, the Diyanet and Turkish faith-based religious networks. 
Religiosity declined and identity politics were rather based on secular national identity 
that on religion. This is especially true for Albanians, whose nation-building process 
focused on language rather than faith. For Turks in Bulgaria, their identity was shaped 
by strong secular Turkish nationalism between the two World Wars and an anti-
religious communist modernisation. Among Albanian communities, the more religious 
groups are more positive to the AKP, nevertheless, its influence remained questionable.  
Seemingly the most influential political partner of the AKP is the SDA in 
Bosnia. The Bosniak nation-building process, especially its recent chapters have given 
more importance to Islam. The war in Bosnia, which was interpreted by many as a clash 
of civilizations, strengthened this feature. Moreover, the Dayton Agreement (1995) 
codified ‘nationalism’ as an integral part of the state system, a nationalism that emerged 
along religious divisions. The SDA, as the ‘owner’ of the heritage of Alija Izetbegoviç, 
has become a good partner for the AKP. In particular, its leader, Bakir Izetbegoviç is 
always present at Erdoǧan’s visits and has close relations with him. The benefits beyond 
the political marketing could be detected during the clash with the Gülenists. The 
party’s member, Kaplan condemned the movement’s activities in the country. Due to 
the SDA’s strong presence in the Federal Assembly, and the influence of Izetbegoviç, 
any similar declarations threaten the Gülenists’ positions. Nevertheless, the bottle is 
half-empty: despite the good relations the SDA had no real willingness or real power to 
chase the movement from the country. 
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A more recently founded political party in Macedonia also hit the headlines. The 
Movement BESA was created by Bilal Kasami and Zeqirija Ibrahimi, Chief Editor of 
Shenja magazine in 2014 as an anti-establishment party seeking justice, freedom and the 
fight against corruption. The party scored a surprise victory in the December 2017 
elections in Macedonia, when it received some 5 percent of votes. However, despite its 
success and challenge to the ‘established’ Albanian parties, the BESA entered 
weathered an internal crisis at the beginning of 2018. Since its establishment it was 
associated by its political adversaries as a pro-Turkey and pro-Erdoǧan party getting 
support from Turkey. The party leadership denied Ankara’s support (Balkan Insight, 
24/10/2014). 
The work of the Turkish institutions and faith-based religious networks achieved 
success in many ways. It is fair to say that both co-optation via socialisation and 
education (in Turkey or at home in Turkish schools) as well as financial incentives have 
led to the emergence of a growing pro-Turkey, pro-Islam elite, especially in the Western 
Balkans. By creating local associations, foundations, or even political movements, this 
elite contributes to the strengthening of Turkey’s position in the region. Despite their 
emerging number, these pro-Turkey groups could not ensure enough influence to 
conquer the most important political positions in the countries and they have remained 
rather marginal, even if they can show noteworthy results in their respective fields.  
The great difficulty for the projection of the AKP’s hegemonic project in the 
Balkans is that the social context is vastly different in southeast Europe, and there are 
comparatively fewer groups that can identify themselves with the AKP’s neo-Ottoman 
identity politics emphasising the role of Islam. Nevertheless, their number is growing, 
but in the current political situation in the Balkans, no major changes are expected in the 
upcoming years. 
Moreover, the slow advance of Turkey-related groups suffered a backlash after 
the 15th July coup attempt. The effect of the domestic conflict between the AKP and the 
Gülenist movement damaged Turkey’s positions abroad and led to a deepening internal 
division of Turks, or pro-Turkey people in the Balkans. 
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3. Turkey`s economic relations with the Balkans 
3.1. The role of economy in Turkish foreign policy 
 
This chapter intends to reveal the economic principles of Turkey’s foreign 
policy. In line with the internal, neoliberal transformation of Turkey, its diplomacy also 
got new impetus towards stronger representation and protection of Turkish economic 
interests. As shown in earlier chapters, the literature has already touched this topic.  
Kemal Kirișçi argued that Turkey is a trading state aiming to boost economic relations 
to gain new markets for trade and investment. Others also emphasized that the economic 
considerations serve as a base for Turkish activism (Pintér, 2013, Szigetvári, 2018). The 
country’s economic opening to Africa was also described mainly as an economic-driven 
phenomenon. Pundits even pointed out the role of Turkish business interests in in 
sending military troops to the struggling Somalia.  
Under the AKP era, Turkey has become the 17th biggest economy in the World 
(in 2016) thus member of G20. It also pushed forward an ambitious agenda by including 
economic goals in the ‘Turkey 2023’ aims, such as becoming one of the 10 biggest 
economy, reaching its total GDP 2 trillion dollars and 25 000 dollars GDP/Capita, an 
employment rate higher than 50% and unemployment rate below 5%, reaching an 
export of 500 million dollar per year and constituting the World’s total trade 1.45 
percent instead of 1.2 in 2012. (Republic of Turkey Export Strategy). 
In order to achieve its goals in the envisioned Export Strategy, eight sub 
strategies have been identified in eight areas such as 1) Culture, 2) Education, 3) IT, 4) 
Transportation, 5) Logistics 6) Tourism 7) Healthcare, 8) Construction export strategy. 
Nearly one hundred state institutions are involved in the realization of these strategies; 
some of them, like the Yunus Emre Institute, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the TIKA 
and so on were already mentioned in the previous chapters. Interlocking the foreign 
policy institutions with economic goals clearly highlights the increasing neo-liberal 
features of the Turkish foreign policy.  
Economic interests have always played a role in AKP’s commitment to the EU 
accession – at least in the first years in power –,, and until today economic 
considerations are important in maintaining the EU accession negotiations despite the 
fact that currently they are stalled. The launch of the accession negotiations in 2005 had 
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a strong effect on Turkish economy: the incoming FDI started to rise sharply mainly 
due to investments of European companies. The EU-Turkey Customs Union also had a 
positive effect on the Turkish economy, nevertheless its partiality (it is  not 
implemented in every sector) and other deficiencies (Free trade agreement signed by EU 
are not applied automatically on Turkey) compel Ankara to seek the updating and 
improvement of the agreement (EC/Impact Assessment/21/12/2016). 
As a whole, EU candidacy and accession talks were important for international 
investors to believe Turkey’s  dedication to market economy and rule of law . On the 
other hand, the perceptions about the weakening of these principles after 2013/2015 
contributed to the emerging difficulties facing the country(devaluating lira, rising 
inflation and unemployment rate).  
Nevertheless after 2002, the AKP was always insisting on boosting economic 
relations. The importance of economic incentives in Turkey’s foreign policy could be 
detected by the rocketing number of free trade agreements. While the country has 24 
agreements, 17 of them were signed during the AKP.61 Furthermore new dialogue 
institutions have been established. The so-called High-level Strategic Councils (Yüksek 
Düzeyli Stratejik İşbirliği Konseyi) serve as the highest-level forum for Turkish and 
foreign decision makers and businessmen to find common interest and sign investment 
supporting agreements. The first council has been established with Brazil in 2006. Until 
the end of 2017, Turkey has created 20 councils and in 2010 it also created a High-level 
Strategic Council with the involvement of four countries: Turkey, Lebanon, Syria and 
Jordan.  During the last more than a decade, 537 agreements were concluded at these 
council meetings (Çavuşoğlu, 2018, 7). 
The export oriented policy required the country to boost its investment 
promoting and foreign trade supporting institutions. In 2006, the Investment Support 
and Promotion Agency of Turkey (ISPAT) was founded subordinated to the Prime 
Minister’s Office. The originally small institute of 30 staff members doubled its size 
after 2010 (ISPAT, 2018). 
Sectoral and geographical incentives were also introduced during the AKP era. 
Firstly, it continued to maintain all 19 Free Zones (established during the 1990s and 
aiming to attract foreign investors by providing special regulatory treatment) and  it also 
implemented a new investment incentive regime in 2012 (Ekonomi Bakanlıǧı, 2018) in 
                                                          
61 The first one was signed in 1991 with the EFTA while the remaining 23 agreements were usually 
bilateral. 
245 
 
order to direct investors towards the less developed regions and simultaneously 
facilitate the arrival of new technologies. 
The Turkish Eximbank, which has been established in 1987, has supported 
Turkish foreign trade by 22 billion dollars in 2016 which covered some 23 percent of 
the total amount of the country’s trade. In order to facilitate the situation of Turkish 
companies, it opened new offices in major cities of the country; in 2017, in established 
in Denizli, Bursa, Adana, Konya, Kasyeri and more in Istanbul (Türk Eximbank: 
Hakkimizda, 2018). 
In 2011, after restructuring the foreign trade support institutions, the Ministry of 
Economy has become the main depositary of trade, but it also works on boosting 
investment opportunities. The Ministry possesses a network of more than 200 economic 
attachés employed at the Turkish embassies and consulates in a number of countries – 
in such a circumstance the increase of foreign missions played a crucial role in boosting 
economic relations all around the world. Nevertheless, the attaché system is just one 
pillar in promoting Turkish investment and trade. The Ministry organizes and supports 
various events, sometimes in close cooperation with other institutions and business 
associations. In some cases it also sponsors companies to join foreign exhibitions, to 
make market analysis and gives them information about the prospective markets in 
terms of legislation etc.  Through the Turquality project it helps enterprises to create 
their own brand etc. (Ekonomi Bakanlıǧı, İhracat destekleri, 2018) 
 Furthermore, it has established diverse, business supporting regimes in order to 
help Turkish enterprises to enter foreign markets. It has to be emphasized that this 
promotion activity is realized with the cooperation of business associations which 
constitute an important part of Turkish economic policy. 
Other important feature of Turkey’s economy and trade policy stems from the 
leverage of business associations. As we have already mentioned, a number of them, 
like TÜSIAD, MÜSIAD, TUSKON or TOBB have been being a strong actor not just in 
shaping the economic policy but influencing domestic politics as well. They had been 
usually established much before the AKP came to power, however, the party got strong 
support, especially in the early 2000s from them to push forward liberalizing the 
country’s economic policy.  
 The main, government related establishment, the DEIK was initiated by Turgut 
Özal who wanted an institution which represents and accumulate the interests of various 
business groups. Although the DEIK is a state organization, it serves as the main 
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business association promoting foreign investment opportunities for Turkish companies 
(Özcan-Turunç, 2011). 
The Turkish government supports Turkish companies at highest level via mainly 
four incentives:  
1) Business delegations. Usually a number of businessmen, sometime even 
several hundreds of them escort the President of the Republic or the Prime 
Minister at the official trips. These visits give the opportunity to the business 
groups to find partners in the destination country, simultaneously getting 
political support from top Turkish officials.  
2) Business forums. The economic forums initiated by various business 
associations play an efficient role in boosting relations. The former ally, the 
TUSKON was especially active in this field and was a major actor in shaping 
the Africa policy. Its business forum in 2005 got governmental support, 
when Abdullah Gül participated in the event thus demonstrating the support 
of the state. In the same year, the government decided to focus on Africa by 
declaring it the “Year of Africa.” As a consequence, the number of Turkish 
embassies and consulates in the region has skyrocketed. 
3) Strategy making. Major business associations, but especially the Turkish 
Exporters Assembly, the TİM plays an influential role in shaping and 
creating Turkey’s foreign economy policy. The TİM initiated the current 
foreign trade strategy of the country, and participated along with other 
association in its preparation. It was the TİM who managed to gain 
governmental support to launch Turkey’s main business branding project, 
the TURQUALITY in the mid-2010s and the ‘Turkey: Discover the potential 
campaign’ that has become the official slogan campaign for TURQUALITY 
project. The DEIK added the issue of Diaspora strategy to the agenda 
pointing out the economic incentives in Diaspora politics. Its sub institution 
established to represent business interests of the Diaspora, the DTIK seeks to 
strengthen the relations of Turkish businessmen living home and abroad. 
4) Business promotion. The Ministry of Economy in line with the 
TİM established the chain of Turkish Trade Centers (TTM) which main goal 
is to represent and host small and medium sized Turkish companies abroad. 
The selected firms got financial support to establish their 
office/showroom/depo abroad, more exactly in a given business centre rent 
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by TİM. Thus, the TTM serve as a supportive hub for the related Turkish 
companies. 
Thus, these incentives have facilitated the economic ‘success story’ of Turkey. During 
the AKP, the country’s average yearly GDP growth was between 3 and 7 percent. The 
total GDP has increased from USD 238.428 Billion in 2002 to USD 863.712 Billion in 
2016 in current prices. The change in GDP/capita followed the same trend: USD 9 330 
in 2002 while it rose to USD 25 247; the PPP GDP/Capita USD 3660 to 10 862. To put 
into comparison: for the same period, in case of Hungary, these values were USD 
14 549 USD to USD 26 700 USD and USD 6 665 USD 12 820, respectively (World 
Bank, 2018).  
 
Chart 6. The evoltuion of Turkey’s export and import during the AKP era, Billion USD 
(Source: TÜRSKTAT) 
 
The volume of foreign trade of Turkey also increased during the AKP era (Chart 6.). In 
2002, its export was 36 Billion USD while its import was only 51.5 Billion USD. 
Fifteen years later, in 2017 its export reached 157 Billion USD and the country’s import 
increased to almost 234 Billion USD (TURKSTAT). As the chart shows, this increase 
was not linear, and the financial crisis of 2008-2009 led to a strong downturn, however, 
the country could recover relatively fast. As the chart shows, during this time Turkey 
had to face a growing trade deficit. This deficit is mainly based on the country’s reliance 
on crude oil and gas as well as high value-added manufactured products, especially 
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from Western Europe. The trade deficit also makes Turkey’s balance of payment 
negative giving vulnerability to the economy. Despite the AKP’s commitment to the 
export-oriented economic policy, Ankara was not able to handle the deficit; even the 
country’s integration in the world economy increased its imports rather than the export. 
Much of Turkey 2023 goals were just partially achieved. In the current circumstances, it 
is likely that the country will not be able to reach its self-imposed aims during the next 
five years. The abovementioned problems, such as political challenges and security 
issues, diplomatic crises threatening foreign trade and investments (especially with 
Russia and EU countries), deteriorating economic perceptions about the country 
(decision of credit rating agencies etc.) affect Turkey. Subsequently, the difficulties  of 
the Turkish economy can decrease its capabilities to extend  economic power to the 
Balkans  if the AKP cannot find the antidote for these challenges. 
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3.2. Evaluation of Turkish-Balkans economic relations 
 
Overall economic picture of the Balkans 
The previous chapters have revealed the importance of the economic and social 
transformation in Turkey that outlined the need for a more economy and business 
oriented foreign policy. The frequent high-level visits in the Balkan countries, the fairs 
and events organized by business associations also drew the attention to growing 
Turkish interests and influence in the region. The increase in Turkish political activities 
is not and cannot be decoupled from Ankara’s economic interests in the region. 
Nevertheless, the dynamics in economic relations differ slightly from those in politics. 
By looking at the Balkans, one can state that the region during the last twenty 
years has faced various political and economic problems which damaged its economic 
performance. Especially the 90s have created a challenging period: the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia followed by wars and ethnic cleansing, mass emigration toward Western 
Europe and to neighbouring countries (e.g. the war in Kosovo in 1999 that pushed some 
two hundred thousand people to Macedonia causing huge economic and political 
challenges for the country) in line with the difficulties of the regime changes and 
transition from state-planned to free-market economy. These countries went through 
huge losses in welfare, social capacity and productivity (Gabrisch, 2015, 309). 
After the end of turmoil of the 90’s, the economic outlook the region has become 
more favourable: the prospect of accession to the European Union (especially after the 
summit of Thessaloniki, 2003) interrelating to the financial assistance programmes and 
the launch of Stability Agreements contributed to the stabilisation of the economy of 
these countries, even though the amount of assistance from the EU raised criticism. 
Moreover, some regional economic integration organisation has been formed. The 
BSEC, founded in 1992 has usually given more opportunities for countries being the 
Eastern part of the peninsula (Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey which group was enlarged 
by Serbia and Montenegro in 2004). 
The Eastern part of the region, avoiding deep economic and political turmoil 
(Romania, Bulgaria) and the more developed Western states of the former-Yugoslavia, 
Slovenia and Croatia providinng more efforts towards the EU have become members of 
the Union. These changes contributed to the massive inflow of investments and steady 
economic growth in these countries, especially after 2005 when they could benefit from 
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either the prospect of or the actual  EU Member State status. The remaining part of the 
Balkans, albeit instability continued to be permanent part of problems (among others 
dissolution of the Federal Republic of Serbia and Montenegro in 2006; clashes in 
Kosovo in 2004, 2011, and the declaration of his disputed independence in 2008; 
constant inter-ethnic tensions in Macedonia, political crises in Albania and Bosnia-
Herzegovina) also benefited from the overall growth. 
This favourable progress was halted by the financial crisis reaching the region at 
end of 2008. In 2009, Western Balkan countries had to face an average of 3.9% GDP 
contraction (Zeneli, 2014, 53). During the upcoming years, South-eastern European 
countries had to face significant recession resulting increasing unemployment, social 
tensions and budget deficits triggering austerity measures and the request for IMF 
packages in order to help recovering the economy. The financial crises triggered a fall 
of remittances of expatriates and a downturn in FDI especially in the Western Balkans 
where the decrease was around 30% in 2009 (Zeneli, 2014, 54). The spillover effect for 
the fragile Balkan countries facing high unemployment and weak institutions was harsh 
when the Eurozone crisis hit Greece. The Greek state which was an active and 
influential political and economic actor in the 1990s and 2000s had to face deep 
economic downturn, social and political instabilities as well as perpetual bailout 
packages forced by the EU. The crisis weakened its position over the region (especially 
in the financial sector, as Greek banks were active in Bulgaria, Albania etc.) that 
granted Turkey a special status (Fisher-Onar –Watson, 2013, 413-416). Ankara’s 
positive image of sustainable economic growth, its successful handling of the crises 
created favourable circumstances for economic power projection. It is not a 
coincidence, that even Serbia, a traditionally reluctant country toward Turkey intended 
to increase the cooperation and was ready to sign a free trade agreement during these 
crisis years. 
After 2011, a slow but steady economic growth returned to the region, however, 
its scale has remained low compared to the booming years of 2005-2007. Recent years 
show a more promising economic performance in case of these countries. Especially 
Romania and Bulgaria demonstrated a strong GDP growth by benefiting from the 
favourable international economic circumstances and EU funds. Nevertheless, even 
these changes could not overwrite the region relative underdevelopment and poverty 
compared to the neighbouring regions (especially in the Western Balkans), that led to 
the mass emigration of population toward wealthier EU member states (especially Italy, 
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Austria, Germany and the UK) and also, in a limited extent, towards Turkey 
(Istanbul/Marmara region). Nevertheless, the emigration did not affect these countries in 
the same manner; while some have to face with lack of workforce, others have high 
unemployment (Macedonia, Kosovo etc.).  
 By losing millions of people and having an aging population with decreasing 
and low fertility rate, even the sustainability of economic growth is questioned. Alarms 
are ringing because of the sharp decline of population in Bulgaria and Romania, but 
smaller states, like Croatia, BiH are also affected by this phenomenon. Even Albania 
and Kosovo – countries having relatively high fertility rate and young population – lose 
high percentage of their inhabitants due to the emigration.  The thesis does not want to 
address this problem, but highlight its relevancy for Turkish economic (and political) 
interests: decreasing and aging population means decreasing market that weakens 
Turkish business perspectives in the region on the long-run. The fragmentation of the 
region resulting in smaller markets, the relatively high corruption also makes the 
Balkans less attractive economic market.  
Table 13.  Ranking of Competitiveness of SEE countries (Source: World Economic Forum) 
 
The weakening of the EU’s transformative power can also have disadvantageous effects 
on the middle-income countries of the Balkan. Even the implementation of the 
neoliberal economic model based on the Washington consensus had huge deficiencies 
(Zeneli, 2014, 57). Despite the efforts, these countries’ productivity and 
competitiveness had remained low, even compared to Turkey which managed to 
achieve a higher rank over the last decade (see Table 13). 
The region also possesses some advantages which was attractive to (Turkish) investors. 
First, the Balkan states have cheap labour force that leads to relatively cheaper 
  2007-
2008 
2008-
2009 
2009-
2010 
2010-
2011 
2011-
2012 
2012-
2013 
2013-
2014 
2014-
2015 
Albania 109 108 96 88 78 89 95 97 
BiH 106 107 109 102 100 88 87 n.a. 
Bulgaria 79 76 76 71 74 62 57 54 
Croatia 57 61 72 77 76 81 75 77 
Macedonia 94 89 84 79 79 80 73 63 
Montenegro 64 65 62 49 60 72 67 67 
Romania 74 68 64 67 77 78 76 59 
Serbia 91 85 93 96 95 95 101 94 
Turkey 53 63 61 61 59 43 44 45 
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production (however low labour productivity counterweights it). Furthermore, its 
proximity to EU markets and strategic position also boost a favourable economic image.  
Its relative wealth of resources opened investment opportunities. Furthermore, while 
elite in the 1990s were not able to realize the economic reforms, these measures were 
postponed to the 2000s, especially in the Western Balkans. As neoliberal policies 
gained momentum, mass privatizations were launched providing opportunities for 
foreign investors; Turks also benefited from this (see later).  
 
Turkish economic interests and policies 
Ankara’s economic relations with the Balkans were shaped by its export-
oriented neoliberal economic policies. Thus, it also intended to establish the economic 
regime portrayed in previous chapter, like signing bilateral agreements about 
investment, free trade etc. and also founding high-level business councils. Nevertheless, 
as it was already explained, the neoliberal economic policy in Turkey is not the AKP’s 
invention, nevertheless, it continued its implementation. 
Turkish and regional authorities have signed a number of agreements to boost 
economic ties as tables 14-16 show. The main feature of these agreements is based on 
political and economic stability in case of given country. As Balkan countries have left 
behind the planning economy and pushed towards market economy and further 
integration into the world economy their readiness to sign trade and other economic 
agreements have risen. Turkey has managed to conclude these agreements with the 
relatively stable countries which avoided any wars in the mid-1990’s such as with few 
exemption with Romania and Bulgaria or Albania. The fact that some countries have 
gained independence during this period  has also affected the signature of these 
agreements: before 2006 it was impossible to conclude them with Kosovo or 
Montenegro. 
By analysing these agreements, it can be stated that the AKP has managed to fill 
the hiatus that could have not been done in the Western Balkans due to the wars in 
1990’s. Bilateral investment agreements were signed with Croatia and Serbia, free trade 
agreements with Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, and double taxation agreements with 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia. It is important to emphasize 
that while the some of these agreements were signed by previous government in the 
1990’s, overwhelming majority of them (especially the free trade agreements) came to 
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force just during the AKP’s era. By facilitating export and import Turkey could reach a 
better turnover in its trade and investment.  
 
Country name bilateral investment agreement  
signature In force 
Albania 1/06/1992 26/12/1996 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 21/01/1998 10/02/2009 
Bulgaria 6/07/1994   22/09/1997 
Croatia 18/02/2009  
Kosovo 14/07/1995 31/12/2017 
Macedonia 14/07/1995 27/10/1997 
Montenegro   - - 
Romania 02/03/2001 10/12/2003 
Serbia 03/03/2008 08/07/2010 
Table 14. Biletarel inverstment agreements between Turkey and SEE countries (Source: 
Ministry of Economy) 
Country name Signature Entry to force 
Albania 22/12/2006 01/05/2008 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 03/07/2002 01/07/2003 
Bulgaria 06/03/1995 01/01/2007 
Croatia 6/03/1995 01/07/2013 
Kosovo  - - 
Macedonia  07/09/1999 01/09/2000 
Montenegro 26/11/2008 01/03/2010 
Romania 6/03/1995 01/01/2007 
Serbia 1/06/2009 01/09/2010 
Table 15. Free Trade agreements between Turkey and SEE countries (Source: Ministry 
of Economy) 
Country name Signature 
Albania 04/04/1996 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 16/02/2005 
Bulgaria 07/07/1994 
Croatia 22/07/1997 
Kosovo  28/05/2009 
Macedonia  16/06/1995 
Montenegro 12/10/2005 
Romania 15/06/1997 
Serbia 12/10/2005 
Table 16. Double Taxation Agreements between Turkey and SEE countries (Source: 
Ministry of Economy) 
 
The establishment of supportive economic regime for Turkish trade and 
investment strengthened the formation of business support intuitions in the region. 
Turkey has at least one economic attaché in every Balkan country. 
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Evaluation of economic relations 
The foreign trade of Turkey was booming during the AKP’s period. Its value 
rose by six times from nearly 70 billion of USD in 2001 to 400 billion in 2014. The 
export increased from 31 billion to approximately 160 billion USD while the import 
rose from 41 billion to 240 billion USD. The foreign trade with the Balkans closely 
followed this spectacular change, even the region managed to increase its weight within 
the trade. The exports and imports between Turkey and the region have increased 
between 2002 and 2017 from 1.3 billion to USD 8.4 billion (export) and from 1.2 
billion to USD 6.3 billion (import).  The export share of these countries rose from 3.7 to 
5.3 percent while the import from 2.3 percent to 2.7 percent.  
 
 
Chart 8. Share of Balkan countries’ exort and import in Turkey’s trade (Source: 
TÜRKSTAT) 
Nevertheless, this change was also not linear. The export increased sharply until 
2007, while the upcoming years caused a decline in the Balkans’s share in Turkey’s 
export and imports. The economic downturn was relatively short in Turkey whose GDP 
growth already returned to its pre-crisis level by 2010. Meanwhile Balkans states 
reacted differently to the crisis. Small and less-open economies, like Bosnia and 
Herzegovina or the Kosovo were less affected due to their relative low integration to the 
international markets. Crisis management also affected these countries’ economies 
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while some (e. g. Romania) implemented a harsh austerity package that later facilitated 
the economic growth while others (like Croatia or Serbia) were slow to address the 
crisis.  
Following the downturn in 2008-2009, the slow economic recovery helped to 
revive the foreign trade, however, it could not reach the previous levels. The crisis had 
another effect. It not just reduced the volume of trade but also cut the Turkish export to 
these countries as their demand for import goods have decreased. The recovery shows 
that the import from Turkey started to grow leading to a new trade sufficit in Turkey. 
This decrease of export and import stopped in 2013 mainly due to Romania’s and 
Bulgaria’s increasing trade volume with Turkey.  
The balance of trade has also changed several times during the AKP’s rule. 
Usually Turkey has a tight trade sufficit with the Balkan countries except the years of 
2010-2013 when it had to face with measurable trade deficit. Despite the growing 
sufficit in recent years, its level could not reach that of the 2006-2007 period (Chart 9).  
 
Chart 9. Turkey’s trade of balance with SEE countries (Billion USD) (Source: 
TÜRKSTAT) 
The analysis of foreign trade relations shows that the main trading partners of 
Turkey are Romania and Bulgaria. Romania represented some 40 percent; Bulgaria 
received almost 30 percent of the total regional export in 2014. The import has been 
similar: in 2014, Romania’s share from to total import to Turkey was 47 percent while 
Bulgaria’s was around 40 percent. This value highlights the double-face of the Turkish 
interests. Although Ankara claims that it is committed to boost economic relations with 
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the Western Balkans, seemingly Turkish business groups prefer to choose greater and 
closer markets. Romania with its population of 19-20 million, Bulgaria with 7.3 million 
inhabitants give more than half of the total population of Southeastern Europe. Not just 
the size and the distance affect the foreign trade, although these are the major factors 
that explain these countries share. Romania’s and Bulgaria’s accession to the European 
Union in 2007 also improved the prospects for trade as Turkey is the member of the 
customs union since 1996.  
The second group – former Yugoslav states and Albania – has relatively 
balanced export relations with Turkey as the Chart 10 shows. While they diverge 
according to their level of development and size of their population, the picture is more 
complex. Kosovo’s relatively high proportion in the Turkish export, compared to its 
size  can draw attention.  
Nevertheless, Turkey’s import is minuscule from these countries. The main 
trading partners from this group are Serbia and Croatia – the most developed ones – 
while Kosovo’s export towards Turkey is almost negligable. However, recently Bosnia 
and Herzegovina’s share within Turkish import started to increase from its nadir 10.5 
percent in 2011 to 22 percent in 2014 within this country group.  
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While Balkan countries play a limited role in Turkey’s trade and investment, the 
economic importance of Turkey for these states also remains narrow. Despite the 
efforts, the country could not become a major trading partner of the region. Turkey 
usually occupies the 7-10th position among the most important trading partnerswhich is 
far from being crucial for these countries. Germany, Italy and even Hungary and other 
regional countries usually have bigger volume of trade with the region than Turkey. 
 Furthermore, Turkey’s export and import to the Balkan countries also remains 
under 10 percent, even if one can notice a narrow increase in recent years, and the 
volume of imports coming from Turkey are skyrocketing in Albania and Kosovo.In the 
case of major trading partners such as Bulgaria and Romania Turkey’s share is rather in 
decline than in increase. Based on the trend, only Kosovo and Albania have the prospect 
in the near future to become dependent (more than 10 percent of imports or exports 
from a given country) on Turkey, nevertheless, the economic struggle in the Anatolian 
country questions the sustainability of the positive trend.  
In line with the relatively small volume of trade, Turkish investments also 
remained limited in these countries. The share of the region within the onward Turkish 
investment flow has varied between 2.4-5.4 percent within the 2002-2016 period, even 
if the trend is rather positive as in 2016 it reached 5.34 percent compared to the 3.17 in 
2015.  
Turkish companies have rather invested in Romania and Bulgaria at the 
beginning of the period, nevertheless one can see a strong increase in case of Western 
Balkan countries, such as in BiH and more recently in case of Albania and Kosovo. 
Enterprises are usually active in construction, financial and telecommunication sectors.  
Bulgaria is popular among Turkish investors. According to the Sofia Office of 
Commercial Councellor, the number of Turkish companies was 55 in 2017, employing 
more than 10 000 people (Sofya ticaret müşavirliği, 2017, 89) 
 Șișecam has established several factories, mainly in the Turkish inhabited 
region – partially due to Kasim Dal’s lobbying. In 2012, in cooperation with Qatari 
companies, Turkish firms started to construct a highway between Ruse and Svilengrad.  
Turkish investors’ position is the strongest in Albania where they give the third 
in the total investments in the country. The Çalik Holding in partnership with the Türk 
Telekom has bought 76% of the Albtelecom. After gaining ground in the IT sector, 
Çalik Holding acquired BKT bank as well.  
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In Bosnia, Turkey was the fourth biggest investor in 2016. The Ziraat Bankasi 
which entered in the Bosnian market right after the end of the war in 1997, has become 
one of the biggest bank in the country. Turkish Airlines seized 49% of the Bosnian 
national Airlines in 2008. 
In Kosovo, Limak constructed and operates in cooperation with the French 
Aéroport de Lyon the airport of Prishtina. The Bechtel was awarded by the EUR 700 
million highway project. Turkish companies also seized assets in the Telecommuncation 
sector.  
In Serbia, Turkish investors have appeared relatively late. Despite the 
governmental promises, they are rather active in Central Serbia and in Belgrade than in 
the Bosniak inhabited Sandjak. The Halk Bank opened some offices in the country.  
In case of Macedonia, TAV won the tenders for operation of Skopje and Ohrid’s 
airports in 2008. Halk bank has assets in the financial sector. 
In Montenegro, the Torcelik company has invested in the aluminum factory of 
Nikșiç. The Global Ports Holding has bought the majority share of Bar’s harbor in 
2014.  
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 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Albania 0 0 0 2 2 53 162 136 148 17 4 37 37 51 492 
BiH 0 17 24 31 34 44 89 181 240 257 252 343 277 193 197 
Bulgaria 39 41 46 51 52 54 40 92 76 75 84 89 87 119 261 
Croatia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 9 22 168 174 154 166 
Kosovo 0             104 153 
Macedonia 0 1 1 1 0 1 22 25 29 110 125 146 137 103 121 
Montenegro 0      15 15 18 18 0 61 50 51 39 
Serbia 0     1 0 0 0 1 68 19 18 46 76 
Romania 125 120 133 159 162 185 263 253 277 244 114 198 189 57 152 
TOTAL 164 179 204 244 250 338 591 702 798 731 669 1061 969 878 1657 
Table 17. Turkey’s onward FDI (directly from Turkey, sotck, million USD) (Source: Central Bank of Turkey) 
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Important to emphasis, that Turkish businesses usually did not follow the 
politicans’ promises. This is obvious in case of Sandjak region in Serbia, which was 
frequently visited by Turkish president (Abdullah Gül) and Prime Minister (Recep 
Tayyip Erdoǧan) in 2009-2011. Nevertheless, despite their promises to bring Turkish 
investors to the region and the seemingly growing activities of TIKA, no Turkish 
companies have appeared in the region according to the field research done in March 
2012.  
Country Turkish companies 
Albania ENKA, Gintaş, Armada, Metal Yapı, Aldemir, Servomatik, Çalık 
Holding/Türk Telekom, Makro-Tel/Hes Kablo, Istanbul Foundation 
BiH THY 
Bulgaria Şişecam, Alcomet, Nursan Otomotiv Ltd, Techno-Aktaş AD, Sertan 
Bulgaria Ltd, Teklas, Perfektüp, First Dialysis Services Bulgaria EAD, 
Türk Ekonomi Bankası (TEB), Çalık Grubu’na ait BKT (Banka 
Kombetare Tregtare) Türkiye İş Bankası  
Croatia Uzel Grubu, Sembol A.Ş. , Eksen Holding,  
Kosovo Calik, Özerler Holding, Şen Kardeşler Şirketler Grubu, Aksoy Grup, 
Konak İnşaat, Uluova İnşaat, Enka, Limak, FTM Group Kosova 
Macedonia Halk Bank, TAV, Sisecam, Cevahir Holding 
Montenegro Gintaş Şirketler Grubu’na 
Serbia Halkbank 
Romania Credit Europe, Garanti Bankasi, Ülker 
Table 18.  Main Turkish companies in SEE (Source: own research) 
Table 17. Turkey’s onward FDI (directly from Turkey, sotck, million USD) 
 To sum up, Turkey’s economic interests in the Balkans are obvious, however, the 
region importance for the country is rather limited, even if one can see minor increase in 
the recent years. Turkish trade rather goes to bigger and closer EU countries, such as 
Romania and Bulgaria whose share is around 70 percent in the total SEE trade.  
The picture is more complex when one analyses the case of investment. Onward 
Turkish investment also focuses on these two countries, as usually they also give the 
majority of the Turkish FDI, however, the picture is more balanced in favour of Western 
Balkan region, especially in case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, even if Turkish 
investments are not that strong, they are more visible. The airports in Macedonia, 
Kosovo are run by Turkish firms, some highways in Bosnia, Bulgaria and Kosovo were 
constructed by Turks. The Halk bank’s logo ruled the view in the main square of Skopje 
for years.  
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But as a whole, Turkey cannot compete with other, usually EU players, such as 
Germany, Austria, Albania and even Hungary in the majority of these countries. Higher 
share in trade and investment was achieved only in Kosovo and Albania, however, these 
are too small to really challenge the EU’s economic position and importance in these 
countries. Having an unfavourable economic prospect for Turkey, even its current rank 
will be challenged by other partners. Thus, despite the strong Turkish commitment to 
boost its economic influence over the region, this aim was not achieved even if tangible 
gains and truly increasing economic relations can be detected.  
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Conclusion 
 
This piece intended to reveal the internal dynamics of Turkish domestic politics 
by utilising Antonio Gramsci’s theoretical framework about hegemony, reflecting on 
the neo-Gramscianist writings on neo-liberal hegemony and analysing these dynamics’ 
effects on Turkey’s foreign policy in the Balkans. It argued that the AKP under the 
leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was successful in becoming a counter-hegemonic 
actor based on the rising Islamist classes and capital. While it accommodated the neo-
liberal economic policy and embedded Turkey into the neo-liberal, globalising world 
order, it gained enough social legitimacy and power to counter the traditional veto 
players such as the military and top courts, which served as the last bastions of Kemalist 
elites. Later, the AKP also defeated the opponents within the Islamist field, most 
prominently the Gülenist movement and weakened the position of Islamist and 
nationalist parties (such as the Saadet Partisi, MHP or İYİ) by absorbing the majority of 
Islamist and conservative voters into its hegemonic bloc. 
The AKP was successful in creating its own electoral hegemony. This was based 
on several factors, such as a perpetual ability to manage political crises and to set the 
national agenda. It also could benefit from steady economic development and stable 
growth, especially in the first years of power (until 2007). Later, Turkish economic 
performance remained sustainable despite internal difficulties (e.g. the decline in of 
tourism, the devaluation of YTL, the deteriorating business climate, etc.), which did not 
harm its popularity to a great degree. The government’s large-scale infrastructure, 
education and healthcare programmes also convinced the deprived social classes that 
the only viable option for them was to keep the AKP in power.  
After the emergence of the AKP as a governmental party in 2002, scholars did 
not predict a long future based on the party’s Islamic roots and the fate of its 
predecessors – banned regularly by the Constitutional Court and removed from power 
by the army. Although the AKP established a remarkably strong presence in the 
parliament, with only one opposition party (the Republican People’s Party, or CHP), the 
Kemalist elite and especially the TSK were deeply suspicious of the party’s rhetoric, 
along with its domestic and foreign policy endeavours. Past experiences of the shutting 
down of former Islamist parties oriented the AKP leadership to use a more pro-
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European discourse and follow an EU-compliant policy-making strategy. Accompanied 
by remarkable economic growth, this policy ensured electoral victory in the following 
elections. Steady economic growth stabilised the party’s position at home, which was 
rewarded by the start of EU accession negotiations in 2005.  
After tackling the threat imposed by the Kemalist establishment – namely the e-
memorandum in April 2007 and the so-called ‘constitutional coup’ attempt by the chief 
prosecutor and Constitutional Court in 2008 – the AKP continued to increase its 
influence. This process was – at least indirectly – helped by various investigations and 
probes, like the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases. These contributed to weakening the 
opposition forces, as (retired) generals, university presidents, leftist politicians, 
intellectuals and journalists were detained and later sentenced to prison. These affairs 
silenced many of the critics of the government. Moreover, they also influenced the 
relations between the AKP and the army by easing the transformation of the latter’s 
leadership. The next wave of internal fights started at the end of 2013: probes were 
launched by the judiciary, however this time they aimed at targeting pro-government 
circles and this step led to a government crisis. This attempt was reframed as a coup 
attempt by the so-called ‘parallel state’ – the Gülenist movement – and was dealt with 
through the mass dismissal of suspected Gülenists from state institutions and an open 
‘war’ against the movement. This internal struggle culminated in the 15th July coup 
attempt associated with the movement, which ultimately failed and paved the way 
towards even harsher retaliations and the almost complete annihilation of the 
movement.  
The 2010 constitutional referendum also enhanced the growth of AKP’s power 
as it made it more difficult to ban political parties and changed the Constitutional 
Court’s statute. The general elections in June 2011 granted the highest share of votes in 
the party’s history, nearly 50 percent. Although the second half of the third Erdoğan 
government’s term resulted in unprecedented social unrest and corruption scandals, the 
AKP managed to overcome these challenges and even won the local elections in March 
2014. This era culminated in Erdoğan’s victory at the presidential elections in August 
2014. He could save its position after the 2015 June elections when the AKP could not 
seize the simple majority. The snap elections in November secured the party a 
comfortable majority in the TBMM but the Turkish ‘war on terror’ launched in July 
2015 led to the gradual destabilisation of the country, growing insecurity, perpetual 
attacks by PKK/TAK, ISIS and other terrorist groups. Although the coup attempt in 
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2016 did not achieve its goal; the increasing authoritarian tendencies, spreading 
violence and the gradual crackdown on Kurdish political movements with the 
constitutional change opened a new chapter in the modern history of Turkey. 
The AKP was able to win consecutive elections since 2002 which is a unique 
case for the establishment of the Turkish multi-party system in 1950. There was no 
other party or leader that could stay in power for more than fifteen years and survived a 
great number of ‘coup attempts’ from the judiciary to the military ones, as well as defeat 
various internal adversaries, like the Fethullah Gülen movement. The party’s electoral 
success played a key role in maintaining its hegemonic position. It helped the AKP to 
acquire the majority in the parliament, to gain almost two-thirds of the municipalities 
and acquire the presidential post after 2007 (firstly for Abdullah Gül in 2007, later for 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in 2014). Thus, the electoral victories based on 35-50 percent of 
votes provided the opportunity to boost its popularity among vast parts of the society, to 
seize key institutions and control over the state apparatus, create economic and media 
dominance; in summary, to create a hegemonic bloc. 
Its hegemonic project based on Islamist circles combined with neo-liberal 
economic policies was successful. The emergence of the Islamist middle classes can be 
described as a slow process of war, a passive revolution of a counter-hegemonic force 
that intended to occupy the hegemonic position of the Kemalist elite. This process could 
not avoid the perennial coercive forces of the state as Islamist parties (along with others) 
were regularly marginalised since the 1970s. Nonetheless, the AKP as a depositary of 
pro-market economy, religious, conservative groups won the elections in 2002, which 
opened a way a gradual change without violent events – e.g. without a war of 
manoeuvre – that finally resulted in the establishment of cultural hegemony. This can be 
characterised as neo-Ottomanism due to the use of religion and the Ottoman legacy in 
the field of cultural policy. Nevertheless, the AKP’s hegemonic project cannot be 
declared as a finished one in Turkey. The ambiguities of its hegemonic project are 
represented by the struggle between the AKP and the existing – but obviously declining 
– Kemalist elites, leftist groups, and Gülenists. The clashes over power in recent years 
led to the increasing authoritarianism in Turkish domestic politics characterised by one 
politician’s growing power. This politician, Recep Tayyip Erdoǧan has managed to 
transform the country’s political system from a parliamentary to a presidential one and 
to centralise the state in an increasingly authoritarian way. 
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The author described the neo-Ottomanist characteristics of the AKP’s cultural 
policy focusing on the mighty imperial past with strong religions connotations and a 
type of ‘Kulturkampf’ (cultural war) against the Kemalist heritage. Contrary to the 
common belief, the AKP’s foreign policy was less neo-Ottomanist (in terms of 
irredentism, revisionism towards former imperial lands and aggressive spread of Islam) 
because its turn towards its ‘near abroad’ (essentially the post-Ottoman territories) 
stemmed from the neo-liberal turn in the Turkish economy and the need for a more 
autonomous foreign policy in an more and more insecure, multipolar world. The AKP’s 
pro-active foreign policy advocated globalisation, economic opening and boosted the 
image of the country and the self-confidence of an emerging global player. Turkey 
joined the G20 in 2002, was able to start the European Union accession negotiations in 
2005, whereas it launched a new initiative with Spain called the Alliance of 
Civilisations promoting intercultural (inter-civilisational) dialogue. In the same year, it 
was elected to the UN Security Council as a temporary member for 2009-2011, it also 
managed to position itself as one of the main depositaries of human rights for a while 
and one of the leaders of the Muslim countries, and via a fast-growing net of 
institutions, such as the TİKA, YTB and the Yunus Emre Institutes emerged as an 
important actor not just in the former Ottoman territories but in the entire Muslim 
world. 
The government was ready to use foreign policy as a tool for its election 
purposes. At the beginning of the AKP’s era, EU accession was a major goal, thus 
seeking good relations with EU members states appeared on the party’s agenda. After 
2006, when the accession negotiations lost their momentum due to the dead-end of the 
Cyprus issue, the AKP gradually withdrew from emphasising the EU’s role, or even 
started to use a more critical approach stating that the ‘Christian bloc’ has been using 
double standards and had an anti-Turkey or anti-Islam stance. The 2009 municipal 
election campaign coincided with the Davos crisis and the deterioration of Israeli 
diplomatic relations, which boosted the support of Erdoǧan within Turkey and in the 
Arab world as well. The Mavi Marmara flotilla issue was also used by the AKP to 
strengthen its popularity by benefiting from anti-Israeli sentiments before the 2011 
elections.  
Recently, the 2017 referendum also showed the readiness to sacrifice diplomatic 
relations for domestic gains: the Turkish government weathered the conflict with the 
Netherlands by insisting on pursuing rallies on its territory despite the prohibition of the 
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Hague. The AKP implemented sanctions and used belligerent rhetoric against the 
Netherlands after Dutch authorities prevented its ministers Mevlüt Çavușoǧlu and 
Fatma Betül Sayan Kaya from speaking at rallies of the Turkish diaspora. 
The foreign policy discourse, especially under Ahmet Davutoğlu, highly 
reflected on the Ottoman past, values and glory that could be of use for domestic 
political purposes. Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Balkans also gained a new 
context: the good relations with this region, especially the close cooperation with the 
Muslims granted the AKP more popularity in the religious electorate and was also 
convincing at least in a limited manner for the voters who had any Balkan affiliation. 
This Ottoman cause received strong incentives from Bosnia, which was easy to interlink 
with the role of Islam. As the Yugoslav wars revitalised the discourse about identity and 
Islam not just in the Balkans but in the whole world, Necmettin Erbakan’s Islamist 
party, the Refah’s politicians and charity organisations, such as the İHH, closely 
followed the developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina and intended to send aid (which 
however resulted in a corruption scandal). The Bosniaks were described as Muslim 
people of the Ottoman legacy in the Balkans. The writings and ideas of the Bosniak 
leader, Aliya Izetbegović gained momentum in Turkey even during the AKP’s era, and 
soon became a reference point (e.g. new publishing of his writings, or Erdoğan’s good 
personal relations with his son, Bakir Izetbegović). Furthermore, the genocide of 
Srebrenica appeared in Turkish politics and media. Srebrenica has become a lieu de 
mémoire for pious Turkish Muslims, and commemorations are held for every 
anniversary not just in the Balkans but in Turkey as well. 
The Balkans retain a unique place in the neo-Ottoman discourse. As İlber Ortaylı 
pointed out, the Ottoman Empire was also a Balkan Empire and the Ottoman rule had 
greater effects on the region compared to that on the Middle East; subsequently, one 
could argue that the Balkans had a greater reverse impact on the Ottoman Empire and 
later on the history of Turkey. The more Ottomanness is linked to multiculturalism and 
religion, the more the Muslim people of the Balkans gain ground in the AKP’s 
Ottomanism. Moreover, several centuries of Ottoman rule (approximately 550 years in 
Macedonia, 500 years in Bulgaria, some 400 years in Serbia and Bosnia) produced an 
immense ‘constructed heritage’ in the form of bridges, caravanserais, mosques, 
hamams, etc., which are specific mementos of Turkey and its cultural impact. 
From this respect, Balkans is more important for Turkey than Turkey is for the 
Balkans. It has no real hard power leverage, especially after the 2016 coup attempt 
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when the Turkish military was decimated and almost half of the admiralty and brigadier 
levels were dismissed or detained. Despite sending its troops, Turkey’s military 
presence in a rather stable region (compared to the 1990s and early 2000s) can be 
identified as a soft power tool to demonstrate its commitment towards ‘its brethren’ and 
assure the Turkish electorate about the country’s allegiance to its kin. Even if Turkey 
makes gains against the PKK in southeast Turkey and against the PYD in Afrin or 
northern Syria, the above-mentioned internal purges and lack of (experienced) 
commanders weaken the image and the real capabilities of the (omni)potent TSK.  
The AKP’s goal of ensuring good economic relations and boosting trade and 
investment also delineates the limits of Turkish foreign policy. Economic interests have 
a great leverage on Ankara’s approach to the Balkans. The success of these policies are 
linked to the growing statistical figures (e.g. volume and value of trade, investments, 
number of companies), but one can conclude that neither the Balkans plays a crucial 
role for Turkey nor is Turkey a major economic actor for the region after analysing the 
data. Only 5-6 percent of Turkish trade goes to the Balkans (the Western Balkans’ share 
is even less) and it has been declining during the AKP’s era, highlighting that the 
economic importance of the Balkans does not grow as fast as Turkey’s economic 
relations with other regions and countries. If one looks at the other side, similar patterns 
can be outlined. The share of Turkey’s export and import for Balkan countries is also 
small, in every case it is less than 10 percent, and with the exception of some countries, 
like Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Albania, it is decreasing.  
The internal problems and features of the region and Turkey itself explain these 
dynamics. First of all, the Balkan region is so fragmented and divided among small 
states that it is more vulnerable to external political powers but less attractive for 
external investors. Their internal troubles, corruption (their weak performance in 
competitive indexes has already been shown) and market size are the main factors that 
makes Turkish companies’ activities more limited.  
Furthermore, Turkey’s economic performance also has its own limits and affects 
its relations with the region. The years after 2013/2015 have seen more and more 
economic challenges for Turkey, like the devaluation of the Turkish lira despite the 
yearly 4-5% GDP growth led by the construction sector. The economic struggles of the 
country also reduce its potential for investments and trade with southeast Europe. 
Turkish activism in the Balkans, even after Davutoǧlu fell from power, is an 
outcome of the internal economic, social and political changes of the country. Turkey’s 
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main activities in the region did not change after May 2016, the same institutions 
continue their tasks in roughly the same manner. Bosnia and Herzegovina and other 
Balkan countries, like Macedonia or Kosovo, play an important role in Turkish 
domestic politics and for the AKP’s decision makers, especially Erdoǧan. Srebrenica 
has been used as a tool for mobilising the more religious electorate and it is also a tool 
in order to build the feeling of collective belonging among various Muslim 
communities.   
But the power projection of Turkey to Muslim communities has its own limits as 
well. There is a strong difference between the Balkan countries in this respect. In the 
Western Balkans, while the Diyanet supports its kin these Muslim communities rather 
look up to their states and align themselves rather with their respective capitals than 
with Ankara. In these countries Turkey appears as a strong supporter of religious 
communities by providing publishing (translation), aid packages for religious events, 
exchange for students, religious personnel and financial help via various ways, 
especially constructing or renovating mosques. The interference in these communities’ 
internal affairs has remained limited, and the mediation between conflicting factions of 
these communities did not reach a breakthrough (see the case of Serbia). The co-
optation to the AKP’s hegemonic bloc was strengthened by establishing close links 
between various congregations in the Balkan countries and Turkey. These inter-
community relations were boosted by the Diyanet local muftis and the Turkish towns as 
well. By building these bridges, the commitment of Turkey has become more tangible 
and noticeable. However, the Diyanet’s moves are under suspicion, even if the support 
is welcomed. There is a strong difference between the Muslim communities in the 
Balkans and Turkey: in the Balkan countries, they are autonomous, the state does not 
interfere in their affairs (or does not intends to interfere), which in turn has led more 
internal conflicts between their leaderships, while on the other side the Bosporus the 
Diyanet works as a state institution with an appointed (and not an elected) leader, 
meaning its activities are part of state policy.  
Bulgaria and Romania constitute a different group compared to the Western 
Balkans. The majority of their Muslims are Turks. These countries allowed Turkey 
during the 1990s to act as a kin state in the field of religion. Thus Ankara managed to 
gain a strong institutional leverage, especially in education because the imam-hatip 
schools are run by the Diyanet. Furthermore, imams sent from Turkey are also present. 
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The Diyanet mediation in the case of the conflict over the leadership of Chief Muftiate 
was also handled with its help. 
From this perspective, Albania is a special case. After many decades of strong 
anti-religious policies, the country in the early 1990s welcomed the support of various 
Muslim countries and faith-based religious networks. Turkey, and more importantly the 
Gülenist movement, were successful in gaining ground in this context and emerged as a 
partner in (re)building the Islamic education system. It has become not the only one, but 
one the most important actors in this field. 
The co-option of these Muslim communities into the Turkish state is happening 
via governmental and non-governmental actors. The above-mentioned state organs, like 
the Diyanet, the TİKA development agency, the Maarif Vakfı and so on follow the same 
logic in creating leverage and supporting the Ottoman-constructed legacy and Muslim 
communities. Non-governmental actors also participated in these endeavours. The 
various Balkan immigrant communities participate rather indirectly in foreign policy 
making because of their influence for the higher ranks is rather negligible. However, via 
twin town programmes, through electoral tourism and participation as well as political 
campaigns and protests they are able to influence the public opinion and gain leverage 
over the electoral performance of the Turkish parties, especially in Bulgaria where the 
Turkish minority live in greater number.  
The various Islamist charity organisations and faith-based networks are more 
tangibly linked to the state’s endeavours. There projects are often realised in close 
cooperation with Turkish state institutions (TİKA, Diyanet) and through twin town 
projects. Faith-based Islamic networks also contributed to the strengthening of Islam 
education in these countries in line with the principles of Hanafi Islam that the Diyanet 
supports.  
Turkey did not generally change its foreign policy towards the Balkans during 
the AKP era compared to the 1990s. It follows the main principles of seeking security 
and promoting ‘Ottoman Islam’ alongside upholding every aspect of the Ottoman 
heritage. This in practice entails the support of ‘local’ or ‘traditional’ Islam, which is 
different from the new Wahabbi influences of the 1990s and 2000s. Thus, Turkey 
emerged as a historical partner for these communities, even if there are strong domestic 
political considerations behind Ankara’s aid. Nevertheless, despite the growing Turkish 
institutional network, the vast amount of invested money in building soft power 
capabilities, Ankara has acquired a limited number of local allies, even if these 
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countries’ governments usually seek to establish good political and economic relations 
with their emerging middle power neighbour.  
Good relations with the Islamic communities’ leaders, the Turkish political 
parties (except the MRF) and Izetbegović’s SDA and some intellectual circles represent 
the main strongholds of the AKP in the Balkans, which can be used for domestic 
occasions as well. Nonetheless, the Turkish leadership’s gains in secular countries and 
mainly secular communities has marked limits (the best example of which is the 
antipathy towards the AKP among Bulgarian Turks), even if it behaves as a kin state for 
the religious Muslims. Thus Turkey has remained a strong centre of gravity for the 
religious institutions. 
This focus on Ottoman heritage and Islam in foreign relations can cause dissent 
among the Christian population. Due to the different nation-building processes, the 
perceptions about the shared history may be the opposite for these communities, thus 
they do not see Turkish endeavours in too positive a light. This is especially true in 
Bosnia, where the Republika Srpska’s political leadership is more sensitive to Ankara’s 
pro-Bosniak stance. The pro-Muslim discourse of Turkish politicians has led to 
diplomatic conflicts with Serbia or Bosnia (Serbian part) on several occasions; Turkey 
sometimes behaves like an elephant in a china shop by not paying enough attention to 
this sensitivity. While the current hegemonic bloc relies strongly upon this discourse for 
domestic reasons, it is fair to say that there will be no change in the prospective future 
and the probability of diplomatic crises will remain high.  
The Balkan countries have also felt the spill-over effect of the internal troubles 
of Turkey and are involved in the fight over domestic hegemony. The government 
pushes toward weakening or closing down Gülenist institutions and networks abroad. 
This war presented a dilemma for these states in the Balkans. Despite some people’s 
extradition the movement’s organisations have remained intact for the most part. This 
also suggests that Ankara may not be the main reference point for the countries of the 
region. 
Turkey has two main incentives to increase its leverage on the region. First, the 
AKP pushed towards  co-opting its kin through neo-Ottoman cultural policy: 
emphasising the shared heritage, Ottoman legacy, importance of (Hanafi) Islam, etc. 
But only limited segments of the population were supportive, namely some parts of the 
religious circles and the Turkish minority groups. Second, Turkey’s economic 
expansion based on the success of the AKP’s neo-liberal policies was successful in 
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many ways. Nevertheless, its importance in the Balkans has remained limited compared 
to major EU powers, like Germany and Italy, but even Austria and Hungary (in some 
cases). Furthermore, its economic difficulties weaken its opportunity to become a more 
pivotal economic actor in the Balkans.  
 
New achievements of the thesis: 
 
- Conceptualising the scientific literature about Turkish foreign policy and 
identifying the main driving trends. 
- Using a Gramscian and neo-Gramscian approach for Turkey and its foreign 
policy in a detailed and comprehensive manner. 
- Describing the neo-Ottomanist cultural policy as a tool of hegemony making 
in Turkey.  
- Explaining the importance of various Muslim peoples (especially the 
Bosniaks) in (daily) Turkish domestic politics instead of national minority 
groups (Turks in Bulgaria) by identifying the change in the kin policy of 
Turkey. 
- Elaborating and updating the body of knowledge about the relevant Turkish 
foreign policy institutions. 
- Analysing Ankara’s foreign policy in a given region –  in the Balkans, and 
not just in the Western Balkans  – chosen as a case study and identifying its 
main tenets; by doing so, describing the Turkish economic (foreign trade) 
institutions and Ankara’s incentives to strengthen its neo-liberal economic 
transformation. 
- Revealing the main features of economic relations and outlining the 
importance of the region in economic terms to Turkey and vice versa, by 
claiming that despite the strong political emphasis Turkish capital has 
remained rather reluctant to enter the region. 
- Highlighting how Albania and Kosovo are the most dependent on Turkish 
economic relations in the Balkans, and this economic dependence has some 
chance of being converted into certain political advantages. 
- Identifying the importance of non-state groups in shaping Turkish foreign 
policy and perceptions, like the immigrant groups and associations in Turkey 
and their leverage, including the faith-based organisations (especially 
Gülenists) and charity organisations in the region. 
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